


PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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
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PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

James Mikel Williams

This is the first attempt, as far as I know, of an American sociologist to deal with the chief problems of political science. Hitherto they have been left to practical statesmen . . . or to writers of a legalistic bent. Professor Williams attacks some of the fundamentals from the point of view of social psychology; but he does not use that term in the vague way that such writers usually do. He stays as near to the ground as James Madison does in the tenth number of *The Federalist*, and nobody can read his book without learning something important. Those who will disagree most violently can learn the most, if they will.

—Charles A. Beard

This is one of the two or three substantial books that get written in a generation. By this I mean that it not only contains ideas (a score or more of books written in every generation contain ideas) but that it consists of ideas. There is not a paragraph in it without an idea more or less challenging; and all of this intellectual stuff is coherent. It constitutes an argument and arrives at conclusions. It is more, too, than a work of logic. Professor Williams is not only a thoughtful man, he is also an educated man. He knew what his predecessors in the fields of social science thought and wrote before he tried to reconsider the problems upon which they reflected. He knows history, also, and letters. Best of all, his Maker gave him imagination and humor. He is always judicious and sane. His pages abound in abstractions but they are rich also in concrete fact and felicitous phrase. They are not, however, easy reading. They are not written to amuse. They demand attention and alertness.

Professor Williams' thesis is that all of the social sciences make assumptions which, when examined, turn out to be propositions in social psychology. Therefore, he contends, social psychology is the foundation of all social sciences including politics, jurisprudence and economics, and all students who would make contributions to them, or even hope to understand them, must first know their social psychology. The reader presumably will not be mistaken if he infers that the volume is a far-ranging, as it is a profound, introduction to a system of social psychology.

The author's method is straightforward. He never indulges in fine writing and never tries to arrest attention by circuitous approach. . .

On every page . . . the reader finds evidence that Professor Williams has mastered the literature of psychology to date. He knows the expositions and the arguments of the functionalists, the behaviorists and the Freudians, and yet he never talks their jargon. . . He lives up to his declaration that he has "attempted to bring to a focus the human nature basis of the different fields of knowledge" within the scope of social science.

—Franklin H. Giddings, in *Columbia Law Review*

8vo, cloth, 500 pages

NEW YORK: ALFRED · A · KNOOP

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

As Developed in a Study of Economic and Social Conflict

BY

JAMES MICKEL WILLIAMS, B.D., Ph.D.



New York

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO
THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER,
MARY MICKEL WILLIAMS,
MY FIRST TEACHER IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

PREFACE

Social psychology has developed as a branch of psychology, and a branch of sociology. Whether it be regarded as a part of the one science, or of the other, or as a separate science, it has a distinct field, which requires inductive study. In this book I have attempted an analysis of certain psychological processes that extend throughout social organization. These processes, as pointed out by Professor Dewey, have their roots in instincts.¹ In Book I, I have given the shortest possible description of these processes, or dispositions, as I shall call them, and, in the following books, have analyzed their functioning in social organization. I do not cover all social organization, for instance, the press, which is better treated in a study of social suggestion. And I do not treat all social-psychological processes. The limits of one book forbade it. The extended treatment of other processes, for instance, social suggestion, social processes of feeling and thought, conventionality and the functioning of social attitudes, is reserved for other books. The treatment of those processes in this book is subordinate to its main purpose—the analysis of economic and social conflict. This approach to social psychology arouses interest by bringing readers immediately into contact with concrete processes. They thus acquire a background for the more abstract studies which require special treatises. Wherefore, this book may serve as an introduction to the study of the psychological processes of social organization.

This volume covers a field different from that treated in the author's "Foundations of Social Science." It is the first of the projected volumes on social psychology referred to in the preface to that work. The social psychologist should begin with a statement of his problem. The first main problem is the problem of conflict, and it requires an analysis of conflict throughout social organization. In addition to this the processes of feeling and thought that are involved in adjustment, the development of personality subserved, and the processes of social suggestion and control in which that development occurs are successive aspects of the great problem of social behaviour. A study

¹ Dewey, *The Need for Social Psychology*, *Psy. Rev.*, Vol. XXIV, July, 1917, 268.
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of conflicts naturally begins with economic conflicts, that is, with an analysis of the conflict of interests in industrial relations. We shall find that the causes of conflict here lie not only in an inequitable distribution of wealth and irresponsible economic power but in certain psychological conditions that extend throughout the social organization. Our task is to study: (1) the effect of economic conflict throughout social organization; (2) the clash of egoistic dispositions as a cause of conflict; (3) the inevitable conflict between egoistic and idealistic dispositions; (4) the failure of an idealistic leadership to win popular support. Because conflict appears to be essentially a conflict of dispositions our first task is to describe the dispositions involved. Then follow the analyses of conflict.

This is a book for students and for the general reader. There are two things that a reader can get from a book: a knowledge of the subject, and an intellectual attitude that will serve in acquiring a critical knowledge of any subject. To train the latter is as much my aim as to impart the former. Therefore, I have tried to make the book thought-challenging and not merely illuminating, also to give the reader contact with the sources. Citations of works are given, not for the purpose of giving authority to the text, but to assist critical study. Still further to stimulate a critical attitude, often I have avoided generalizations and an explicit statement of principles where analyses implied principles.

If the reader will take the critical attitude he will avoid being repelled by truth because it "seems radical," and confusing it with "propaganda." The data of social psychology have, in a superficial way, long been common property, wherefore the tendency is to manifest a somewhat more intolerant spirit toward new interpretations of them than of data that are revealed only by telescope or microscope and laboratory experiment and are known only to the few.

The social psychologist is concerned not only with prevailing behaviour but with variations, with those unusual aspects which may not be evident from the documentary sources of the social sciences but are apt to be found more or less by chance in field work. Formulas of prevailing motives do not tell the whole truth, for instance, "quest of profits" as a formula of the motives of business enterprise does not. It is used to formulate the prevailing motives of business enterprise under the existing system, and not as an exclusive generalization of the motives of all business men or of the inevitable motives of bus-

iness. The social psychologist is interested not only in prevailing behaviour but also in variations and what becomes of them.

The multiplicity of mental variations as compared with physical, and the increasing rôle of intelligence in social relations complicates the work of the social psychologist. An understanding of the impulses and the habits that determine human behaviour will cause the intelligence to react on those impulses and habits. This will prevent the principles of social psychology having the aspect of fixity of those of natural and biological science. But the project of a science of the motives of men in social relations is not for this reason futile but rather a challenge to intellectual effort.

In the preparation of this book the author has been conscious of many co-workers, as the citations will show. In particular I am indebted to Professor Gertrude Buck of Vassar College for suggestions in connection with the chapter on literary criticism, and, for assistance in the proof reading, to Mr. and Mrs. Kendrick Shedd, Helen M. Bateman of William Smith College, and Willard Judd McKay.

JAMES MICKEL WILLIAMS

Geneva, N. Y., February 21, 1922.

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BOOK I

ESSENTIAL TENDENCIES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

CHAPTER I

DISPOSITION, IMPULSE AND HABIT

SOCIAL psychology may be defined as the science of the motives of people living in social relations. As such it is one of the sciences of society, society being a general term for mankind living in social relations. And it deals with only one of the aspects of social relations, namely, the motives of human beings in those relations. Other social sciences deal with other aspects. Political science is the science of the relations of people organized as a state. Jurisprudence is the science of social relations in their fundamental legal aspects. Economics is the science of the relations of people organized for the pursuit of their material welfare. These sciences deal primarily with social relations that have become customary. The field of each includes a distinct, complex group of these relations, termed institutions. Thus we speak of political institutions, economic institutions. Social psychology deals with the motives of the individuals who participate in these institutional relations.¹

The social relations of any group are determined, in the last analysis, by the motives of its individual members. These result from inherited traits that become adapted to life in the group in accordance with group attitudes and ideas. In the development of the child the instinctive tendencies soon lose their original form but persist in behaviour in a form modified by the group attitudes and ideas. The human behaviour with which the social psychologist has to do is due to the action of complexes of instinctive tendencies more or less modified by experience.² Essential among these modified instinctive processes are the dispositions.³ They have a modifiable and a permanent aspect.

¹ The author has explained the relations of social psychology to the other social sciences in his *Foundations of Social Science*.

² Psychologists are so at variance in their analyses of instinctive behaviour that the social psychologist must cautiously use the word instinct.

³ For variously worded conceptions of the instinctive aspect of these processes see Thorndike, The Original Nature of Man, 5f.; Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 3f.; Wallas, The Great Society, 22f.; Paton, Human Behaviour, Ch. VIII. The word disposition is by some authors used for the instinctive aspect alone, by others for the modified process.

The disposition gives a characteristic trend to behaviour so that we speak of a person as having an aggressive disposition, or a domineering disposition, or an acquisitive or close disposition, or a sympathetic disposition. The same person may have more than one disposition pronounced. We are here concerned not with the anatomy of the dispositions, which belongs in a treatise on personality, but with their functioning in social relations; wherefore the description of them in this and the succeeding chapters of Book I is designed to prepare for the analysis, in the succeeding books, of their functioning in social organization.

The dispositions are not only processes of human behaviour but also social-psychological elements. For the dispositions of the members of a group develop ways of joint acting that vary from the customary ways. Furthermore, in their social relations people are constantly studying each other's dispositions in order to know how to "handle" each other. So do parents study children. So do business managers study subordinates and foremen study workmen, and workmen their superiors. So do business men study customers. For instance, we are told that in collecting over-due bills collectors must appeal to essential dispositions of debtors, to their desire to make money, their pride.⁴ Out of the dispositions of business men has developed the industrial and financial organization through which they co-operate in satisfying those dispositions. But the dispositions are apt not to be so clearly conscious as the ways of acting that have developed for their satisfaction. And many business men have to be appealed to to follow those ways of acting by skilfully suggesting to them how those ways are in line with the essential dispositions of which men seek satisfaction in business. Owing to the dimly conscious nature of the processes involved, "indirect suggestion may be more effective than open discussion."⁵

The dispositions are subject to the inborn tendency of human nature to avoid annoyance and seek satisfaction. The capacity of a disposition to enjoy satisfaction at any particular time depends on its readiness for satisfaction at that time. This readiness shows itself in action for satisfaction. If the disposition is brought into action when not in readiness, or if, when ready, there are no means of satisfaction, annoyance ensues.⁶ Dispositions in readiness persist in seek-

⁴ Gardner, *New Collection Methods*, 127.

⁵ *Ibid.* 127.

⁶ Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, 125-131.

ing satisfaction until satisfied; if they are balked, the annoyance is diffused through the connections, causing the reactions that are characteristic of a balked impulse.⁷

In addition to the tendency to seek satisfaction and avoid annoyance, there is another, namely, the tendency of dispositions when satisfied to be strengthened and to develop a variety of habits and attitudes. The behaviour of a social group in its outward aspects is constituted largely of these joint habits and social attitudes organized around fundamental tendencies. This customary behaviour persists, owing not only to "the force of habit" but also to the satisfaction thereby afforded dispositions involved.⁸ We are apt to overlook this cause of the persistence of customary behaviour and to observe only the more obvious force of habit. But when force of habit is particularly strong, it is due to the fact that the action is satisfying. Action according to habit satisfies the impulse to leave one's peace of mind undisturbed, and the particular action may satisfy some other impulse. For instance, in the efforts put forth by the United States government during the World War to induce people to economize, it was found very difficult to change food habits when this involved substituting a poorer food for the luxury to which people had become accustomed. Note also the persistence of the customs surrounding the satisfaction of the sexual disposition. These have persisted because eminently satisfying to the man, who has exercised the social control.

As long as the primal instincts are fairly well satisfied, among people who are unconscious of others social behaviour tends to be extremely conventional. While there is always a tendency to the breaking up of habits and the formation of new ones,⁹ habit exercises a retarding effect on impulses for a more satisfying adaptation. "The habits, like the instincts, are safe and serviceable. They have been tried, and they are associated with a feeling of security. There consequently grows up in the folk-mind a determined resistance to change. And there is a degree of sense in this, for while change implies possibilities of improvement it also implies danger of disaster, or a worse condition. It must also be acknowledged that a state of rapid and constant change implies loss of settled habits and disorganization. As a result, all societies view change with suspicion, and the attempt

⁷ See Book VIII.

⁸ Keller, *Societal Evolution*, 103.

⁹ *Ibid.* 249-251.

to revise certain habits is even viewed as immorality."¹⁰

This tendency to conservatism is apt to be weaker in the future than it has been in the past. The increasing intimacy of association and communication, the facilities for cheap printing,¹¹ the spread of education will more easily unsettle habits. Isolation, the great buttress of conventionality,¹² is coming to be a thing of the past. There is little stimulus to change where a group is isolated. The attention of the members is exclusively on each other, so that one who differs excites a social irritability and an impulse to compel outward conformity, at least, to the beliefs and customs of the group.¹³ But no group, not even a sovereign nation, can any longer remain isolated, and the differing minds which cannot find support in their own nation may find it in another.

Another condition that tends to weaken conservatism is the increasing tendency to migration all over the world. This frees men and women from the restraints of home, subjects the mind to a flood of new impressions, and requires adaptation to new ways of doing. As college students like the freedom of college life, as men like the freedom of the club or life on the frontier, so immigrants, particularly the young, like the freedom of a new country. While remaining in the family they may profess the beliefs of their parents, but are apt to discard even the appearance of assent after passing from under the parental restraint.¹⁴

Another condition that tends to weaken conservatism is the increasing influence of young men as compared with old. The intensity of life calls for comparatively young men for the difficult positions. Furthermore, the tyrannical control of old men that we see in primitive and barbarian tribes was due to the religious significance of age, which has now passed away, and to their being the repositories of the traditions of the group, which are now written in books.¹⁵ There is a poise and power of judgment that comes only with maturity, but this does not mean old age. It means the period in which a man is at the

¹⁰ Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, 21.

¹¹ Lea, *The Eye of the Reformation*, in Ward, Prothero, Leathes (editors), *The Cambridge Modern History*, I: 684-685.

¹² Semple, *The Influence of Geographic Environment on the Lower St. Lawrence*, *Amer. Geog. Soc. Bulletin* XXXVI: 465; Shotwell, *The Religious Revolution of Today*, 17-18; Williams, *An American Town*, 72-78.

¹³ Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, 103; Williams, *op. cit.*, 30, 46-50.

¹⁴ Hupka, *Über die Entwicklung der westgalizischen Dorfzustände*, 190-193.

¹⁵ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 10-15, 421; Simkhowitsch, *Die Feldegemeinschaft in Russland*, 364.

height of his intellectual powers, as compared with old age when the intellect has lost its flexibility and become set in the ways of thinking of the past. The increasing intensity of competition does not permit this type of intellect to maintain its control. Where it still is in control it is an obstacle to efficiency and progress and is subjected to increasing criticism, as in the case of judges whose conservatism has been increased by age and who exert a repressive influence over progressive tendencies in legislation.

Probably the essential cause of the tendency to decreasing conservatism is the increasing intensity of the clash of group interests. This was once the sole cause of change and it has continued essential to the present day.¹⁶ International rivalry and conflict produce far-reaching changes in the beliefs and attitudes of nations that prove to be inferior,¹⁷ but the superior may have their conventionality confirmed by their demonstration of superiority, which, however, means decadence and a rôle of inferiority in the next clash. Class rivalry and conflict also produce great changes in the beliefs and attitudes of an inferior class, as has the increasing struggle between capital and labour in the beliefs and attitudes of organized labour, while the superior class may have its conventionality confirmed by its superiority, as have reactionary capitalistic interests.

Owing to the above mentioned causes of decreasing conventionality, even the most sacred beliefs are now challenged and critically examined. Certain beliefs long withstood criticism because of the instinctive aversion to discussing them, particularly beliefs concerning sexual relations and property. But the rivalry of women with men for opportunities for self-realization finally became so intense as to force discussion even of beliefs regulating sexual relations. And the rivalry of economic classes has forced discussion of beliefs as to property.

In spite of its tendency to decreasing fixity, conventionality persists. What are the essential causes of this? One of these is the weakness of the intellectual disposition and the consequent tendency to be annoyed by any suggestion of a change of habits and any criticism of beliefs. This tendency to mental inertia is accentuated by superstitions and religious beliefs that sanction custom. Violation of custom arises with new conditions which cause changes in behaviour in order to satisfy strong impulses; changes in behaviour are indulged in and at

¹⁶ Teggart, *The Processes of History*, 151.

¹⁷ Hearn, *Japan*, 411; Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, 317-318.

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the same time the contrary moral ideas continue to be professed, especially when supported by religious sanction. The sanction is sufficient to restrain uncouth behaviour except in the face of strong contrary impulses. When, in obedience to these, new ideas appear to be coming to prevail in spite of the religious opposition, ecclesiastics, in order to maintain their control, alter the interpretations of beliefs and sanctions in accordance with the new habits of the people. Thus the old formulas remain with a constantly changing meaning, and in this way the ecclesiastical organizations are able to exert no inconsiderable influence for conventionality. A progressive element in some ecclesiastical organizations is now aiming to make religion no longer a largely conservative force but a positive influence that will alter habits in line with an ideal of social progress.¹⁸

Changes in habits and beliefs tend to be most pronounced along the lines of the strongest impulses because annoyance there is keenest. When it is a question of a change that is not directly in line with a strong impulse, though it may be much more important and far-reaching for human welfare than one that is, if it requires intelligence to comprehend, conventionality is apt to persist. The masses lack the intelligence to recognize a leadership that aims to alter conditions and institutions in a way to achieve for the masses a progressive satisfaction. This lack of intelligence is due to mediocre mentality, to deficiencies in public education, and to conditions that dull the sensitivity of the common man,—as the intensity and monotony of the work of the masses. In addition to these deficiencies there are too few sensitive and capable leaders in close touch with the masses and interested in their welfare.

Monotonous work always has been one great cause of conventional behaviour, and, as such, it has by no means ceased with the development of machine industry. Work is monotonous when it does not enlist the impulses that facilitate work. The behaviour of workmen doing such work lacks enthusiasm.¹⁹ They are listless and indifferent and act mechanically because the work in itself has no interest for them. It is simply the means of earning pay. Very much of factory labour is of this kind. “A job analysis which covered the work of over eighteen thousand people showed that seventy-six per cent. of the jobs required no particular previous experience or training. . . . This is typical of the modern industrial development in the division of

¹⁸ See Chapter XXI.

¹⁹ Hobson, *Work and Wealth*, 87.

labor. . . . Many jobs are dull and monotonous. . . . They fail to engage the worker's entire mind and they do not stimulate his imagination."²⁰ This is true not only of mechanical but also of administrative work in industry. The young college man who, intellectually in earnest and alert, goes into a factory position is apt to find that the co-operation he is enjoined to practise by the management means not perfectly free discussion of the problems of the business that arise, as between equals, but his acceptance of his place in a mechanism of authority and subordination. As he says, "I tell you it is hard for a young man to keep his ideals in business." He means that the mechanism in which he finds himself dries up the intellectual impulses and leaves him with but one desire, that of making, through the monotony and grind of the day's work, "all he can get." His aim is to get the means with which to satisfy non-intellectual impulses at the close of the day's work, when he is too weary any longer to feel the intellectual. The same is true in education, which, of all callings, should be least influenced by the desire for money. Many teachers lack a vital interest in their work and are uninteresting as teachers because their work does not enlist their intellectual impulses. What they must teach is uninteresting to them and to the pupils and is learned by rote; so they teach perfunctorily. Whatever intellectual earnestness and sympathy they may have started with has dried up as they realize that their one motive has become the desire for "the money there is in it."

The monotony of much of the work of the world has caused upper classes to believe that anything that appealed to strong impulses of subordinated classes, even to their higher impulses, was undesirable because it might unsettle their working habits and make them discontented. Consequently wherever we find an exclusive attitude of upper classes, we encounter a prejudice against the education of the lower—a prejudice conspicuous in nations like Austria,²¹ and Russia²² until the revolution, and found in all nations, including the United States.²³ One result of the subjection of lower classes to the control of upper is their acceptance of this verdict against their aspirations for higher education. As one working mother said to her boy who aspired to a college education, "What right has a boy like you to think of a college

²⁰ Link, *Employment Psychology*, 182-183.

²¹ Hupka, *Über die Entwicklung der westgalizischen Dorfzustände*, 435.

²² Lanin, *Russian Characteristics*, 21.

²³ Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow*, 313-315.

education?" The workingman who aspires to a fuller knowledge and self-development is told he has no right to expect it, for education would make him discontented with his lot and, therefore, would be unwise. This objection may be convincingly answered by an intelligent person;²⁴ it originates in a dominating and contemptuous attitude to lower classes and is not a result of an intelligent consideration of economic conditions. One of the causes of "the force of habit" in mankind is, therefore, the necessary monotony of much work and the unnecessary monotony of much more because of the tendency of those in authority to distrust and repress free mental action in education and in work.

The strength of habit among mankind can be understood only when we consider that an occasional blind struggle to avoid annoyance, rather than the continued action of intelligent impulses for a larger total satisfaction, has been the essential impulsive movement in human nature up to the present time. Habitual submission to oppressive control has ceased only when the annoyances suffered became too keen to endure. This condition confirmed the force of habit throughout the course of social evolution. With the rise of pastoral and agricultural industry and the extension of slavery,²⁵ the chiefs and other men of strength and initiative among a conquered people—those whose personal force would have made for change and progress,²⁶—were killed in the process of enslaving them,²⁷ and the rest were reduced to a conventionalized mass. For slaves and serfs, down to modern times, everything was determined by custom. The passing of slavery and serfdom was due to changed conditions which made slaves and serfs more difficult to control and made free labour more convenient, certain and profitable for landowners than unfree.²⁸ But the free peasants continued subject to the control of the landlords,²⁹ and the working masses in the towns, recruited from similar classes in the country, came under the control of employers and continued conventional. From that day to this the workman has started in life with an insignificant education or none at all, and the blind struggle to avoid annoyance, rather than intelligent impulses for satisfaction, has been the essential human process. Fear

²⁴ Link, *Employment Psychology*, 385-386.

²⁵ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I: 563.

²⁶ Webster, *Primitive Individual Ascendancy*, Pub. Amer. Sociol. Soc., XII: 50-58.

²⁷ Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 40-41.

²⁸ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I: 701-704.

²⁹ Hammond, *The Village Labourer*, Chs. V-XII; Hupka, *Über die Entwicklung der westgalizischen Dorfzustände*, 191-193, 375-383, 329-331.

and the narrow range of satisfactions confirm the tendency to react according to habit. Balked impulses provoke resentment in youth but eventually weaken from disuse. This disuse of dispositions which might otherwise have functioned for increased efficiency has continued through the centuries. The result is the pronounced tendency to react according to habit which characterizes the human nature of today.

The conventional character of the working masses is, however, less pronounced than formerly because the mass of workmen now work in intimate association and take their recreation in intimate association. Where workmen continue to work alone, as farm workmen, they continue comparatively irresponsive to social suggestion.³⁰ But where they work in close association, as most workmen do, the beliefs and casual remarks of the more forceful influence the others, and there is more or less stimulus to mental activity. And where workmen take their recreation alone, or have none except in their families, as rural workmen, they are not subject to the suggestions that play on the workmen of a great city. The mass of workmen have become city dwellers instead of countrymen, as formerly, and the result is a weakening of the tendency to react according to habit.

Another reason why the conventional character of the working masses is less pronounced is that the tendency of human nature to free action for new satisfactions and the enlargement of life is encouraged by the new social conditions. This tendency manifests itself subconsciously and is less obvious than either the unusual, conscious and more violent movements to avoid annoyances, or the usual tendency to conform to the habitual behaviour of associates and acquiesce in the prevailing social control. Thus, in the labour movement, the impulse for self-realization has been subconscious and the clearly conscious impulse has been the impulse to resist arbitrary and annoying domination and exploitation that resulted in needy and miserable living conditions. But whenever the conditions of the masses were improved to the point where misery was relieved, then the tendency asserted itself to improve living conditions indefinitely. But this tendency has been more impulsive than intelligent. Workmen are apt to seek increases in wages—the material means of self-realization—more from the rivalrous impulse to get as high wages as other workmen are receiving, or to support as high a standard of living as that of other workmen's families, than from a carefully analyzed conception of the wage and standard of living necessary for

³⁰ Gillette, *Constructive Rural Sociology*, 68.

the self-realization of the family. But in some cases where controversies have passed under government surveillance, there is an effort to determine what wage and conditions of labour constitute a self-realization standard for the workers. And progressive labour leaders demand, on behalf of the working masses, opportunities for their self-development as men.³¹

Again, in the woman's movement, the clearly conscious impulse has been the impulse to resist all the annoying forms of masculine domination. It is said that the beginning of the movement for emancipation among Japanese women sprang from an impulsive resistance against masculine domination led by a number of spirited young women who dramatically asserted their right to act, in certain particulars, just as men acted,—with as much freedom and disregard of decent public opinion. This impulsive action, it is said, injured the cause of female emancipation in Japan. The movement requires, it is said, a theory of the relation between the sexes that is necessary for social self-realization.³² The movement for the emancipation of woman in the United States was originally prompted by the impulse of women to attain equal rights with men. The movement sprang from resistance of masculine domination, impatience with a position of inferiority and an impulse for equality of opportunity with men in business and the professions.³³ Along with this conscious resistance of annoying conditions there was a subconscious feeling after a freer satisfaction of higher impulses than is usually realized in relations between the sexes.

Unrest will not cease with the amelioration of annoying conditions because the satisfaction of the most insistent impulses sets free others and gives the individual a conscious experience, for the first time, of the tendency to free action in the development of personality. This tendency asserts itself with every encouragement given by a progressive leadership, and this leadership is increasing in numbers and influence both in industry and politics and the professions and the church and education. A progressive social condition is one that reasonably satisfies this tendency, as distinguished from a reactionary period that is characterized by oppression and habitual subservience that inevitably results in social annoyance and resistance.

³¹ Smillie, *The England the Workers Want—When—How?* in Gleason, *What the Workers Want*, 215-221.

³² This was the opinion of Professor Yoshimoto of Osaka College, in conversation with the author.

³³ See the chapter entitled, *The Conflict between the Sexes*.

Thus we assume at the outset the conceptions of social order and social conflict.³⁴ By order I mean not a mere static condition but the progressive condition referred to in the preceding paragraph. It requires intimacy and discussion and an increased play of the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions. Conflict is due to the persistence of beliefs and processes expressive of egoistic dispositions, for instance, family egoism³⁵ and individualistic rivalry in industry³⁶ and politics.³⁷ A progressive social condition requires a leadership that is trained to react to conceptions of social progress and is not merely representative of egoistic families and of party and class interests. Egoistic leaders may induce fear and submission and so enforce order for the time being. But domination is productive of conflict rather than order because fear and submission eventually result in a reaction of suppressed impulses toward a better ordered personal and social life. Rivalry, also, conduces to conflict. The rivalrous disposition makes men dissatisfied with their social position and ambitious for a higher one, and a period of rivalry may thus be a prelude to a better social order; but this never would be attained without a sympathetic and intellectual leadership. Mere rivalry begets an irrational restlessness that calls for rational guidance and rational leaders always find themselves in conflict both with the dominating, reactionary type, and with the demagogic type that appeals to restlessness without any of that sense of responsibility and those convictions that are derived from a carefully reasoned conception of a rational social order.

Because of the lack of a sufficient number of sympathetic and intelligent people to act as leaders conflict is an inevitable phenomenon in groups of all kinds—family, industrial, political, professional, ecclesiastical, and educational groups. Conflict leads to efforts for adjustment, and the result is compromise for the time being. Compromise permits of the satisfaction of some impulses but requires the suppression of others; and conditions may at any time change in a way to give the suppressed impulses added strength and precipitate another con-

³⁴ Conceptions of conflict and order are fundamental in economics, as well as in social psychology. Wants are essentially conflicting so that it is always a question of choosing one line of conduct and avoiding another (Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 59-60); and production is necessarily uncertain and order requires that individualistic impulse give way to rational co-ordination of production as far as possible. But uncertainty, individualistic effort and conflict will persist. (Ibid. Chs. XI-XII.)

³⁵ See Chapter XX.

³⁶ See Book II.

³⁷ See Book III.

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flict. Social conflict as thus conceived may seem an inexplicable maze of social situations that defy analysis, but running through all are certain psychological processes which it is our main purpose to explain.

CHAPTER II

RIVALRY

THE social psychologist is interested in motives from the point of view of their functioning in social relations. From the viewpoint of function certain dispositions play a predominant part in social behaviour and these only will be described in these introductory chapters. From the viewpoint of social relations, an essential distinction is between dispositions that are satisfied regardless of the satisfaction of other people and those that are satisfied only by satisfying others.¹ In the latter case satisfaction is directly a result of the satisfaction of others; the disposition is annoyed if others are not satisfied and happy. In the former case satisfaction occurs regardless of the satisfaction of others. For instance, the acquisitive disposition is satisfied by acquiring things though others go without. The rivalrous disposition is satisfied by the superiority of self and the inferiority of others, though the inferiority of others is a source of unhappiness to them. The dominating disposition is satisfied by the submission of another, though submission may annoy the other. The behaviour of an egoistic disposition may conceivably satisfy the individual acted upon, as well as the acting individual, but the satisfaction of the individual acted upon is incidental, whereas it is necessary to the satisfaction of an altruistic disposition. In addition to dispositions that are obviously egoistic or altruistic there are those that are neither, as the resistful disposition, the social significance of which depends on its connections. The egoistic and altruistic dispositions are modified by their connections, wherefore no disposition can be called bad in itself but only from the point of view of its effect on personality and social relations. But this depends on its intrinsic nature as well as on its connections, wherefore the distinction above made is justified.

Essential among the egoistic dispositions is rivalry. Rivalry is the disposition to show superiority. The satisfaction of the rivalrous

¹ The altruistic instincts are as essential elements of human nature as the egoistic. (Perry, *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, 77.)

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disposition varies all the way from the thrill of power enjoyed by the conspicuously successful person whom the public admires and is eager to see to the subconscious, self-satisfied feeling that characterizes families of an upper class which have long occupied a position of social superiority. In addition to the newness of the position of superiority another condition of an intensely conscious thrill is the social standing of the rival, superiority over whom has been demonstrated. Men feel only contempt for weak rivals; they feel an intense desire to prove superiority over those who appear comparatively equal; while to those far above them they feel admiration for their superiority but no impulse to rival them.

Still another condition of an intensely conscious thrill is the extent of the social admiration of the superior person. The more extraordinary the superiority, the more apt it is to be noticed beyond the community, to be referred to in the press, and the superior person is thrilled not only by the praise of friends and neighbours but also by the recognition of the larger public. People of every class use the newspapers and magazines as a means of advertising anything in connection with themselves that will give the desired thrill. The power of the press rests in part on this rivalrous disposition of human nature. The press can make a man appear inferior, as well as superior; hence the impulse of rivalrous people to avoid expressing any idea or doing anything, however true or necessary for social progress it may be, that might create an unfavourable impression. The increasing intimacy of modern life and particularly the development of the newspaper has made possible a wider social admiration or contempt and, therefore, a more intense satisfaction or annoyance of the rivalrous disposition than ever before.

The rivalrous disposition prompts one to want to do whatever another does that wins praise. Children are jealous of others who win attention and praise, and many adults are children in this respect. Anything acquired by a member of a certain class which wins favourable attention causes restlessness among other members of the class until all have it. Commercial interests pitilessly exploit this tendency of human nature by multiplying goods, possession of which will win favourable attention, whether they are of any other value or not. The commercial interests themselves are subject to the same disquieting effect of rivalry. For instance, a business man is quite satisfied with the price he gets for a commodity until he hears another is getting a higher price, then he becomes dissatis-

fied. These rivalrous impulses are most pronounced toward those to whom one has an attitude of rivalry. Among children they are at first felt indiscriminately, but as they grow up, "this attitude is assumed only toward those with whom they are frequently in conflict. By the fifth year children (boys especially) are very keen in noting any favours extended to their competitors."² Men and women likewise develop rivalrous attitudes to certain ones with whom they are associated, but the rivalrous disposition is by no means limited to those who are recognized as competitors.

In persons of a strong rivalrous disposition its action is not dependent on external stimuli, but shows itself in an ambition to accomplish something noticeable or extraordinary. Doubtless this has been the predominant motive in achievement. Rivalry brings out latent capacities of men and women, stimulates productive effort, discovery, invention, the projection and completion of great enterprises, advancement in art, science and letters, and brings the most capable leaders to the front. But it is never, in any of these particulars, the sole disposition involved. It is tempered and directed by others, equally necessary, which are popularly undervalued because their part is more obscure. Inordinate rivalry may suppress instead of bring out the latent capacities of men and women. It may interfere with the methodical work that is essential in productive effort, and with the free play of the intellect in discovery and invention and the advancement of art, science and letters. The leaders it brings to the front may not be the most capable; they are not if they are more intent on proving their own superiority than on disinterested service. Achievements that glorify the individual may mean little for social progress. The material and economic structures reared by superior organizers of men, money and materials are at first shaped to satisfy the rivalrous impulses of those men and are but slowly subjected to public purposes. Because achievements represent conspicuous success, and because the public is spellbound by material success, the real significance of achievements, their value for widespread development of personality is not generally considered. They are merely means to an end—the development of personality and of progressive social relationships—; wherefore, we must avoid the prejudice in favour of the rivalrous disposition that has developed because of our predilection for mere achievements.

² O'Shea, *Social Development and Education*, 174.

Unregulated by a rational social purpose, the tendency of rivalry is to make social behaviour extreme and ill adapted to requirements for social welfare. Rivalry may impel to the seeking of superiority in any line that has become a pronounced activity ³—in acquisition of wealth, in religious submission and humility, in sympathy and philanthropy. The action of any disposition may, therefore, be intensified and given an egoistic turn by associating it with rivalry. A rivalrous person wants to be more loved than the other members of the family; wants to be more popular than others in the community because of social qualities or philanthropy; wants to be considered the best singer or conversationalist in the exclusive circle. Thus rivalry may make even a person of pronounced sympathetic or esthetic tastes at bottom an egoist. It may be the determining disposition not only in economic and political relations but even in those more intimate and personal relations that are the natural channels for the satisfaction of the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions.

Rivalry is, however, most apt to be pronounced in connection with other egoistic dispositions. Because of the prominence in human behaviour of the acquisitive disposition, the rivalrous disposition especially seeks wealth, or position that is associated with wealth, but with behaviour different from that of the acquisitive disposition. Rivalrous behaviour is imaginative, impatient of conventional beliefs and practices that interfere with its satisfaction, impatient of regular manual work and other activities that require concentration of attention on small points; it is apt to be extravagant instead of thrifty and frugal.

While rivalry is generally for things that satisfy other impulses also, the disposition itself is immediately satisfied not by things but by social recognition of superiority. Wherefore, the rivalrous disposition seeks what will win recognition whether it has any other value or not. What is sought is the form or token of superiority that will win social acknowledgment. The standards of superiority are, therefore, set by the group and must be unquestioningly, not intelligently, accepted.⁴ The entire process is impulsive, though great shrewdness and cleverness may be stimulated in the course of the rivalry. The social acknowledgment of superiority that is sought is an egoistic gratification. The admiration felt by others may satisfy their impulse to admire; but admiration is not sought by the

³ Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, 98-100.

⁴ Watkins, *Welfare as an Economic Quantity*, 17.

rivalrous person in order to satisfy others but in order to satisfy his own rivalrous disposition. The superior person finds the acknowledgment of a defeated rival especially satisfying. He is indifferent to the annoyance occasioned by the defeat. This disposition, is, therefore, contrary to the sympathetic disposition, which is moved to relieve annoyances suffered by others.

Human nature as we find it is an apparently inexplicable maze of conflicting dispositions, so that it is difficult or impossible to determine, in a particular case, whether conduct is egoistic or altruistic. An egoistic may be subordinate to an altruistic ultimate motive, or an altruistic to an egoistic, so that the essential problem, in a particular case, always is: What is the ultimate motive. For instance, a mother, when reproached for indulging a child in a way that encourages it to form a bad habit, will sometimes retort, "I know it, but it is so annoying to have him teasing and acting so." Her ultimate motive is the egoistic impulse to avoid annoyance, wherefore she yields to the impulse to satisfy the child. Conversely an egoistic impulse may serve an altruistic purpose. The essential cleavage in human motives referred to at the beginning of the chapter, between motives that seek satisfaction of self and those that seek satisfaction of others, means, therefore, ultimate motives. Man is a conscious being and is more or less conscious of a complex of motives, and is capable of duplicity as well as sincerity in his self-knowledge. For the sincere man the essential cleavage in his nature is between the disposition ultimately to seek not so much the satisfaction of others for the moment as their satisfaction in the long run—their welfare—and the disposition ultimately to think of himself.

A sense of superiority and achievement has a marked effect on those in whom the rivalrous disposition is pronounced. Success eases the impulse for superiority and gives a serenity and complacency. Unrelieved by sympathetic and intellectual impulses, the expression may become the impassive calm of one who feels so far superior as to be indifferent to the pretensions of others. Or superiority may result in the smug, self-satisfied air of the successful but still busy person. If the falling in abeyance of the satisfied rivalrous disposition allows others to become active, superiority may result in "the graciousness of conscious power," or in a dilettante intellectual interest. But sense of superiority is seldom absolute and undisturbed. Men of a pronounced rivalrous disposition are not satisfied unless superiority is constantly recognized. Hence the disposition to dis-

play evidences of it. Furthermore, the superior are solicitous for their position and suspicious of manifestations among the inferior that suggest a desire to excel, wherefore they have an impulse to display their insignia. Finally, no superiority is so great but that a greater may be achieved. Success in gaining wealth superiority allows the attention to swing to other emblems—position on an academic board, an honorary academic degree, political position, a high place in the civic activities of the city, reputation as an extensive traveller. On account of the range of possible lines of superiority, a man is never so great but that he might become a little greater. There is a limit, however, even to the most inordinate ambition, and marked success in any one line generally gives a sense of superiority that noticeably affects the attitudes and ideas.

A deep-seated sense of inferiority likewise profoundly affects the inner life of man. The inferiority complex, because it, rather than the superiority complex, characterizes the vast majority of people in whom the rivalrous disposition is pronounced, is, perhaps, more interesting than the superiority complex. Among the processes are, first, the disposition vigorously to assert superiority. Display here differs from that of him who has won superiority in that it shows the effort of the climber. Those who most insistently emphasize their evidences of superiority, who talk of their family, their possessions, their travels, who emphasize the superior correctness of their speech, thereby betray their inferiority. For, as we have seen, the superior person knows he is superior, and assumes that anybody would recognize it if he took the trouble to display it. The climbers who vigorously assert their superiority often impress others with their evidences of it and win popular recognition, but usually fail to win the assent of the rivals they are most eager to convince. The assertion of superiority results in cheap imitations of evidences of solid superiority, for instance, in veneered furniture and other cheap imitations of material things, in the superficial knowledge of literary and scientific ideas that may be gleaned from popular magazines, in the imitation of the ideas and attitudes and luxurious tastes of the wealthy. Assertion of superiority prompts also to an association with the wealthy and distinguished as closely as flattery can bring it about. Or it prompts to the bringing forward of other evidences of superiority than those socially recognized and the assertion of the superiority of these over the social evidences.

Another process of the inferiority complex is admiration for the

superior, without impulse to excel, which is the reaction toward those greatly superior. It is characteristic also of one in whom the rivalrous disposition is not pronounced as compared with other dispositions of his personality. In a timid person or a fearful class, admiration becomes servility. The inferior exaggerate their inferiority and the superiority of the superior in order to please the latter. Between this class and the vigorously self-assertive above mentioned come the great mass of people who, while not obtrusively seeking superiority, seek to avoid conspicuous inferiority. Distinct from these three classes is the critically intellectual individual who inhibits both rivalrous and servile impulses through absorption in his ideal of an all round development of personality.

For several reasons rivalry makes for conflict. First, rivalry, as an ultimate motive, tends to cause conflict because it does not recognize the annoyances of others. Second, the rivalrous disposition never is satisfied—there always is somebody a little more wealthy or a little more clever—or is satisfied only for the moment until some rival has forged ahead and the struggle must be begun anew. The business man is satisfied with his profits only until he hears that some other business man is making more. Families are satisfied with their standard of living only until some family in their class has a new toy. Third, the tendency of rivalry is to maintain secrecy. A rival seeks to conceal from another his intent and his means of making himself superior to the other. Rivalry in athletics encourages "secret practice." Business rivalry fosters secrecy, and men who insist that business must not be a rivalry between profit-seekers but must be conducted for the public welfare call for publicity as to profits. Rivalrous scholars are secret in their work because they are solicitous about being "anticipated" in the publication of their ideas; thinkers who are more in earnest for the progress of science than for the advancement of self urge more co-operation in scientific work. Rivalrous nations are secret in their diplomacy, while the statesman who stands for friendliness instead of rivalry between nations stands for open diplomacy. The enforcement of publicity in business and diplomacy would, therefore, be an effective move against economic and international conflict. But no laws to enforce publicity can do away with the duplicity that is inevitable as long as the rivalrous disposition is essential in the relations of mankind. There is an irrepressible conflict between the processes of thinking of the intellectual disposition, which sincerely searches for truth, and those of

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the rivalrous disposition, which cleverly seeks recognition of superiority. The rivalrous disposition has become more intense in modern life than formerly, wherefore cleverness is apparently more in evidence,⁵ and duplicity less subject to disapproval. This situation requires that social psychology, with its candid study of human motives and training in sincerity, be made more prominent in education.⁶

The strife fostered by rivalry is intensified by the fact that rivalry gives whatever satisfies that disposition an enhanced value. Men therefore tend to over-value any achievement that evidences their superiority. For instance, ask a farmer the price of his cow and he is likely to name a price in excess of its real value with the remark, "I raised that cow myself and I know what she is worth." For the same reason the rivalrous author over-estimates the importance of his own book and a publisher is apt to find him unreasonable. A rivalrous workman over-values his productive power and expects a higher wage than he can earn. Trade unions generally find it impossible to maintain two union rates of wages because no workman will admit that he cannot earn the higher rate. In like manner employers magnify the importance of their function, and claim no return is too high for "brains." Thus the rivalrous disposition prevents critical attention to the alleged evidences of superiority, and this increases conflict in industrial relations. Men tend to ask more than their goods or services are worth, to offset which the practice has arisen of bidding less than they are thought to be worth and the adjustment reached is more a matter of compromise than of accurate, intelligent valuation. Furthermore, men not only over-value the evidences of their own superiority but also under-value the evidences of that of rivals. Employers not only over-value their part in the industrial process but under-value that of workmen. Workmen likewise over-value their part and under-value that of the employers. The result is still further to intensify the tendency to ask too much and bid too little for labour, and to make the wage rate a matter of compromise, without any intelligent basis.

Not only for the producer but also for the consumer rivalry gives whatever satisfies that disposition an enhanced value. Goods are classified by economists into (a) goods which possess qualities which are wanted for themselves, (b) goods wanted for conjoint consump-

⁵ Meiklejohn, *What Does the College Hope to be during the Next One Hundred Years*, address delivered at Amherst College Centennial Celebration, 1921, 27.

⁶ Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, Ch. XXIII.

tion with some other goods, and (c) goods wanted solely because of their bearing on the social relations of the possessor.⁷ In this third class come goods that have no value for any other purpose than to demonstrate social superiority.⁸ Goods do not necessarily belong wholly in one or another of these classes. Very many things are wanted for direct consumption, or for use with other goods, but have their value greatly enhanced by qualities that demonstrate superiority. The values attached by social rivalry are distinct from those that further social welfare; they are values that appeal to the dilettante impulses of that class which gives its time to social rivalry. Social rivalry does not increase the production of wholesome food but of unwholesome delicacies, not of necessary but of unnecessary, expensive furniture and equipage; it tends to make education impractical and useless for the development of personality—merely a means of prestige.⁹ Consequently expenditures for social rivalry that have become customary are a conventionalized waste.¹⁰

Conventionalized waste includes not only a waste of things but also a waste of time. The time spent in idle talk in clubs and gossiping circles, in indulgences that weaken efficiency, in conventional amusements and observances, is far greater than one would suppose. Time thus spent may give some relaxation, but it is not complete relaxation. The necessary relaxation might be gained in one-tenth the time, wisely spent. It is spent in the conventional ways for the same reason that money is spent in those ways, because social standing in the community is thought to require it.

The standards of social rivalry are largely set by the well-to-do and wealthy families. In those periods of history when status depended on the class into which the individual was born, social rivalry was an intra-class affair and, in the lower classes, there was little rivalry or none at all. But, with the rise of economic freedom, the individual of capacity could work himself into a higher class and the rivalrous disposition then became a force for breaking down class distinctions.¹¹ The influence of those who rose in the social scale was infectious until today there is an inter-class rivalry, and rivalry in its large or small manifestations is pronounced in all classes.

⁷ Watkins, *Welfare as an Economic Quantity*, 12.

⁸ *Ibid.* 12, Ch. XIV.

⁹ Leopold, *Prestige*, 169-170; Watkins, *op. cit.*, 161.

¹⁰ Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chs. II-VII; Bowley, *The Measurement of Social Phenomena*, 159.

¹¹ Watkins, *op. cit.*, 147-148.

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The strength of the rivalrous disposition and the degree of mentality of the individual determine how high he will aspire; ordinarily the impulse is to acquire or do some of the things conspicuous in the standards and behaviour of the well-to-do and wealthy classes. The mothers and fathers of the more humble families often are discouraged to find how little influence they have over their children as compared with some wealthy woman whose example the girls will invoke as an excuse for the dressing, dances, and other behaviour in which they indulge. Not infrequently children reproach their mothers for being socially inferior to some fashionable woman. There is no social influence equal to wealth and its display, and often the very people who profess regret that cultured and refined qualities give people so little influence are themselves most susceptible to the influence of wealth.

Where standards of rivalry are determined by the well-to-do and the wealthy people, they are apt to be determined, in the first instance by the strongest impulses, by the food, the sexual and other strong impulses. The rivalrous well-to-do and wealthy families strive to excel one another in their table, and in the dress and ornamentation of their wives and daughters. But social rivalry expands beyond this until it reaches all dispositions, even the sympathetic and intellectual. And because behaviour has an enhanced value when it satisfies rivalry, any disposition is goaded in its functioning by connection with the rivalrous disposition. Rivalry causes men and women to be extravagant in food, vain in dress and showy in the use of language, to be extreme in philanthropic work, pedantic in their ideas and hyper-critical toward others. Instance the father who has an hyper-critical attitude toward the language and the ideas of other members of the family. Rivalry gives an extreme tendency to the preferred type of scholarship of the age. In the early centuries of the Christian era it took the form of fruitless reasoning and argument between rival schools concerning the nature of God.¹² In the nineteenth century it caused the collection of great masses of historical facts by rival schools.¹³ It causes the laborious development of systems of thought,¹⁴ of po-

¹² Harnack, History of Dogma, IV: 12-59.

¹³ Robinson, The New History, 41.

¹⁴ Dean Roscoe Pound recognizes the distinction between this type of scholar and the intellectual type in his appreciation of his predecessor, Dean Ezra Ripley Thayer of the Harvard Law School: "Thayer's pre-eminence did not come from the laborious toil of one striving merely for high rank. . . . He had extraordinary intellectual powers and capacity." (Pound, Ezra Ripley Thayer, Harvard Law Review, XXIX: 4)

itical, economic and other theories, which are heralded as achievements but which turn out to be as nearly worthless for the advancement of science as the physical achievement of reaching the North Pole. They are merely evidences of intellectual superiority. Rivalry may render extreme even the impulse of submission, as in those religious sects in which the members try to excel one another in self-denial, in "giving up for God," and are as proud of their humility as a wealthy person is proud of his wealth or a scholar of his books.

The rivalry of nations, as well as that of individuals and families, gives the object of the rivalry an enhanced value. International rivalry often gives a value to the economic advantages struggled for which, on critical examination, is seen not to exist.¹⁵ Nations which have been rivals in the exploitation of the natural resources of an "uncivilized" people sometimes continue this rivalry long after the natural resources of that people have been so far exploited as to be of little value.

Rivalry causes conflict, also, because of the great variety of emblems of superiority, which results in conflicting claims among rivals. Particularly is there conflict between those who would put personal above social superiority and those who would put the latter above the former. For the most part, people tend to discriminate less than might be expected between personal and social superiority. Men enjoy possession of superior wealth or position because the mere possession of it wins the admiration of people and satisfies the rivalrous disposition. There is not apt to be any careful inquiry on the part of the admiring populace as to the wisdom of this form of socially recognized superiority. When the matter of the personal superiority of a socially superior person is brought up it is apt to be either from jealousy of the superior person, or to justify an admiration impulsively felt prior to and regardless of the justifications. There is not apt to be any intelligent analysis, either by the reacting group or by the socially superior person himself, of his claim to be regarded as superior.

However, it is easy to over-emphasize the popular indifference to whether or not the person possessing the social tokens of superiority is personally superior. Popular admiration must be distinguished from that respect and confidence with which one entrusts one's fortunes to the leadership of another. What really gives a man influence in his community or nation? Does mere wealth? The national ros-

¹⁵ Johnson, *Commerce and War, Pol. Sc. Quart.*, XXIX: 49.

ter of the men of influence omits many wealthy men.¹⁶ The wealthy man may be admired because of his superior position without being respected as personally superior. His power to make or unmake others in a business or professional way may cause deference to his particular ideas or wishes, without giving him influence like that of the man of extraordinary energy, intellectual power or moral qualities.

A social recognition of personal power gives a more intense thrill of satisfaction than mere admiration of or deference to social power. For this reason the acknowledgments of a man's own rivals are particularly satisfying. Though they may be given from ulterior motives instead of being a spontaneous recognition of superior power, they come nearer to the latter than other forms of social recognition. Popular praise and admiration tickles the vanity, but the praise of rivals thrills for "they know." It is for this reason that the recognition a professional man most craves is that of members of his profession. And the higher they stand in the profession, the more their praise "means." And because it betokens personal superiority, public acknowledgment of his superiority by a man's rivals profoundly impresses people generally.

In like manner an entire group is profoundly impressed by the praise given it by a rival group. We had an illustration of this in the effect on the American public of the praise of President Wilson during the first weeks of his visit to France, England and Italy in 1918-1919 on the occasion of the Peace Conference. How soon the heated opposition to his leaving the United States died out when the newspapers began to chronicle how the monarchs and great men of European countries were vying with one another in doing him honour, as the representative of the great American People. A people does not consider ulterior motives for giving praise, or whether or not the praise is deserved; such consideration might destroy the full measure of satisfaction derived therefrom.

The recognition given men by their professional associates does not, necessarily, fairly represent their comparative worth for two reasons. In the first place, the man who remains unrecognized, or recognized in lesser degree, may be the greater in personal power, but, for this very reason may have refused to accept the professional standards of super-

¹⁶ For an interesting account of the considerations determining the selection of men and women for "Who's Who in America" see Gray, *An Interview with Albert Nelson Marquis, American Magazine*, Jan., 1921, 7.

iority by which his standing is judged. His sympathetic and intellectual impulses may have moved him to violate the professional standards for the sake of following ideals that more adequately embrace the public welfare. He may, therefore, even be condemned instead of acclaimed superior, though of surpassing personal superiority and exalted ideals. Judge Ben B. Lindsey is an example of this inadequately recognized superiority. In the second place, personal worth may be inadequately recognized because the obstacles that had to be overcome are not understood. In this connection an observation of the late Booker T. Washington made in mature life is significant. He said: "I have learned that success is to be measured not so much by the position that one has reached in life as by the obstacles which he has overcome while trying to succeed."¹⁷ The common tendency is to judge superiority superficially, according to the outward achievements. The common tendency is an impulsive tendency, and Mr. Washington's attitude is the intelligent attitude that is acquired in the course of experience. Social valuations of superiority are believed in because they are satisfying to the socially superior—the class which exercises the social control—and to the admiring masses. The thoughtful man, in mature life, may conclude that success is to be measured not by the position reached, but by the obstacles overcome; but these are known only to the individual himself. They cannot be socially understood. To have to consider them, or to have to reflect that one ought to consider them, annoys the impulses to gain recognized superiority and to admire the superior, which so powerfully move men.

On no point in social psychology is there more uncertainty and a more inconsistent attitude than on this of the worth of social valuations of superiority. For instance, some business men habitually remind subordinates that "in the long run in this life a man gets about what he deserves," and then, in their talk with their associates at the club, condemn a social system in which a lucky speculator can make a fortune while a hard-working business man may make very small profits. Press the inconsistency and they will maintain that, in the long run, the lucky speculator is apt to lose a good part of his gains by unlucky ventures. But the many evidences to the contrary prove that their talk is only for the sake of supporting their argument. Men *want to believe* that the social rewards are according to merit. Their active rivalrous disposition makes them want to believe it; were it not so there would be no encouragement for the action of the

¹⁷ Washington, *Up From Slavery*, 39.

rivalrous disposition. The many cases of rough approximation of reward to worth encourage them to believe it to be so. But on careful analysis it becomes evident that it would be true only in an artificial world in which opportunities were equally distributed and in which all men and women were animated solely by rivalry. Opportunities never have been equally distributed; and men may reject the standards of social rivalry altogether and be moved by sympathetic and intellectual impulses that only incidentally net them any return in symbols of superiority and favourable social recognition.

Rivalrous social attitudes are passed on from generation to generation by example and precept. The parent says to his boy when he leaves home, "Remember, there is always room at the top." The chief source of many, perhaps most people's pride in their children lies in the fact that they are "doing well," "getting on," advancing, being promoted, are "well thought of," "admired,"—not in the fact that they are altruistic and stand for social justice, even at the sacrifice of promotion. Because of the strength of the rivalrous disposition, the rivalrous social attitudes are not questioned. The strength of the rivalrous disposition is due to the fact that it is essential both in natural and in sexual selection, and is closely connected with other strong egoistic dispositions.

Those who have a pronounced desire for superiority are apt to be conscious of some unusual capacity. These are the men whom the social welfare requires should get the difficult posts, provided, however, that their behaviour therein be not determined by the rivalrous disposition. But if through this disposition they secure the difficult posts, what is to prevent them using these for the satisfaction of the rivalrous disposition? High position often gives an added sense of responsibility. On the other hand it may merely stimulate the rivalrous disposition to seek a still higher position.

Though the social effects of rivalry, as an egoistic disposition, may be contrary to a progressive social order, is it not to be encouraged as compared with some other egoistic dispositions, for instance, fear? The common belief is that the feeling of assurance due to sense of superiority is the most effective way of subduing fear, wherefore this assurance is sometimes called "moral power." For instance, a physician advised a mother who had a timid and sickly daughter to dress her well that she might have "the moral support of good clothes." A professor in a small college who lacked the assurance necessary to undertake scholarly work preferred to accept a subordinate univer-

sity position, where he would have less leisure and freedom but would have what he called "the moral support" of the university connection. It is doubtless true that many people are dispositionally timid, lacking in assurance, and apt to drift and amount to little unless they can win some initial success that will give them more confidence in themselves. But often the initial success stirs only a conceited sense of superiority, instead of an ambition for greater success. And if ambition is stirred it is apt to be essentially a selfish ambition. From the point of view of social progress it is a question whether many selfishly rivalrous or self-satisfied and conceited men had not better have been merely fearful conformists. But there are other ways of overcoming fear than by encouraging rivalry. A less socially disturbing way is to develop sympathy and intelligence, but the rivalrous disposition is stronger than either of these, hence the appeal to it. However, our aim is not only to point out the natural connections, but also to emphasize the possibility of directing the development of social personality and institutions by an education that changes human nature in the way required for the development of a rational social order. Such an education will aim to develop sympathy and intellect, instead of fostering rivalry, as a means of overcoming fear.

A progressive social order requires, therefore, the subordination of the rivalrous disposition to others. This is constantly happening, here and there, subconsciously in personal experience. One of the processes is the experience of the worry of keen rivalry (and, as we have seen, the disposition is never completely satisfied) and the cultivation, often conscious and deliberate, of forms of sympathetic contact. The associations of business men in the different lines of industry, their regular meetings and dinners, have this subconscious impulse for a more satisfying relation than keen competition, as well as the conscious purpose to get together on production and prices. From the same motives, business men seek to avoid the worry of labour troubles by fostering relations of sympathy and co-operation with workmen. In fact, all kinds of groups, from the families of a community to the nations of the earth feel increasingly the dissatisfaction of rivalry.¹⁸

The increasing dissatisfaction of rivalry is calling attention to the unintelligent nature of a social system which is predominantly

¹⁸ For an interesting analysis of the biological processes of which this dissatisfaction is the psychical expression see Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, 203-210.

determined by the rivalrous and associated dispositions. What are the processes in human nature to which the teacher, the preacher, and intelligent people generally can appeal to inhibit rivalry and stimulate sympathy and intellect? One of these processes is the expansive mood that is fostered by social intercourse and increasing intimacy of association. The processes of social intercourse are similar to those of play at its best. In play rivalry is subordinated to the playful mood; it is not in earnest, not real rivalry, but "in fun." One will not let the other win a game. That would not please the other. But one will give the other every chance to show his points of excellence, and the interest lies less in which is superior than in the particular points of excellence of each competitor. One method of regulation of the rivalrous disposition is, therefore, the cultivation of an underlying expansive mood as an ideal psychological condition, in which the rivalrous is subordinated to the sympathetic disposition.

Another process that may make for decreasing intensity of rivalry is humour. Roughly speaking the essential process in humour is the association with a larger serious state of social consciousness of some trivial analogous situation, event, act, or idea.¹⁹ The humour of the association is increased if it is novel²⁰ and unexpected. The application of this principle to social rivalry is two-fold. In the first place rivalry prompts to attention-getting behaviour that will win recognition of superiority, and if this happens to vary from the prevailing social behaviour it stirs laughter,²¹ which acts as a deterrent on the rivalrous disposition.

The second application is more difficult to explain and more important and consequently must be explained more at length. There are many people, many more than we think, who are not blind devotees of the conventional system of social rivalry; who have some comprehension of its significance; who evaluate it from the point of view of the effect of their part in it on their own personal development. To the extent that they thus do comprehend its significance they are outside of a purely impulsive subservience to it. Now the further one has gone in this personal valuation of social standards, the more humorous his general attitude becomes, that is, the more amusing any particular rivalrous impulse appears. The conventional person laughs at unconventional rivalrous behaviour but the under-

¹⁹ Sidis, *The Psychology of Laughter*, 24; Bergson, *Laughter*, 5-6.

²⁰ Sully, *An Essay on Laughter*, 87, 102, 139.

²¹ Bergson, *op. cit.*, 133.

standing person laughs at conventional behaviour as well. His viewpoint is that of ideal social relations, which he takes as seriously as the conventional person takes the conventional society. And the larger one's comprehension of the great society, the wider is one's range of humorous reactions to the actual, provincial society of which one happens at the time to be a member. This humour of comprehension is a more common experience than is thought. Young people, even those whose comprehension has not gotten very far, will laugh at the conventional rivalrous impulses of their parents, whom otherwise they respect. To be sure, those who laugh have their own rivalrous impulses and somebody of larger comprehension will be laughing at them. As comprehension broadens, the field of humour widens also and one is less subject to particular rivalrous impulses until there is reached the comprehension and the humour of a Lincoln who, with his profound comprehension of social rivalry, seems to have mastered his own rivalrous disposition and entirely to have adjusted it to ideal requirements. Thus by effectively postulating one's own ideal society in the light of one's impulses for personal development one sets free one's nature and is prepared to play a part in the subordination of the rivalrous disposition to others in social relations. Inasmuch as it is social psychology that gives the comprehensive point of view, will not instruction in that subject, when it is generally introduced into public and higher education, tend to promote this development in human nature and in social relations?

While an increasing sense of the worry and dissatisfaction of rivalry and an increasing comprehension of its social significance is serving to inhibit it and give increased play to other dispositions, at the same time the means of social rivalry are being acquired by a larger proportion of people who lack common sense and comprehension and, therefore, are subject to social suggestion. A mass of new recruits are constantly entering as the enlightened leave the temple of mammon. But the movement is ever toward enlightenment. One may see this in connection with any prominent social symbol of superiority. The display of dress, furniture, equipage, social and political position, titles, degrees, is more and more an occasion of amusement. The seriousness, the punctiliousness, that once attached to these things is passing among people of enlarging comprehension, though such people often continue to seek them from utilitarian motives. They seek them and then are amused at the people who take them seriously.

This psychological situation of increasing comprehension and its reaction on the particular rivalrous impulse is one favourable for a new movement in education, a movement to encourage the exercise of the intellectual disposition in the deliberate use of rivalry to give an incentive to the cultivation of the excellencies that are required for the development of personality. When rivalry is thus used interest centres not in superiority over the other but in the excellencies which one seeks to cultivate. A person of any breadth of view at all takes little interest in questions of superiority as such because one individual rarely, if ever, is superior at all points. He is superior in some and inferior in other respects. The impulse of the thoughtful man is not to see the points in which *he* is superior but those in which the *other* is superior, that he may profit from these hints for the sake of personal development. And quite apart from any particular social stimulus one often likes to subject himself to some moral test and, if he stands the test, feels he is more of a man. Wherefore, if one persists in the impulsive form of rivalry he is not true to himself. Even rival groups of scholars may so far forget the ultimate purpose of scholarship as thus to cease to be true to themselves. They may seek to prove their superiority and parade the inferiority of the rival group by brilliance of dialectic, when they should examine the strength instead of exaggerating the weakness of the contrary position.²² There is need of a new movement in education which shall have in view ultimate aims in the development of personality, and shall revise traditional values to that end.

The development of personality requires the subordination of rivalry to the cultivation of the excellencies required by the ideal of personality. "Rivalry in excellence" too often prevents an effective cultivation of excellence by maintaining rivalry as the essential motive. If a rivalry in sympathy results in a real development of sympathy, this inhibits the rivalry. If a rivalry in things intellectual results in sincere thinking, this inhibits the rivalry. If a rivalry in humility results in genuine humility, the rivalry has ceased, for humility is the negation of desire for superiority. The strength of the sympathetic and intellectual man lies in a profound capacity for humility and resignation.

This regulation of rivalry by organizing the personality in a way to satisfy the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions would develop

²² Neilson, Inaugural Address as President of Smith College, in Inauguration of President Neilson, 40-41.

a type of character different from the prevailing egoistic types. To the prevalence of these types social conflicts are due, and the method of social progress has been to let conflicts reach the acute stage of annoyance that sets in motion forces of readjustment and compromise. The reason the necessity of rivalry, for social progress, has been so emphasized is that theories of progress have been largely deductions from the biological theory of evolution. The action of rivalry is conspicuous in the biological processes of natural and sexual selection and this has caused too little attention to be paid to the less conspicuous processes of sympathy and intelligence. No doubt we are face to face with the possibility of a great change in the method of progress and, therefore, in human nature as its necessary condition. But those who have education in charge will be slow to be convinced that rivalry is not the essential and indispensable motive in social progress, and should not be stimulated by educational procedure. Our publicists, also, will long insist that our institutions should appeal primarily to individualistic enterprise, ambition, self-interest. Plainly, however, the need is for an increased interest in the lives of others, and for changes in institutions that depend on and will facilitate this change in human nature.

Because of the predominance of instinctive impulses and the strength of the rivalrous disposition in children, training in idealism may well begin by setting, for the rivalrous disposition, standards of excellence in conduct. It is in groups in which each is personally known to all and amenable to the approval and disapproval of all that egoistic behaviour is most easily modified.²³ The standards of the schoolroom and of the scout organization should be the socially necessary types of conduct, those that are consciously fostered by teachers from an ideal of social progress. However, though these types of conduct may win the recognition badges in the school and the scout organization, they will not necessarily win recognition when the pupil passes into the real world. For the excellencies required for social progress are apt to be variant, unusual types of conduct often directly contrary to the type that prevails in industry, the professions and politics. Consequently along with this setting of standards of excellence in conduct for the rivalrous disposition in the school, there must go a training in the subordination of that disposition to others. For the aim is not only to inculcate

²³ Williams, *An American Town*, 179, 192; Cooley, *Social Organization*, Pt. I.

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ideas of excellent conduct in the child mind, and make them the standards that win recognized superiority in the school group, but also to train the child to stick to those standards out in the world, whether they bring him success and superiority or not. They will not necessarily bring worldly success, but may incur the opposition of the successful. He should be trained to be loyal to his ideals regardless of the annoyance they cause the rivalrous disposition. This involves making the rivalrous disposition subordinate to the sympathetic, intellectual and resistful dispositions.

Without this education for social progress the method of progress will continue what it has been, that is, progress through group rivalry, the shock of group conflict, compromise, and adjustment for the time being. In these conflicts individual self-interest gives way to group self-interest. It is said that in thus becoming absorbed in a group purpose the individual loses his intense self-interest. But his absorption in the group purpose is not necessarily disinterested. His personal fortunes are bound up with those of the group, so that group rivalry is, in the last analysis, another phase of individual rivalry. Furthermore, group rivalries are apt to be as self-centred as individual rivalries, because in intense group rivalry the most rivalrous characters rise to the leadership of the group and exert the strongest influence. The extreme social annoyance caused by this method of progress suggests the possibility of some other method than group conflict and temporary adjustments.

Are there any tendencies that lead us to expect some other method of progress? It is said such a change is possible because of an observed change in the motives of leadership; that while the group relies on the play of the rivalrous disposition to bring to the front the men who are to fill the difficult posts, the motive of rivalry for leadership is changing; that men are being increasingly moved to this rivalry because of the greater opportunity to render service offered by the difficult posts. It is said their rivalry is to demonstrate their superior worth from the point of view of the service ideal, and that this kind of group leadership will react on the rivalry of groups in a way to make the group less self-centred, and more intent on service in the larger society. In how far do men of this altruistic type win the superior positions in the economic organization, the state, the professions, the church, education? We do not know. The mere statement of the problem shows how little we know about it. Actual conditions in the economic organization, the state, the pro-

fessions, the church and education suggest that leaders are still moved more by egoistic rivalry than by emulation in the service of the common good. The approach to this great problem requires an analysis of all aspects of the social organization with a view to determining their main motive currents. To make this analysis is the purpose of this book.

CHAPTER III

DOMINATION, FEAR, AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS

BECAUSE of differences in personal and social power, rivals never have an equal chance. Those who are superior press their advantages and maintain it is their right so to do. Hence the development of rules for fair play. In the nature of the case the spectators, who are less absorbed in the rivalry than the rivals themselves, are in a favourable position to appreciate unfairness and to insist on observance of rules. But these never are sufficiently severe to eliminate the advantages of natural or social superiority. The naturally superior tend to make use of their endowments to control and use others in the acquisition of symbols of social superiority—wealth, position, and other symbols—and then they use their social advantage to achieve still greater superiority. The result is that, in a society with largely unrestricted rights of private ownership and bequest, there has developed gross inequality.¹ This encourages the more powerful to perpetuate their power by the mastery of others. That is, inequality is a condition that is favourable to the action of the dominating disposition. Owing to the strength of this disposition in the original nature of man, and because of ownership of property and the economic, political and social control of propertied classes, all individuals tend to be drawn into relations of domination and submission.

The dominating disposition is one that impels the individual to insist on having his own way, either for the satisfaction it affords or for some other satisfaction if domination serves some ulterior motive, as the impulse to use others in acquisition of wealth. A man in whom domination is pronounced does not necessarily insist constantly on having his own way, but he finds satisfaction in the consciousness that he can have his own way if he chooses. As long as he has this consciousness he may good-naturedly allow others to have

¹ Mitchell, King, Macaulay, Knauth, *Income in the United States*, Ch. 3.

their own way. For instance, while many men let the members of the family have their own way, their peace of mind seems to depend on the consciousness that they can have their own way if they wish. Just so in industry an employer may good-naturedly consider plans for giving workmen representation in the management of his business as long as he is conscious that, in virtue of his ownership of the business, he exercises the ultimate control. And in the state the propertied classes that wield the sovereign power may give a political party that represents non-propertied classes considerable political freedom as long as that party does not disturb the propertied classes' assurance of ultimate political control. Thus it is necessary to distinguish between the impulsive satisfaction of the dominating disposition and the consciousness of power to satisfy that disposition at any time.

Men under the impulsion of the dominating disposition will seldom admit that what they want in the last analysis is their own way. They assume their way is the best way for all concerned but are not apt to be perfectly frank in inviting discussion. They want whatever may happen to be their view recognized as the best way. Their interest is primarily in getting assent to their idea, in instigating submission to the plan they want carried out. The satisfaction of an impulse of domination depends on getting assent or submission, and it ignores the annoyance that may be occasioned thereby. Domination is, therefore, egoistic, as distinguished from sympathy which is satisfied by satisfying others. Even if submission were eminently satisfying to the one submitting, it is not satisfying to the dominating one for that reason. What he seeks and enjoys is not the satisfaction of the other but the assent or submission of the other and the triumph of his own idea or plan.

Men seek to dominate others either by impressing their own ideas, by reiteration and argument, perhaps with a vehement manner and implied threats, or by ridiculing the contrary ideas of the other. Ridicule is particularly effective when the contrary idea is a novel one, for the weight of authority on the opposite side makes a novel idea seem foolish. A person of strong resistful disposition meets contempt with counter-contempt or resentment instead of shameful acceptance of the contempt and an impulse to avoid ridicule by giving up the contemned idea.

Men in whom the dominating disposition is pronounced seek sym-

bols of superiority that will raise them from a position of inferiority in which submission is required to one in which domination can be exercised. Those in the superior positions in turn seek to maintain their superiority by dominating those below them who are struggling to rise to the superior positions. Thus rivalry for superiority inevitably develops into a struggle for domination wherever the latter disposition is pronounced. A man is apt loudly to condemn domination in those above him and then, when he has reached a position of superiority, to attempt to dominate those who would dispossess or excel him. Superior position is especially apt to tempt to ruthless domination when it is held, not by those of superior personal power who easily maintain it, but by inferior people who inherited the position. Those who inherit often lack the personal power that would have been necessary to win the position; consequently, in order to maintain it, they feel driven to act in a more or less arrogant way, and, on occasion, to use their power in ruthless domination. Consequently a civilization in which an hereditary employing class has developed is apt to be ruthless and repressive.

Like rivalry, domination is connected with other dispositions in original nature, and, in experience, characteristic connections are developed. A man is particularly desirous of having his own way when this satisfies also the acquisitive or the sexual disposition. Domination satisfies also the rivalrous disposition. A man of a rivalrous disposition wants his word assented to or his plan submitted to because failure to do this challenges his superiority. The connection of the acquisitive and rivalrous dispositions with the dominating intensifies the impulse of an employer or manager to dominate workmen. Even the conforming disposition may connect with the dominating in a way to intensify it, as when a conforming mass of people are enraged at a dissenter and insist that he conform at least outwardly. Their impulse to conform intensifies their impulse to dominate. The dominating is opposed to the intellectual disposition in that, while an intellectual process ends in action according to the conviction formed, which may involve the submission of others, the dominating disposition, by its primary interest in gaining assent to the idea that happens to hold the attention, interferes with the thought necessary to form a rational conviction.

People submit to others in order thereby to get relief from the

fear caused by others' attempts to dominate them. The large place occupied by fear in human nature makes domination easy.² Thus workmen have a fearfulness of losing their jobs and submit to the domination of bosses for the sake of holding them.³ Submissiveness is satisfying, also, because it relieves from a sense of responsibility.⁴ Lack of intellectual initiative inclines men to find irresponsibility satisfying and to prefer following the directions of others to planning and carrying the responsibilities of management. They like to throw down their work at the close of day and quit. But submissiveness becomes annoying when it is arbitrarily compelled. Though submission "is natural and even pleasurable when normally indulged, it is a great mistake to attempt to fix it as a permanent mood. In its spontaneous manifestations it is healthy; externally imposed on any but the feeble-minded it breeds resentment by reaction."⁵

Fear may intensify the egoistic dispositions, when it is felt to be a question of dominating or being dominated, and may stimulate aggressive and cruel behaviour. It also stimulates sociability. Fear also enlists ideas that suggest to the fearful individual some form of superiority, which stimulates his self-assertion, or that suggests that he is the object of protecting care, which comforts and relieves from fear. Theology speaks not only of a deity that strengthens but also of one that gives repose in the thought of being loved and protected. As distinguished from this ideational reaction to fear there is the strictly intellectual reaction, that is, the impulse to look into and analyze the grounds of the fear, and so dissipate it if it is groundless, or remove its causes, whatever they are.⁶ Those who regard fear as inevitable and impossible to dissipate emphasize the ideational reaction and declare that mankind attains its highest development only through these states that give an impetus to imaginative self-assertion and self-comfort. Those who emphasize the strictly intellectual reaction stand for the elimination of fear. This involves not merely inquiring the cause of a particular depression or scare, but going deeper into one's subconsciousness in a way to appreciate how much one loses in life by tolerating those fearful attitudes that so easily become essential

² Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 92-94, 57-68; Hocking, *op. cit.*, 73.

³ Webb, *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions*, 69-70.

⁴ Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, 113-114.

⁵ Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 184.

⁶ Cabot, *Social Work*, 102.

in character—that habitual discretion in speech and thought, that punctilious conventionality, that hesitancy to feel and aspire except in accord with social views. How fortunate for civilization are certain incidents in the lives of our great exemplars which brought home to them the significance of the fearful attitudes, for instance, Judge Ben B. Lindsey's well-nigh tragic elimination of fear, which made him eventually the moral uplifter of a nation.⁷

The resistful disposition is the disposition to remove obstacles that thwart efforts to satisfy impulses.⁸ The more intimate social relations become, the more intense the annoyance due to balked impulses, and the more intense the hostility that develops in the course of the resistance.⁹ The connections formed by the disposition of resistance depend on what dispositions predominate in the individual. A man with a pronounced sympathetic disposition will resist on behalf of others after he himself is relieved from annoying conditions. And when the intellectual disposition also is strong, ideals reinforce resistance in the face of the strongest opposition and give that capacity for an enduring resistance on behalf of others which has characterized the great idealists. A strong resistful disposition with sympathetic and intellectual connections thus makes for a progressive social order.

The rivalrous, dominating and resistful dispositions are distinct dispositions as I use the term. Rivalry seeks social admiration, domination seeks submission, while resistance seeks to remove obstacles to the satisfaction of any disposition. I am aware that some psychologists make rivalry merely playful pugnacity, domination a more serious form of rivalry, and resistance merely pugnacity acting under certain conditions. The three dispositions may have a common relation to certain biological processes.¹⁰ But the social psychologist can see in human behaviour a differentiation sufficient to justify, I think, the classifications suggested. In children under five one may see rivalry in various forms—in their impulse to have things that are "as good" as those of other children—without the least impulse to dominate others. And one may see, especially in sensitive and timid children, a disposition to resist when thwarted, without any impulse to dominate. They call the rough, dominating boy "bad" and avoid him. When these children grow up, these traits per-

⁷ Lindsey and O'Higgins, *The Beast*, 15-16; "Bars for Judge Lindsey?" *The Survey*, Feb. 12, 1921, 689.

⁸ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 54.

⁹ See Book VIII.

¹⁰ Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, 74-80.

sist. The ultra-rivalrous person often has no capacity to meet obstacles and remove them, while the resistful person may enjoy obstacles in his work and enjoy the rôle of non-conformist, with no obvious desire for superiority. Similarly the dominating, "big-feeling" man may be notoriously weak in the face of obstacles other than those that thwart the satisfaction of his domination. Conversely, we see social reformers who are mighty resisters on occasion but show no impulse to dominate. Wherefore, these three dispositions, as I use the term, seem valid classifications of elementary processes in social relations.

Sharply in contrast with the resistful is the conforming disposition, which seeks to do as others do, not from habit, because doing as others do may require violation of habit—"When in Rome do as the Romans do"—, but just for the sake of the satisfaction of doing as others do.¹¹ It is this disposition that irons out unlike behaviour everywhere, that makes workmen "the working masses," or in times of violent unrest "the mob"; that makes business men uniformly "profit-seekers," even though many of them may be conscious of sympathetic and intellectual impulses that are not satisfied by that behaviour. The conforming disposition is characteristic of people of comparatively weak impulses, wherefore they do not find it difficult to deny impulses that are contrary to the behaviour to which they conform. Men of strong egoistic dispositions become leaders in economic and political conflict; or, impelled by sympathetic, intellectual and resistful impulses, they become leaders in movements for greater freedom of opportunity. People who are predominantly conforming in disposition are of neither of those classes, but, because the egoistic impulses exercise a predominant social influence, the conforming behaviour is determined by that influence. Conformity tends to make the dispositions that are pronounced in society everywhere prevalent. Conformity is promoted by fear, by the impulse to admire the superior, and to avoid the contempt accorded the inferior. The size and might of the herd is superior to that of any member, wherefore members fear to oppose it, they feel a dumb admiration for the bigness of the mass, of which they themselves are a part, and a contempt for one who would set himself up against it. One tempted to oppose it realizes this contempt and fears the ridicule his opposition would call forth. Because ridicule implies inferiority it is hard to withstand.

¹¹ Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 88-91, Ch. VIII; McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 96-107.

We come, finally, to the two dispositions that are essential in the life of the race, the sexual and the acquisitive.¹² Let us note some of the connections of these dispositions with those we have described. Essential in the sexual disposition is the instinct to attract the other sex. The behaviour includes ornamentation, speech, song, manners that attract. This disposition stimulates rivalry among those who seek to attract the other sex. The male not only seeks to win the female but rivals other males and displays his strong qualities; and the female is attracted by the superior qualities of the male. The female not only desires to attract the male and to be sought by him but rivals other females in attractive qualities. In their competitive dressing women are apt to be more conscious of rivals among their own sex than of seeking to attract the other sex. Out of this rivalry of males and females has developed the fashionable dressing of modern times, with the world-wide commercial organization for style. In stylish dressing the sexual disposition is less prominent than the rivalrous, though by no means inconspicuous, as we see in prevailing fashions of women's dress and ornamentation. Thus the rivalrous disposition is connected with the sexual, originally and institutionally, and stimulates the latter far beyond the length to which it alone would carry behaviour to attract the other sex.

In addition to the economic institutional connections of the sexual disposition there are the connections in the family. As sexual tension increases the male becomes more insistent and dominating, the female more willing and submissive. Thus domination and submission are closely connected with the sexual disposition, and have been essential in the relation between husband and wife throughout the development of the family.¹³

The acquisitive disposition seeks merely to acquire what satisfies the elemental impulses, not to acquire for superiority. It seeks to acquire things that satisfy the instincts for food, clothing and shelter of a dull population, and other things to which such a population might take a fancy. It does not play a large part in the behaviour of most business men.¹⁴ It is pronounced in a population which has little or no opportunity for advancement, as the peasant populations of Europe, where neighbours may be stimulated by each other's industry but with little or no impulse for superiority. In a popula-

¹² Hocking, op. cit., 73, 356; Thorndike, op. cit., 97-98.

¹³ See Chapter XVIII.

¹⁴ Taussig, Inventors and Money-Makers, 82.

tion of industrious people there is apt to be a sharp distinction between mine and thine, for the same impulse which prompts an individual to acquire a thing from nature or from another prompts him to defend his possession.¹⁵ But this must be distinguished from rivalry. Furthermore, the acquisitive disposition prompts the individual to secrete and save what he has acquired, not to show it or spend it for the sake of winning socially recognized superiority. All the virtues which spring from the acquisitive disposition—industry, persistence in work, courageous defence of possession, thrift and frugality may be found in a population which is not conspicuously rivalrous. The lower class of farmers in European countries has had these characteristics, but has lacked that sense of free rivalry which has characterized the American farmer, who has felt his freedom of economic opportunity and his independence of upper class domination. As distinguished from the sense of independence of the American farmer, there has been among the peasantry of Europe a submission to and adulation of the "gentry" and aristocracy, and a contentment with a mere subsistence income. To this subservience and apparent contentment of a fixed peasant class the American agricultural class has an intense aversion. We find also among a submissive peasant class a deficiency of that imagination which is stirred by ambition to rise. Consequently the tendency of human nature to react according to habit is accentuated. The imagination is the great foe of habit. Where it is deficient, habit soon fastens.

The man in whom the acquisitive disposition predominates distrusts the man in whom the rivalrous disposition predominates—who "is always going to do something great";¹⁶ but when the two dispositions become connected in the same man, the rivalrous stimulates acquisition. Acquisitive behaviour is shrewd but deficient in imagination, rivalrous behaviour imaginative but lacking in shrewdness. The combination of the two dispositions effects a combination of mental qualities that increases capacity to accumulate.

The acquisitive disposition is egoistic in that it prompts to the acquisition of things for self, or for those with whom the self and its satisfaction have become identified. A man in whom this disposition predominates finds by experience that family dissatisfaction annoys him, so he spends to remove that annoyance as he would

¹⁵ The fierceness of the defence often is out of all proportion to the value of the thing defended. (Edman, *Human Traits and their Social Significance*, 140.)

¹⁶ Williams, *An American Town*, 202.

to relieve hunger or some other discomfort. But the disposition itself stimulates saving instead of spending. There is an impulse for a store of wealth. This saving is due not to wise forethought for the future but to the impulse to keep what has been acquired. From this impulse many men who "are saving" grow more saving instead of less as their accumulations increase. This is due not merely to habit but to the continued action of the acquisitive disposition out of which the habit first grew.

Because of its intensely egoistic nature the acquisitive disposition causes social conflict, and customs develop that regulate acquisitive behaviour in order to prevent conflicts. Among primitive peoples, the acquisitive disposition is restrained by customary obligations to charity.¹⁷ This was true also in the early American rural community.¹⁸ But this charity may be egoistic—from apprehension that some day the individual may himself need help.¹⁹ The laws that regulate the acquisitive and other dispositions that are involved in the acquisition of wealth become more complex with the development of civilization, in which most of the law has to do directly or indirectly with property rights. One of the reasons for the increasing conflict is that the rivalrous disposition is closely connected with the acquisitive and stimulates the latter far beyond the limits to which that disposition alone would go in the acquisition of wealth. This connection of the two dispositions has resulted in that institutional development under which a large part of the instruments of production are owned or controlled by a very small minority. The acquisitive disposition has a connection with the parental instinct, through which the owner feels that he in a sense maintains his ownership after death by bequeathing his property to his children. But the rights of bequest and inheritance have been immensely strengthened by the rivalrous disposition, which causes an impulse to bequeath a great fortune to a child unimpaired—or little impaired by dividing it—, thus perpetuating the family superiority.

It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that the dispositions may be little more intelligent when they animate mature men and determine forms of organization than in children. The forms of organization originated and developed under impulsions of the dis-

¹⁷ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I: 540-546; Sumner, *The Yakuts*, *Jour. Anthro. Inst.*, XXXI: 65-70.

¹⁸ Williams, *op. cit.*, 28, 43-44.

¹⁹ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I: 560.

positions. Men working under those forms have the same impulses that originated and developed the forms. Consequently, as long as the dispositional impulsions which determine the economic behaviour of men do not change, they find the forms of organization congenial. But men not of the prevailing dispositions find them uncongenial.

CHAPTER IV

THE SYMPATHETIC AND INTELLECTUAL DISPOSITIONS

SYMPATHY is the disposition to share the expression and mental states of associates, whether of satisfaction or annoyance.¹ But it is more than this for as one has an impulse to remove one's own annoyance and increase one's own satisfaction, so one seeks to remove the annoyance or increase the satisfaction of another with whom one has become identified by sympathy. Whether one will feel pity² for another in a certain situation will depend on whether or not one is in sympathy with the other. A person of dull sympathy will feel contempt for weakness and need where a person of keen sympathy will feel compassion. As the impulse to relieve our own annoyances is more intense than the impulse to seek satisfaction, so the compassionate impulse to relieve need is stronger than the impulse merely to enhance the satisfaction of others. This latter manifestation of the sympathetic disposition is apt to be confined to intimate associates while compassion is felt for mere acquaintances and even for strangers and distant populations. That is why it is comparatively easy to interest the public in relief of need but difficult to arouse interest in improving conditions for the self-development of others.

The sensitiveness of the sympathetic disposition is, therefore, a vital aspect of it. A person may be compassionate and generous and yet show a lack of fine consideration of the feelings of others. People of a pronounced sympathetic disposition often lack that discrimination and power of inhibition which makes it possible for one to leave unsaid what would hurt the feelings of others, and to avoid spoiling the effect of generous behaviour by lack of tact in the way it is done. Sensitiveness is particularly necessary in the intimate relations of family life. The development of the personality of husband and wife requires that delicate understanding of each other that makes it possible "to recognize more of the subconscious and growing in

¹ McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 94.

² Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 102-103.

one another than can ordinarily be appreciated between members of the same sex; they are drawn into a protective attitude toward whatever is groping and 'unsaved' in the other self."³ Likewise the development of children requires a discriminating understanding of their personalities on the part of parents. A person who is sensitive in one direction tends to be so in all. Thus Mr. Darwin was sensitive not only in his appreciation of nature⁴ but also in his social relations. He had a discriminating understanding of his wife and of each of his children which made him unusually appreciative of his wife's fine qualities and impressed his children with his respect for their personalities in the little everyday relations.⁵ He was discriminating not only in his family relations, but in all his social relations, in those with the members of the rural community in which he lived, with his guests, with colleagues, and with acquaintances and strangers with whom he corresponded.⁶

Sympathy that is not sensitive or intelligent often is intense, and it is intensified by the fact that sympathy gives whatever satisfies it an enhanced value. Many gifts owe their value largely to the sympathy of the giver. For instance, many of the toys mothers buy for their children give the children very little satisfaction. They are made to attract the mothers, not to satisfy the impulses of the children. People often give from the impulse to please another for the moment, not intelligently from a study of the needs or tastes of the other. A vast quantity of goods for "the Christmas trade" have this impulsive value; such gifts are appreciated largely because of the "motive of the giver." An abundant income makes possible a thoughtless satisfaction of the sympathetic disposition. This may be pronounced, also, among the poor, as seen in the parent who denies her own needs to give the children what will please them. But it is most apt to lead to extravagant living and the pampering of children among those who have the means for extravagance and pampering. Extravagance from this motive often is enhanced by the rivalrous motive to display superiority by giving children as expensive or more expensive things than children of other families have:

People who benefit by the sympathetic acts of others feel gratitude and devotion. The happiness of another and his or her ex-

³ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 357.

⁴ Darwin, *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, I: 83, 125.

⁵ *Ibid.* I: 109-111, 115.

⁶ *Ibid.* I: 115, 97-98.

pression of gratitude is what satisfies the sympathetic person. If the one benefited does not show gratitude the benefactor is not satisfied, even though his gift manifestly relieved need or increased happiness. He wants to be recognized as the source of the happiness. The relation most desired by a sympathetic person to one with whom he lives intimately is one in which he can feel, from the gratitude and devotion of the other, that he is absolutely necessary to the other's happiness. One may sometimes see this relation between friends, and between an altruistic clergyman who has had a long service in the parish and some of his parishioners, also between social workers and those whom they have often aided. But it is most apt to be seen in the family. The happiness of this relation in family life may be so absorbing as to weaken capacity for an altruistic attitude outside.

Sympathy is to be distinguished from congeniality. Two people may be congenial without either having any pronounced sympathy for the other. Two people are congenial who mutually satisfy one another's impulses. A man who enjoys the pleasures of the table and shows his enjoyment and appreciation finds a wife who enjoys cooking and is a good cook to that extent congenial, though the term congeniality is apt to be used only when each satisfies a variety of impulses of the other. A dominating man and a submissive wife find each other congenial; a rivalrous man and a wife who is given to admiration are congenial; so are two sympathetic people. Evidently, then, congeniality is a broader term than sympathy. It may include sympathy, and, if it does not, it facilitates sympathy. It is easier for one who is by nature adapted to satisfy the impulses of another to do so than for one who is not, even though the latter may be very sympathetically inclined.

Another form of congeniality is likeness of characteristic impulses. This gives pleasure because the likeness produces social suggestions that stimulate and encourage the characteristic impulses of each. But likeness may not facilitate satisfaction so that this form of congeniality may conflict with the other form. If a dominating person finds a companion dominating also, his disposition is stimulated but not satisfied, for that requires submission. Two rivalrous persons may be stimulated but not satisfied by one another. On the other hand, if the likeness is one of sympathy or intellect, it both furnishes agreeable stimulation and facilitates satisfaction. The development of a personality often requires that impulses different from the characteristic ones should be stimulated, in which case unlikeness

furnishes the social suggestions that will, in the long run, give fullest satisfaction.⁷

The sympathetic disposition is opposed to the dominating. The sympathetic person enjoys above everything else the realization that another has an attitude of devotion to him; the dominating person, that another has an attitude of submission to him. What is desired is habitual devotion or submission. The conflict between domination and sympathy is evident in a family where one of the members hesitates to be unselfish and helpful lest it give the other the feeling that he or she "is getting the advantage." That is, the one who is dominating mistakes sympathy and helpfulness for submission. Thus the impulse to have one's way spoils the family life. A wife who has a sympathetic husband sometimes "likes to keep him guessing as to whether she loves him or not." In this way she keeps him in a state of apprehension, in which he will accept her suggestions and thus constantly try to make her happy while she is trying to dominate him and "make him do things." If the husband is dominating and the wife is of fearful and submissive disposition, she finds his impulse to make sure of her submission—to avoid the disagreeable feeling of uncertainty as to her submission—fairly satisfying to her because, by adopting the submissive attitude he desires, she avoids stirring his dominating impulses. This dominating-submissive family relation was fairly stable through the centuries, until women began to become less submissive and more conscious of suppressed impulses, and to demand a relation that would make possible self-realization. Stability can be restored only by both husband and wife relinquishing domination and cultivating an intelligently sympathetic attitude to one another.

Sympathy is opposed, also, to rivalry. Often rivalry must take place and it must be decided which rival is superior before a sympathetic relation can develop. The achievement of superiority may be followed by admiration for the plucky but defeated rival, with an impulse on the part both of the victor and the spectators to minimize the shame of inferiority by congratulating him on the excellencies of his performance. This mutual admiration of the rivals for the excellencies of each other may develop into a relation of sympathy.

Achievement of superiority may satisfy the rivalrous disposition and cause it to fall into abeyance, as the sympathetic, with its claims

⁷ See the chapter entitled, *The Basis of Congeniality*.

long ignored, now asserts itself. Thus we hear of "the graciousness of conscious power," when the individual, no longer under tension in the satisfaction of his ambition, becomes sympathetic in expression and manners. The lingering sense of superiority is apt to make this expression of sympathy condescending. This may be the characteristic expression of aristocratic families, while personalities of a pronounced sympathetic disposition in those families may be more genuinely sympathetic. Another reason for the rise of sympathy when the rivalrous disposition has been more or less appeased is that the means for the satisfaction of the sympathetic disposition have been accumulated in the course of rivalry. Thus some men begin to enjoy giving away, late in life, what they have given their best years to accumulate. It is in instances of the generosity of members of upper classes that the opposition between rivalry and sympathy becomes most noticeable. Why is it that, while they enjoy so much helping individuals of the mass, they are at the same time so careful to protect and even foster their sense of superiority to the mass? It is because the two attitudes will not coalesce. Their generosity does not extend to the point of assuming the possibility of such a development as would make any considerable proportion of the masses their equals. Their sense of superiority limits their generosity to a mere giving of things or instruction, a giving without any vision of the possibilities of personal development of the recipients. It prevents their understanding the masses in a way that would make their generosity most effective for the enlargement of their own lives.

The thrill of satisfaction that accompanies achievement of superiority often is mistaken for sympathy. The girl may feel flattered by the attention of a superior young man and mistake her enjoyment of her superiority over the other girls for love of the man. A man may mistake his enjoyment of his wife's admiration of his superior appearance, or high position, for love of her and a wife may mistake her thrill at the man's worship of her superior beauty or vivacity for love of him. There are men and women so deficient in capacity for sympathy and common sense that they cannot believe another loves unless he or she worships. Again a minister's love of his people often is due to his sense of their admiration of him as a preacher of superior power, rather than a relation of sympathetic understanding between him and them. While sympathy is not possible if one looks down on another, it is not necessary to look up to the other in admiration. Intimate living together soon weakens admiration

because many aspects of the personality of the most admirable person do not, on close acquaintanceship, stir admiration; those that originally did are apt to seem less admirable.

The tendency of any rivalry is to become increasingly keen and "in earnest" unless there is consciously maintained an underlying sympathetic attitude. If this is maintained the rivalry is not real rivalry. Instead of the attention being centred on gaining superiority over the other, as in real rivalry, the individual aims by doing his best to stimulate the other to do his best and there is an enthusiastic acknowledgment by each of the points of superiority of the other. Thus each tries to do something for the other instead of to belittle the other by proving himself superior.

Conversely, rivalry may be the underlying disposition. The rivalry may be real rivalry, though conducted under a veil of goodwill. Contests between opposing lawyers often are bitterly in earnest while the forms of friendly intercourse are maintained and the lawyer "never loses his smile." Much business rivalry, also, is of this sort. There is no underlying mood of friendliness. The rivalry is the essential relation, though conducted under a veil of goodwill. The goodwill and politeness are "tricks of trade," and are employed because they attract customers, and prevent rivals exerting themselves to the utmost, which would cause a lapse into cut-throat competition at the expense of all rivals. While in business and in the law and other professions the rivalrous relation is essential, it is not necessarily so in all those who participate. Most of them take the prevailing rivalry seriously and find it fairly congenial, while those of sympathetic and intellectual dispositions follow their personal impulses, as far as possible, in their attitude to rivals, clients and customers, which results in variations from the prevailing business and professional behaviour.

The relation of sympathy to the egoistic dispositions cannot be understood without some reference to certain processes of personality. Essential among these is the diurnal rhythm from a forceful to an expansive mood. The forceful mood is the mood of work, and of the action of the egoistic dispositions involved in self-preservation, the expansive mood, of relaxation. People naturally seek social intercourse when relaxed,⁸ except those of extraordinary mentality who are trained in ideational relaxation.⁹ In the play of social in-

⁸ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 55, 73.

⁹ Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 98-99.

tercourse a great variety of impulses are discernible. In their sociable talk after the day's work, workmen are rivalrous, dominating, contemptuous, kindly, but all in the expansive mood of social intercourse. For the sake of sociability they will assent to what they would have seriously disputed during the day. The experiences of the day's work pass before their minds and the unpleasant experiences—the failures—are unexpressed, while the quarrels and triumphs are recounted, not with the seriousness of the original experiences but for the sake of the flow of the ideas of the reminiscent imagination. The good fellow is the one who most successfully avoids the seriousness of the day's work, and assumes the expansive mood. Men want to see on each other's faces the expression of sociability, so that the impulse is to cheer up the depressed, to gladden still more those who are glad. This sympathetic disposition is contrary to the rivalrous, dominating and other forceful dispositions, and their action in play has to be constantly watched and controlled lest the play suddenly become in earnest, as the play fighting of animals or boys, or the sociable dispute of workmen or the friendly debate of college students.

The expansive mood is, therefore, one in which a person is inclined to accept the suggestions of another. A speaker aims to put his audience in this mood by his agreeable manner and delivery and his anecdotes. Employers of labour aim to cultivate this mood in workmen as one means of controlling them.¹⁰ When the seriousness of a situation makes this mood impossible the suggestible one that it is sought to cultivate is that of submission or admiration.

The mental process of the forceful mood is concentration, and the rhythm is from concentration to the free flow of ideas for their own sake. This rhythm is facilitated by social intercourse between likeminded people. Likemindedness facilitates the enjoyment of ideas for their own sake. People who are not likeminded when together feel like being on their guard in their expressions of opinion. Their intercourse does not invite that free flow of ideas that means mental relaxation. The assent of another to one's ideas dispels any doubt, and encourages unhesitating, spontaneous expression. The enjoyment of this mental play is associated with the other who stimulates it by his or her presence and assent. Likemindedness has an important function, also, in the concentration period of the rhythm, when another clarifies one's problem and one's mind moves along

¹⁰ See chapter entitled, *Employment Management as a Remedy for the Conflict of Interests*.

with that of the other and associates with the other this enjoyment of intellectual clarification. Associates whose minds are thus united by experiences of intellectual clarification develop an attitude of confidence in each other. The mind of the one confidently invites illumination of the other, and, conversely, feels that, if it can convince the other of a certain truth it will itself be more confident of that truth. In the course of this intellectual interchange potential is converted into actual likeness and people become able to work together for common ends.¹¹

Sympathy facilitates likemindedness in that it enables us to share the mental states of others. Conversely, likemindedness facilitates the action of the sympathetic disposition, for it is easier to feel with, and understand one whose impulses, attitudes and ideas resemble one's own than one who is entirely different. But likemindedness is not itself sympathy. In their relations two likeminded persons may be moved by pronounced egoistic dispositions¹² instead of by sympathy. The solidarity of a labour group is due to the fact that each workman perceives *his own interest* to be identical with that of others, not to the fact that he sympathizes with and seeks primarily the interest of others.¹³ The bond of union of capitalistic interests is similarly an egoistic likemindedness. Likemindedness is, then, a broader term than sympathy.

The intellectual disposition is a process that may function in connection with any instinct. "It may be said that every instinct is *curious*, for every instinct, in man at any rate, tends to lend interest to objects in any way bearing upon its own operation. . . ."¹⁴ The intellectual disposition may serve any other, or it may act independently. Children are constantly asking questions about what has no other interest except that it has aroused curiosity. This independent action of the intellect is characteristic also of the scientist. Darwin made it quite explicit in his autobiography that, while he had felt the rivalrous disposition in connection with his work, the disposition to which he owed his scientific achievements was his "love of natural science."¹⁵ He states explicitly that this was a "pure love" and

¹¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 17-19; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, 63; Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, Pt. II; Giddings, *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Chs. III-IV; Giddings, *Pluralistic Behavior*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., January and March, 1920, 385-404; 539-561.

¹² See the chapter entitled, *The Basis of Congeniality*.

¹³ See the chapter entitled, *The New Attitude of Labour*.

¹⁴ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 55.

¹⁵ Darwin, *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, I: 83.

implies that, while he felt the rivalrous disposition, he curbed it: "I do not mean to say that a favourable review or a large sale of my books did not please me greatly, but the pleasure was a fleeting one, and I am sure that I have never turned one inch out of my course to gain fame."¹⁶ Sometimes the curiosity of the scientist runs away with him and he does not hesitate at problems on which the data are so scant that they seem, in the nature of the case, insoluble, as the problem of immortality. There is, therefore, an intellectual disposition, which is as truly instinctive as any other. "If it still seems anomalous to find the activity of intellect, customarily contrasted with instinct, brought within the category, we may remember that while the intellect finds reasons (which are certainly something else than instinct), it does not begin by asking the reason for finding reasons. The motive or value of its own activity is, during that activity, unreasoned and untaught. The *exercise* of thought, as has often been remarked, is a matter of our impulsive nature; and it is the underlying craving for action, not the particular type of activity that betokens the instinct."¹⁷

Curiosity has a number of constituent instincts, including attention to novel stimuli, visual exploration and manipulation.¹⁸ When curiosity is strong in workmen it takes the form of an "instinct of workmanship"¹⁹ or "instinct of contrivance."²⁰ In the extraordinary inventive genius, the contriving impulses work without any ulterior motive, but in the lesser, they function in connection with other dispositions.²¹ In the monotonous work of machine industry the contriving impulses disappear because the work is entirely devoid of interest.²² Where a man enjoys some opportunity for initiative the situation is different. His intellectual impulses are aroused. He is interested in his work. Even if the work involves little contrivance there is at least a leading purpose as to the day's work which he wants to corroborate. He wants to *see* his work done. If he is working for another man he wants to *show results*. Ideas that originate in the action of other dispositions are so controlled that the impulses of these ideas are shunted into the service of the day's purpose. The solitary farmer, as he works, thinks of the neighbouring farmer, his

¹⁶ *Ibid.* I: 55.

¹⁷ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 61-62.

¹⁸ Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 135-140.

¹⁹ Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, 15; Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 143.

²⁰ Taussig, *Inventors and Money-Makers*, Chs. I-II.

²¹ *Ibid.* Ch. I.

²² Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, 49-52.

rival, and the rivalrous thought stimulates his working movements. He thinks of the field or horse that will be his if the harvest is good and the acquisitive thought energizes him. Therefore, while the intellect ordinarily serves a purpose suggested by another disposition, in the course of its activity it absorbs impulsions of other dispositions for the realization of that purpose.

The employer, likewise, though moved by an acquisitive or rivalrous purpose, may show a pronounced activity of the intellectual disposition. The rare intellectual business man is not satisfied until he has built up his enterprise from the small beginnings to a stage of perfection that corroborates his plan.²³ It is the realization of his dream as the book is of the author's. The best type of business man gets interested in building his business, and improvements become a passion even though they lead nowhere immediately. Experts sometimes are puzzled to find business men asking for investigations of various parts of the business and then not putting the results into practice. It is because the passion for improvement outruns the financial possibilities, or the capacity of the existing personnel. The enjoyment of experimentation causes these business men to feel that an investigation will yield more important practical results than it really does. This type of business man differs radically from that in which the pronounced disposition is not the intellectual but the acquisitive or rivalrous and which consequently makes business a hard profit-seeking venture. This type of employer finds it impossible to understand associates and workmen who have impulses for creative work.

The intellectual disposition may have one of two relations to every other. Each disposition may enlist the intelligence for the sake of its own satisfaction, or the intelligence may react upon it for the sake ultimately of the satisfaction of the intellectual disposition in social adjustment.²⁴ Thus, the rivalrous disposition may enlist intelligence and the imagination may be stimulated in laying plans for winning superiority without limit, as in the speculator, the promoter, the ambitious politician. Or the intelligence, instead of merely serving the rivalrous disposition, may react upon it, as when gaining a position of superiority results in increased thoughtfulness on account of the problems there opened up. Whether this shall be the effect of attaining a superior position depends essen-

²³ Taussig, Inventors and Money Makers, 57-60.

²⁴ Ellwood, An Introduction to Social Psychology, 67-68.

tially on the disposition of the individual rather than on the social relation he happens to be in at the time, wherefore we find, in all kinds of social relations, a tendency of superior position to increase sense of responsibility. In the family, an older daughter is sometimes given charge of the other children and thereby ceases to act as their rival and develops a thoughtfulness and conscientious care beyond her years. Responsibility may have the same effect on those given positions of trust in ecclesiastical organizations.²⁵ Business men of the intellectual type, as they rise in the economic organization, have an increasing sense of responsibility for the welfare of their workmen and the progress of their industry. College and university teachers, as they reach a position of influence, are apt to feel more responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of their statements. Political leaders who have been impulsive in the rivalry for office sometimes develop into cautious and responsible administrators, and withstand the importunity of politicians in their insistence on an efficiency standard at least in appointment to the most important offices. Among men of intellectual disposition, personal ambition, family pride, partisanship, chauvinism are forgotten in the sobering sense of the responsibility of a high position. Conversely, to men of a rivalrous disposition, high position is simply a means of elevating members of their family or party to office and themselves to a still higher position.

The dominating disposition, also, may enlist the intelligence or the intelligence may react upon it. The dominating disposition stimulates deductive thinking and argumentation under the impulse to convince another of the truth of one's idea, often by wittily making the opposing ideas appear contemptible. Students who are more or less indifferent to their studies are apt to show an increased interest when an opportunity for argument arises. Keenness of logical reasoning often very evidently springs from the impulse to close every avenue of escape from the idea that the reasoner is trying to impress on another. Or the intelligence may react upon the dominating disposition, and, by opening the mind, inhibit that cocksureness with which one tries to impress another with the truth of his idea.

The sympathetic disposition, also, may enlist the intelligence or the intelligence may react upon it. The form of intelligence enlisted is an impressionability, a quick responsiveness,²⁶ an appreciation of what

²⁵ Reynolds, Fisher and Wright, *Two Centuries of Christian Activity at Yale*, 183.

²⁶ Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 106.

others need and of what will make them happy for the time being. Or the intelligence may react upon the disposition and, for the sake of realizing a rational social purpose, inhibit the impulsive wanting to see everybody momentarily satisfied and happy. The motive becomes primarily to understand the other and to make him feel he is understood.²⁷ The intellectual attitude enables one to ignore the lack of gratitude or annoyance shown by those benefited or denied in the present for the sake of their future welfare. An intelligent sympathy enables the parent to give the children not what they want but what they would want if they were sufficiently intelligent, whether they like it or not. It enables the publicist to stand not for what the people want but for what they ought to want. Intellect without sympathy, on the other hand, except in the case of the single-minded scientist or other extraordinarily intellectual person, inevitably serves egoistic dispositions.

Though the dispositions differ in behaviour and objective they are, as we have seen, intimately connected. Their satisfaction is relative. Though different dispositions predominate in different individuals each feels impulses of all, and the satisfaction of certain ones releases impulses for the satisfaction of others. In the day's experiences the forceful dispositions are first active and, when satisfied, release a craving for the sympathetic experiences of home or friendly circle. Similarly there is a life rhythm. In youth the forceful dispositions are active but fall in abeyance toward the end of life when sympathy and reflection succeed ambitious planning and aggressive self-seeking.²⁸ This fact of the relativity of satisfaction must be considered in developing a theory of personality. It is due not only to the intimate connections of dispositions but also (1) to the economic scarcity, which requires careful choice of impulses to be satisfied and the inhibition of some for the sake of the satisfaction of others, and (2) to the fact that action for social self-realization involves the action of all the dispositions. It involves deliberately making certain dispositions the organizing ones, and these are precisely the ones required from the standpoint of personal development.²⁹

The dispositions that have been delineated are conceptions assumed for our analysis of social organization. An adequate treat-

²⁷ Read the discriminating description of the proper attitude of physician to nervous patient in White, *Outlines of Psychiatry*, 50-51.

²⁸ Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, 259.

²⁹ See Chapter XXX.

ment of them will require a separate volume. The point to bear in mind is that they are complexes that are variously combined in concrete personalities. If one speaks of a lawyer or minister of a certain disposition, one merely signifies the disposition that predominates in his behaviour. Personifications of dispositions are apt to be found in novels, not in real life. In the analysis of behaviour, then, the reader must not allow his imagination to suggest particular individuals of his acquaintance in connection with this or that disposition. Men as we find them embody several dispositions, often contrary ones; and much of their life's struggles arises from the conflicts due to the contrary dispositions with which they are animated. Thus animated they often appear inconsistent, when, as a matter of fact, the disposition that is most conspicuous in a man's behaviour may be one which he is consciously trying to "overcome" but is only partially successful. His behaviour appears inconsistent but he is consistently trying to make certain dispositions the organizing forces in his character. The tendency in the personal life is to adjust the conflict of dispositions by consciously and, perhaps, still more, unconsciously making certain dispositions the organizing forces, thus, as far as possible, doing away with the annoyance occasioned by contrary and conflicting dispositions.

What dispositions will be made the organizing ones depends on what ones are pronounced in the individual—he will instinctively seek satisfaction of these,—and on what ones predominate in the social attitudes of the groups of which the individual is a member. He will be subject to the social suggestions of group attitudes. Hence a youth is inclined to select a vocation, the attitudes of which are congenial to his dominant dispositions, and success and happiness in a vocation depends on doing this.³⁰ For instance, the rivalrous youth chooses business or the law in which he can give his rivalrous disposition free rein and justifies this with various secondary explanations; thus the rivalrous disposition becomes the organizing disposition of his life. Teaching gives freer play to the intellectual disposition than law or business, so that the man of intellectual disposition inclines to teaching. But he finds therein a strong stimulus on the rivalrous disposition, wherefore his great problem becomes that of the extent to which he will inhibit that disposition in order to give free rein to his intellect and make it the organizing principle of his life.

³⁰ Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 73-75.

While the vocation may appeal predominantly to certain dispositions, it does not appeal exclusively to them, so that the problem for the individual is not merely to accept the organizing influence of his vocation, but to cultivate those variant aspects of the vocational behaviour that will make the vocation more effectively serve the development of personality.

It follows from the intimate relation of disposition to the choice of a vocation, and from the effect of vocation on character and the effect of strong and variant characters on standards of vocational behaviour, that people who are so unfortunate as not to have a vocation are without the essential means of self-development. In children the different dispositions are seen in their original oppositions. In the vocational experience inhibitions are carried out and connections formed which effectively organize the dispositions. But sometimes a youth or girl brought up in easy circumstances has merely satisfied, instead of organizing the dispositions, so that these remain with many of their original contradictions. One often meets men and women who appear to be over-grown children. Their behaviour is impulsive and they have not organized their contradictory dispositions in a way to develop an effective personality.

A progressive social order requires that the intellectual disposition be emphasized in a liberal education. For it is necessary that those who are to have a part in the solution of the problems of the time should meet those problems not from the point of view of the satisfaction of that disposition and those attitudes which class and vocation have emphasized, but with a free exercise of the intellect and for the satisfaction of the intellect itself. The tendency of a liberal education should be, therefore, to make the intellectual disposition the organizing principle of the personal life. The advantages of this are: that the mental life thus gains a satisfying breadth that adjusts all the other dispositions through enlisting and adjusting their characteristic mental processes; and that in reaction of individual on environment, absorption in the intellectual interest makes the individual disinterested in his solution of problems.

Making the intellectual disposition the organizing one is the surest way to secure the requisite development of the sympathetic disposition. For a high degree of intelligence is due to a highly developed nervous system, which makes possible a high degree of mental interaction, wherefore the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions tend

to develop together, and each to facilitate the satisfaction of the other.³¹

The organization of dispositions depends not only on what disposition predominates in the individual but also on his or her mentality. The behaviour of perhaps the great mass of people is largely determined by their local and face-to-face relations. Their acquisition is determined by the degree of industriousness of those around them. They conform to the prevailing submissive and dominating attitudes in the family, industry, the church, and the body politic. Their rivalry is the petty rivalry with associates. Their sex behaviour likewise is determined by response to stimulus, by the moving pictures, the allusions to sex that they hear, as well as by the prevalent beliefs as to what is proper behaviour toward the other sex. Their sympathy is primitive, largely confined to the family, and they have no intellectual interests. This conforming mass looks upon the man of some imagination and ambition as a "promising young man." His thought naturally takes the direction of his vocation and his imagination looks beyond his immediate vocational associates to something of a career. If his mentality is made largely or entirely to serve the rivalrous disposition, that disposition will become the organizing one of his character. But if others are strong they will deflect mentality from rivalrous aims, and this conflict of dispositions inevitably stimulates and invigorates the intellect and pushes it to the fore as a conscious process. The self may thus gradually become a self-conscious personality and the intellect a disposition distinct from those it serves, with its own impulses for satisfaction. The intellect may thus become the organizing force in the personal life, and its satisfaction and requirements the ultimate test of the truth of solutions of the various problems of social adjustment. This type of mentality not only lifts the individual out of his face-to-face relations but also detaches him from his vocational experience and makes of him a personality with distinct ideals and a critically intellectual attitude. A person thus individualized is very rare, but partially individualized personalities are common among people of a vigorous intellectual disposition.

The organization of the dispositions may take place in more or less impulsive response to social suggestion or with a view to a conscious development of personality. The tyranny of an unusually

³¹ Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, 393; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, Ch. IX.

strong disposition may warp the development of personality as much as may uncritical response to social suggestion. For instance, the business man must control his rivalrous disposition not only in the interest of social justice but also for the sake of his own personal development. The scholar must not only properly limit his critical impulses and judiciously express his convictions in his social relations but also, for the sake of his own personal development, must control his impulse for perfectly satisfying clearness which so often leads to logical consistency at the expense of truth.³² The sympathetic person must have power to say, "I will not sympathize," when the situation demands hardships of others as well as of himself. A conscious development of personality requires the control of inordinately strong dispositions. This is not done independently of social suggestion, for the objective process develops a subjective counterpart.³³ A boy who is made to obey by a wise parent thereby acquires the power of commanding and controlling himself. His power to say no to an impulse depends partly on the power with which his mother said no to his impulsive self in his boyhood. Thus is his dominating disposition organized in the service of intellectual power of inhibition. In like manner the submissive disposition may be organized into an ennobling resignation to the inevitable; the rivalrous disposition into a keenness for the cultivation of excellencies seen in others; the sympathetic disposition into a refining and broadening consideration of others' feelings and ideas. Thus may be organized a rationally conscientious character. As a particular type of parental training, carried on for generations, gives a family a distinctive character, so an intellectual training in school and college should develop a rationally conscientious character for action in the larger world. For all men, regardless of their vocational experience, there is the larger situation involved in their presence in, and the necessity of action in a world of men. The final problem of adaptation is not vocational but a problem of manhood and womanhood.

The social organization has differentiated into social institutions along the lines of which are sought the satisfaction of particular dispositions. Social control in a particular institution is gained by satisfying the dispositions of others which predominantly seek satisfaction in that set of social relations. The family is the institution in

³² Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, 451-452.

³³ Dewey, *Some Stages of Logical Thought*, *Phil. Rev.*, IX: 473.

which the sympathetic disposition most naturally seeks satisfaction, and influence in the family is gained by satisfying others' sympathetic impulses. In industry the situation stimulates the impulses involved in workmanship, and control is exercised most effectively by foremen and managers who contribute to the satisfaction of those impulses. In all institutional development there is also another tendency, namely, not only to afford satisfaction of the dispositions that predominantly seek satisfaction therein, but also to broaden the area of satisfaction. Thus, in the development of the family an increasingly wide range of dispositions have found satisfaction. In the development of industry, variations in behaviour have increased the play of other dispositions than those that determined the predominant forms of industrial institutions. Political institutions developed out of the domination exercised by an upper class; but, in the development of the state, variations in political behaviour have restrained domination, have made the submission of subjects less exclusively the motive of political allegiance, and have increased the play of other dispositions. While each institution serves primarily some predominate dispositions, the development of each institution has been paralleled by an increasing variety of connections with the result that a wider satisfaction has been realized through the functioning of the institution. Further progress in institutional development requires the formulation of a definite function for each institution,³⁴ and this involves a knowledge of its psychological basis and a theory of the development of personality which it serves.

The sympathetic disposition is weak as compared with egoistic dispositions because the action of the sympathetic has been confined largely to the family while the egoistic have been predominant in the economic relations of the family with the outside world, and have mainly determined institutional development, which, in turn, has strengthened them. The struggle for subsistence has been supplemented by a struggle to win those positions of authority in which not only subsistence but a variety of satisfactions are possible with little or no effort, positions in which, also, one is free of the harassing experience of the uncertainty and submission incident to being under authority. The entire social organization has been influenced by the impulsion of these egoistic impulses. In spite of the variations in political institutions referred to in a preceding paragraph, the ultimate fact in the sovereignty of the state remains its obedience-

³⁴ Cole, Social Theory.

compelling power, to wield which party organizations and economic classes contest for control of the government. The ultimate fact in the control of capital also is an obedience-compelling power—the power to use men and materials in profit-seeking. Rivalry for positions of authority, exercise of authority and subordination to authority are the essential political and economic attitudes. The rivalrous and dominating dispositions are conspicuous likewise in family, academic and ecclesiastical relations. The egoistic dispositions are predominant in the traditional social organization, while the altruistic are, for the most part, unorganized and lack the stimulus that is imparted by organization.³⁵ Successive generations of natural, sympathetic young people come up, feel impulses to improve conditions for the development of personality, meet discouragements, "learn their lesson," "subside," and become more or less hopeless and indifferent. Individuals pronouncedly sympathetic persist in their ideals and gather likeminded groups around them. But the ideas of these groups are met by the opposition of a state, of an economic order, of ecclesiastical and educational systems that, in spite of features to the contrary, are organized essentially for the satisfaction of egoistic dispositions. Where should the reorganization begin? Obviously with that section of the population in which the sympathetic disposition has not been rationalized into an innocuous and selfish indifference,—with the youth of the land. It should be begun in public and higher education.

The development of altruism as an attitude of mind ³⁶ requires a constant resistance of the social pressure of the traditional organization. One must reach the conviction that egoistic behaviour is not justified merely because it is the prevailing behaviour, that it is the prevailing behavior because it is more unintelligent than altruistic.³⁷ But this conviction is difficult to reach because we are constantly under the pressure of the prevailing order. On this account the individual usually does not, until late in life, begin to "give vent" to the sympathetic impulses. As he nears that "vast forever" the social pressure lessens. He realizes that his time is short at the longest, that the self-preserving and other egoistic instincts should no longer entirely absorb him because he can no longer preserve himself. It is to be regretted that this shift toward the sympathetic disposition

³⁵ Dewey, *Progress, Intern. Jour. Ethics*, Apr., 1916, 317.

³⁶ Small, *Some Structural Material for the Idea of Democracy*, *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, Jan., 1920, 444.

³⁷ Thorndike, *Intelligence and Its Uses*, *Harper's Magazine*, Jan., 1920, 235.

comes so late that most men have only enough energy left to play with their grandchildren and make their wills. How much fuller life would be if, from the beginning, it had been lived from the point of view of the ideals suggested by sympathetic and intellectual impulses. This total view of life, and enlistment of the whole personality, which most men never fully comprehend is attained by great men early in their careers, as in the case of Lincoln who was constantly subduing his rivalrous and fearful impulses by consciously attending to them and asking them *why*.³⁸

³⁸ "Oh! why should the spirit of mortal be proud?" was the first line of a poem which he recited for some thirty years at every opportunity." (Hapgood, Abraham Lincoln, 49-50.)

BOOK II

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER V

PROCESSES OF THE ECONOMIC ORDER

THE prevailing motive of business enterprise is the quest of profits.¹ The production of goods and services goes on under the system that has developed out of the impulse of business men to make profits. Some enterprisers may feel other impulses more strongly but, under the existing system, only the exceptional man can afford to make his business a means of satisfying his sympathetic and intellectual dispositions.² The commanding financial and industrial positions are apt to be gained by men of strong rivalrous and dominating dispositions,³ whose behaviour determines the trend of economic development in a direction that satisfies those dispositions. And the mass of business men who feel those impulses less strongly conform to the system developed by the leaders. The system thus developed and perpetuated not only facilitates individualistic profit-getting, which is the important economic result, but also stifles variations in industrial behaviour which, if fostered, might change the trend of industrial development in the direction of a rational economic order, that is, one in which the production of goods and services is determined primarily for the public welfare. The social psychologist sees variations subjected to the controlling powers of the system, the authoritative profit-seekers, rather than to the selection of the public as investor and consumer, or of the working classes, who compose the large part of the public and produce the goods and services. Hence the essential conflict in industrial relations is between individualistic profit-seeking on the one hand and the public welfare on the other.

The legal aspect of the economic order emphasizes the function of

¹ Veblen, Theory of Business Enterprise, Chs. III-V; Mitchell, Business Cycles, Ch. II. For a statement of the situation by an industrial engineer see Gantt, Organizing for Work, Ch. I.

² Burritt, Dennison, Gay and others, Profit Sharing, Ch. XII.

³ Mitchell, op. cit., 33. For a statement on this point by an industrial engineer, see Wolf, Securing the Initiative of the Workman, Amer. Econ. Rev., IX (Supplement) : 120-121.

business enterprise as one of individualistic profit-seeking. Under the law the officers of a corporation must manage it for the benefit of the stockholders exclusively, and for failure to do this they may be held in an action for damages by the corporation.⁴ The law denies the legal right of directors to limit, on behalf of the public welfare, the dividends to be paid stockholders. This legal emphasis on the rights of profit-seekers as opposed to the public welfare is seen in the case of *Dodge v. Ford Motor Company*. The Dodges were large stockholders in the Ford Motor Company of which, however, Mr. Ford owned a majority of the stock, and so dominated the policy of the Company. The corporation had a capital stock of \$2,000,000, on which it paid 60% a year and in addition, from 1911 to 1916, special dividends that totalled \$41,000,000.⁵ In 1916, according to the bill of the plaintiffs, Mr. Ford "declared it to be the settled policy of the Company not to pay in the future any special dividends, but to put back into the business for the future all of the earnings of the Company other than the regular dividend of five per cent. (5%) monthly upon the authorized capital stock of the company—two million dollars. . . ."⁶ And plaintiffs charged that, in doing this, Mr. Ford alleged a humanitarian purpose, as follows: "My ambition is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business."⁷ Plaintiffs declared the ground on which they brought their complaint to be that "The proposed scheme of expansion is not for the financial advantage of the corporation, either mediate or immediate, and is not to be prosecuted with that intent, but for the purpose of increasing the number of employés and of the cars produced, to the end of giving employment and low-priced cars to a greater number of people."⁸ The plaintiffs, who owned one-tenth of the stock of the company, sued for a restraining order against the carrying out of the new policy. Counsel for plaintiffs alleged that the ends sought by Mr. Ford "are ends worthy in themselves but not within the scope of an ordinary business corporation—ends which, if prosecuted, should

⁴ Hirsch, *Business Law*, 441.

⁵ *Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.* Supreme Court of Michigan, Opinion and Decree, Feb., 1919, 4-5. (Decision published by Conway Brief Co., Detroit.)

⁶ *Ibid.* 8.

⁷ Brief for Plaintiffs, 10. Opinion and Decree, 9.

⁸ Brief for Plaintiffs, 3. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, 17, 18.

be by individuals associated for such purposes."⁹ The "chief basis of their bill was defendant Ford's alleged liberality towards the public and workers, to the sacrifice of stockholders' interests."¹⁰ Counsel for defendant replied that "Although a manufacturing corporation cannot engage in humanitarian works as its principal business, the fact that it is organized for profit does not prevent the existence of implied powers to carry on with humanitarian motives such charitable works as are incidental to the main business of the corporation."¹¹ And counsel declared that Mr. Ford's policy might, in the long run, prove to be wise for the aggrieved stockholders in that Mr. Ford had said "he did not believe the public would stand for such excessive profits."¹² The court decided that "there should be no confusion . . . of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes."¹³ The court affirmed the decree of the lower court ordering the stated distribution of profits to the stockholders.¹⁴

Predominant in the legal aspect of the economic system is the assumption that the utmost freedom of individualistic profit-seeking is for the public welfare, that this free competition for profits is worth more than it costs.¹⁵ The analysis of the legal aspect will not be carried further here as we have analyzed it at length elsewhere.¹⁶

Our purpose is not to challenge the value of the capitalistic system as a mechanism of production and distribution, nor are we apologists for it. Our aim is to analyze its underlying psychological processes. Our analysis is not a culmination of a series of exhaustive investigations by many students of the subject, but an attempt to

⁹ Brief for Plaintiffs, 3. Opinion and Decree, 32, 47, 48.

¹⁰ Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' "Reply Brief," 13.

¹¹ Brief for Defendants, 127. Opinion and Decree, 48.

¹² Supplemental Pages to the Original Brief for Defendants, 8.

¹³ Opinions and Decree, 49.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 52.

¹⁵ Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, 253, 244.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Chs. XI-XVIII.

bring together and to carry a stage further the beginnings of such investigations.

The work requires the strictest maintenance of the intellectual attitude. The reader, as well as the writer, must maintain that attitude. Without a conscious and deliberately maintained intellectual attitude, one subconsciously yields to the attitudes he has acquired through long susceptibility to the social suggestions of his environment. The intellectual attitude requires that we turn the mind's eye on our heretofore unconscious attitudes and regard them critically. Otherwise, to accept the attitude of the class to whose influence we have been subject is to be prejudiced against the other. Yet so rare is this intellectual attitude that one who maintains it is regarded askance. If his opinions seem to favour the labouring class he is, by the employing class, regarded as prejudiced against them and for the labouring class; and, by the labouring class, as prejudiced favourably for them, and, therefore, against the employing class. Or else he is regarded as having the interested aloofness of the consumer, as being against any class whose action is believed to make for high prices. So rare is the intellectual attitude that the community generally refuses to believe that any man can be consistently actuated by it, and insists on identifying the man of intellectual attitude with that group in the community which his opinions seem to favour. Opinions that seem to favour one class and discredit another do not, therefore, necessarily have that significance in the mind of the scientific man. He states his facts and interpretations without regard to the likes or dislikes of any class. He writes only for those who, by the exercise of the intellectual attitude, free themselves from the influence of class attitudes. With this understanding as to our point of view we turn again to our analysis of the processes of the economic order.

Business is organized, for the quest of profits, in the form of corporations the liability of the stockholders of which usually is limited to their investment. This limited liability reduces to a minimum the risk taken by the investor, as well as his sense of responsibility for the effect of the activities of the corporation on the public welfare. For he surrenders his interest in the management to a board of directors, who are held accountable for its management. In a corporation of many stockholders only the large stockholders practically have any voice in its management.¹⁷ Economic behaviour thus loses the aspect

¹⁷ Brandeis, *Other Peoples' Money and How Bankers Use It*, 59-60.

of personal accountability that it had in the days of small business enterprises.¹⁸ The immense size of many of these corporations makes business a venture far more momentous for or against the public welfare than formerly. It becomes particularly so in a war period when the dependence of the government on the capitalistic class enables the latter to profiteer with impunity.¹⁹ Individual stockholders feel no blame for the profiteering policy of the corporation through which they profit. They are, for the most part, ignorant or "innocent" investors, who know little or nothing about the way in which their business is conducted. They know little about the relative security of investments, and have come to trust some investment bank which, because of this confidence of investors, or "goodwill" as it is called, is able to sell the securities of various corporations, and thus acquires an immense influence far and wide in the management of corporations.²⁰ Investment banking interests are, in turn, subject to the control of a relatively small number of men, who so co-operate as to reduce the risk of extension of credits to a minimum,²¹ and are, therefore, in a position of financial power that stimulates to an extreme degree the rivalrous and dominating dispositions.

For working capital, as distinguished from fixed capital, the corporation is dependent on the commercial bank. "If, in the judgment of the commercial bankers, a particular borrower in a given line of industry is not entitled to credit, there is little chance of his survival in competition with others whose credit standing is unimpaired. Since the possession of adequate working capital is quite as indispensable as the possession of fixed capital, the commercial banker thus in a sense holds the veto power over the decision of the investment banker, even as the investment banker holds the veto power over the decision of

¹⁸ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 498-507; Fite, *Moral Valuations and Economic Laws*, *Jour. Phil. Psy. Sc. M.*, XIV: 10-16; Veblen, *The Modern Point of View and the New Order*, *The Dial*, Dec. 14, 1918, 543-547.

¹⁹ For war profiteering in the U. S. see Friday, *Profits, Wages and Prices*, Chs. II-XI. Professor Hobson, after analysing the different kinds of war profiteering in England, which added several thousand million pounds to the property of the profiteers, writes: "That this mass of new wealth, due to war scarcity and risks, and obtained at the expense of the taxpayer or the consumer by a comparatively few rich, powerful, lucky or unscrupulous men, should have contributed little or nothing to the expenses of the war, is widely and justly resented, and lies at the root of our present discontents." (Hobson, *Taxation in the New State*, 178-179.)

²⁰ Veblen, *Theory of the Business Enterprise*, 171-174; Brandeis, *op. cit.*, 99, 113, 191.

²¹ Veblen, *The Industrial System and the Captains of Industry*, *The Dial*, May 31, 1919, 557.

the manager of a corporation which is seeking to raise fixed capital. And certainly, it will be observed, the dependence of almost every business upon both investment and commercial bankers results in giving to these financiers a predominant influence in the control of the development of industry.”²² It is the money of many thousands of investors and depositors, controlled and used by these financial powers, which gives them their dominant position, wherefore it is a vital question for the public whether or not the control is exercised for the public welfare. This is to be answered, not merely from the effect of the control on the interests of investors and depositors, but also from its effect on the working hosts employed by corporations thus controlled,²³ and on the consumers that are dependent on those corporations for the necessities of life. We have, then, uninformed investors dependent on financial interests for opportunities to invest; a consuming public dependent on corporations for the goods of life, while these corporations aim to perfect arrangements which will enable them to fix prices in a way to realize the largest profits; these corporations, in turn, dependent for loans on financial interests which also are seeking primarily private profits; and workmen dependent on these industrial and financial interests for an opportunity to work —a condition of general dependence that gives the leaders great power, and is favourable to the action of the dispositions for maintenance of superiority and for mastery.

Obviously whether such a system will serve the public welfare will depend on whether the leaders invariably put public welfare above private profits, and are men of such wisdom as reasonably to achieve that purpose. Banking is based on confidence and the public welfare requires that confidence in banks be maintained. Because lack of confidence in one may precipitate a run on many, banks have developed a high degree of co-operation and an admirable mechanism for the security of depositors and investors. They have also developed a procedure to encourage sound business, that is, safely profitable business. All this has been done under the impulse for private profits, and the centralization naturally tended toward an autocratic control that was used in the interest of profit-seekers who occupied strategic positions. This tendency called for reforms in the interest of the public welfare.²⁴ These have not seriously weak-

²² Moulton, *The Financial Organization of Society*, 750-751.

²³ Final Report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915, 117-118, 16-21.

²⁴ Moulton, *The Financial Organization of Society*, 756-771.

ened the bankers' autocratic control.²⁵ They consider not merely security but character in the making of loans, and are apt to include in the category of unsafe character progressive tendencies in business men, particularly in their attitude to labour. They also refuse to float government bonds of states in which progressive agricultural or labour interests control the government. For bankers are extremely solicitous about the delicate psychological mechanism of confidence which depends on the smooth running of business whereby business men may meet their obligations. This requires that workmen work like well disciplined hosts, and banks are impatient with any ideas or practices among business men, and with any governmental policies that may unsettle the conventional economic attitudes and encourage new impulses; and they use their positions on the directorates of corporations whose bonds they float, and their enormous influence with business men generally to maintain their autocratic attitude. This attitude is one of the chief obstacles to progress in industrial relations.

The development of industrial, as well as financial organization has taken a direction of autocratic control in the interest of private profits. Economists pass in review various alleged causes of the development of monopoly—possession of patents, control of raw materials and of transportation, control of capital, the tariff—and conclude that these causes were not the essential ones, that the essential one was the desire to create a monopoly in order to make large profits and gain control of the industry.²⁶ It is this motive that prompts the unfair practices of ruthless competition that ends in monopoly. Of the motives of those instrumental in the growth of monopoly, writers in sympathy with that development say: "Possibly the chief influence in the long run in promoting combinations of capital, as well as their most far-reaching effect in the earlier days of the Trusts, was the element of personal ambition which is fostered by monopoly. There can be no doubt that, in the case of the larger industrial combinations, the belief on the part of the managers that a virtual monopoly could be secured was a powerful element toward bringing about their formation. The pride of power, and the pleasure which comes from the exercise of great power, are in themselves exceedingly attractive to strong men. As one with political aspirations will sacrifice much and take many risks for the

²⁵ *Ibid.* 772.

²⁶ Durand, *The Trust Problem*, 23-27; Jones, *The Trust Problem in the United States*, 562.

sake of securing political preferment in order that he may in this way rule his fellows, so a successful organizer of business derives keen satisfaction from feeling that he alone is practically directing the destinies of a great people, so far as his one line of business is concerned. Mr. Havemeyer said that his ambition was to refine the sugar of the American people. Mr. Gates asserted that it was the ambition of the organizers of the American Steel and Wire Company to control the wire output of the world. . . . No one can question that these elements of personal satisfaction and pride are most powerful factors in all lines of social intercourse, and this pride could not be gratified in business short of the belief on the part of these men that they could secure a practical monopoly.²⁷ To prevail in their impulse for superiority, these masterful leaders appealed to the impulse for monopoly profits of the independents that must be incorporated,²⁸ or to their fear of what would happen if they refused to join the consolidation.²⁹ The monopolists persisted in the face of unfavourable judicial decisions³⁰ until the United States Supreme Court decided to make a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable industrial consolidations and to allow those considered reasonable to continue to exist.³¹ But, in notable cases, corporations condemned as unreasonable and ordered to dissolve as di-

²⁷ Jenks and Clark, *The Trust Problem*, 75-76.

²⁸ Durand, *op. cit.*, 26-27.

²⁹ Masters of corporation bent on creating a monopoly find their task made easy by the apprehension of independent weaker companies. In the meat-packing industry, "The powerful position in the industry which the big packers occupy and such practices as the foregoing, by which they have made themselves felt, have inspired the independents with much caution and even fear of running counter to them." (Federal Trade Commission, *Report on the Meat-Packing Industry*, 1919, Pt. III: 138.) Again, in a decision in a government suit against the American Can Company, the judge declared that the reason so many can-makers sold out to the American Can Company was fear of what would happen if they did not; that some were threatened but that threats were generally unnecessary because "the apprehension was quite general that the only choice was between going out or being driven out." (U. S. v. American Can Co., Distr. C. Md., Feb. 23, 1916, Reprint.)

³⁰ Said Justice Harlan of the attitude of combinations to the Anti-Trust law of 1890, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in 1896 (*United States v. Missouri Freight Association*, 166 U. S., 290-344): "But those who were in combinations that were illegal did not despair. They at once set up the baseless claim that the decision of 1896 disturbed the 'business interests of the country,' and let it be known that they would never be content until the rule was established that would permit interstate commerce to be subjected to reasonable restraints." (*Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States*, 221 U. S. Supr. Ct. Repts., 1910, 657.)

³¹ 221 U. S. Supr. Ct. Repts., 1910, 641-652.

rected by the court have continued under tacit agreement.³² The criterion of reasonable is that the consolidation, which may have a pronounced market leadership, does not indulge in "unfair practices" and does not, in the mind of the court, injure the public.³³ Thus, what the monopolists sought to attain they have attained in spite of determined efforts to prevent it on the part of all organs of government.³⁴ A monopoly may virtually exist. If declared illegal it may continue to exist by tacit agreement. One psychological effect on business men generally of this failure of the government to prevent monopoly has been to encourage the motives that actuate the monopolist. While the anti-trust agitation may have improved business morals in some respects, the examples of business men who have had their will in spite of all the government could do, and have amassed great fortunes, cannot but have had an effect widely in emboldening to profiteering. One sometimes hears a business man refer to a successful monopolist as an excuse for profiteering, and doubtless these justifications often are felt effectively when not expressed. It is inevitable that the behaviour through which the successful achieved their conspicuous success should be widely imitated.

Once the trend toward monopoly is started under the impulsion of the rivalrous and dominating dispositions of masterful personalities, other psychological conditions tend to accentuate it. The big concern and the names of successful organizers associated with it exercise a suggestive control over the public. It can afford to advertise extensively. Even an enterprise that is not economically monopolistic may acquire a prestige over rivals, through advertising and otherwise, that makes it what we might call a psychological monopoly, "a monopoly of custom and prestige. This form of monopoly is sometimes of great value, and is frequently sold under the name goodwill, trade marks, brands. . . . Instances are known where such monopolies of custom, prestige, prejudice, have been sold at prices running up into the millions."³⁵ When a corporation is also eco-

³² Durand, *op cit.*, 36.

³³ United States v. United States Steel Corporation, Advanced Opinions, Apr. 1, 1920, pp. 222ff.

³⁴ Senator Sherman sponsor for the Anti-Trust Law of 1890, in a speech in favour of his bill, declared its purpose to be to make unlawful monopolistic combinations: "If we will not endure a king as a political power . . . we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price. . . ." (Congress. Rec., Vol. 21, Pt. 3, March, 1890, 24, 57.)

³⁵ Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*, 55-59; Davenport, *Economics of Enterprise*, 486, 487.

nomically monopolistic, this adds many new ways of advertising and perfecting the psychological monopoly. Its mere bigness and importance in the industrial world causes it and its officials to be frequently referred to in the papers, and its products and name are distributed everywhere among the people. Thus it builds up a reputation in the community until people come to react to their attitude to the establishment, without considering whether or not its goods are superior. When a number of great corporations have attained this psychological advantage, popular sentiment for breaking up monopolies begins to weaken, and courts begin to find reasons for justifying their existence. The monopoly has acquired a social-psychological foundation and courts attempt to give it a legal foundation.

Not only buyers but also investors are subject to the influence of the reputation of a great corporation. The investor "has ceased not only to manage capital, but to use care and judgment of his own as to the use of his savings in creating it. The investment banks are the most important real directors of the course of investment. . . .

"Hence the great power of those bankers who secure the confidence and support of numbers of investors. It is common to speak of the 'control' of a given enterprise—a railway, a factory or combination of factories, a mine or complex of mines—as being in the hands of an individual or a few individuals; and the public is staggered by calculations of the hundreds and thousands of millions' worth of capital which are dominated by a Morgan or a Rothschild. Control of this sort does not signify necessarily or usually a concentrated ownership of those millions. It does signify concentrated power, based on the confidence which a multitude of investors have in the judgment and leadership of commanding personalities."³⁶

In the promotion of industrial combinations, the goodwill possessed by the various corporations of the combination is capitalized, and a considerable proportion of the nominal capital of the combination "is made up of the capitalized goodwill of the concerns merged."³⁷ The financing firms and financiers who effect a combination in turn depend on their goodwill to enable them to market the stocks of the combination. And "the goodwill of the various great organizers and their financing houses has repeatedly been cap-

³⁶ Taussig, *Principles of Economics*, I: 95.

³⁷ Veblen, *op. cit.*, 126.

italized . . . in the common stock of the various corporations which they created.”³⁸

Nothing shows more interestingly that human nature is the same the world over than the fact that in “free America” the acquiescence of investors and the consuming public in the industrial and financial domination of the few is most marked. “The concentration of control in few hands shows itself most strikingly in the United States. Though we have been singularly reluctant to concentrate political control, we have been unhesitating in the acceptance of concentrated industrial control. It is odd that in England where unification of responsibility has been carried to the maximum in public affairs (at least, in the central government), directors still direct industry, and the powers of presiding managers are still strictly limited. In the United States, where the tradition of checks and balances continues to shape political organization, directors in industrial corporations are often no more than figure heads, while presidents are benevolent despots.”³⁹ This autocratic control rests on the acquiescence of investors, which is due not only to their ignorance but also to the fact that “bankers control the avenues to recognizedly safe investments almost as fully as they do the avenues to capital.”⁴⁰

As investors and customers develop goodwill toward a business enterprise, so employés develop goodwill toward an employer. And as the goodwill of customers is, by the employer, turned to account in his profit getting, so he may turn to his account the goodwill of his employés. This goodwill is regarded as legally belonging to the employer.⁴¹ Hence organizers of a union who, in the course of their efforts to persuade employés to join the union, thwart the expectancy based on the employer-function, lay themselves liable to legal prosecution. This was one of the reasons given by the United States Supreme Court, quoting former decisions, for declaring illegal the action of officials of the United Mine Workers of America who attempted to persuade the employés of the Hitchman Coal and Coke Company to organize a union. Speaking of this company as plaintiff, the Court said, in its decision affirming a perpetual injunction restraining officials of the United Mine Workers from attempting

³⁸ *Ibid.* 174.

³⁹ Taussig, *op. cit.* I: 95-96.

⁴⁰ Brandeis, *op. cit.*, 99, 113, 199.

⁴¹ Commons and Associates, *History of Labour in the United States*, II: 506. See the list of cases given in the note to this statement.

to unionize the mine of the plaintiff, that "plaintiff was and is entitled to the goodwill of its employés, precisely as a merchant is entitled to the goodwill of his customers although they are under no obligation to continue to deal with him. The value of the relation lies in the reasonable probability that by properly treating its employés and paying them fair wages, and avoiding reasonable grounds of complaint, it will be able to retain them in its employ, and to fill vacancies occurring from time to time by the employment of other men on the same terms. The pecuniary value of such reasonable probabilities is incalculably great, and is recognized by the law in a variety of relations."⁴²

The recent development of consolidation in industrial relations under the impulsion of the rivalrous and dominating dispositions of leaders, with the acquiescence of investors in this leadership, is not, from the mere fact of its motivation, contrary to the public welfare. But the individualistic motive only incidentally realizes the public welfare, and is quite apt to be contrary to it. Professor Jones, above cited, writes: "The modern trusts were organized primarily for the purpose of suppressing or restricting competition, and thus of securing monopoly prices and profits. . . . In the prospectuses offering the securities of the trusts to the public, much was made of the economies of the trust form of organization; and the trusts were able to realize a considerable number of savings that were not open to less all-embracing business units. Nevertheless, . . . the desire to reduce costs was not the main reason for the formation of trusts; and though twenty years have elapsed since the outbreak of the modern trust movement, the economic superiority of trusts over less comprehensive corporate units has not been established. Moreover, though competition was keen prior to the formation of trusts, it was not ruinous; and therefore the creation of these mammoth organizations cannot be explained on the ground of economic necessity." They were created primarily to satisfy the egoistic dispositions of the monopolists.

The individualistic aspects of the present order are the more extreme because men of strong rivalrous and dominating dispositions reach the commanding positions in the financial and industrial organization, and determine the trend of organization, while the mass of business men conform to the business organization thus developed.

⁴² *Hitchman Coal and Coke Company vs. John Mitchell, T. L. Lewis, W. B. Wilson, U. S. Supreme Court, No. 11, October Term, 1917.* Reprint.

They may inwardly protest but they outwardly conform. The situation is expressed by a prominent business man of Denver who gave up his business in order to be free to speak his mind: "I gave up business because I desired to be perfectly free to express my convictions on public questions whether or not they were in accord with the views of my business friends. The unconscious influence working in the minds of most business men is the question, 'What will be the effect on my business if I express my opinions publicly?' A business man must conform. If he does not, he is guilty of the worst crime in the catalogue of business. . . . In a great crisis he cannot be independent, he cannot even be neutral. What the business world needs today more than anything else is a group of business men who are not afraid to utter their honest convictions on the subject of social and economic justice. Unfortunately the voices of such men would scarcely be audible in the business councils of the nation."⁴³ The strong egoistic dispositions are dominant in business councils, and to beliefs and policies formulated under this impulsion the mass of business men are expected to conform.

Let us go a little further in our analysis of the industrial side of the economic organization. We note that the essential process is competition among business men to stimulate and satisfy wants, with little or no discrimination of the social necessity of the wants satisfied.⁴⁴ Economists assume that the consumer should determine his consumption for the sake of his social efficiency;⁴⁵ wherefore production should be determined from the point of view of the social necessity of the goods as one of the essential means of health, efficiency, and the development of personality. But the business man has no such point of view in determining production. And the mass of the people are incapable of knowing the things they most need for health and efficiency.⁴⁶ There is no agency to plan production on their behalf. Their untrained impulses are exploited by business men in profit-seeking. Advertising is entirely a means of effective suggestion to buy, not a means of stimulating rational choice.⁴⁷ Economists have distinguished between intelligent and unintelligent consumption,⁴⁸ but have generally assumed intelligent consumption

⁴³ Federal Council of the Churches, Information Service, Apr. 1, 1921, 2.

⁴⁴ Veblen, Theory of Business Enterprise, Chs. III-VI; Cooley, Social Process, 316.

⁴⁵ Carver, Principles of National Economy, 572-577.

⁴⁶ Their consumption falls far short of the economist's rational "Law of Choice." (Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, 64-65.)

⁴⁷ Adams, Advertising and its Mental Laws.

⁴⁸ Watkins, Welfare as an Economic Quantity, Ch. II.

to be more prevalent than it is, perhaps from a subconscious impulse to justify the régime of individualistic enterprise.

In their consumption the masses are creatures of social suggestion. Under the competition of commercial interests the suggestions imparted are to get and spend money. But human nature has aspects which, if properly appealed to, would make for saving instead of spending. There is satisfaction in saving, as well as in spending. The possession of money stimulates the imagination, for, as people say, "with money you can get anything you want." Possession of money enables the individual to anticipate many more possible satisfactions than the money would buy. The rivalrous and displaying person imagines that he could make this or that display of superiority. He is more superior many times, in his imagination, than the actual use of the money could achieve. The sympathetic person may imagine how much good he could do in many more ways than is warranted by the money in his possession. Particularly does possession of wealth make it possible to escape annoyance by the consciousness that any time the individual wishes he may leave the annoying situation and use his money. Possession of money gives a solid basis for the anticipation of rest and the enjoyments of life, in moments when this anticipation is sorely needed. Often this anticipation is all that one needs to steady him in the perplexities of his work. It is often more effective for efficiency than would be the actual realization of what is anticipated. Therefore human nature could be powerfully appealed to to save instead of spend. But the relative value of spending and saving is not considered by the business man. His interests demand that people spend instead of save; and his competitive appeal is to the strongest dispositions, not to the weaker and higher that the development of personality requires should be stimulated.

The use to which people put their money is determined not by a conception of development of personality but by the social attitudes which the individual acquires from his environment.⁴⁹ These are constantly changing under the competition of business interests to stimulate new wants by new appeals to the impulses of the people. The possible range of these variations depends on what dispositions predominate among the people. Different dispositions determine different reactions to the same material things and the

⁴⁹ Cooley, The Institutional Character of Pecuniary Valuation, Amer. Jour. Sociol., XVIII: 543.

same ideas, that is, they give the same thing different capacities for producing satisfaction—different desirabilities. Take, for instance, the attitude to a new food. Men of the same purchasing power and the same liking for it will not give it the same value. The man of acquisitive disposition will not buy it if it is dear. He has an aversion to it, not because he does not like it but because his disposition is such that he wants to save money instead of spending extravagantly. Compare this attitude with that of one who finds that food satisfying which satisfies certain intellectual convictions as to the kind of food that is necessary for efficiency. Food that violates the efficiency ideal is not highly valued though it may be otherwise satisfying. Again, compare the above attitudes with that of the woman who buys luxuries out of season in order to satisfy her instinct to display her ability to pay high prices. Evidently the demand for different kinds of food depends on the relative strength of different dispositions in the social population. The conforming disposition accepts the social standards in food; the rivalrous disposition accepts the social standards and merely tries to excel; the intellectual disposition may find those standards foolish; the acquisitive may avoid them as expensive.

The production of goods and services is determined, therefore, on the one hand, by popular attitudes and dispositions, on the other hand, by the impulse for profits of the business man. There is no agency that regulates production from the point of view of the development of personality. The government may forbid the manufacture and sale of certain harmful commodities and regulate the manufacture and sale of others. Financial institutions, in making loans, may favour enterprises that produce staples rather than luxuries. But this public and private regulation of production for the public welfare is very limited. In general what is considered by commercial interests is the profitableness of a market and not whether those wants are desirable from the point of view of the social development of personality. Production and the advertising of products may be for the public welfare⁵⁰ or it may not. The producer, if challenged, maintains that it is up to the consumer to consider whether or not a purchase is wise. When he aims to "serve" the public, his aim is to give the public what it wants, to tempt the public to buy, intelligently or unintelligently. Thus products are made to satisfy the impulse for cheapness, whether durable or not, to satisfy

⁵⁰ For instances see Cherington, Advertising as a Business Force, 459.

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the impulse for tasty food, whether wholesome or not, for display, whether useful or not.

Consider the enormous production of goods to satisfy the impulse for style. People generally have an impulse to escape the contempt felt for those whose dress is "out of style," and many people also have an impulse for display of stylish dress. Because the rivalrous impulse for superiority by display is one of its motives, style, particularly in dress, exhibits the extreme behaviour⁵¹ that is characteristic of the rivalrous disposition. Furthermore, because newness is an important element, and because style may be quickly and easily imitated, ostentation calls for rapid change,⁵² and this fits in with the profit-seeking impulse of business men who instigate a rapid change of style in dress so that the great mass of people who fear to be conspicuously out of style must discard old things and buy new while the old are still serviceable. For this reason, as well as because style requires an expensive organization for originating and dispensing styles,⁵³ costly methods of manufacture,⁵⁴ of advertising, of selling,⁵⁵ and costly materials because of its emphasis on expense,⁵⁶ many of which materials are of no use except for display, the expense of style is enormous. It is for the most part a useless expense, except "to serve the exaltation of the ego."⁵⁷ But, like other egoistic motives, it is rationalized under the impulse to hide its essentially egoistic nature, an impulse which is not baldly insincere, since those animated by it do not understand its significance.⁵⁸ The impulse for style "is especially likely to cloak itself in the guise of aesthetic enjoyment."⁵⁹ Another justification offered, particularly for a style in which expense figures, is that "the best quality is cheapest in the end." But the indiscriminate pursuit of the "best quality" means a failure to adapt different qualities to their uses in a way to realize the largest total satisfaction.⁶⁰ Desire for the best quality is due to the impulse for display of superiority, and merchants exploit this impulse by advertising goods of ordinary quality as

⁵¹ Ross, *Social Psychology*, 106-107.

⁵² Watkins, *Welfare as an Economic Quantity*, 149.

⁵³ Cherington, *The Wool Industry*, Chs. XI-XII.

⁵⁴ Van Kleeck, *Artificial Flower Makers*, Chs. I, III, 88.

⁵⁵ Van Kleeck, *A Seasonal Industry: A Study of the Millinery Trade in New York*, 141.

⁵⁶ Watkins, *op. cit.*, 149.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 149.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 155.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 155.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 159.

superior and so getting a higher price from those willing to pay for superiority. Thus the inordinate strength of the rivalrous disposition is a costly matter for society.⁶¹ What people spend for style they cannot spend for more nourishing food or self-development. The impulse for style is thus exploited by manufacturers in the interest of private profits and contrary to the public welfare. The remedy lies, obviously, in such education of boys and girls that, as men and women, they will understand the commercial motive of business and not respond impulsively to the stimuli of commercial establishments. Only education in these matters can make possible a standardized dress,⁶² which would diminish the enormous expenditure for style.⁶³

The competitive appeals of commercial interests reach every class in the community and every part of the country. This condition obtains in every civilized country. The result is a planlessness in production and an absence of public welfare considerations that is world-wide. The competition of the manufacturers of one nation with those of another in the markets of the world gives an intensity and an acumen to the analysis of the impulsive wants of consumers, and a remarkable ingenuity in catering to their wants.⁶⁴ If manufacturers and merchants do not put the welfare of the people of their own country before private profits, it can hardly be expected that they would do so in their trade with other countries. The result is everywhere a weakening of the old rural habits of thrift and frugality by thus subjecting the masses to these suggestions of commercial interests. Strong impulses and weak foresight and self-control make the masses an easy prey. The strong impulses of the profit seeker move him to appeal to the strong impulses of the masses, and, between the two, there is little chance for the exercise of intelligence that is necessary for the development of personality through wise choice of the material means of satisfaction.

In the absence of a conception of public welfare in the determina-

⁶¹ Douglas, *What Can a Man Afford?* Amer. Econ. Rev. (Sup.), Dec. 1921, 4.

⁶² Cherington, *op. cit.*, 190-191; Bryner, *The Garment Trades*, 190.

⁶³ During the World War the United States Government exercised some censorship over production for style through its control of credit, fuel and raw materials. It also undertook a propaganda of education against extravagance in style. The Attorney-General enlisted certain women's organizations in a campaign to incite "a patriotic refusal to be stampeded into buying new clothes simply because the designers change the style from six to eight times a year." The plan was to "off-set the 'buy now' propaganda of trades people" by sending speakers throughout the country to explain the enormous expense and the folly of style. (Associated Press (R. D. C.), Oct. 18, 1919.)

⁶⁴ Hauser, *Germany's Commercial Grip on the World*, Pt. III, Ch. I.

tion of production, the individualistic profit-seeking impulse has been the determining force and the slogan has been, "Increase production." It is said that the progress of civilization depends on increasing production. "The belief in the importance of production has a fanatical irrationality and ruthlessness. So long as something is produced, what it is that is produced seems to be thought a matter of no account. Our whole economic system encourages this view, since fear of unemployment makes any kind of work a boon to wage-earners. The mania for increasing production has turned men's thoughts away from much more important problems, and has prevented the world from getting the benefits it might have got out of the increased productivity of labour."⁶⁵ With the present productive power of civilized nations rightly directed, "a certain proportion of the population, without working long hours, could do all the work that is really necessary in the way of producing commodities. The time which is now spent in producing luxuries could be spent partly in enjoyment and country holidays, partly in better education, partly in work that is not manual or subserving manual work. . . . Because of the excessive belief in the value of production, it is thought right and proper for men to work long hours and the good that might result from shorter hours is not realized."⁶⁶ This is because men lack a conception of the development of personality as a point of view for defining impulses that are unworthy of satisfaction. They see all around them men and women spending their income for the thousand and one kinds of food and ornamental dress and house furnishings and equipage that are advertised in the magazines and newspapers and displayed by the merchants; spending for memberships in clubs which give the members a "standing" in the community; and they follow the crowd in spending and add their voices to the cry for increased production. And whenever the public consumption begins to lag, manufacturers "drum up trade," and merchants advertise more extravagantly, start "buying campaigns," and "get publicity" for their instigation of increased consumption in the columns of the newspapers.

Probably the impulsiveness and lack of common sense that is so evident in the industrial process would gradually become evident to the mass of consumers were it not for the fact that the sponsors of that process are those who profit by it, and who, also, are the men

⁶⁵ Russell, *Why Men Fight*, 128.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 128-129.

of wealth and prestige in the community, and control the agencies of social suggestion, particularly the press. Owing to the popular admiration for these industrial leaders and wealthy citizens, the masses accept their point of view and ideas without criticism, including their slogan, "Increase production." They accept the suggestions emanating from this class that fill the newspapers. The result is an over-emphasis on the necessity of wealth and material satisfactions for self-realization. People ignore all the varied pleasures of physical activity that cost little or nothing, and the simple enjoyments, because of absorption in the satisfaction of sophisticated desires that are conspicuous among the well-to-do and wealthy classes. This results in an economic system that depresses the vital energies of men, which in turn still further weakens aspirations for self-realization. The root of the decadence lies in the suggestibility of the masses to the successful classes and to the suggestions of commercial interests. Obviously the remedy lies in the right sort of public and higher education. Boys and girls should be so trained as to be able to resist influences that are contrary to the development of personality. This training is particularly necessary for children of the well-to-do and wealthy classes, who will wield the social influence in the next generation.

Economic processes depend, in the last analysis, on the dispositions of business men and their degree of mentality. There is the great mass of employers of ordinary mentality whose behaviour is largely determined by their local and face-to-face relations. Most of the merchants and manufacturers of a village or city in their thinking are dependent on the stimulus of associates. Their industriousness, their rivalry, their sympathy is largely a matter of conformity. They acquiesce in, rather than shape, the changes initiated by the men whose larger mentality carries them beyond the influence of their intimate associates. These men are of two classes, first, those whose mentality is made to serve unusually strong rivalrous and dominating dispositions, and second, those in whom sympathy and a sense of human welfare and social justice deflects mentality, thus bringing them into conflict with the rivalrous and dominating leaders. The latter for the time prevail because of the force of their dispositions and also because their behaviour is in line with the prevailing profit-seeking impulses. Where the influence of the rivalrous type of leadership is predominant business practices violate the conventional standards of honesty and considerateness that characterized business in the days of

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face-to-face relations.⁶⁷ But the trend in the long run must be against the egoistic leadership because of the strength of dispositions repressed in workmen who submit to it, and because of the satisfactions of which the public are thereby deprived. The dominating business man thinks of business as his business, of himself as the only party to industrial relations to be considered. On the other hand, the progressive business man comprehends the industrial relation in its entirety. The impulse for absolute control that is for the dominating type an obsession is for him merely one of the problems of industrial relations; and, in the solution of these problems, his own dispositions are involved in a way to illuminate his understanding. Out of this reflective insight he evolves an ideal of industrial relations for the development of personality toward which particular solutions are approximations.

⁶⁶ Williams, *an American Town*, 192.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROFIT-SEEKING MOTIVE

THE essential fact in business enterprise is that production is based not on definite knowledge of demand but on anticipations. Business men contract for raw materials and services in advance at fixed rates, on the anticipation of realizing by the sale of the product. Changes in conditions may upset anticipations and yield a greater or less return than was anticipated.¹ In spite of the reduction of much uncertainty by devices of economic organization² that reduce it to reasonable risk,³ it continues essential in business enterprise and it is this condition that makes possible profits.⁴ Uncertainty, anticipation and profit are not peculiar to the business world, but are found more or less in every vocation, even the most intellectual. The scholar who sets forth on an adventure in ideas never knows whether his long search will bring him a clear-cut discovery and renown or failure and contempt for his futile efforts.

There are two types of reaction to uncertainty, that of one who enjoys the impulsive action it fosters and that of one who would reduce it to certainty, as far as possible. For instance, one finds among carpenters those who, in putting on siding, enjoy "giving a guess" as to dimensions and then sawing a board and seeing if it fits, while others prefer first to measure the space and the board in order to know that it will fit. Again, among farmers, there are those who enjoy holding their crops for a rise and those who are "too nervous" for this game and make a practice of selling crops when harvested if the price will give them a fair return. Likewise there are business men who enjoy the speculative element in business and others who dislike it. On which of these types predominate among business men depends to a certain extent the trend of economic organization,

¹ Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Chapter VII.

² Ibid. Ch. VIII.

³ Ibid. 20.

⁴ Ibid. Ch. IX.

though there is always a tendency on the part of the public to want, and to a degree secure, arrangements that diminish the fluctuations in prices, the unemployment and uncertainty due to the quest of profits. The type that enjoys uncertainty and anticipation is of a rivalrous disposition; in the one to which it is unpleasant, other dispositions are more pronounced. The latter type of business man to a degree co-operates with the public for greater certainty in economic arrangements.

A word is necessary as to the processes of uncertainty, though a full analysis must be deferred to the volume on processes of feeling and thought. Where uncertainty persists, it tends to make behaviour impulsive and to stimulate affective rather than intellective association. The affective associations are projected as explanations of the problem, or as beliefs on which to act. This type of thinking is intolerant because the explanations are valid only as long as the uncertainty is not reduced by intellectual analysis. The explanations and beliefs are clung to because satisfying. Satisfying rather than unsatisfying ideas tend to be projected as explanations of uncertainty owing to the tendency of human nature to seek satisfaction and avoid annoyance. Hence thinking of this kind begets an intolerance not only with respect to the particular ideas and beliefs but also with attempts to resolve the uncertainty and even with the suggestion that there is any uncertainty. Hence the intolerant reception that men of this type give suggestions that changes in government are desirable. The great uncertainty in connection with political problems, even for the most learned, encourages affective association in connection therewith and fosters intolerance. Hence the opportunity for fierce partisan rivalry over political issues, as rival classes project into the uncertainty, as solutions, the explanations and beliefs that satisfy their class interests. And hence the opposition of representatives of these classes to progressive leaders who stand for freedom of thought in connection with political problems, which would resolve the uncertainty and thus cut the ground from under the affective associations of rival classes and parties. Again, the projection of affective associations causes business men to give an intolerant reception to suggestions of changes in the industrial order. The prevailing uncertainty in connection with industrial problems, even for the most informed, encourages affective association in connection therewith and fosters intolerance. Hence the opportunity for fierce rivalry in industrial disputes, as capital and labour project

into the uncertainty, as solutions, the beliefs and demands that satisfy their class interests. And here also there is the opposition of representatives of these interests to those who stand for free investigation of the problems presented. The intolerant interests maintain there is no uncertainty, there are no problems, their views are the only correct ones and adequately express all the truth of the situation.

Uncertainty has diminished with the progress of knowledge and institutional development. Among primitive people, who lived on the bounty of nature and were frequently at war, uncertainty in the serious work of life was extreme,⁵ and in their recreation gambling was prominent.⁶ Their uncertain situation caused projection into it of affective associations, which resulted in their systems of magic.⁷ Among agricultural peoples the serious work of life is uncertain, owing to the uncertainty of the seasons, and there is a strong passion for gambling, and a zest for the reassuring religious ideas of priesthoods that live by dispensing these ideas.⁸ On the frontier of the United States the hazards involved in making a livelihood caused uncertainty.⁹ Because of cheap land and the rise in land and other natural resource values the uncertainty encouraged satisfying anticipations,¹⁰ which is the essential economic cause of the strength of the individualistic profit-seeking motive in the United States. Expectation of profit animated not only landowners and business men but politicians and resulted in the spoils system.¹¹ It caused gambling to be a favourite form of recreation¹² and determined the preferred type of religion.¹³ Today, the gambling impulse and a belief in luck and providence are conspicuous in the behaviour of very many who take part in organized speculation.¹⁴

⁵ Dewey, Interpretation of Savage Mind, *Psy. Rev.*, IX: 222-226.

⁶ France, The Gambling Impulse, *Amer. Jour. Psy.*, XIII: 373-374; Thomas, The Gaming Instinct, *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, VI: 751.

⁷ Goldenweiser, Totemism, An Analytical Study, *J. Amer. Folklore*, XXIII: 275.

⁸ Smith, Village Life in China, Chs. XIII, XVI; Williams, An American Town, 199, 234.

⁹ Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, Proc. of Forty-first An. Meet. of State Hist. Soc. of Wis. Reprint, 11-13; Martineau, Society in America, I: 212.

¹⁰ Hill, The Public Domain and Democracy, Ch. II; Flint, Recollections of the Last Ten Years (1826), 199-203.

¹¹ Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage, 104; Turner, The Rise of the New West, 107.

¹² Schouler, History of the United States, II: 269.

¹³ Bryce, American Commonwealth, II: 577; Hill, op. cit., 87.

¹⁴ Brace, The Value of Organized Speculation, 138, 139, 180-185, 190-199.

From this period we inherit certain ideas that have been influential in our economic and political profit seeking. One of these is that at all costs we must develop the country. Hence the permission of wasteful exploitation of natural resources, of giving away valuable franchises and other privileges, the encouragement of unrestricted immigration,¹⁵ the ambition for annexation of territory,¹⁶ and other policies to accommodate profit seekers. Another idea is that private enterprise is absolutely the best and only way of conducting business. From this period and the foundations laid further back we inherit an averseness to secure investments with small return and a penchant for taking risks; also the pronounced tendency of speculators to extreme behaviour, as over trading;¹⁷ also the strenuous opposition to any reform that will discourage speculation;¹⁸ also the speculative, inefficient character of much of American business management. Business men moved by speculative impulses are averse to considering improvements in their business that promise only slight economies or increase of revenue. Their interest is enlisted only by propositions that offer a chance of large profits, and the small economies are not made until depression forces it, or not at all. The speculative mind runs to exploitation and exhaustion rather than to careful and methodical development of resources, natural and human. The spreading control of great financial organizations over industry accentuates the tendency to exhaustion particularly of the human resources.

Finally, we inherit from our early profit-seeking era our optimism in philanthropy. Men of a sympathetic disposition give rein to those impulses and affective associations as men of acquisitive and rivalrous dispositions to the impulses to make money. "The American often addresses himself with fervour, energy, and great intellectual and pecuniary effort to the eradication of ills which the European regards as incurable and irresponsible to treatment. And this American faith in the power to rectify, revive, and purify nature often struck me, no less than many other Europeans, as verging on the chimerical. In short, even in what are called social works, the American often seemed to me more idealist, more of a dreamer, and less practical than the European; more ready, that is to say, to venture on a

¹⁵ Fairchild, *Immigration*, 392.

¹⁶ Scroggs, *Filibusters and Financiers*.

¹⁷ Gerstenberg, *Materials for Corporation Finance*, 433.

¹⁸ *Taxation Problems in New York City, Survey*, Dec. 4, 1915, 231.

struggle against the innumerable ills of life without being quite sure of possessing adequate means for conquering them, at the summons of a mystical faith in the progress of the world.”¹⁹

The development of economic organization inevitably involves the invention of devices for increasing certainty, because the man who can reduce an uncertainty to a reasonable risk is apt to get the best of a rival. Hence the movement for certainty. The government undertakes to furnish certain general information²⁰ and to make it public everywhere at the same moment.²¹ However, the use of these facilities requires intelligence, and the information, instead of increasing certainty, often serves to start unfounded rumours.²² Much of it, merely as information, is worthless as a basis for forecasts.²³ Private associations of dealers, also, organize in stock and produce exchanges, which collect information from every quarter and in this way have diminished uncertainty in their purchases and sales. This gives these dealers an advantage over producers of whom they buy, as dealers in farm produce have an advantage over the farmers. But, for the dealers themselves, the very immensity of the exchange activities introduces new and portentous elements of uncertainty, especially for the less skilled in those transactions, whose activity increases the range of error in forecasts.²⁴

The movement for certainty is primarily for certainty that will serve the interests of the business man, not for the sake of the working masses and the consuming public. Free contract, the legal principle of inviolability of contract, insurance, the consolidation of industry, limited liability, the diffusion of investments through many companies and other devices enable profitseekers to diminish uncertainty.²⁵ The machine increases certainty for the employer as compared with hand labour. It is never late in the morning and never sick or on strike. The machine makes the labour of workmen more certain. “The share of the operative workman in the machine industry is (typically) that of an attendant, an assistant, whose duty it is to keep pace with the machine process and to

¹⁹ Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, 144-145.

²⁰ Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*, 260-261.

²¹ Moore, *Forecasting the Yield and Price of Cotton*, 57, 165.

²² Brace, *The Value of Organized Speculation*, 191-193.

²³ Moore, *op. cit.*, 91-92, 165-170.

²⁴ Pigou, *Wealth and Welfare*, 459.

²⁵ Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*, 233-254; Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I: 702.

help out with workmanlike manipulation at points where the machine process engaged is incomplete."²⁶ The artisan working with his own tools meets uncertainty in his work and, in case of a striking outcome for good or ill, may ascribe it to luck or Providence,²⁷ and has his lucky tools,²⁸ but the machine soon takes this form of religion out of the worker. However, uncertainty does not cease for the worker. The employer is, through the machine, more certain of the workman but this very fact puts the workman in an uncertain position. It makes him dependent for a living, not on his own land or tools, but on instruments of production owned by the employer. Furthermore, the machine diminishes the necessity of skilled workmanship and thus makes employment more precarious because the employer can more easily dispense with the services of a particular man. To meet this uncertainty introduced into the lives of the working masses by machine industry have developed the systems of workingmen's insurance.²⁹

Much of the employer's interest in the labour problem centres around his impulse to relieve himself of the annoyance of uncertainty. Ask an employer what quality he prizes above others in workmen and he is apt to name reliability. One reason why improvements in conditions of labour are slow is that, whereas the result of the introduction of a machine can be calculated with some certainty, results of improvements in conditions of labour cannot. Many business men, in their effort to escape the worry of uncertainty, as well as for other reasons, are making their chief aim the development of a reliable labour force. In so doing they diminish uncertainty for the workmen also. For one of the methods of increasing reliability is to hold out a future for those who mean to stay and make good, that is, to offer them some degree of certainty of employment and promotion.

Uncertainty in business depends on a variety of conditions. One of these is the kind of business. Most manufacturing processes are more controllable and calculable than are agricultural operations,³⁰ and agriculture is, in some ways, more certain than mining. The development of mining, as of agriculture, is marked by some increase of certainty. "Mining has reached such a stage of development as

²⁶ Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, 306.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 305.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 52.

²⁹ Frankel and Dawson, *Workingmen's Insurance in Europe*.

³⁰ Knight, *op. cit.*, 265.

a science that management proceeds upon comparatively well-known lines. . . . While in mining an estimate of a certain minimum of extension in depth . . . may occasionally fall short, it will in nine cases out of ten, be exceeded. If investment in mines be spread over ten cases, similarly valued as to depth of extension, the risk has been virtually eliminated. The industry, if reduced to the above basis for financial guidance, is a more profitable business and is one of less hazards than competitive forms of commercial enterprises."³¹ "Unfortunately for the reputation of the mining industry and metal mines especially, the business is often not conducted or valued on lines which have been outlined in these chapters. There is often the desire to sell stocks beyond their value. There is always the possibility that extension in depth will reveal a glorious Eldorado. It occasionally does, and . . . allures undue numbers of the venturesome, untrained, and ill-advised public to" mining investments, which enables unscrupulous men to exploit this public.³² Thus, even in mining, certainty has had marked development, but this, in the nature of the case, benefits only the comparatively few trained investors. In every line of industry business uncertainty will continue to exist for those who are ignorant, and the initiated will profit at their expense. Wherefore the initiated are apt to object to measures to enlighten the ignorant, and to oppose laws that would discourage or forbid operations of the ignorant.

Another condition determining uncertainty in business is the size of the business. "It is undoubtedly true that the reduction of risk to borrowed capital is the principal desideratum leading to the displacement of individual enterprise by the partnership and the same fact with reference to both owned and borrowed capital explains the substitution of corporate organization for the partnership."³³ Large scale production may reduce uncertainty in some respects and for certain inner groups in the consolidations, but, in general, "The hazards to be assumed grow greater with the extent of the market and with the time which elapses between the initiation and the fruition of an enterprise. But the progress of industrial technic is steadily widening markets, and requiring heavier investments of capital for future production. Hence the share in economic leadership which falls to lenders, that of reviewing the various chances offered them

³¹ Hoover, *Principles of Mining*, 183.

³² *Ibid.*, 184.

³³ *Knight*, *op. cit.*, 252.

for investment, presents increasing difficulties and, as has been shown, a large proportion of these lenders, particularly of the lenders on long time, lack the capacity and the training for the successful performance of their work.

"These defects in the system of guiding economic activity and the bewildering complexity of the task itself allow the processes of economic life to fall into those recurrent disorders which constitute crises and depressions."³⁴

The growth of corporations, and their deliberately planned as well as subconscious influence over the government, has not tended to decrease the uncertainty of political activity in a democratic state. Ex-President Wilson describes the nature of corporation control of government: its secrecy; the rumours to which it gives rise; its all-pervading influence in state and national legislative halls; and points out that this "invisible government" is the cause of general uncertainty and apprehension. "Every community is vaguely aware that the political machine upon which it looks askance has certain very definite connections with men who are engaged in business on a large scale, and the suspicion which attaches to the machine itself has begun to attach also to business enterprises, just because these connections are known to exist. If these connections were open and avowed, if everybody knew just what they involved and just what use was being made of them, there would be no difficulty in keeping an eye upon affairs and in controlling them by public opinion. But, unfortunately, the whole process of law-making in America is a very obscure one."³⁵

An economic system which has as its essential motive profit seeking inevitably involves uncertainty, because it has not the comprehensive social purpose or the co-ordination of effort which will systematically eliminate uncertainty.³⁶ The system is, as we have seen, a development out of impulsive human nature and the peculiar economic conditions of the past, not a product of constructive thought. We have now to analyze certain psychological processes which are essential in this system.

The behaviour of profit seekers depends, in the last analysis, on the dispositions that predominate in business men. We note, among farmers, small tradesmen, and manufacturers, the motive to "make a living" according to the conventional business practices, as con-

³⁴ Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, 39.

³⁵ Wilson, *The New Freedom*, Master Workers' Book, 118-119.

³⁶ Mitchell, *op. cit.*, 39.

trusted with the more impulsive behaviour of the rivalrous business man, who banishes from business all sentiment that interferes with money-making.³⁷ But the behaviour of all has this characteristic, that the amount the business man may make is not fixed and known to him, but is uncertain, and there is an anticipation³⁸ and a secretiveness is the profit seeker's motive. In this he differs from the wage and salaried worker, who has a certain income and a fixed routine. In the absence of certainty the behaviour in profit seeking is impulsive and resents interference. Hence the individualistic attitude of the profit seeker. This attitude characterized the early agricultural communities of the United States, in which returns were uncertain, farmers were expectant and secretive, and there were conflicts among them owing to the impulse of each to pursue his acquisitive desire as he pleased.³⁹ So it was in the growing towns. The store-keeper or manufacturer or banker who was making money was apt to continue to live much as he had before, at least to refrain from expensive living, in order, among other motives, to conceal the fact that he was making money. Thus he avoided stirring jealousy among his neighbours, stimulating rivals, attracting new rivals into the field, and causing customers to find fault with his prices and business methods. The impulse was to conceal unusually rich sources and unusually successful methods of acquisition. And there was an impatience with any form of governmental regulation of business.

This individualistic profit seeking has persisted as the essential force in the economic system of the nations to the present day. From the beginning the natural resources of the world have appeared unlimited and were invaded by the peoples and exploited by the individuals of the strongest acquisitive and rivalrous dispositions. When class rule and hereditary ownership of the natural resources had developed in an old country, the enterprising members of other classes pushed on into the colonies of the old country or into a new. Or they invented new methods of acquisition in the old country. All the enterprising asked of their government was freedom in acquisition and the protection of property. All the government asked was that they turn the material resources or new methods into wealth and submit to taxation. All the consuming public asked was such

³⁷ Ross, *Changing America*, Ch. VI.

³⁸ Taussig, *Inventors and Money-Makers*, 87.

³⁹ Williams, *An American Town*, Pt. I, Ch. IV.

competition between business men as would result in low prices. There was no agency to plan the economic operations of the nation for the sake of the public welfare. The government was subject to the influence of a dominant profit-seeking class, or was the means of compromise between conflicting classes. The profit-seeking motive was, however, subject to some public control in that the goods produced had to appeal to consumers and had to be within reach of their ability to pay. Wherefore production provided a rough satisfaction of the bare needs of the masses with little ability to pay and a luxurious living for those who had abundant means. The competition of profit seekers for profitable markets naturally turned the trend of production in the direction of goods for persons of abundant means,⁴⁰ who could pay the larger margin of profit. At the same time the chance of winning great gain resulted in a willingness to take risks, an overcoming of obstacles by organization and invention which governmental operation of industry could not have achieved. Governmental positions never have attracted men of the kind that achieve marked success in industry because those positions do not offer the opportunities for making profits that are offered by private industry. Though remarkable inventions have resulted from a purely intellectual motive, the development of industry seems to have resulted largely from ability that gets its impulsion from strong acquisitive, rivalrous and dominating dispositions.⁴¹ Wherefore, the stage of development that involved, primarily, the exploitation of natural resources and the building of railroads and other enterprises was a stage that selected ability not unlike that of the leader of the venturesome enterprises of a more primitive economy.⁴² To plan production for a nation, co-ordinate and administer the multitude of agencies, is a vast project for which the dispositions that impel to profit seeking are not adapted, wherefore that project does not come to the fore except in a national crisis when intelligence is by common consent given some precedence over impulse and men of extraordinary intellectual power are called to leadership.⁴³

It is through the individualistic profit seeker that the present highly complex economic system is connected with the primitive economy out of which it has evolved. Man has an instinct to go forth in

⁴⁰ Watkins, *Welfare an Economic Quantity*, 149-150.

⁴¹ Taussig, *Inventors and Money-Makers*, 46-54, 76-98.

⁴² Taussig, *Inventors and Money-Makers*, 87-88.

⁴³ Mitchell, *Statistics and Government*, Quart. Pub. Amer. Statist. Ass'n. Reprint, 228.

anticipation of gain; to seize that which holds his attention; to defend his possession of it; and to take it to a secret place to contemplate it, or to a familiar person, usually a member of the family.⁴⁴ The developed desire for property manifests itself in the impulse to enjoy the anticipation of great gain more than the certainty of a moderate income; to seek to acquire that to which the attention of people is directed; to go to any lengths to defend possessions; to maintain secrecy as to possessions and business affairs and to oppose laws requiring publicity; to bequeath property to the family and to support laws of bequest and inheritance.

The instinct to seize and appropriate that which holds the attention is closely connected with the instinct to dominate and use another in getting what holds the attention. Hence the great rôle of the dominating disposition in a profit-seeking system. The impulse to appropriate what holds the attention of self and others is closely connected, also, with the impulse to possess what will give superiority in the eyes of others. To get and keep what others want requires superior power thus to do. Hence the close connection of the acquisitive with the rivalrous disposition. Possession of that which satisfies the acquisitive disposition—wealth—has become the essential symbol of superiority in modern civilization.

Thus the profit-seeking motive involves a number of strong egoistic dispositions, by virtue of which it is exceedingly individualistic. The use of imagination and shrewdness in the acquisition of property does not make it less impulsive. Imagination supplies the ambitious purpose and the secondary explanations that justify it. Shrewdness makes effective a persistent and thrifty behaviour in realization of the ambition.

No attempt is made by the individualistic profit seeker to analyze his ambitious purpose as to its ultimate social justification. His thinking merely runs to associations that plausibly justify it. It is said that all business proceeds under the spur of quest of profits and that measures which discourage this quest discourage enterprise; that individualistic profit seeking is the best way of keeping prices down and quality good that can be devised; that it is the best automatic process for the selection of men for the difficult posts in industry that can be devised; that profit seeking is the right, inevitable, essential and unalterable process of economic relations and reasoning should proceed on that assumption and should look merely to the

⁴⁴ Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, 30-31.

elimination of unfair methods. No thorough-going analysis from an adequate social point of view is attempted by apologists for the system because their fundamental assumption has behind it the driving force of the strongest instincts of a dominant class that will not be thwarted in the satisfaction of its impulses.

The prominence of secondary explanations, as compared with candid analysis, among those who are most favourably situated for an analysis of the profit-seeking motive, makes the analysis of it by an outsider extremely difficult. Concealment of essential motives on the part of all parties to industrial relations seems inevitable as long as these relations center around profit seeking.⁴⁵ Employers tend to conceal their motives because they fear that the public will feel resentment because of the high prices that yield them large profits, and that workmen will feel resentment because their wages are not sufficiently raised when profits are large. Consequently they tend to conceal not only their profits but also their profit-seeking motive. Workmen conceal their resentment because they fear that employers will discharge them when business begins to be "slack." The public conceals its resentment at high prices because it fears the reproach of "Socialist" or fears that a reduction of prices will be followed by a general reduction of wages and salaries, or by unemployment. Professional men and women who feel directly or indirectly the influence of profit seekers likewise, consciously or unconsciously, disguise their subservience by adopting disguising motives and these determine associations of ideas of the speeches of lawyers and legislators, of editorials, of sermons, of class-room lectures, and of books, as well as of the talk of the professional classes in their social circles. In a profit-seeking system there is a general tendency to concealment of motives. A system based on rivalry, in which the advantage of one party can be gained only at the expense of another, inevitably engenders secrecy and concealment of essential motives. This concealment makes motives difficult to get at and discuss, and, because they thus escape observation and criticism, makes it difficult to correct them, or eliminate them if socially undesirable.

The law, though it has developments on behalf of a social regulation of property rights,⁴⁶ predominantly endorses an individualistic

⁴⁵ Eliot, A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Group Formation and Behaviour, Amer. Jour. Sociol., Nov. 1920, 333-352.

⁴⁶ Ely, Property and Contract in the Distribution of Wealth, I: Pt. I, Chs. VI-VII; II: Pt. I, Ch. XX, Pt. II, Ch. V, pp. 621-623; Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution Chs. V-VIII.

property right, and thereby satisfies the powerful egoistic dispositions of the dominant economic and political classes. This law was inherited by the people of early America, among whom there was no pronouncedly dominant class because land was cheap and any enterprising man might leave his employer and take up land. The essential industrial relation was the individual's relation to that part of physical nature of which he was legally possessed. But the development of the rich natural resources of the country soon resulted in the rise of dominant economic interests. The thrill of success in what all men would like to succeed in absorbs the mind and stimulates the imagination to devise means of still greater accumulations. There is the thrill of superiority over particular rivals, and the consciousness of social recognition, of achievement of power. This sporting impulse may so obsess those who acquire natural resources or control the strategic points in the financial and industrial system as to inhibit other impulses that ordinarily enter into the determination of the behaviour of the business man.

The contrast between the motives of the merely acquisitive and conventional, and those of the inordinately rivalrous business man is seen on comparing the behaviour of the small manufacturer who follows the conventional business behaviour in a conservative community with that of monopolistic corporations.⁴⁷ The conservative business man observes the maxim "Live and let live."⁴⁸ The money-making motive is active but the essential motive, in many cases, is to conform to the prevailing business behaviour. Not until the rivalrous disposition is aroused does the essential motive become the impulse to excel in money-making. It is then that behaviour becomes "individualistic" in the full sense of the term, for the tendency is to follow the impulsion of the profit-seeking impulses regardless of the conventional restraints. When the dominating disposition, also, is aroused the impulse is to control competitors and workmen in order to make money. But rivalry may be active without domination. There are business men who are keenly competitive and not bound by tradition, without, however, attempting to dominate competitors; they rely on close attention to business to decrease costs and to improve the quality and attractiveness of goods. Rivalry without domination is the prevailing motive in the earlier stages of a career, and "the great

⁴⁷ Federal Trade Commission, Report to the President of the United States Senate on Profiteering, June 28, 1918, 3-4. Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Meat Packing Industry, 1918, Chs. I, II, IV.

⁴⁸ Veblen, *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*, 159-160.

majority of those who actively conduct business are probably impelled throughout their lives by social emulation more than by any other force."⁴⁹ But several conditions cause this disposition to be succeeded in many cases by domination as the characteristic disposition. One is the fact that men of a pronounced dominating disposition are those who rise to the leadership in the keen rivalry of capitalistic groups and in the conflict of capital with labour, so this disposition is apt to be cultivated by ambitious men. Another is that the leaders are apt to be men of mature years and the tendency to be dominating increases with age. Another is that power makes men dominating. The business manager in the position of power maintains that, as business expands, his control has to expand with it, that he is the creature of circumstances. "Yet in thus analyzing the case he but gives still further illustration of the half truths and the pretenses, the conventional phrases, by which men deceive themselves. It is far from true that the man *can* not stop. He does not wish to stop. The force that holds him to his endless task is not anything immanent in the business enterprise; it is the power of overmastering instincts in himself. Among the instincts thus possessing him . . . domination seems here to be the more important."⁵⁰

The rivalrous young business man imitates the dominating characteristics of the leaders, rises to a position of power in a corporation and this confirms his dominating disposition. The mere bigness of a corporation, its semi-monopolistic or monopolistic position, has the same effect on the characters of officials that political power does on the character of high officials in the state. Power tends to make men dominating, separates man from his kind, and separation, except in the case of a man of extraordinary intelligence, tends to make of strong impulses, emotional obessions. Industrial power has this effect even more pronouncedly than political power, because that depends on maintaining popular support while industrial power is maintained, regardless of the acquiescence of the mass of workers in the enterprise. Furthermore, the financial power of a great corporation, and the political power that goes with it, tends to weaken regard for public opinion. Thus the profit seeking of corporations tends less to concealment than formerly. They think it is fair to get out of the consumer all they can, and some of them do not hesitate to say

⁴⁹ Taussig, Inventors and Money-Makers, 97.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 90-91.

so.⁵¹ The tendency is for this attitude eventually to spread among all business men because of the suggestive power of the big business figures. The effect of the failure of the government to prevent the profiteering of certain corporations emphasizes their power and success, and what was before condemned by many business men now seems to them justified. The rank and file thus come to feel they are justified in getting out of the consumer all they can, and, when the economic situation is favourable, because of an unusually strong demand for goods, and a limited supply, profiteering tends to become general.⁵² The attitude spreads also to workmen and their theory of wages becomes "all we can get."⁵³ Thus does the profit-seeking motive spread everywhere in its more unrestrained form and the inevitable result is increasing conflict.

The conflict is intensified by the consolidation of labour organizations to meet the consolidation of capital. As in the organization of capital, so of labour, the greater the organization, the stronger the tendency for dominating figures to rise to the leadership, and high position causes these figures, likewise, to "feel their authority." Thus the growth of capitalistic and labour organization tends to intensify conflict, with the inevitable result of involving the government more and more in regulation and arbitration. Thus, to control dominating power in industry, the power of the state, and with it the tendency of officials to be dominating, is increased.

Because of the impulsiveness of profit seeking and the lack of any effective regulation for the public welfare, business always has taken and continues to take the form of a cycle from prosperity to depression. Though well organized, individualistic profit seekers lack sufficient foresight to control the wild anticipations of a period of prosperity, which result in depression with its disaster not only to profit seekers but also to salaried men and wage earners. The cycle is due to the impulsive optimism of business men. Human nature is naturally optimistic because men instinctively seek satisfaction rather than annoyance. They expect a pleasant rather than an unpleasant result, unless made cautious by experience or unless dispositionally very cautious, which is exceptional. The general tendency is to expect the pleasant rather than the unpleasant, and an-

⁵¹ Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, *The Church and Industrial Reconstruction*, 69.

⁵² Federal Trade Commission Report on Leather and Shoe Industries, 1919, 159, 177-179; Friday, Profits, Wages and Prices, 15.

⁵³ Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, *op. cit.*, 70.

ticipations that are pleasant are believed, for that reason, to be true. This optimism is essential in business ventures. It infects all classes of business men. Farmers, manufacturers, and merchants, when prices are high and profits large, expect them to continue and increase production in order to make more profits. Even bankers are subject to this tendency and, though well organized, make no effective effort to prevent the unsound expansion of credit called forth by the desire to increase production. Says Moulton: "By virtue of their control of the purse strings the managers of commercial banking institutions are in a position to exercise a restraining influence—to control, in fact, the rate of business expansion and to prevent a continuance of the upward swing (of prices) to the stage of acute crisis which ends in financial collapse and panic. Under the American banking system prior to 1914, however, American banks did not exercise any restraining influence on business."⁵⁴ He points out that, before the panic of 1907, a few bankers sounded a warning against expansion of credit, and adds that little heed seems to have been given these warnings, "but much was made of every straw which suggested a possible further advance."⁵⁵ The bankers, like other classes of profit seekers, were impulsively optimistic and not rational. The same was true after the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. The essential cause of business cycles is impulsive profit seeking; business activity is not rationally regulated in a way to safeguard the public welfare. Lack of effective regulation is due to the fact that the human nature of farmers, merchants, manufacturers and bankers is not yet rational enough to want it. With tens of thousands of business men of the individualistic type scattered over the land, it matters little what a few rational leaders may say.

The leaders that are apt to exert the decisive influence are those who are making conspicuous profits in the period of prosperity—the speculative traders. Their lucky strokes are on every one's lips. Their operations are of all degrees of magnitude, from those of the small margin traders throughout the nation, whose winnings are rumoured throughout the countryside, to the big operator whose gains are chronicled in the press. The speculative traders are the class of profit seekers in whom the optimistic impulses are most pronounced. Brace writes: "The hopefulness of traders is shown in the tendency

⁵⁴ Financial Organization, 520.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 522.

of the market to rise whenever any excuse can be given for a bull movement." For this reason "the bull element introduced by organized speculation is even more important than the bear element. . . . This is because speculators are naturally bullish, and more of them seek to buy for long accounts than to sell short."⁵⁶ In speculative traders the natural tendency to optimism finds its most conspicuous expression and their influence is correspondingly great.

The effect of this prominence of speculation and luck in the acquisition of wealth is to discourage the working hosts, because the control of opportunities for making profits seems to be the means of making money rather than hard, conscientious work and the virtues that go therewith. A state's policy of emphasizing above all else the provision of economic opportunities for its business men abroad, including the acquisition of privileges for its business men to exploit the natural resources of other nations, reacts powerfully on the morale of its working hosts. In its eagerness to encourage the enterprise of its business men in their rivalry with the business men of other nations, a government discourages the hard faithful work which is more important than any spirit of risk-taking in the industrial development of a nation.

Because human nature is the same the world over, individualistic profit seeking has determined the economic order the world over, and the business cycle with its extremes of prosperity and depression is a world-wide phenomenon.⁵⁷ But it is most pronounced in nations that have the most highly developed industrial systems, for there industrial relations are more intimate and intricate, and are more largely based on credit, the expansion and contraction of which is the essential economic cause of the cycle, and there the contagion of affective states is more intense.

The rivalrous disposition is, as we have seen, pronounced in the behaviour of the successful and influential profit seekers. One of the characteristics of that disposition is that achievement of great superiority is apt to make men conceited and inefficient. Under scientific management the efficient workmen are paid just enough more than the inefficient to mark them as somewhat superior and spur them to achieve still greater superiority,—not enough to make them feel so much superior to others that they can "lay down on the job." But this procedure is not followed with profit seekers, though their

⁵⁶ Brace, *The Value of Organized Speculation*, 96, 111, 139.

⁵⁷ Mitchell, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.

human nature is the same as that of workmen. The fact that economic arrangements allow large, in some cases enormous profits, often results in impairing the efficiency of business management. Governmental investigations show that a corporation may tolerate inefficiencies and, at the same time, rely on the veriest financial tricks to make millions of dollars. Business men generally tend to be made inefficient by making large profits, just as workmen are made inefficient by being paid too high wages. The elation of prosperity tends to distract from close attention to business; business men become absorbed in speculative projects, or in social life, amusement and display. Business management is apt to be most efficient not in a period of prosperity but in depression, which stimulates downright thinking to decrease costs. The psychological principle of a system of distribution in which rivalry predominates is that no one who participates in the system, either workman or employer, should receive enough to give him a quiescent sense of superiority. Employers know this well enough in arranging the pay of workmen, yet do not admit the principle for themselves.

The economic system of the world, thus determined by the profit-seeking motive, has in each nation no adequate rational control. The "industrial process of making and the commercial process of distributing goods are thoroughly subordinate to the business process of making money."⁵⁸ This business process persists as the controlling factor because of the strength of the impulses that determine the profit-seeking motive of all classes of business men, and because it has determined the legal forms of the economic organization. These forms are essential in legal tradition, wherefore the legal aspect of the economic order is defended by lawyers as the corner stone of the social order. Business men and lawyers exercise the dominant political influence. Because of this influential support there is a widespread distrust of recommendations that would limit the activities of profit seekers for the sake of more adequate protection of investors, of workmen, and of the public.

There are three distinct conflicts of interest between unregulated profit seeking and the public welfare: the conflict with investors, with the public, and with labour. We shall note two cases of the conflict with investors. The first is in connection with financial consolidations. Of the 183 industrial combinations investigated by the Census Bureau in 1900, one-third had paid no dividends at all and over

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 570.

two-thirds had paid no dividends to common stock holders.⁵⁹ This failure to pay dividends was due either to the failure to achieve a monopoly or to the fact that the consolidation was so over-capitalized that the earnings did not permit the payment of the promised dividends. Those who invested in securities failed, therefore, to receive the promised dividends and the securities depreciated accordingly. The second case of conflict with investors is in the immense loss suffered throughout the United States, especially in periods of prosperity, through the purchase of fraudulent securities.⁶⁰ Most of the states have enacted laws to prevent the sale of such securities but these laws are not well enforced.⁶¹ In addition to the losses from purchase of securities of this kind there are the losses suffered because of the passing of dividends and the buying up of securities at the depressed price by those on the inside.⁶²

The conflict of unregulated profit seeking with the interests of the public as a whole is seen in the following cases: in the exploitation of fertile land and the impoverishment of the soil for private profit;⁶³ in the devastation of the forests for private profit;⁶⁴ in the waste of resources of coal and oil for private profit;⁶⁵ in the loaning of funds by banks for the manufacture of goods, without any regard as to whether the goods are socially necessary or a social waste, except as loans to manufacturers of staples seem a better risk than loans to manufacturers of luxuries;⁶⁶ in consolidations of industrial enterprises the essential motive of which is to create a monopoly and

⁵⁹ Seager, *Principles of Economics*, 447.

⁶⁰ Moulton, *Financial Organization*, 186-197. The frauds discovered and stopped by the U. S. mail service in one year reached \$129,000,000 and no one can tell the volume of undetected fraud (*Ibid.* 186). The President of the Iowa Bankers Association said, in 1920, that, in the preceding two years, over \$200,000,000 worth of well nigh worthless securities had been sold in Iowa alone. (Monthly letter sent out by National City Bank of New York, Dec., 1920.)

⁶¹ Moulton, *op. cit.*, 197-198.

⁶² The duty of a director in negotiating with stockholders for the purchase of stock, to disclose, unsolicited, all facts bearing on the value of securities which he has learned as a director is asserted by writers on jurisprudence but not observed in practice or generally enforced by the courts. (Laylin, *The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock*, *Yale Law Journal*, April, 1918, 731-740.)

⁶³ Hill, *The Public Domain and Democracy*, 151-154.

⁶⁴ Lumber Depletion and the Answer, U. S. Dept. Agric., Circular 112; Hill, *op. cit.*, 161-171.

⁶⁵ Lane, *Conservation through Engineering*, U. S. Geol. Survey, Bulletin, 705, 16-20; White, *The Petroleum Resources of the World*, U. S. Geol. Survey, 9; Van Hise, *The Conservation of Natural Resources*, 26-29; Hill, *The Public Domain and Democracy*, 171-179; Smith, *Thrift in Coal*, U. S. Geol. Sur., 5; Polakov, *Coal. New Republic*, Nov. 17, 1921, 292.

⁶⁶ Gerstenberg, *Principles of Business*, 623-624.

so make it possible to increase profits by decreasing the output and raising the price to consumers; in seductive and sometimes "mendacious advertising,"⁶⁷ an evil which may be carried to great lengths by the large corporations because of their command of capital.⁶⁸

The conflict with workmen arises out of the relation with workmen into which individualistic profit seeking forces the employer. While workmen work for a specified wage, they have the same instincts that prompt an employer to work for profits. Like him they are creatures of anticipation and any evidence of prosperity in the business causes them to anticipate a rise in wages. Not knowing what is the actual condition of the business they may expect more than is justified; on the other hand, the immense prosperity of a business is often a matter of record and they feel that, having produced the product, they have a right to share in the profits due to the high price of it. Denial of this rankles and exasperates. They feel their desires are unduly repressed while those of employers are inordinately satisfied.⁶⁹ There is, therefore, an inevitable and irrepressible conflict of interests in an industrial system the driving force of which is the quest of profits on the part of a capitalistic class and the use of labour to that end.

Business men rest their claim to an exclusive right to the profits on the fact that they own the business.⁷⁰ Workmen, on their part, feel they have a right to a share of the profits accruing from what they have largely created. They feel, also, a sense of proprietorship in the tools and machines they have habitually used. This attitude is similar to that of men in primitive society in which ownership rested closely on instinctive processes and was determined by the creation of wealth or the habitual use of it.⁷¹ Another primitive principle was that of ownership by right of previous occupation, and this is seen in the feeling among workmen that the jobs are theirs, if not legally, yet in the justice of the case.⁷² As the primitive criteria of creation, habitual use and previous occupation conflicted with right that rested on power to maintain ownership by superior personal

⁶⁷ Taussig, *Principles of Economics*, II: 428.

⁶⁸ The meat packing consolidation published full page advertisements in a number of daily papers which plausibly denied the findings of the Federal Trade Commission in their report on that monopoly. The public did not read the report but read the advertisements.

⁶⁹ Parker, *Motives in Economic Life*, Pub. Amer. Sociol. Soc., XII: 151.

⁷⁰ Tead, *op. cit.*, 72-73.

⁷¹ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, II: 35-43.

⁷² Tead, *op. cit.*, 68-71.

force that was construed in terms of legality,⁷³ so in the modern organization the impulsively determined demands of workmen conflict with the ownership and control exercised by a dominant class. The minds of the workers, in so far as they are not under the influence of the ideas and attitudes of the employing class, are influenced by the same motives which determined property right in the primitive group, while the owners of property rely on the power of the state to protect them in the ownership guaranteed them by the law. In so far as changes in the mechanisms of the distribution of wealth, and reforms in the law of private property are required for the general happiness, which it is the function of the law to further, these reforms cannot wait upon the impulses and attitudes either of the working class or of the employing class. It is impossible, in the complex industrial conditions of modern life, to distribute income according to creation of it, nor can the principles of previous occupation or of habitual use be followed. Yet the primitive instincts at the base of these principles persist and conflict with the equally unintelligent motive of a reactionary employing class to maintain its position of advantage by industrial and political domination. This conflict of interests can be resolved only by re-shaping the law of property according to a rational social purpose.⁷⁴

Employers generally maintain that, questions of ownership aside, they base an exclusive right to profits on the ground that they assume the responsibilities of the business. It is true that, "In the existing state of things the ultimate responsibility centers almost altogether in the ownership of the property 'at risk' in the business."⁷⁵ Labour takes no property risk and has little or no control. Responsibility should be commensurate with assumption of risk, or rather uncertainty;⁷⁶ and the bearing of uncertainty should give right to profits. As a matter of fact the workman risks his personal power in a business and it is used up therein, as the investor risks his capital.⁷⁷ The reasons that workmen do not demand responsible power and profits in proportion to their assumption of risk are: (1) that workmen are notoriously reckless of life and limb, as well as of in-

⁷³ Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law*, II: 29-41; Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, Chs. XVII-XVIII.

⁷⁴ Holmes, *The Common Law*, 48; Ely, *Property and Contract in their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth*, I: Ch. VI.

⁷⁵ Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*, 350.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 354.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 354.

come,⁷⁸ wherefore the risk they run has not occurred to them as a reason for demanding responsibility and a share of the profits; (2) that the mass of workmen do not like to assume responsibility. Wherefore workmen are more willing to entrust their lives and fortunes to an enterprise without adequate control and assumption of responsibility than are investors to loan their money.⁷⁹ The workman has, until recently, had it in mind that he could go elsewhere at a moment's notice, while capital invested in an enterprise is less mobile.

But the attitude of workmen is in this respect rapidly changing, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter. Under the influence of progressive labour leaders, and of progressive business managers, they are becoming conscious of the risk they assume, of the care they should take of themselves physically and of their economic opportunities, in short, that they should demand a responsible part in the management of industry commensurate with the risk they run. This attitude is combatted by the individualistic employer who maintains his traditional right to exclusive responsible management. This conflict of interests is described as follows by a distinguished industrial engineer: "The employer as a rule assumes the complete lack of responsibility of employés for the risks of the business, and on this basis rests his claim to the total 'profit.' Many an employé, on the other hand, feels that he stakes a larger proportional business risk in the industry than the employer. Leaving aside all such matters as raise questions in the field of direct blame, a business which may in part shut down or become involved in competitive difficulties, because its managers are not men of enough intellectual grasp to avert them, may well cause more complete destruction to the lives of many workers than the complete failure of the business would to the owners or managers."⁸⁰ The employer may lose profits, stockholders may lose dividends, but the workman and his family, when his wages stop, face dire need. It is on this ground of the risk run by employés as well as employers that, as we shall see in a succeeding chapter,⁸¹ industrial engineers maintain the right of employés to a share of the profits and base their recommendations for shop reorganization on that assumption.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 301.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 356.

⁸⁰ Valentine, *The Human Element in Production*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., Jan., 1917, 484. See also Veblen, *The Nature of Peace*, 152-153.

⁸¹ The chapter entitled, *Scientific Management and Joint Management as Remedies*.

The evils of individualistic profit seeking, less when business men observe the conventional restraints, greater when they are obsessed by rivalrous impulses, have given increased influence to the co-operative ideal in economic relations. Men who are moved by sympathetic and intellectual impulses see a greater complexity and need of adjustment in economic relations than do business men who are moved primarily by their own profit-seeking impulses. Wherefore the development of the co-operative relation requires a wide intelligence among employers, workmen and the public, particularly among employers because they must initiate the co-operative features. The conservative type of employer is more shrewd and conventional than broadly intelligent; the rivalrous employer uses constructive imagination along the line of his particular purpose but is apt to be indifferent to the larger problems and the social implications of business. Very much business is reduced to a routine so that the business man follows certain ways of doing that require little or no original thinking. This is true even of those in the most important positions.⁸² Inasmuch as the employer will have to take the initiative in the development of any co-operative relation, this lack of broad intelligence is a great obstacle to the introduction of such a relation.

The predominance of individualistic profit seeking in the economic system is due more to the unfinished state of the system than to the fact that opportunities for profit seeking represent an unalterable demand of human nature. Many manufacturers are carried away by the money-making opportunities of a period of prosperity but, when adversity comes with its losses, they declare a system that would introduce greater certainty with comparatively small returns would be much more desirable than the present one. This sentiment is growing, especially among manufacturers that have a comparatively small, highly competitive business. The same is true among the farmers. There was a time when people were moving west, "taking up land" and speculating on its rise in value, and the profit-seeking seemed stronger than the possessing impulses.⁸³ But the opportunities for making money by speculation in land have largely passed

⁸² Veblen, *The Industrial System and the Captains of Industry*, *The Dial*, May 31, 1919, 555.

⁸³ Trollope wrote, in 1862, that the "American has no love for his own soil or his own house," that, "to keep a farm which he could sell at an advantage . . . would be to him as ridiculous as the keeping of a family pig would be in an English farmer's establishment." (*Trollope, North America*, I: 145.)

from the mass of smaller landowners. And the farmer has so often experienced loss instead of profit in the raising of crops that he has quite lost a taste for the little venture in profit seeking afforded by his ownership of a farm. Many farmers are now more anxious for the certainty of a small income than to embark on a profit-seeking venture.⁸⁴ Another reason for less keenness in profit seeking among farmers is that they have a customary standard of living and are quite well satisfied with a return that enables them to maintain that standard. Indeed the effect of high prices during the last year of the World War was, in many cases, to cause farmers to dispense with hired men and cultivate a smaller acreage because, in so doing, they could get their customary return "with less bother." Among small merchants and manufacturers, also, profits are normally less than formerly, so that they carry on business less under the lure of profit seeking than to "be your own boss and make a fair living." A considerable part of the business of the world is now carried on without any motive of speculative profit. Very many business men have become accustomed to the idea that all their business ever will yield them, in the long run, is interest on capital and wages of superintendence. If business were carried on primarily for the public welfare, they would be satisfied with this return.⁸⁵

It is in the making of big fortunes that individualistic profit seeking is most conspicuous. For such fortunes are made by taking big risks. "When fortunes are made with prodigious speed, it is usually wholly or chiefly through profits. Accumulation by compound interest though amazing in its possibilities *after* a fortune is large, cannot in a single lifetime make a large fortune out of a small one. . . . Profits are the *chance* part of distribution, the part which is the *uncertain*, and therefore extremely *variable*, margin left after the more fixed and known parts of the distribution—rent, interest, wages, and salaries—have been deducted.

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"The important point is that, under the present private-profit sys-

⁸⁴ The fixing of the price of wheat by the government during the war is said to have been the main factor in the immense extension of the wheat acreage during that period, not because the guaranteed price was a high price but because, if he had a fair crop, the farmer was certain of selling at some profit. (Eldred, *The Grain Corporation and the Guaranteed Wheat Price*, Quart. Jour. Econ., Aug., 1920, 705.)

⁸⁵ "If business were for service and not for private profit, there would be no element of speculative profits demanded by the capitalistic class." (Ellwood, *The Social Problem*, 159.)

tem, the chance of profits and risk of losses, as well as the management, are entirely in the hands of one only of the three classes interested in the success of the enterprise. The other two classes, namely, the workers and the public, do not ordinarily participate much, if at all. . . .

“While government enterprise has glaring defects, the present system of private profits is also defective. It is even very costly to the public in that the enterpriser requires the chance of large profits to compensate for the large risk he assumes. Two unfortunate consequences follow. One is that in this great game of chance the lottery winnings make multimillionaires out of millionaires, which is inconsistent with democratic ideals and democratic progress. The other is that it creates hostility on the part of the other two classes.”⁸⁶ In the opinion of Professor Fisher this irrational economic order can be rationalized only by eliminating much of the chance element through giving the government the risk-taking function. “The government, representing the public, is, with all its faults, in a better position than the private capitalist to underwrite great industrial undertakings, both because its resources are greater and because the chances of gains and losses in many different directions would tend, more fully, to offset each other.”⁸⁷ He points out that the government successfully exercised this function during the war. Since the war the enterprisers of the country have continued to organize into great associations of producers to regulate production and prices, and these conflicting interests will require governmental regulation.

⁸⁶ Fisher, *Economists in Public Service*, Amer. Econ. Rev., IX (Supplement): 13-15.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 15.

CHAPTER VII

THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ATTITUDE TO LABOUR

THE prevailing industrial practice is one in which the employer, counting the wages of his labourers as labour cost—which, like other costs, are to be kept as low as possible,¹—conducts his business with a view to private profits. Impelled by the quest of profits employers have claimed the right to manage their business as they might see fit,² and to consider labour in the same light as raw materials or machinery,³ in the interest of private profits. This right, when applied to particular situations, differentiates into particular rights, as the right to employ and discharge at will, and exclusively to decide matters pertaining to the business. Workmen must submit to the orders of employers.⁴ In this relation of authority-subordination, those in authority easily become dominating if their authority, no matter how arbitrarily exercised, is questioned.

The development of large-scale production has facilitated this capitalistic control. Great corporations are, for several reasons, in a very favourable position to exercise control over workmen and to repress organized effort to improve conditions.⁵ They have ample financial resources; they employ a large mass of unskilled labour, which it is difficult to organize;⁶ often they can transfer work to be done from a factory in which there is a strike to other factories;⁷ their

¹ Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, 465-466.

² Pigou, *Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace*, 12; Stockton, *The Closed Shop in American Trade Unions*, J. H. U. S. H. P. S., Series XXIX, No. 3, 165; Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, 73.

³ A professor of engineering recently reminded his class that it is a business principle not to introduce an expensive machine to do the work of cheap labor because, in case of unforeseen changes, the labour can be scrapped without loss but not the machine.

⁴ Fitch, *The Steel Workers*, Pts. II-IV; Taussig, *Inventors and Money-Makers*, 84-94; Wolfe, *Works Committees and Joint Industrial Councils*, as a report prepared for the United States Shipping Board, 1919, 26.

⁵ Weyforth, *The Organizability of Labor*, J. H. U. S. P. S., Series XXXV, No. 2, Ch. XII.

⁶ Wolman, *The Extent of Trade Unionism*, *Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sc.*, Pub. No. 1092, 6.

⁷ Wolman, *The Extent of Labour Organization in the United States in 1910*, *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, May, 1916, 507.

very size and power intimidates workmen; the policy of a monopolistic corporation of diminishing the output to raise the price decreases the demand for labour and hence tends to lower the wage; a decrease in the number of establishments under a régime of consolidation lessens the opportunity of striking workmen to find work elsewhere.

When only a little capital was required to become an employer, the more vigorous and ambitious workmen, who resented what they regarded as the making of large profits at their expense, went into business for themselves and competed with their erstwhile employer. Today the starting of an independent business is much more difficult than formerly. The man with a strong impulse to make money, who can no longer satisfy his impulse by going into business for himself, is offered a tempting salary as the price of his complete devotion to the interests of a corporation. Men whose dispositions do not permit this subservient attitude become forces in the progressive political and labour movements.

Labour organization is not apt to develop among a body of workmen in whom the forceful dispositions are weak. Compare, for instance, mercantile establishments, which contain a vast body of listless, inefficient workers,⁸ with railroad transportation, in which "exacting entrance requirements insure a type of employés which, for physical fitness, mental alertness, and ability to handle difficult situations is unsurpassed in any industry."⁹ The work is exacting and requires extreme caution, good judgment and decisive action.¹⁰ The result is that men engaged in railroading develop a group character which makes their unions among the most aggressive and effective in the country,¹¹ while department store employés lack the characteristics necessary for effective unionization.¹² The aggressive unionism of bridge and structural iron workers is due to the hazardous character of their occupation, which selects only the most resolute and daring men and confirms these traits in the course of the vocational practice.¹³

Labour, neither unorganized nor organized, disputes the necessity of recognizing authority in production. Workmen admit that re-

⁸ O'Leary, *Department Store Occupations*, 84-87.

⁹ Fleming, *Railroad and Street Transportation*, 14.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 20-25.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 26.

¹² Wolman, *The Extent of Labor Organization in the United States in 1910*, *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, May, 1916, 502.

¹³ Grant, *The National Erectors' Association and International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers*, 9.

sponsibility calls for sufficient authority to protect the responsibility. Responsibility includes the necessity of making decisions and taking the consequences of decisions when put into effect. Authority involves the power to make use of all the agents necessary to carry out the decision and insure its having the result intended. Workmen recognize the necessity of authority and subordination and admit that it is not possible for the industrial relation, under any system, to become one entirely of co-operation between management and workmen on a plane of complete personal equality. Whether the employer is a manager hired by private owners or a government official or a manager elected by a co-operating group of workmen, there must be authority and subordination in the industrial relation. Those most capable of industrial leadership must direct the work of others; the directed must act according to the instructions of the directors. It is, therefore, an evidence of intelligence in industrial relations that the subordinate accepts the subordination necessary to the efficiency of the organization. Exactly the same intelligence is required of one who occupies a position of authority. He is required to perform the duties of that position without thinking of his position as giving him authority impulsively to dominate subordinates. The elimination of this impulsive relation depends on bringing into the financial and industrial leadership the men most capable of leadership and on developing the intelligence of workmen. Intelligent workmen follow the leadership of those who show themselves able to lead, but they resent an assumption of authority without ability. Incompetence of managers is, then, one cause of the antagonism between labour and capital. Another cause is more fundamental, being inherent in the industrial system as at present constituted. That system has developed out of the profit-seeking motive, and that motive involves the use of labour, as of raw materials for private profit. High productivity and the lowest wages consistent therewith is the aim of the profit-seeking employer. His ultimate aim is not to increase the efficiency of labour in the long run, but to make large profits for the time being, even at the sacrifice ultimately of the vitality and morale of workmen on which productivity depends.¹⁴ Furthermore, this profit-seeking motive usually actuates not only the ultimate employer but extends through the entire management, inasmuch as, in most cases, the higher officials of an enter-

¹⁴ Webb, *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions*, 76.

prise have a direct stake in the business beyond their fixed salaries.¹⁵ This aim to use labour for private profit makes inevitable an antagonism between capital and labour. It involves domination of labour—a subconscious attitude of domination in the ordinary course of business, a conscious attempt to dominate if workmen jointly resist and insist on higher wages or improved conditions of labour. Individual employers may feel little or none of this domination toward workmen, may simply conform to the prevailing business practice, and, in case of a difference of opinion, may intelligently discuss grievances with their workmen. But the system itself is based on domination-submission, or domination-resistance—mutual antagonism—and the men who reach the positions of power and influence in the system are apt to be those who excel in dominating power. Hence the reactionary aspect of the capitalistic system. As Justice Higgins, President of the Australian Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, said: "There is a very real antinomy in the wages system between profits and humanity. The law of profits prescribes greater receipts and less expenditures—including expenditures on wages and on the protection of human life from deterioration. Humanity forbids that reduction of expenditure should be obtained on such lines. Other things being equal, the more wages, the less profits; the less wages the more profits. It is folly not to admit the fact and face it. Moreover the economies which are the easiest to adopt in expenditure tend to waste and degradation of human life—the most valuable thing in the world; therefore so long as the wage system continues there is need of some impartial regulating authority."¹⁶

The individualistic employer lacks the social point of view in production; his narrow vision intensifies his impulsive action. Domination-submission is so prevalent in the industrial relation because it is the easy relation for the superior. It is easy to yield to a strong impulse. Such action requires no thought. It is seen not only between employers and workmen but also between different grades of workmen: "I doubt whether there is any authority in the industrial world more absolute than that of the mechanic over his helpers; and as for arbitrariness in the use of authority, give me every time the manner of a mechanic in telling a helper to pass a wrench, or shoulder a piece of pipe. If a foreman should speak in such a manner to

¹⁵ Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, 349.

¹⁶ Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order, II, Harv. L. Rev., XXXII: 216-217.

a mechanic, he would quit.”¹⁷ The dominating attitude is prevalent because of the natural strength of the dominating disposition and because this attitude has been fostered by the form taken by social institutions. In the family the bread-winner is the ultimate boss. In industry the employer who owns the instruments of production is the acknowledged boss. In the state the propertied classes are the implicitly recognized rulers. The impulse to dominate is strengthened by the sense of power due to ownership of property, and by the impulse to protect ownership, hence the assurance of propertied classes and their impulse to maintain their political as well as their industrial control.

The dominating attitude is not usually conspicuous in a business enterprise; domination is apt to be the final resort when other appeals have failed. The other forms of appeal are, therefore, most in evidence. For instance, in some factories the policy is to keep in the lower managing positions, in close touch with workmen, men of unusual power to win admiration of workmen. Then, at the other end, the general manager may be a person of rough and ready generosity,¹⁸ perhaps something of an idealist, who makes a hobby of profit sharing as a possible policy of the future, or of something else that serves as a lure to the loyalty of subordinates. This general manager may delegate to subordinates the work that makes a man disliked, for instance, the handling of requests for increases of pay. The function of this subordinate, is then, that of a sort of chancellor who “shields the Emperor.” He assumes entire responsibility in those matters that inevitably call forth criticism.¹⁹ Thus the management is so shaped as to appeal to workmen’s admiration for ability and devotion to generosity, with only as much domination as seems absolutely necessary to maintain control.

The dominating attitude of the individualistic employer may be veiled because while workmen are submissive the dominating disposition is satisfied and other dispositions assert themselves. The employer may become benevolent and conduct welfare work. But any resistance after employers have launched welfare enterprises is termed “base ingratitude,” and the essential attitude of domination is apt to become more pronounced than ever.

¹⁷ Colburn, A Foreman’s Responsibility and Authority, *Industrial Management*, June, 1917, 350.

¹⁸ “Human-Being Management,” *Industrial Management*, Dec., 1916, 398-400.

¹⁹ The same arrangement is seen in the state. A President of the United States takes out a union card and professes sympathy with the aims of unionism while his attorney general takes measures to crush a threatened railway strike.

The dominating attitude is not, therefore, necessarily conspicuous or even conscious. It is more evident in the language and manner of some employers than others,²⁰ but, in most employers, except in industrial disputes, it does not come to the surface but remains subconscious. A manager may consciously hate autocracy and, at the same time, *subconsciously* think in terms of that attitude in his industrial relations.²¹ We cannot here go into the many ways in which the dominating attitude subconsciously affects the thinking of managers. Under the influence of it a manager will twist the truth as suits his purpose and insist that subordinates accept his interpretation of a situation, even though it may reflect on their truthfulness or efficiency. He maintains that, as their superior, they should "take it from me." Or he may refuse to hear the truth from a subordinate against one above the latter, for, as he avers, he must protect those in authority by refusing to hear criticisms against them. In both cases, obviously, authority means power to dominate. He wants to have it generally acknowledged that "whatever he says goes."

Because of the immense advantage possessed by employers, as a result of the development of modern capitalism, workmen are disposed to submit while annoyances are sufferable or injustices not too flagrant. The rank and file are not ordinarily conscious of their submission, because it is habitual, as employers are not conscious of their domination because it is habitual. Workmen are conscious of impulses of resistance, or of resentful submission when compelled to submit after resistance; but their habitual submission is subconscious. The employer realizes his superior power, which strengthens his dominating attitude. Employers not of a dominating disposition often will assume this attitude to their workmen under the insistence of the more dominating employers of the industry. Employers of the latter type are apt to rise to leadership in a period of industrial development in which the outstanding facts are the war against labour and the war against independent concerns that resist the tendency toward monopoly in the industry. Furthermore, because submission of workmen is customary, and because in a strike

²⁰ Sir Charles C. Allom, *Unionism as Foe of Labour*, *American Industries*, March, 1919, 42; Kirby, *Industrial Freedom; Its Friends and Enemies*, Address delivered at Sixteenth Annual Convention of National Association of Manufacturers, 1911, Reprint, 12; Address of President Barr before National Founders' Association, *Open Shop Review*, Dec., 1918, 466-467.

²¹ Smyth, *Efficiency, Industrial Management*, Dec., 1918, 464.

the conspicuous action is the resistance of workmen and not the domination of employers, the conventional public believes submission is right and resistance wrong, and this still further disposes workmen to submit while annoyances are sufferable.

The submissive attitude of labour is at the bottom of the conventional aspect of the behaviour of labour, which is its most pronounced aspect, particularly in America. For, in spite of the new attitude of labour sketched in the succeeding chapter, the influential leadership is the conventional leadership, as is evident from the election of Samuel Gompers for forty years as president of the American Federation of Labour.²² Fearfulness, submission makes for lack of initiative,²³ discourages thought, wherefore, the labour movement, except in the minds of its progressive leaders, has lagged behind the development required by the economic changes that have taken place through the initiative of, and primarily in the interest of employers, who are not fearful and submissive but rivalrous, masterful, and constructive from the point of view of individualistic ambition.

The dominating attitude of the individualistic employer obtains not only between management and workmen but also between managers and other members of the management who are subordinate. And here, as in relations of management with workmen, it causes inefficiency. The individualistic employer may good-naturedly listen to criticisms of the business by subordinates but will not frankly discuss them. In this he differs from the idealistic type of business man described in the succeeding chapter. The latter encourages perfectly free and frank discussion, and the result among the staff is a mental alertness, a readiness to entertain the other man's viewpoint, and an openness to new plans and ideas. Under a dominating management co-operation means something entirely different. When such a manager asks subordinates to co-operate he means to accept and observe the relations of subordination in which they find themselves, not an intellectual co-operation involving perfect frankness between men all intent on the problems of the business. For instance, a young college graduate, a brilliant and earnest young fellow, went into the service of a corporation. In the preliminary talk he was given to understand that the worst fault of the college man in business is his unwilling-

²² Saposs, *Out of the Beaten Path*, Survey, July 16, 1921, 514.

²³ The distinguished engineer, Ordway Tead, says: "The testimony is general that, away from the accustomed restrictions of the bench, workmen display an ability and leadership which would be wholly unexpected from their conduct in the shop." (*Instincts in Industry*, 89.)

ness to "co-operate." He is too individualistic, too rivalrous, wants to be noticed as a superior man and to get ahead quickly. Our young man was told what manager he was under and started in to "co-operate." He did conscientiously what he was expected to do, and, at the same time, did a good deal of thinking on the problems he met in the business. He came to know other workmen and learned what they were thinking as to the defects in the business organization and methods. One day, in discussion with the general manager and his associates, he candidly pointed out certain defects and indicated that he was not alone in thinking so. To his surprise, instead of candidly and on a plane of comradely equality discussing the alleged defects with him, they began vehemently to defend the practices criticized, and he felt uncomfortably that he was regarded as a "knocker." Then he began to realize why there were, as he had found, others who shared his ideas, but did not venture to discuss problems with the management and, perhaps, had become largely indifferent to the problems of the business, and seemed to be mainly interested in drawing their pay. It is this dominating attitude of a management toward young men that discourages their interest, that keeps them from entering heartily into an intellectual co-operation, that makes men eventually less and less interested in the problems of the business and in doing thoroughly their own part, and more and more rivalrous for higher pay and promotion, more and more clever in taking advantage of the weak points of those on whom increase of pay and promotion depend—their love of the flattery of receiving presents, of finding their ideas agreed with, their love of expressions of loyalty. Or, if the intellectual young man maintains his ideals, he feels that he is in danger of sacrificing them by remaining in the business and is quite apt to get out.

But what is the cause of this attitude of the superiors to the young man—this repression of his thoughtful analysis of business problems and criticism of defects of organization and methods? It is possible that his attitude is misunderstood. From the description given it is evident that it is exceptional. The business man finds a good deal of assumed interest and conceit among subordinates and, on this account, may develop a somewhat indifferent attitude to their opinions. Another reason for this indifference may be that, from the position of the general manager, in which he can view the entire situation in the business, the partial view of any subordinate and the criticisms made from that point of view seem of small account. Another reason may

be that a manager does not want his peace of mind disturbed as long as conditions in the business at the time are not such as to disturb it. The long absorption in the effort to make money in a certain business may not have resulted in making much money, but it results in a mesh of habits and attitudes that determine the business behaviour. Students often make the great mistake of thinking that the business man is invariably consciously reasoning in his business behaviour, from the point of view of his own business interests. This is untrue. It is difficult to get many business men to talk seriously on business problems because it is difficult to get them to *think*. In his business he acts according to habit and attitude which, often, it must be confessed, is as successful as clearly-thought-out action would be; but this has its limitations.²⁴ Now, when an intellectually-in-earnest young fellow proposes any change in the business organization, the business man, because of this aversion to thinking, because of his addiction to habit, as well as for the other reasons above given, is not apt to take the proposal seriously. Without any particular discussion as to its merits it is dropped. Because of his recognized authority, his indifference or impatience with reference to the proposal ends the matter.

In the last analysis, then, the aversion of a manager to the discussion of problems of the business is due to the fact that his egoistic dispositions are stronger than the sympathetic and intellectual. When a superior will not take intellectually the candid criticisms of a subordinate, even though they may be given somewhat impulsively, but instead will sit back with an assumption of complacency and "let him knock," thus impulsively and unjustly misconstruing the attitude of the subordinate, or will impetuously defend the alleged defects, his reaction is determined by his sense of superior position. When this attitude animates the head of a business, it affects his subordinates. The result is apt to be that, throughout such an establishment, each superior seeks his own advantage—the satisfaction of his egoistic dispositions,—and, in his relations with subordinates, is not subject to the sympathetic appeal of the face-to-face relations. He is suggestible to the egoistic attitude of the man higher up and that one, in turn, to the man higher up, and so on to the general manager who administers the business with an eye to the attitude of his employers, the influential men among the directors.

²⁴ Bruce, Building a Sales Policy, in *Annals of Amer. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sc.*, the vol. entitled *Modern Manufacturing*, 290-292; Dickson, Some Twentieth Century Problems, in same publication, 22.

Owing to this egoistic spirit throughout an organization, the attitude of a management to changes in physical processes that are recommended by the engineers employed by the corporation is apt to be entirely different from the attitude to changes in relations with workmen that are recommended by the employment manager. For instance, a manufacturer of milk products finds that certain products ferment in hot weather. The chemist is put to work on the problem and finally recommends radical changes in methods of manufacture and these, despite the indifference of foremen and workmen, who habitually ridicule changes they do not understand, particularly radical changes, are carried out under orders from the manager. In the same establishment there is some dissatisfaction among workmen and the employment manager, after investigation, recommends changes in relations with workmen. The changes are no more radical than those recommended by the chemist but the employment manager is denounced by the manager and directors as radical. Why? One reason is that the scientific basis of his conclusions is not as clear cut as that of the chemist. The latter deals with substances and weights which permit of exactness in experiment; the results of experiments can be convincingly stated on a sheet and placed under the eyes of the manager. But the employment manager deals with the motives of men and conditions of work—vague data that cannot be presented with the exactness of the results of an experiment on substances. Consequently the manager is not convinced if the analysis runs counter to his attitude to workmen. He has no personal attitude and prejudices with regard to substances, but he has toward workmen. He is apt to call recommendations radical if they run counter to the authoritative attitude of the employer. Any suggestion of yielding to demands of workmen or of granting anything that may appear like yielding is repugnant to the employer because it seems to challenge his authority to run his own business as he pleases. He thinks, "Yield or appear to yield this time and it will be harder for you to maintain control next time." Consequently suggestions of changes in relations with workmen may be denounced as radical, while equally radical suggestions of changes in processes are readily carried out.

This individualistic attitude of the employer results in what Mr. Frederick W. Taylor called the "military system of management," in which the general manager is responsible for the work of the entire organization and delegates authority and responsibility to sub-

ordinates and they to their subordinates. "In such a form of management, criticism from the head goes completely down the line, gathering in vehemence and force as it proceeds, while praise extended from the top usually penetrates only as far as the superintendent's office.

"Despotic authority which manifests itself in harsh criticism or tyrannical treatment of men is undoubtedly the characteristic of this form of management. Money returns are the only gauge of success, and that foreman is best who can force from his men the greatest amount of work with the least possible compensation."²⁵

Under military management the shops are run almost entirely by the foremen. They alone are in direct contact with workmen. Foremen win their position through a demonstration of "ability to get work out of others either by driving or persuasion,"²⁶ and by proving their loyalty to the company first and last. The most successful foremen are those who have a subtle understanding of the dispositions of workmen. Workmen like a foreman who does not interfere with their action in work except in a way to facilitate its accomplishment,²⁷ who furnishes materials without delay, proper tools, or other means of making the work go smoothly; who does not lose his temper and become domineering; who satisfies the impulse to admire superiority by himself working as a master-workman among his men, and by mastering unruly workmen; who satisfies the rivalrous impulse by praising good work and by recommending promotions strictly according to merit. The more varied the satisfactions of dispositions that are derived from contact with a foreman, the stronger his control. Foremen not thus gifted in control rely on domination and this type of foreman is more apt to drive than the other. When driven, workmen are apt to feel that they give more work than they are paid for and deliberately to soldier on the job. The foreman, in turn, "in loyalty to the company frequently feels bound to use his knowledge to exact more work than employés feel they are getting paid for. He almost inevitably develops a subtly suspicious attitude towards others and a desire to outwit them

²⁵ Dodge (Chairman of the Board, the Link Belt Co., Phila.), *The Spirit in Which Scientific Management should be Approached*, in Thompson, *Scientific Management*, 287.

²⁶ Tead, *The Importance of Being a Foreman*, *Industrial Management*, June, 1917, 354.

²⁷ See the statement of Mr. Gantt, Hearings before the Special Committee of the House of Representatives appointed to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management, 1912, I; 576.

in a game, sometimes cunningly played by both sides, to see who can give as little as possible for as great a return as possible. Far from being blameworthy, this attitude is the natural result of the foreman's knowledge of the tendency of some workers to soldier and of his own efforts to overcome the same feeling in himself, in order that he may qualify as a real 'company man.'²⁸

The dominating attitude of the foreman is due not only to his industrial position and to his strong dominating disposition but also to the fact that that disposition is strong in many workmen. Furthermore, every workman, from the manual labourer to the college professor, regards his knowledge of his work as his claim to superiority and is inclined to resent suggestions and directions from anybody, no matter how high his position, who is not actually engaged with him as a comrade in that kind of work. However humble the work, the man doing it feels he knows more about it than men not actually engaged in it. Hence the difficulty of co-ordinating and directing workers. This is especially true if the dominating disposition is strong among them. They want their own way as well as the foreman, and he feels that, when it is a question of which is to have his way, he has that right in virtue of his position. Workmen in whom the dominating disposition is strong have their stubbornness intensified by the influence of the dominating attitude of the foreman and he has his impulse to dominate intensified by the attitude of workmen. Through social suggestion they act and react on one another. Though the foreman eventually has his way and the workmen have to follow his directions, it is with a smouldering resentment that stimulates their self-assertion at every opportunity.

In addition to this personal relation of mutual antagonism, however, there is another factor in the situation. Workmen often resent the domination of foremen without recognizing its wider significance, that it is in part the outcome of the profit-seeking attitude of the employer. But the organization of labour results in more or less discussion of relations with employers and the analysis made by the more intelligent workmen eventually becomes the common property of all. Workmen come to realize that a foreman is above all trying to commend himself to his employer and that his dominating attitude is incidental to the impulse to get as much out of workmen for as little pay as possible in order to increase the employer's profits. Wherefore the labour organization soon becomes

²⁸ Tead, *op. cit.*, 354.

conscious of its main purpose—resistance of the autocratic employer and his subordinates. The experience of attempts at collective bargaining and of strikes increases the intelligence of the mass of workmen, and eventually they have analysed their industrial situation down to what seems to them the essential thing in it—their submission, because of their slender resources, to the employer because of his overpowering resources.²⁹

The organization of labour seems to the individualistic employer a menace because labour is organized to resist his traditional authority in industry. All the plans of employers, in an industrial relation in which there is no spirit of co-operation, depend on the docility of their workmen, and this makes employers sensitive to any change in that attitude. As the organization of workmen becomes more intelligent and effective, employers become more dominating. They tend to justify this attitude by secondary explanations,³⁰ instead of regarding it intellectually. They assert that workmen are free to leave their work if they do not like the employer's attitude. Under modern conditions, however, large bodies of workmen have no such freedom. It is idle to talk of the ten or fifty thousand workmen of a great corporation being able to go and find work elsewhere. The employer's position against labour has been strengthened by the growth of the great corporation, and this has strengthened the individualistic attitude. Sometimes a corporation's domination becomes so violent and so wide-spread in the compelling force with which it instigates the behaviour of governmental officials in its interest as to arouse the entire country. The employer's attitude then becomes a subject of public discussion. Other employers condemn the domination in the particular instance because it arouses public resentment against the employing class and reveals the essential attitude in the relation of employers to employed.

The attitude of domination-submission still prevails except where the organization of labour has made possible effective resistance. But as yet only a very small percentage of wage-earners are organized.³¹ Reactionary employers' associations aim to keep labour submissive by keeping workmen unorganized. This attitude stirs the resistance of labour groups far and wide, which are bound together by this

²⁹ Babson, *Religion and Business*, 43.

³⁰ See the chapter entitled, *The Conflict of Attitudes of Industrial Leaders*.

³¹ Wolman, *The Extent of Labor Organization in the United States in 1910*, *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, May, 1916, 502.

sense of a common resistance.³² Employers also feel common cause because of their emotional determination to perpetuate their domination. This is the state of the class struggle and it projects itself into politics.³³ It is a conflict in which the employed are apt to feel a grievance not only against their particular employers but also indiscriminately against capitalistic interests, and those interests to feel indiscriminately that all labour movements are a menace.

This conflict makes for inefficiency in industry. The attention of workmen is unconsciously diverted from their work by their dissatisfied state of mind; and deliberate inefficiency in work becomes a wide-spread practice.³⁴ Furthermore, in the periods of violent resistance no work is done, and the effect of such a period is long felt. "The attitude of the employing class has forced trade unions to become for the most part fighting organizations. Workers have been obliged to fight primarily for an increased share of the necessities of life and for the recognition of their unions."³⁵ Men cannot fight and work too—hence the class struggle causes industrial inefficiency. It causes also political inefficiency. The more intense the struggle, the more do legislatures and courts become partisans of the dominant class and unable to keep the public welfare in view in the performance of their functions.

³² The Amalgamated Garment Workers subscribed \$100,000 to the steel strikers fund in 1919. (Hard, Hillman and the Amalgamated, *New Republic*, June 2, 1920, 16.)

³³ See address of President Barr of National Founders' Association, *Open Shop Review*, Nov. 1918, 473. This association, "has joined with the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Council for Industrial Defense, and the Anti-Boycott Association in fighting anti-injunction laws" and other laws sought by organized labour, and "has itself at times retained a representative in Washington to watch proposed legislation of possible interest to the Association and to direct attempts to quash such as is undesirable." (Stecker, *The National Founders' Association*, *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, XXX, Reprint, 33-34.) The National Association of Manufacturers also is pledged "to oppose any and all legislation not in accord" with its interests. (American Industries, March, 1919, 45.) Against these employers' associations the American Federation of Labour takes the political field. (See American Federation of Labour's "Reconstruction Program," *American Federationist*, Feb. 1919, 133-134.)

³⁴ Brissenden, *The I. W. W.*, 277.

³⁵ Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, 386-387.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONFLICT OF ATTITUDES OF INDUSTRIAL LEADERS

IN a preceding chapter we distinguished two types of profit seekers, the acquisitive, conventional type and the rivalrous, unconventional type that does not let established ways of doing interfere with personal ambition. Another and rarer type of business man is one in which the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions predominate. Of this type there are at least two varieties, one which is merely progressive and one which is idealistic. The progressive business man has impulses to improve industrial relations and does so in minor details as he has opportunity. His impulses are for fairness and co-operation and he is not slow to declare for any new line of co-operation that is coming to the front and being talked about. But his impulses lack definite, constructive application. He is less a man of independent ideas than of generous impulses. He looks for the "trend of sentiment" before declaring for a progressive idea and likes to feel that he has at least a considerable business sentiment with him. With the idealist he may admit that profits are the bone of contention in industrial relations and that the only solution of the industrial unrest is publicity as to profits and some rational disposition of them, but he has no plan which he is ready to see tried and no sympathy with the constructive work of idealists along this line. The trend of sentiment is not in that direction. The progressive leader goes only as far as he safely can and continues to play his part in a system of profit seeking which most employers find more or less congenial and endorse as "the only way to do business." The idealist, however, has his independent and constructive ideas, different from those of other business men, that withdraw him more or less from the system, and there is a conscious antagonism between him and the business world.

The idealistic employer is, in the last analysis, like the other types moved by impulse but his pronounced impulses are the sympathetic

and intellectual and these incline him to a social view of production so that his behaviour is more modified by social considerations than is that of the other types. Not only the impulsion of pronounced sympathetic and intellectual dispositions but also the force of ideas is necessary to make the idealism of the business man sufficient to cause his behaviour to vary from the prevailing behaviour. But in addition to the ideas there are always the dispositions that demand satisfaction. These incline him to industrial arrangements that will make workmen contented and enthusiastic in their work, for instance, arrangements that enlist the creative impulses of workmen and provide for profit sharing and co-operation in management. Such arrangements must be initiated by employers, inasmuch as the relation to which workmen are everywhere accustomed is the egoistic relation of submission to the dictates of those who control the instruments of production. Because ownership of wealth is everywhere felt to convey the right to dictate as to the use of that wealth, employers must take the initiative in inaugurating a relation that in any way waives that right.¹

The attitude of the idealistic, and also of the progressive employer determines his idea of industrial right in a great variety of situations. For instance, he maintains that he has no right to put a girl at work which will injure her eyesight, that he has no right to put a man where he will injure his lungs. The egoistic employer holds he has a right to do so inasmuch as he "puts it up" to the intelligence and free will of the employé; if the employé chooses to work under such conditions, it is no concern of his. He feels no annoyance of sympathetic impulses on account of injuries suffered by employés, because his sympathetic impulses are weak as compared with his profit-seeking impulses. The latter are annoyed by outside interference with the use of workmen for private profit.

If idealistic employers were more common and were as successful in their business as they have been in certain instances, profits as a bone of contention would be eliminated and the economic order would be changed. While the usual motive of profit sharing has been to increase the efficiency of the business as a profit-making concern, where profit sharing has been most successful the leaders have been men of extraordinary breadth of sympathy and vigour of intellect.²

¹ Stoddard, *The Shop Committee—Some Implications*, *The Dial*, July 12, 1919; Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, 393.

² Burritt, Dennison, Gay, Heilman, Kendall, *Profit Sharing*, Ch. XII.

Because such men are so rare,³ and because their plans, which contemplate a distribution of profits outside the sacred circle of ownership, are unlikely to have the confidence of investors, and of those who, by force of their rivalrous and dominating dispositions, have reached strategic positions in the financial system where they control the making of loans, the idealistic type of leadership remains, except in certain rare instances, the dream of the future.

In spite of the overwhelming pressure of the profit-seeking system under which all business men work, their purpose and behaviour depend, to some extent, on the dispositions that actuate them. Disposition likewise determines behaviour in other lines of leadership, even in military leadership, which, of all kinds, gives the least play to variant dispositions. While military life stimulates the aggressive and dominating dispositions, certain of the ablest military leaders have been conspicuous for their humane disposition. This has been true even of savage chieftains,⁴ and also of modern military leaders, as Garibaldi⁵ and Robert E. Lee. Lee's sympathetic disposition is seen in the stand he took as a commander-in-chief of the Confederate Army, against wanton destruction of property and the ruthless treatment of non-combatants, which, as he truly observed, had, in some instances, characterized the behaviour of the Union forces.⁶ So in industrial organization, in spite of the pressure to conform to profit-seeking behaviour, we find other and very different impulses that seek satisfaction in the industrial activity. If this idealism in business turns out to be effective in profit getting, the methods are adopted by business men whose essential motive is profit seeking. For instance, the success of an idealist in managing labour no sooner attracts the attention of profit-seeking corporations than his ideas are adopted and his personal traits imitated. In this way sympa-

³ Emmet, Profit-Sharing in the United States, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bulletin No. 208, Washington, 1917, 170.

⁴ Mooney, The Ghost-Dance Religion, Fourteenth An. Rep. Bu. Ethn., Pt. II: 681; Drake, Life of Tecumseh, 142.

⁵ Mr. Gladstone relates the following story told him by Garibaldi: "When I was a boy," he said, "I was at school in Genoa. . . . Genoa was a great military post . . . constant parades and military display, with bands and flags. All my school fellows used to run here and there all over the town to see . . . these military parades. . . . I never went to see one. It struck me then as a matter of pain and horror, that it should be necessary that one portion of mankind should be set aside to have for their profession the business of destroying others." (Morley, Life of William Ewart Gladstone, II: 110.) See also Dwight (translator), The Life of General Garibaldi, Written by Himself, 14-15.

⁶ Page, Robert E. Lee, 632.

thetic tend to replace dominating personalities in managing positions in which the incumbent is in close touch with workmen.

A business in which the management has eliminated profit seeking as the essential motive and has adopted a frank relation with employés as to the earnings of the business finds the chief obstacle to an intimate mutual understanding to be lack of intelligence among workmen.⁷ Such a business gradually eliminates unintelligent workmen, who cannot discuss differences or assent to reasonable adjustments, and who, therefore, must be discharged. It gradually eliminates also the ultra-rivalrous workman, for rivalry causes friction among workmen while sympathy promotes harmony and efficiency. One may note how the promotion of a workman kindles jealousy among his fellows until they have come to realize that his attitude toward them is not one of rivalry but of fellow feeling; whereupon the restlessness stirred by his deserved promotion becomes willing acquiescence. So, when fellow feeling pervades the whole labour force, differences in efficiency do not destroy the prevailing good feeling. Relations of intelligent and sympathetic co-operation throughout an organization are thus a means for the selection of intelligent and sympathetic workmen⁸ and the elimination of others. Those selected for their intelligence in adapting themselves to the organization also tend to be more intelligent and efficient in the performance of their individual work.⁹ Co-operative arrangements, in turn, stimulate intelligence and sympathy by the training afforded by those arrangements.

In a profit-seeking economic system idealistic impulses may have some play, but the essential tendency is reactionary. This tendency has become pronounced with the development of the great corporation, in which the men who reach the higher positions do so through a masterful disposition, and through a good degree of conservatism. And the corporation, with its management removed from the working force, fails to take interest in the human nature of the working

⁷ We have to face the fact of the low average intelligence level of native whites and the still lower level of foreign-born and Negroes. See Doll, *The Average Mental Age of Adults*, *Jour. Applied Psychology*, Dec., 1919, 320-321.

⁸ The more intelligent individual tends to excel also in industriousness and in that sympathy which stimulates a keen sense of justice. (*Thorndike, Intelligence and its Uses*, *Harper's Magazine*, Jan., 1920, 233-235.)

⁹ "An individual's intelligence compared with that of other individuals of his age is, within limits, a stable permanent characteristic of him." (*Thorndike, Intelligence and its Uses*, *Harper's Magazine*, Jan., 1920, 232.)

force; it has no sympathy with the efforts of the occasionally progressive manager to work out industrial relations that furnish opportunities for the development of personality in the course of work. This is not true in all large corporations; the situation is quite to the contrary in some of them. But this is the tendency that has been marked in the development of the great corporation. Contrary to this attitude is that of certain industrial engineers who are in close contact with labour and have pointed out that the reactionary attitude discourages the creative impulses of labour; that these must be appealed to in order to increase the productivity of labour; that this calls for a new attitude of employers to labour. Between this type of industrial leadership and the reactionary type there is an irrepressible conflict.¹⁰

The attitudes that differentiate the types of leadership are apt to be subconscious in the mind. Consequently, when men of different types discuss industrial problems they often differ hotly without knowing why. It is because the trend of their opinions is determined by their subconscious attitudes. Their talk is about the same facts, they acknowledge the facts, but they cannot agree on the interpretation of the facts. The only possible way in which they could come into any closer agreement would be to take up their differing attitudes and discuss those. But they are not even conscious that they have differing attitudes, or, at least, are so dimly conscious of it as to be unable to make this difference a subject of discussion. The points of view are implicit, subconscious.

Irreconcilable attitudes make opinions irreconcilable not only because the attitudes are subconscious, and, therefore, difficult to get at and discuss but also because they are determined by contrary dispositions. These are contrary in original nature and those actuated by them use industrial experience to satisfy their different dispositions so that the original conflict is made more irreconcilable by the course of industrial experience. The economic system under which all must work has been predominantly determined by egoistic dispositions but this cannot permanently suppress the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions, for an essential tendency in human nature is to seize whatever new opportunities chance to arise for the satisfaction of repressed impulses. The increasing interest of the public in industrial matters is affording increased support to sympathetic and intellec-

¹⁰ Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, 141-142.

tual employers. Consequently the conflict between the opposite attitudes is apt to become more pronounced.

The different attitudes of business men determine the course of their thought on political and industrial problems. The acquisitive type of profit seeker is apt to be extremely individualistic—his social horizon being limited to self and family. He is inclined to a minimum of governmental regulation. As a country largely rural develops into an industrial nation, the tradition of governmental non-interference is somewhat weakened by the impulse of a rivalrous leadership to seek governmental support in enterprises beyond the nation. The business man of this type, under certain conditions, may even be impelled to consider ways and means of a national prosperity that will not immediately and directly benefit his business. He may become absorbed in plans for the economic superiority of the nation. Under this idea employers and workmen, like the officers and common soldiers of an army, have their relations unified by a common purpose, which is neither individual acquisition nor self-realization but national superiority. This requires both employers and workmen to fit into a national organization of industry under governmental leadership, to regard themselves as part of it and not as individuals or classes with opposed interests. This attitude of national egoism is opposed to the progressive and idealistic attitudes which seek to shape industrial relations for the development of personality of all concerned, and oppose the subordination and suppression of the individual for the sake of national superiority. Business men of these attitudes desire legislation which will protect them from ruthless competition and, at the same time, leave them as free as possible for working out their arrangements for the self-realization of their workmen.

Opinions as to the wisdom of trade union policies, also, are determined by attitude. For instance, Professor Seager pointed out that the difference of opinion over the justice of the boycott between himself and lawyers hired to defend corporations against trade union boycotts was due to a difference of attitude toward trade unions.¹¹ Sharply opposed to the attitude of the individualistic employer, described in the preceding chapter, is the idealistic attitude, which regards the self-development of the working masses, which constitute

¹¹ Seager, *Trade Unions and the Law: A Rejoinder*, Survey, Jan. 31, 1914, 525.

the major part of society, as essential in social progress, and from that point of view analyses and evaluates trade unionism.

How attitude determines the course of thought is an inquiry that takes us into social processes of feeling and thought, a subject reserved for a future volume. We may note here that the impulses of an attitude affect the imagination which intensifies the impulses, confirms the attitude and causes a tendency to exaggeration. Thus employers exaggerate the evil tendencies of trade union policies,¹² especially when they seek to move judges to support them by an injunction against striking or boycotting unions.¹³ Professor Titchener notes that even the intellectual man has "verbal rushes" in the course of his literary and scientific work,¹⁴ but he is less apt to be the sport of impulse and to be incapable of conscientious introspection than men who have developed an antagonistic attitude to one another. The only way in which these impulses can be controlled is to trace them to their root and show the folly of their verbal expressions. As Lincoln put it, in the first address of his journey from Springfield to Washington, which was delivered at Indianapolis: "Solomon says there is 'a time to keep silence,' and when men wrangle by the mouth with no certainty that they mean the same thing, while using the same word, it perhaps were as well if they would keep silence. The words 'coercion' and 'invasion' are much used in these days, and often with some temper and hot blood. Let us make sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the meaning of those who use them. Let us get the exact definitions of these words, not from dictionaries, but from the men themselves. . . . What, then, is 'coercion'? What is invasion'?"¹⁵

Another process of feeling and thought connected with attitude is the tendency to justify an attitude by secondary explanations. These differ from impulsive exaggerations in that they are more under the control of reason and often are clever and seductive. On the other hand they may be simply the platitudes with which one class conventionally justifies its antagonism to another. For instance, the individualistic employer justifies his antagonistic attitude toward trade unions by secondary explanations some of which are: "that

¹² Read, for instance, the files of the Open Shop Review.

¹³ Laidler, Boycotts and the Labour Struggle, 232.

¹⁴ "In my experience, the verbal flow runs at a white heat; language becomes picturesque and full of metaphor; I achieve sentences that I am heartily sorry to destroy." (Titchener, *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes*, 258.)

¹⁵ Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, VI: 112-113.

a natural harmony of interests prevails in society and therefore the unions are to be restrained when they use coercive methods; that the employers' interests are always identical with the interests of society and therefore unionism is to be condemned whenever it interferes with their interests; that the interests of the worker and employer are harmonious, and therefore, when unions oppose the employer they are misled by unscrupulous leaders and are to be condemned; that the employer gives work to the labourers and therefore they are ungrateful and immoral and to be condemned when they combine to oppose him; that the employer has an absolute right to manage his own business to suit himself as against his workers, and therefore the unions are to be condemned when they interfere in any way with that right; that the business is his, an absolute property right, and to compel him to bargain with the men collectively, instead of as individuals, is to compel him to deal with men not in his employ, with an irresponsible committee, . . . that every worker has an absolute right to work when, where, and for whom he pleases and therefore the unions are to be condemned when they restrict this right and freedom; that free competition of the workers is always in the interest of society and therefore that any interference by the unions in this is to be condemned; that the greatest possible production is always in the interest of society and therefore the union is to be condemned whenever it interferes with this; that the law, the courts, and the police represent absolute and impartial rights and justice, and therefore the unions are to be condemned whenever they violate the law or oppose the police.”¹⁶

The essential point to grasp is, therefore, this fact of attitude and its reinforcement by impulsive exaggerations and secondary explanations. Unless a person grasps and firmly fixes this fact, his opinions will be subconsciously determined by the attitude of the class which exercises the social control, the employing class. If, on the other hand, he turns his attention to the attitude itself, and analyses that, he frees his mind from the control of the attitude that is dominant in the mind of the community, and thus is able to think and behave independently. People not thus independent, who are susceptible to the social control of the employer's attitude, Professor Hoxie addresses as follows: “Is there any more basis for the employers' claim of rights and condemnation of attacks of unions upon them, than the counter-claims of the unions? Is it true that employers give work

¹⁶ Hoxie, *Trade Unionism in the United States*, 195-196.

to labourers any more than that labourers give profits to employers? That the employer has a right to compel men to bargain individually any more than labourers have a right to compel employers to bargain with men collectively? . . . Has every man a right to work where and when and for whom he pleases, regardless of the effects on his fellow workers? . . .

"If it is wrong for workers who have no grievances against their particular employer to help other workers who have, then why is it not wrong for employers who have no grievances against their particular workmen to help other employers who have? . . . If we feel that there is a difference, that it is somehow morally worse for the workers to strike in aid of those with whom their employer has no concern, than for employers to aid other employers with whom they have no concern, it means that we have been consciously or unconsciously holding to assumptions underlying the militant employers' interpretation of unionism." "We have come to assume with employers that whatever has been is normal and right, while whatever is becoming is abnormal and wrong; that is, because employers have been able to act so and so, therefore, it is natural, God-given, normal, right, but because workers are only just beginning to be able or are striving to be able to act so and so, therefore, it is unnatural, abnormal and wrong."¹⁷

In this conflict of industrial attitudes the process which will determine which one shall finally prevail is not different from that great process which, from the beginning, has been operative in social evolution. This is the rivalry of social groups. When the working hosts of a national group have become so intelligent as to feel competent to assume a part in the management of industry, there results resistance to the domination of employers and this strife weakens the national group in its rivalry with others. That group will gain the advantage in which the industrial leaders recognize the increasing intelligence of workmen and enlist it in productive work by giving workmen responsible powers commensurate with their intelligence. The nation that thus enlists the efficiency of its working hosts will become superior, in peace or war, to the nation whose employing classes persist in the traditional domination. The process of group rivalry and survival will, then, in the last analysis, determine which of the conflicting attitudes of industrial leaders shall prevail.

The present is, therefore, a time of uncertainty and crisis in the

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 197-199.

great nations. The individualistic attitude prevails in industry and the employing class controls the state and uses the power of the government to protect and strengthen its industrial domination.¹⁸ The words of Justice Brandeis, written in 1912, still remain true: "At present we have, in respect to a very large part of our labour, industrial absolutism. With an increasing understanding of the human problem we are securing an enlightened instead of a harsh and unenlightened despotism, but despotism it is, however benevolent. We can never secure real efficiency without a full development of the individual. We must not only remove the conscious discontent but give the workingman that development of his powers which comes only from freedom and sharing in the responsibilities of the business.

"Two lines of development consistent with industrial democracy seem to me possible. Both of them preclude the present arrangement of the so-called individual contract between the employer and employé.

"The one possibility is a great advance in collective bargaining and trade unionism.

"The other possibility is the development of co-operation.

"Co-operation to be effective means something very different from mere profit sharing. It means giving to the workingman not only a share of the profits, but a share of the responsibilities and management, and a utilization of the latent powers in him."¹⁹

¹⁸ At the time of this writing the nation which has the strongest labour party is dominated by capitalistic interests. The English government, in violation of its pledge to stand by the findings of the commission that recommended nationalization of the coal mines, has returned the mines to the private owners, because as Professor Laski declares, "the mine owners are the men who control government policy," and "they are assured of the support of the business community." (Laski, *More Unrest Among British Miners*, Survey, Apr. 2, 1921, 10-11.)

¹⁹ Brandeis, *The Preferential Shop*, *Human Engineering*, Apr., 1912, 179-180.

CHAPTER IX

THE NEW ATTITUDE OF LABOUR

MACHINE industry has been gradually changing the industrial attitudes of workmen. The individual rivalry of farm labour, the distinctive skill of the craftsman is no longer possible for machine workmen. A mass of workmen is divided into numerous branches, which jointly constitute one industrial unit under one management, and the same management may control many such units, perhaps the entire industry. Wherefore, says the progressive labour leader, "Labour in order to meet Capitalism effectively, must . . . be organized at least as compactly as industry itself is organized, not in different operations and branches and crafts, but as one individual unit for the entire industry."¹ Under capitalism the employer controls the machines on the use of which depends the opportunity to earn a living, wherefore, unless effectively organized to deal with the employer, the position of labour is in the highest degree insecure. Labour organization is the "consequence of the physical co-operation which machine industry demands. . . . The conscious motive of the average worker is greater security; but it is the commercial control of the machine which makes insecurity permanent in the life of the worker. Group control . . . and with it the hope of . . . more security is the root of the labour movement."²

Let us look into the insecurity of the present system. Depression and unemployment recur owing to business cycles that are due to the profit seeking of business men and the unsound expansion of credit allowed by financial institutions. The employing class rather than the employed is responsible for depression and unemployment. However, it injures not only that class but especially the workers.³ During a period of depression the successful employer can take

¹ Schlossberg, *Problems of Labor Organization* (pamphlet No. 2 of Amalgamated Clothing Workers), 27-28. See also, Budish and Soule, *The New Unionism*, 161-171.

² Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, 32.

³ *Ibid.* 9-22.

his losses with complacency because, during the period of prosperity, he took the profits, while labour cannot take unemployment complacently, having had only wages. Under the profit-seeking system the employer makes use of labour, when it suits his interest, and discharges workmen as suits his interest. Employers of the idealistic type do not hesitate to say that "employment should cease to be a gamble and should hold out a future for those who mean to stay and make good."⁴ But the rank and file accept the insecurity of the position of workmen as inevitable. Many employers declare that the only way to keep workmen tractable is to keep them uncertain as to the tenure of their jobs.

This belief is, in many cases, due to the experience of employers that "a new man will work well for a while, and then he comes to think he owns his job and works as he pleases." This is particularly apt to be the case among agricultural labourers who work by themselves a good deal, and who realize how dependent the farmer is on his hired men because of the loss of crops he would suffer if one left him at a critical time. But it is true also of some labourers in every line of industry. This condition causes many employers to generalize hastily as to the tendency of labour generally and to maintain that workmen must be kept uncertain as to the tenure of their jobs. But this uncertainty is unjust to the worthy employé. Commenting on the relation of employer to employé in the United States with respect to uncertainty of employment, Professor Ross writes that, while professional and other salaried men are not usually abruptly dismissed and their pay discontinued, "the practice of American industrial employers is really amazing in the lack of consideration for the worker found superfluous. No doubt many firms take a pride in building up and maintaining a stable labour force and give serious attention to the plight of the man they have to drop. But the average employer seems to give himself not the slightest concern as to what is to become of the worker let out through no fault of his own. I have heard of a firm long aware of the necessity of curtailment waiting till half an hour before the evening whistle blew to post a notice throwing hundreds of men out of a job for an indefinite time.

"Since Americans are not generally inhumane, the barbarous 'firing' policy so characteristic of our industries can be accounted

⁴ Filene, *The Key to Successful Industrial Management*, in a report of the Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sc. entitled, *Modern Manufacturing*, 1919, 9.

for only as a survival from the time of the small concern when the competent workman let out could walk around the corner and get a job just as good. That such is not the case today may be learned simply by interviewing a number of workingmen as to what loss of job has meant to them. What tales of tramping the streets looking for work, of rushing hither and thither on a rumour that this firm or that is taking on men, of returning night after night worn out and discouraged to an anxious family, of the sharp cutting down of household expenses, the begging of credit from butcher and grocer, the borrowing of small sums from one's cronies, the shattering of the hopeful plans for the children! Here are real tragedies, hundreds, nay, thousands, of them a year in our larger centres, yet the general public goes its way unconscious. No wonder among wage-earners the bitter saying is rife: 'A workingman is a fool to have a wife and kids.'

"What of the far greater number who are employed continuously but who are always worrying lest they lose their jobs without warning? From conversation with wage-earners one gathers that the fear of finding a blue slip in the pay envelope really poisons life for multitudes. So long as many employing concerns move in their present ruthless inscrutable way, not deigning to give their men any advance hint of what will happen to them, there will be resentment and unrest in the ranks of labour, no matter how reasonable the hours and pay."⁵

Not only is the workman's tenure of his position uncertain but also his fortunes in his position. This is true whether he is a salaried man or a wage-earner. Every change in the personnel overhead is fraught with possible momentous consequences for all below. The new "boss" may be a man of dominating disposition who is unpleasant to meet. Merely having to meet him makes the day's work unpleasant. His manner toward the women employés may make him exceedingly unpleasant to them.⁶ He may introduce petty rules and restrictions that seem to him necessary but are really to satisfy his own dominating disposition. To escape these annoyances incidental to positions of subordination men seek advancement. They seek to escape, if possible, the annoyances that come of being underlings. But this is becoming less possible because of the increasing size of manufacturing establishments; for "It may be set down as a general

⁵ Ross, A Legal Dismissal Wage, Amer. Econ. Rev., IX (supplement): 133-134.

⁶ Tead, Instincts in Industry, 34.

rule that the larger the manufacturing unit, the smaller the chance of advancement to supervisory and managerial work."⁷ Work not done in factories offers better chances of promotion; for instance, the "building trades offer many opportunities for advancement."⁸ But, in the larger manufacturing establishments, the mass of workmen and lower salaried men must remain employés at the will of their employer. They lack the training necessary for advancement;⁹ and those who have the initiative and resourcefulness to train themselves are in a position of such uncertainty that often they do not know in what line to specialize.¹⁰ The value of special skill accrues to the workman,¹¹ but the specialized skill may, through some unfavourable change in processes, become of no value.

Efficiency does not make position secure, for workmen are not valued by their superiors entirely according to their efficiency.¹² While there is an increasing tendency in this direction, their standing and tenure are determined also by the attitude which superiors happen to take toward them, whether of liking or dislike, which depends partly on pure luck, so far as the workman is concerned, partly on the cleverness with which they are able to "get a stand-in," and partly on their efficiency as workmen. Workmen are responsible to superiors but superiors are not responsible to workmen. We are accustomed to think that irresponsible government in the state is a fundamental evil; irresponsible government in industry likewise creates a condition of apprehension, unrest and resentment that is destructive of the contentment of workmen, and of their highest efficiency; and no arrangement of work with a view merely to making it more interesting will make good this fundamental defect in industrial organization.

To enable workmen to escape the vicissitudinous aspect of their lives is the essential motive of the labour movement. While the rank and file may not be clearly conscious of this motive, it is becoming essential in the minds of progressive labour leaders. Before self-development can be thought of, workmen must be in a position of greater certainty with regard to their future. Today they are subject not only to the conditions that make industry uncertain for manufacturers, farmers and other employers, but to the uncertainty incident

⁷ Lutz, *The Metal Trades*, 94, 101.

⁸ Shaw, *The Building Trades*, 62.

⁹ Lutz, *op. cit.*, 46-75, 95-101, 124-125.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 75.

¹¹ Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*, 345.

¹² Marshall, *Industry and Trade*, 662.

to their dependent position, for they are dependent on a foreman on whose will, often on whose liking or dislike depends the opportunity to earn a living. The power of employers to influence the immigration policy, and to move labour from one part of the country to another, further increases uncertainty as to jobs and wages. This uncertainty is increased also by the uncertainty of the business policy of an employer, who may adopt a policy of restricting output, or may displace labour with machinery, or otherwise change his policy at any moment in a way that vitally affects labour. This uncertainty is the more painful because wages are not sufficient to enable workmen with the strictest economy to make adequate provision for a long period of unemployment; or for a long period of illness, to which industrial workers are more liable than others owing to the occupational diseases; or for injury due to accident; or for their families in case of death of the bread-winner; or for old age. In cases where wages are sufficiently high to meet the ordinary contingencies there is the chance that they may be lowered at any time, inasmuch as, where workmen are unorganized for collective bargaining, they have no voice in determining their wages. "They are often free to change their employer, but a new employer is only a new master."¹³ The workman is not in control of his fate. His life and that of his family from day to day are in the highest degree uncertain, and the only way he can see to make it more certain is to organize for control in the management of industry.

This movement for control gains added impulsion from a variety of motives. There is the workman's feeling, referred to in a preceding chapter, that more of the product of industry than is his belongs to him by right of creation, that he has a right to control the jobs and tools because of previous and habitual use of them. These motives, though vague to the analyst, are powerful factors in the impulse for control. Take, for instance, the feeling that the workman has a right to his job and to the use of tools and machinery he has habitually used. This is a manifestation of a psychological process that has a wide range. As the business man gets used to his kind of business and says he could not make a success of any other kind, and in particular gets used to his own place of business, as the farmer similarly would despair of changing his occupation, and in particular gets attached to his own farm, so the workman gets accustomed to his occupation, his place of work, his particular functions and tools and declares it is

¹³ Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, 383.

wrong to force him out by denying him just compensation. Always there is the feeling, "What could I do in any other line?" Hence the impulse, though on strike, to hold on to the job. Hence also the impulse to devise some method of gaining control of management in order to obviate the necessity of having to strike.

This tendency of workmen to prefer the work, the place, the functions, the tools they are used to is in line with efficiency. The workman realizes this. In some cases there seems to be too much mental inertia and sentiment in his preference but the fact remains that efficiency is increased by the mental ease that comes of being used to things. A man can use the tool he is accustomed to with greater ease and effectiveness and satisfaction than another. The teamster can manage the team he has driven better than a new teamster, therefore he feels his is the right to use it. In some cases, also, a workman feels unsafe with any other tool than the one he is accustomed to, for instance, workmen working with ice-tongs. In general, workmen are naturally attached to what is familiar, and what they have often used to accomplish results becomes a part of their active self; wherefore, even apart from considerations of efficiency, they feel a kind of ownership of a job and tools; but merely for these reasons to claim property as their own is farthest from their thought. What they demand is joint control, for the satisfaction of these subconscious motives and because they believe such control conduces to efficiency of labour. Add to this the increasing understanding of economic conditions generally, on the part of labour, their migratory life and zest for the novel in life, their aversion to monotonous work intensified by the driving of a boss, and we have a variety of conditions favourable to the development of a more progressive and aggressive attitude of labour. The success of certain progressive national labour organizations in getting what all labour wants has given the new attitude, where it has appeared, a great prestige and influence in the labour world.

The new attitude that has come to animate some labour organizations was, in the first instance, an ideal of progressive labour leaders. In describing the ideal of this type of leadership, we are not justified in ignoring the fact that there are labour leaders who have no ideals at all. In very many cases the assumption of those who undertake to lead in the labour movement is merely that workmen "have a right to be enterprising. They have a right to desire a measure of those material comforts that their employers have." That is, the

ideal, if such it can be termed, is determined by a rivalrous impulse for some of the things the superior class has. The socially inferior man is ashamed of his inferiority. He lacks the intelligence to realize that social inferiority does not necessarily mean personal inferiority, wherefore one finds everywhere among the subordinated classes an itching for the things that betoken social superiority. The "material comforts" that the labouring man or his wife wants are not necessarily *comforts* at all but things that bring some social recognition. In this the members of the subordinated classes are not different from those of the superior classes. One finds in both classes rivalrous behaviour widely prevalent. It is sometimes maintained that this is apt to lead to even greater extravagance among the subordinated than among the superior because many of the latter won their position by foresight and thrift and thereby acquired habits of economy which they maintain in their affluence, while many remain in the subordinated classes because of lack of foresight, and, never having acquired habits of economy, are apt to be extravagant in time of high wages. This general reasoning cannot, however, get us very far because of the many exceptions that may be adduced. We can go as far as to admit the prevalence of the rivalrous disposition and the lack of a highly intelligent standard of living among all classes, and the need of scientific studies of the problems presented. It is not sufficient for a labour leader to assert that workmen have a right to desire a measure of the comforts that the employing classes have, for it may be that those classes have no right to those alleged "comforts." Natural resources and productivity are limited, and there is needed a production that is determined not by individual caprice but by social needs. This is emphasized by progressive labour leaders.¹⁴ The development of personality requires that the employing classes and workers alike be educated in what is involved in real development of personality and that this be the point of view from which conclusions are drawn as to what material things workmen and employers alike have a right to want. This education is more necessary for the superior classes than others because they occupy the positions of influence and what they do with their money influences the consumption of the subordinated classes.

A study merely of the ideals of progressive labour leaders does not indicate the prevalent attitude of labour because the actual behaviour

¹⁴ Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, 198-217.

of a labour organization is determined by the reaction of the mass to those ideals. The mass does not feel the insecurity of its position so keenly as does the progressive leader. One way to relieve the feeling of insecurity is to save when wages are high. But there is much extravagant spending. Again, the mass does not like to take responsibility as does the progressive leader. The average workman likes to follow directions in his work and to feel a sense of irresponsibility for the outcome. The rank and file of a labour organization often lack a sense of social responsibility. They are impatient at the thought of considering the public in the making of their demands. They say the public upholds the profit-seeking employer while he profiteers regardless of the public; why then should they consider the public? The progressive leader's path is hard at this point. And, because the members of a union tend to look to their own number, primarily, for approval or disapproval, this indifference to public sentiment may be accentuated by a labour organization of national scope and great power. In such a case an intense class consciousness may develop. The workman may glory in the strength of his great national union and may fear more than anything else its power to unmake a workman by posting him, as a non-union man or a deserter, in the union records throughout the country. His great union may seem to him above economic law, so that with increased pay he does not increase effort. He does not realize that increased pay, in the long run, depends on increased productivity of labour. Wage demands may be determined by rivalry with other labour groups, by the determination not to take less, or to get more, than those groups, rather than by a consideration of economic conditions.

All these short-comings and defects of the labour movement must be considered in evaluating it as a social movement. It must not be considered solely as we find it in the minds of the progressive labour leader, or as it appears in some great strike that brings out the best in workmen. Sometimes after such a strike is won, under a progressive leader, one sees the men who appeared to have been fighting for a principle, having gotten a rise in wages, sink back, lose their interest, become indifferent to the union, cease to read the union journals and to take interest in the nomination and election of officials. One sees designing labour leaders going forward with their schemes, much as designing politicians do in periods of political indifference. The labour movement must be studied as a whole, in its conservative as well as its progressive aspects, just as we must study the politics of a

nation as a whole, and not merely the progressive phases, if we are to understand the political life of a nation.

Labour organizations in the United States are still, for the most part, of the old type which acquiesces in profit-seeking business; indeed a union of this type is itself a business organization. Its successful leaders are essentially business men. The union is organized primarily to do business with employers, to bargain for the sale of its product—labour. Its position is much like that of a new and rising business concern attempting to force its way into a field already occupied by other concerns.¹⁵ When it has gained the advantage sought, like any other business concern it attempts to maintain that advantage, not only against employers with whom it bargains, but also against other labour groups. As contrasted with this attitude the essential characteristic of the new unionism is its broader, less individualistic, more social point of view. Such a union considers seriously its relation to other labour groups, and also its relation to the public welfare, attempts to reach a thoroughly grounded conception of a rational social order, and uses this conception in the formulation of its policies.¹⁶ Hence it emphasizes the necessity of the education of the workers.¹⁷

Progressive labour leaders have learned, in the course of their conflict with the business man, that the conflict never can be settled so long as it is a conflict over profits. Profits being unknown to the workers, the wage they may reasonably demand cannot be ascertained. Hence the unintelligent nature of a controversy over wages. This attitude to profits distinguishes the new attitude of labour from the old unionism which did not go so far as to question the reasonableness of private profits.¹⁸ It is this element in the new attitude that causes the new unionism to be termed "radical," but it is an inevitable development out of the old,¹⁹ for every union demand for higher wages questions an employer's right to profits. This aspect of the new attitude whereby it makes more explicit the inevitable tendency of the labour movement brings labour more sharply into conflict with employers than did the old attitude. For the individualistic employer holds that he should purchase his labour, under individual or collective bar-

¹⁵ Hoxie, Why Organized Labor Opposes Scientific Management, *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, XXXI: 73-74.

¹⁶ Budish and Soule, *The New Unionism*, 10-12, 191-195.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* Ch. VIII.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 138.

¹⁹ Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, 122-124, 172.

gaining, at the market price and that, the business being his, he is entitled to run it as he sees fit with secrecy as to profits, and to have all the profits.

It is evident that there is not, in the new attitude, any appreciable increase in sympathy between employé and employer. It is rather a relation in which rivalry is less restrained by submissiveness than formerly, and the requirements for successful rivalry are seen in their broader aspects. Even under profit sharing the increased good feeling of labour is due to the idea that nothing is being unjustly kept back by the employer. There is little or no disposition to take the employer's point of view and seek *his* interest, as there is little or no effort on the part of the employer to get the labourer's point of view and seek *his* interest. In so far as there is any effort of the one to get the point of view of the other it is from self-interest. The sympathetic disposition does not determine the ultimate purpose. This is largely true even under profit sharing and it is generally true under profit seeking. The employer's ultimate motive is that of seeking profits for himself and workmen do not like the idea of making profits for an employer. Even when workmen are well satisfied with their wages they are not inclined seriously to consider the employer's interest. When there is a "harmony of interest" it means that the employer realizes that his profits may be increased or his worry diminished by incidentally serving the interests of workmen, and that the workman realizes that his interest is served by incidentally serving the interest of the employer, not that either consciously seeks first the interest of the other. This is the nature, also, of an identity of interests among employers themselves and among labourers. The solidarity of a capitalistic group is due to the fact that each perceives his own interest to be identical with that of the other, not that he seeks primarily the interest of the other. So with the solidarity of a labour group. To be sure the intimacy of trade union relations favours the development of sympathy where there is any basis for it in a pronounced sympathetic disposition, but such a disposition is as rare among workmen, in their relations with one another, as it is among employers, in their relations with one another. Their motives are ultimately determined by the egoistic dispositions, but an identity of interests may facilitate concerted action for common ends in the course of which the sympathetic disposition is fostered by the likeness of attitudes and ideas.

In spite of the continued egoism of industrial relations there is,

in the new attitude of labour, an increasing sense of public responsibility. Because of their predominant influence over the government employers are apt to feel that it is unnecessary to explain to the public their labour policy, while labour, which has little political influence, is becoming conscious of the necessity of explaining to the public the why of the labour struggle. Labour may be content to struggle without knowing why or may be content with a mere impulsive knowing, or feeling, but the public is more disinterested and needs to be convinced. It must be convinced if a labour party is to enter the political arena and successfully appeal for votes.²⁰ Even if it did not have political aspirations, labour needs the moral and financial support of the public in its private struggles. It is under this necessity of convincing the public and itself of the justice of its cause that progressive leaders have worked out certain principles. These are that the workers shall participate in the management of the industry of which they are the chief part,²¹ and in the determination of the purposes for which the industry shall be conducted, which shall include: (1) development of the personality of the workers through and in the course of their work; (2) furtherance of the public welfare by maximum efficiency of labour and maximum production.

In demanding participation in the management of industry workmen challenge the employer's right to insist that they accept his say-so as to business conditions. For instance, when, in 1921, employers declared high prices were due to high wages, some unions proposed that their representatives jointly with the employers investigate the cause of high prices. The employers refused to allow this joint investigation and insisted that workmen and the public accept their dictum. This is the dominating disposition in action. The demand for joint investigation and joint management is the resistful disposition in action.

The interests of the public are vitally concerned in the effort of the workers for participation in the management of industry. For only by joint management can conflicts between capital and labour be amicably settled and the public protected from the inconvenience of strikes and other evils incident to the interruption of industry. As Professor Frankfurter says, participation by both sides in the management of industry implies that, in case of a conflict, "both sides should be charged with responsibility to ascertain the facts and to

²⁰ Budish and Soule, *op. cit.*, 95, 203-204.

²¹ Schlossberg, *op. cit.*, 22-23; Budish and Soule, *op. cit.*, 191-195.

devise ways of correcting difficulties that the facts disclose."²² The alternative to this joint responsibility "is dictation by the side which for the moment has the whip hand."²³ This assertion of temporary economic power concerns the public for "Today it happens to be on the side of the manufacturers; next year it may be with the workers. If the manufacturers exert their brute economic strength today, the workers will naturally seek to exert it next year. The public should not tolerate this everlasting warfare."²⁴

The progressive labour leader takes his stand squarely on the economic principle that the public welfare demands maximum production, and, therefore, maximum efficiency of labour.²⁵ The old unionism recognized the crying need for efficiency and productiveness but generally sanctioned the policy of limiting the output. This was due to the frequent and bitter experience "that employers could and would make use of . . . increased output by the workers not only to seize all of the gains but even to reduce the actual rates and returns to the workers."²⁶ Where this disposition among employers still continues, limitation of the output continues. But in certain industries collective bargaining has developed to the stage where workmen have confidence that their employers will not take an unfair advantage because they cannot under the agreement. And in these industries workmen have set and maintained a high standard of production.²⁷ But it seems fairly certain to labour organizations that such a standard is dependent on arrangements that safeguard willing and efficient workmen against profit-seeking employers, and also against over-zealous workmen. For there always are workmen who, in their eagerness to win the favour of the management, or the higher pay secretly paid pace-makers, are willing to over-exert themselves. Wherefore the standards of production are not left to individual rivalry to determine but are worked out by the group on the basis of what the individual can, and ought to be expected to do.²⁸

Another element in the new attitude of labour is the increasing sense of obligation to live up to agreements.²⁹ In some instances

²² Frankfurter, letter in *New Republic*, Jan. 12, 1921, 202.

²³ *Ibid.* 202.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 202.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 201.

²⁶ Hoxie, *op. cit.*, 74.

²⁷ Hard, Hillman and the Amalgamated, *New Republic*, June 2, 1920, 17-18; "War in the Clothing Industry," *New Republic*, Dec. 15, 1920, 59-60.

²⁸ Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, 159-160.

²⁹ Budish and Soule, *op. cit.*, 199.

labour organizations animated by the new attitude have shown a finer sense of obligation than the manufacturers' associations with which they had agreements. For instance, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers lived up to its part of the wage contract in the boom period of rising clothing prices of 1919-1920, when competing manufacturers were bidding up wages against each other. The union's influence was used to control its members, to keep them from leaving one place to take higher wages offered in another in violation of contract, though higher wages than the contract scale were offered by members of the manufacturers' association. Thus, in a time favourable to labour, the union's influence was used to stabilize conditions in the industry and against wage and price profiteering. But when the demand for clothing suffered a sharp decline and prices fell, in this time favourable to the manufacturers they failed to live up to their part of the agreement to make wage reductions by negotiation with the union, and refused to conduct such an investigation jointly with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, that reductions of wages might be based on scientific fact.³⁰

The individualistic employers in various industries who took part in the open shop drive of 1921 felt their superior power as owners of the shops from which they could lockout workmen, and because they believed they were backed by banks and trust companies of enormous financial power.³¹ They felt the time was propitious to crush militant unionism, in that the labour unions could be made to seem to the public to be the obstacles in the way of the reduction of prices. Consequently these individualistic employers rose to the control of the labour policy in various industries, either with the unwilling acquiescence or in spite of the outspoken opposition of the more intelligent and fair-minded employers.³²

³⁰ The New York Manufacturers' Association took advantage of the decreased demand for clothing to repudiate the entire adjustment board machinery. (Frankfurter's letter in *New Republic*, Jan. 12, 1921, 202; *Amalgamated Clothing Workers, The Case of the Union as stated by Observers*, 5-13.)

³¹ Walsh, *Wall Street's Control of Railroad Labor Policy*, *The Nation*, Nov. 2, 1921, 497.

³² In the clothing industry the open shop drive "was engineered from the outside" (Leiserson, *Report to the Public*, *Daily News Record*, Jan. 24, 1921). Certain men gained the ear of the manufacturers by insinuations against the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union at an opportune time, and, though the majority of the manufacturers did not approve of these insinuations and suggestions, they "fear to express their opinions openly, and do not want to be put in the position of breaking up the association by opposing the dominating figures bent on crushing the workers' union, who, in a time propitious to them, have worked their way into positions of leadership." (*Ibid.*)

The experience of unions in collective bargaining with employers has been such that it would seem to be impossible for employers to satisfy their impulse of domination by the destruction of labour organizations. Unions have seen their leaders conduct their side of the bargaining with as much astuteness and shrewdness as that displayed by the employer. At the same time there has developed, among organized and unorganized labour alike, a feeling that "the rich are no better than anybody else." The subtle power of control by social suggestion that has heretofore been wielded, consciously and unconsciously, with absolute assurance by upper classes has perceptibly weakened. Some authors express this fact by saying that men are both more unequal and more equal than ever before.³³ They are more unequal in possession of property, but more equal through the growing sense of the sham of mere possession of wealth as worthy of admiration, and the insistence on superiority of ability and character as the only superiority worth recognizing. But it is easy to exaggerate this change. It is perceptible but not yet pronounced in most nations. This spreading tendency no longer to regard men of wealth and the upper classes as abjectly as formerly has given labour organizations a feeling of increasing assurance; there is a growing sense of the importance of the labour movement not only for workmen but for the public welfare and social progress.³⁴ And the result is an increasing influence of the progressive labour leadership, a disposition no longer merely to dicker for small things, but to push ideals to the fore, to question the position of the employer as sole industrial authority, to inquire, in problems as to the sufficiency of wages, sufficient for what? As the inquiries have broadened, they have come to include all the essential economic problems. Thus the attitude of the most progressive labour organizations has become, through the influence of their leaders—some of them trained economists—more and more completely in accord with the best thought of the time. In conflict with a labour organization of this type the individualistic employer, with his open shop propaganda, appears in his most reactionary aspect.

Essential in the new attitude of workmen is their resistance to conditions that forbid their development as men. This point of view has stimulated inquiry into those processes of human nature that unite in and give its voltage to the impulse for self-development. Ob-

³³ Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, 55.

³⁴ Schlossberg, *op. cit.*, 23.

viously this brings us to the heart of the problem of the labour unrest. Workmen, like all men, have an original nature that seeks satisfaction in the course of the day's work. Since practically all the day is devoted to work, if the nature of man is not satisfied in the course of his work it will not be satisfied at all. Furthermore, satisfaction is necessary in the course of work if there is to be any satisfaction of the impulses that become prominent in the brief period of relaxation. Without this satisfaction afforded by work, relaxation becomes an abnormal seeking for exciting pleasures, or a more or less depressed "letting down." What is involved in adapting the delicate nervous organization of a man to his work and making it a means of self-realization is not known to most employers. Progressive labour leaders urge the necessity of this knowledge for the proper direction of workmen.³⁵ There are certain instinctive rhythms of man's nature which must be observed, and there are certain processes that protect these rhythms. These processes of personality create a need of conditions that make possible satisfaction in work, and of means of the satisfaction of instincts in relaxation, as the homing instinct.³⁶ It is unnecessary to go to any length to explain that neither the impulses involved in work nor those involved in relaxation are satisfied under present conditions. Says Tannenbaum: "The modern wage worker is, . . . a wanderer, a nomad . . . He belongs to no place in particular—excepting where he happens to be paying rent or board. He shifts from job to job, from factory to factory, from city to city, from state to state and frequently from country to country. . . . To wander is the opposite in its implication to being rooted to a place, a home. . . . He is shifting after better things, after the security of a home."³⁷ Not all workmen are thus migratory but that is the prevailing industrial condition. It is due to the uncertainty of work, and the monotony of work and its failure to enlist the creative impulses, as a result of which workmen are moved by newspaper advertisements and rumours to try to better themselves elsewhere. As things are the work of men is not adjusted to the realization of a normal work-relaxation rhythm; personality is demoralized and workmen become the sport of strong impulses. The more intelligent workmen are, the more keenly they feel the annoyance of a demoralized personality. Instead of their impulses being organized around the day's

³⁵ Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, 192.

³⁶ Schlossberg, *op. cit.*, 22.

³⁷ Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, 45-46.

work, these are organized around projects for resistance to conditions which make it impossible for them to become organized around the day's work. The chief interest of the more intelligent workmen becomes, not the doing of their work but their labour organization to which class consciousness attaches. For it is through organized action that the workman hopes to achieve that certainty and those working conditions which will make possible the development of personality through the enthusiastic and satisfying performance of his work.³⁸

In addition to the fundamental processes of personality that must be facilitated there are a variety of impulses that must be restrained by a development of self-control; this requires education. For instance, the instinct to escape social contempt causes families to be extravagant in order to avoid the contempt felt for a family which does not make all the foolish expenditures that are usual in their class.³⁹ Children should be taught in school to control this instinct to avoid contempt and to persist in thrift in spite of social contempt. There are also the foolish impulses that arise in the course of relations with other workmen, for instance the impulse to rival one another,⁴⁰ to be jealous of the better paid workmen. Finally, there are the impulses that arise in the course of relations with superiors and interfere with the development of personality, for instance, the impulse to fear employers and acquiesce in conditions that make the development of personality impossible.

Merely organizing labour tends to alter to a considerable degree the nature of workmen. The great mass of workmen are docile under working conditions which they regard as just.⁴¹ Owing to fear⁴² they may submit to conditions which they regard as unjust, but this is apt to give way to active resistance as soon as workmen strengthen themselves by organization.⁴³ Benevolent treatment by employers who are felt to be seeking their own interest also causes resentment and ultimate resistance.⁴⁴ The formation of a union transfers the essential allegiance of workmen from employers to union leaders, for workmen become less submissive when they have union leaders who speak for them.⁴⁵ The mass have an instinct to draw together and

³⁸ Fisher, *The Need of Health Insurance*, Amer. Lab. Leg. Rev., March, 1917, 20.

³⁹ Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, 29.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 90-94.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 113-114.

⁴² *Ibid.* 88.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 49; Mitchell, *Organized Labour*.

⁴⁴ Tead, *op. cit.*, 103.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 97.

those who hold aloof are compelled by the scorn of striking workmen for the scab.⁴⁶ Unionization gives a satisfying sense of the support of a strong group; this intensifies the loyalty of the members to one another and to their leadership. It also heightens the suggestibility of each member to whatever behaviour happens to be pronounced in the group at the time.⁴⁷ The strongest dispositions are most intensified by organization, for instance, the resistful disposition, but the leaders in control of a great labour organization, in declaring a strike which may bring suffering to thousands of their members feel their responsibility as keenly as do the leaders of a nation in declaring war. The effect of labour organization is much like that of the organization of the people of a nation into a state: it increases the power of resistance at the disposal of those who control the mass. Organization has also a distinct effect in individualizing workmen. If one of the results of organization is an increase of wages and this is wisely spent, it increases the vitality of the individual workman and thus decreases the submissiveness due to low vitality. Organization also gives an added sense of security of jobs and an assurance of getting what the workman feels he is entitled to; it makes him more hopeful, less indifferent and more productive as a worker.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the union is the great means of education of the workers.⁴⁹ And it provides a wholesome outlet for suppressed impulses of all sorts, impulses that, without it, find satisfaction in exhausting and degrading forms of recreation.⁵⁰ Such recreation cannot be furnished in the factory building after hours because it has not the relaxing, carefree atmosphere that have the club-rooms in which workmen naturally assemble.⁵¹ Nor are club-rooms furnished by employers at a distance from the place of work, which suggest employer control and restraint, as relaxing as rooms of their own.

The new attitude of labour is the natural result of the growing consciousness of all these benefits of unionism. In the first place, trade

⁴⁶ Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 166; U. S. Department of Labor, *Report on the Bisbee Deportations*, 4. Tead says workmen support a strike in order to prevent their families suffering the scorn of the neighbours' wives and children. (Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, 18-19. See also, Warne, *The Coal-Mine Workers*, 160-165.) In Russia, the Bolsheviks brought resisting aristocrats and others to terms by threatening that they would "be turned over to the contempt of the people." (Bryant, *Six Red Months in Russia*, 195.)

⁴⁷ Tead, *op. cit.*, 134.

⁴⁸ Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, 45-64.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Ch. VII.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 64-66.

⁵¹ Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 204-205.

unionism has now existed long enough and developed far enough to convince organized labour that it has come to stay. Whatever reactionary employers or the public may think, organized workmen have a conviction of the assured continuity of their union, and this conviction is reacting on impulsive behaviour to make it more intelligent. A second condition that has increased the sense of the permanence of the union is the conflicts and rivalry with organized employers, which have resulted in the increased solidarity of employers' associations and in labour's conviction that the very life of the movement depends on eliminating rivalry between labour groups and achieving a similar solidarity. A third condition making for sense of permanence is that the great variety of benefits achieved by union action and the methods employed have developed a more and more adequate idea of union purposes and policies, so that certain principles are now regarded as *settled* and as constituting the nucleus of labour union tradition.

CHAPTER X

EMPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT AS A REMEDY FOR THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

THE industrial relations described in the preceding chapters resulted in a large labour turnover,¹ and the position of employment manager was created in order to decrease the turnover and so lower costs and increase profits. A small turnover is desirable because of the expense of breaking in new men² and also because an efficient organization requires not only that workmen shall know their jobs but that they shall be accustomed to working together and shall know each other's idiosyncracies in a way to make possible the most efficient co-operation.

The employment manager succeeds the foreman as the "hiring and firing" agent; the foreman's function is reduced to that of director of workmen. Under the old conditions—which still generally obtain—the foreman represented the company to workmen, who rarely or never came into contact with any higher official. Grievances of workmen originated, in most cases, in their contact with dominating foremen.³ The aim is to substitute for the control of foremen that of a man whose personal qualities and training are such as adapt him to the delicate function of hiring men, happily adjusting them to their place in the organization, and inspiring them to do their best work.⁴ In this he must enlist the co-operation of foremen.⁵ His problems are

¹ "Labour turnover for any period consists of the number of separations from service during that period. Separations include all quits, discharges, and lay-offs for any reason whatsoever. The percentage of labour turnover for any period considered is the ratio of the total number of separations during the period to the average number of employés on the force report during that period." ("Standard Definition of Labor Turnover," U. S. Bur. Lab. Statis., 1-2. See also U. S. Bur. Lab. Statis., Bulletin No. 247, 224.)

² Alexander, The Cost of Labor Turnover, Proceed. of Employment Managers' Conference, 1917, U. S. Bur. Lab. Statis., No. 227, 13-17; Fisher, How to Reduce Labor Turnover, *Ibid.* 29-32; Williams, An Actual Account of What We have Done to Reduce Our Labor Turnover, *Ibid.* 173-190.

³ Tread, The Importance of Being a Foreman, *Industrial Management*, June, 1917, 355.

⁴ Alexander, *op. cit.*, 24-25.

⁵ Hubbell, The Organization and Scope of the Employment Department, U. S. Bur. Lab. Statis., No. 227, 98, 101, 104.

those of handling human beings and adjusting subtle human relationships; wherefore his personality will play a larger part than in the case of the managers of the financial, production and sales departments, who deal largely with the material side of business.

The first function of the employment manager is to hire workmen and adjust them to their work. This requires psychological analysis conducted with all possible use of technique and resourcefulness.⁶ It is possible by psychological tests to determine the relative intelligence of applicants for work and their fitness for jobs, but the moral qualities that enter into fitness cannot be ascertained by tests.⁷ Nevertheless some of the conditions that make for desirable moral qualities can be determined and provided. This scientific determination of the fitness of different workmen will remove "the unpleasant necessity of obtaining a workman's *character* from his superior. . . ."⁸ The tendencies of workmen to over-estimate their ability in comparison with rivals, to endeavour to "keep on the right side" of their superiors by doing various things that have little to do with productiveness, to be servile or self-assertive, will, it is maintained, be cut from under by a scientific estimate of their fitness. The qualities that enter into fitness and the working conditions on which efficiency depends once understood, it will be possible intelligently to provide the conditions that conduce to maximum efficiency throughout the working force.

The employment manager is, therefore, an expert judge of men, and this expert knowledge, in spite of his subordination to the employer, ought to give him a degree of independence in the performance of his work.⁹ Furthermore, he can make the most of the fact that he must have authority sufficient to enable him to provide the working conditions that are necessary to decrease the turnover. Also, he needs at least to appear independent if he is to win the respect of workmen. And he needs to be in as independent a position as possible in order to exercise his second function, that of amicably settling disputes between the company and workmen. To qualify as an arbiter in the conflicting interests of capital and labour he must not be under the influence of his employer, whose opinions, to be sure, he will consider, as his superior, but whose influence must not interfere with his independent performance of his function as arbiter. Because his impulse

⁶ Link, Employment Psychology, Pt. I.

⁷ Ibid. 178-179, Ch. XVII.

⁸ Ibid. 306-307, 70, 84, 85, 125, 126.

⁹ Alexander, op. cit., 23-24; Hubbell, op. cit., 97-98.

is naturally to the contrary, he must deliberately emphasize the workman's point of view in all his calculations.

A third function of the employment manager is to win the loyalty of workmen to the company¹⁰ and to prevent labour troubles and strengthen the position of the business against competitors.¹¹ Labour troubles prevent a corporation keeping its contracts and so cause loss of business, which is gained by competitors who do not have trouble. The financial position of a business also is injured by labour troubles for investment banks consider the labour situation in a corporation before floating a bond issue of that enterprise on favourable terms. In developing loyalty of workmen to employer, the employment manager may engage in a wide range of activities. These may extend to the supervision of living as well as working conditions. In the adjustment both of living and working conditions, the skilful employment manager has in mind the ruling impulses of workmen. For instance, rivalry makes for inefficiency in work unless properly directed. The inefficiency due to petty rivalry may be met, first, by a procedure for placing workmen in the jobs for which they are best fitted and measuring the relative productiveness of workmen thus scientifically placed,¹² so that relative productiveness can be demonstrated beyond the possibility of argument, and, second, by the education of workmen.¹³ The employment manager studies also the impulses of men that seek satisfaction in hours of relaxation and endeavours to make living conditions such as will satisfy those impulses. For instance, the parental and homing instincts are satisfied by an eight-hour day, which gives men some chance to enjoy home and children. Permanency of working position also satisfies the homing instinct because it enables the workman to have his own home and garden and to amuse himself with the little improvements. The satisfaction of these instincts is closely connected with the decrease of the labour turnover.

In winning the loyalty of workmen to the company the employment

¹⁰ Bloomfield, The Progress of Employment Managers' Associations, Proceed. Emply. Man. Conference, 1917, 12; Bloomfield, Relations of Foremen to Working Force, Industrial Management, June, 1917, 345; Commons, Industrial Goodwill, 149.

¹¹ Gregg, A Method of Handling the Problem of Labor Turnover, Reprint from Textile World Journal, Apr. 28, 1917; Gregg, Labor-Turnover Records and the Labor Problem, Reprint of address before American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Dec., 1917. For an extended statement of the employment manager's duties and responsibilities, including technical matters not of interest to the social psychologist, see Kelly, Hiring the Worker, Chs. III-XI.

¹² Link, op. cit., 293-319, 64.

¹³ Ibid. 380-386.

manger aims to develop the lines of control which labour leaders exercise so effectively, the control that is gained by intimate contact with workmen, in order to control them as against the labour leaders. The employment manager is more effective as a controlling agent than are foremen because his subservience to the company is less obvious; also, he has a "white collar job" so that workmen have more respect for him as belonging to a class of prestige; also, he did not come up from the ranks and is supposed to "know more" than a superior of lowly origin; also, workmen are not in close contact with him constantly in the course of their daily work and do not have an opportunity to find out "how little he knows,"—in their admiration for his "white collar" position they assume he knows a great deal. The control exercised by the employment manager is increased if he is able to get for workmen what their leaders acknowledge to be fair. If he is clever he will cultivate a friendly relation with leaders and compel the management to surrender some of the profits of the business in the interest of fair play as those influential with workmen conceive it. This friendly relation with workmen is possible in that he is not in the position of a foreman who must get out the product.

It is difficult, however, for an employer's man, as the employment manager is known to be, to win the confidence of workmen as against one whom they know to be their own man. And confidence is essential in loyalty. It is sought, therefore, to make the employment manager ostensibly independent in his action, for instance, through him to grant the increased wages and other concessions that are to be made to labour and so convey the idea that, though hired and paid by the company, he has final authority in the matters that pertain to his function. He, in turn, professes, and in some cases actually makes his chief purpose that of the welfare of the workers. Still, the ownership of the business enterprise and the control of workmen rests ultimately with the employer who can, at any moment, interfere with the purpose and plans of the employment manager, or dispense with him altogether. The rise of employment management does not, therefore, make any change in the motive of industry or in the ultimately controlling powers. Control rests, as before, with the directors of the enterprise. And their power over workmen, even to that of summary discharge, remains unaltered.

The right of an employer to "fire" workmen is questioned by no employment manager but there is a difference of opinion among them as to how this function should be exercised. It is admitted that "an

event such as the separation of a man from his livelihood and his opportunity for a career ought to be a solemn thing," but it is maintained that authority to dismiss should unqualifiedly belong to the employer, and should be exclusively exercised by those to whom he may delegate it.¹⁴ Others do not go quite so far. Ordway Tead writes: "Certain causes of discharge may be absolute, but if so they must be clearly known to all employés. And there is still the possibility of error in the facts about the case which makes it wise to allow appeal on all discharges to a body empowered to reverse the decision, either with or without subsequent action on its decision. One establishment where a representative committee of workers has final power in cases of discharge finds that in about fifty per cent. of cases the company is right. Clearly, therefore, nothing is more calculated to foster a mutual attitude than to adopt some democratic method of deciding grievances and discharge. The objection that any relaxation of almost military firmness in these matters will shatter a factory's discipline is not borne out by experience. The real loss of shop control comes when workers suffer from arbitrary, passionate decisions by executives who they *know* are in the wrong."¹⁵ Boyd Fisher maintains "that every discharge should be certified to by a committee on which workmen are represented. . . . Slowness and cautious fairness in getting into action, however, only advertises the final result. When a man goes out of that plant, he isn't summarily kicked out, it is true, but it looks much more impressive to be shoved out by a consensus."¹⁶ The general practice is summary dismissal by the management; workmen have no part in the final verdict against a workman.

Under this autocratic control, inasmuch as the employment manager is hired by the company and is the company's man it is difficult to see how he can appeal to workmen and win their confidence as one who is in a position judiciously to appreciate and justly to advance their interests. A more favourable position for winning confidence would be where the appointment of the employment manager must be approved by representatives of the union whose workmen are employed by the company. In those rare cases where this ar-

¹⁴ Cooke, Criticism of address by Boyd Fisher, Proceedings of Employment Managers' Conference, 1917, 75.

¹⁵ Tead, Employees' Organizations and Their Helpful Uses, Industrial Management, Nov., 1917, 251.

¹⁶ Fisher, How to Reduce Labor Turnover, Proceedings of Employment Managers' Conference, 1917, 34.

angement has existed such problems as those of grievance and discharge and of the wage rate are not left entirely to the discretion of the employing company or the employment manager but are subject to trade union action as well. It is suggested that the time may come when the employment manager will be paid by the employing company and the organized labour of the establishment; and that a third party, the government, also may pay part of his salary and, through him as government official, may exert an influence and exercise an authority in industrial conflicts.¹⁷

What might be done toward the solution of industrial conflict if able men were employed as employment managers and given freedom in their work is illustrated by the achievements of Robert B. Wolf. He declares that the resolution of conflict requires "a constant development of the intellect of the men in the organization. In other words, it is an educational process and the function of the management becomes primarily educational in nature. It is more a question of leadership than of compelling obedience. In other words, we have succeeded in getting every man in the organization (I say this in its broadest sense) trying to produce the largest quantity of the best quality of pulp at the lowest cost. It is not because the department heads, superintendent, or myself are making superhuman efforts to produce the results but because we have succeeded in getting every one to co-operate with us. There is a desire to get this result on the part of the workmen throughout the entire plant."¹⁸ "We make it a policy to record the operations of the individual workmen in such a way that they have some means for recording their progress and are thereby able to realize just what their efforts are producing. This brings out what we call the creative faculty of the man to the fullest extent; he is able to really enjoy his work by being given opportunity for self-expression. . . .

"I would like to call your attention here to the fact that we do not use any of the so-called efficiency methods of payment, such as task or bonus and piecework. Our men are all paid by the hour, except those who are on a salary basis. In other words, we have enabled our men to forget that the dollar is the most important thing in life and by paying them liberally (much more than in any other sulphite mill) enable them to devote their energy entirely to the task and they are ac-

¹⁷ "The Rise of a New Profession," *New Republic*, May 25, 1918, 103.

¹⁸ Wolf, Individuality in Industry, *Proceedings of Employment Managers' Conference*, 1917, 201-202. At this time Mr. Wolf was in the employ of the Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co., Berlin, N. H.

tually doing their work well for its own sake. This brings back, as you can readily see, somewhat the old artisan idea, where the workman took pride in the execution of his work because he had means for realizing himself in it; only in our case the man does not create the complete finished article, but does create and form a more or less definite record, and realizes its relationship to the finished product. . . .”¹⁹

Mr. Wolf’s achievement exemplifies what was said in a preceding chapter about a man’s work being the chief means of the organization of his dispositions and the formation of the attitudes that constitute his character. But creative work requires not only that the contribution of each man be recorded and made clear to him but also that he share in the profits of efficient work, wherefore it is impossible for the individualistic employer to stimulate the creative impulses. Mr. Wolf declares: “Until we have changed the autocratic character of our industries (which really dominate the political situation), it will be impossible to have a democratic society. What right have we then to expect a high development of productive (creative) effort when we limit the intelligent handling of materials and forces to the few who autocratically claim it as their right to dominate the wills of others, especially when their contact with the actual work, because of the increasing size of our industrial organizations, is becoming constantly more remote?”²⁰

Sharply distinguished from the appeal made by managers like Mr. Wolf to the intelligence and sense of fairness of workmen is appeal to sentiment. Data for analysis of this form of appeal may be found in the “Pay Envelope Stories” which managers enclose in the pay envelopes of their employés. These leaflet stories contain anecdotes and sentiments that are intended to catch the fancy of workmen and stir their emotions in a way favourable to employers.²¹ Some employment managers use sentimental appeal very effectively.

Another form of sentimental appeal is to workmen’s admiration of physical superiority. Workmen admire a physically superior man and are susceptible to his attitudes and ideas. Even personal superiority that is entirely irrelevant so far as workmanship is concerned may exert this influence. For instance, one manufacturer remarked: “One

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 203-204.

²⁰ Wolf, Securing the Initiative of the Workman, *Amer. Econ. Rev.*, IX (supplement): 120-121.

²¹ A business enterprise which furnished these stories advertised them as a part of their “\$ Make More \$ Service.” They were sent twice a month at a cost of four cents per man per month for each employé, and this price included “full Consultation Privileges regarding labor matters.”

of the highest paid men in our organization is an athletic director, a camouflage employment manager who has won the loyalty of the workmen by his athletic ability."

Still another sentimental appeal is to the sympathies of workmen. The sympathetic man wins devotion and those devoted are susceptible to his attitudes and ideas. This type of control is contrary to that exercised through domination, and the manager of this type often finds himself in opposition to the powers that be who insist on maintaining the traditional domination. For instance, a business men's magazine, *Industrial Management*, gives a report of an address to the executives of an eastern city by a very successful manager (withholding his name) who "calls himself 'a d—d sentimentalist.' Let us all be sentimentalists then for we find that in eight years his volume of total sales has increased from \$500,000 to \$14,000,000." The report of the address runs, in part, thus: "'The trouble with you men is that you are executives, and not human beings. You are so swelled up by the title of General Manager, or Superintendent, or something of that kind, that you get entirely out of touch with the common, every-day human being and, worse than that, you get together in Boards of Directors and put across things as a body that every one of you would be ashamed to do as an individual. . . .' The speaker was addressing a group of executives in an eastern city.

"'We have never had any serious labour trouble,' he said. 'We deal with every one of our employés as human beings; and in order to do this you can't lose sight of the fact that you are human beings, too. . . .

"'For the purposes of our corporation I am the Vice-President and General Manager, but to the 2500 employés of the company I'm "Dad," and nothing else. Do you think any one of our girls would stand beside the mahogany desk of the Vice-President and frankly tell him her troubles? Not for a minute! But they will talk to "Dad" when I meet them at their work, or in the Employés' Office. The Employés' Office. There's something you want to think about. We have a room which I had set aside for the special purpose of meeting them at any time on a heart to heart basis. They don't come to see me in my office; I go to see them in *their* office. . . .

"'You know those of us who are called executives are very likely to shut ourselves into a private office, or call a meeting of the executives, and rack our alleged superior minds for a solution of the problems that come up regularly in management, and we can't for the

life of us see any way out of our trouble. If you will just drop all of this and get right down to friendly relations with the employés in the plant, you will find that while *this* suggestion may not amount to much, and *that* suggestion may not amount to much . . . the total of all the suggestions and opinions you get from the people in the plant will come nearer to getting at the actual truth and solution of the trouble than the racking of your pretended penetrating intellects.''"²²

The control exercised by a sympathetic personality is enhanced by making the employment manager a medium through which the workmen are to be impressed with the benevolence of the employing company. The various "welfare" or "service" enterprises for workmen, in many companies, are intended to win the allegiance of workmen away from the unions, or to prevent the rise of a sentiment for unionism. These service activities are put under the control of the employment manager. Rises in salary apparently come through his influence. He calls the attention of workmen to the company life and other insurance, incidentally pointing out its advantages over trade union benefits.

The increasing difficulty of controlling labour by crude domination is causing an emphasis on the sentimental appeal, and has prompted some employers to favour the intellective appeal used by Mr. Wolf. But there are two conditions that limit the possibilities of the latter. First, the strongest impulses of workmen are to submit to superior force and thus experience the relief of submission, to admire superiority and to be grateful for generosity. Not many centuries ago, workmen were used by lords, at their will, for working or for fighting, and the instincts of personal allegiance that were fostered under serfdom remain today among man's strongest instincts. They are still fostered by most business enterprises which aim to control workmen by stirring submission, or a sense of pride in the superiority of the business enterprise in which they work, or gratitude for the company's benevolent treatment of them. The capacity of workmen to respond to the intellective appeal is, therefore, very limited. This is apt to discourage idealistic managers and to seem to justify the attitude of the rivalrous, ambitious type of manager who cleverly works his way upward through winning the favour of the powers that be, among other ways by accepting the attitude to labour of the individualistic employer.

²² "Human-Being Management," Industrial Management, Dec., 1916, 398-400.

A second condition limiting the possibilities of an intellective appeal is the lack of close touch of the owners and directors of an enterprise with the industrial situation, so that their intelligence and sympathy is not involved, wherefore they maintain the traditional autocratic attitude. As Mr. Dennison said,²³ in an address to employment managers: "Inside your factory or store you will have to face, if you face this issue of democracy, that very difficult question of absentee ownership and absentee management. It is perfectly apparent to my mind . . . that if the concern is managed by directors who do not live there you cannot get the touch of true management. If the concern is owned by stockholders who never visit it . . . the ultimate control, the ultimate ownership resting in their hands, will always make a chasm between the working force and that so-called 'owning' body of men. This is a problem big enough for a national association of its own."²⁴

²³ President of the Dennison Manufacturing Co., Framingham, Mass.

²⁴ Dennison, What the Employment Department Should be in Industry, Proceed. Employ. Man. Conf., 1917, 79.

CHAPTER XI

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND JOINT MANAGEMENT AS REMEDIES

THE most common form of business organization is the traditional "line" or "military" form. Here workmen are divided into groups under gang-bosses, several gang-bosses are under a foreman, several foremen under a superintendent, superintendents under a department head, and the department heads under the general manager. The advantage of this organization is that it facilitates giving orders and fixing responsibility.¹ This is essential in an army, but, in industry, the work to be done is less simple and less easily understood, and consequently the giving of orders and holding those ordered accountable is a more difficult matter. Those above have to know many things and are apt to make unwise decisions because of insufficient knowledge,² and subordinates who are held responsible must find means of executing the unwise orders or pass them on to subordinates. Consequently there is a tendency to hold subordinates responsible for failures due to lack of knowledge of superiors, and for superiors to take the credit for unusually good work done by a subordinate.³ The net result is that the burden due to lack of wisdom of those above finally lands on the shoulders of foremen who, through gang-bosses, drive the men to accomplish what has been ordered. The deficiencies of this military type of organization have caused modifications of it, one of which is known as "line-and-staff" organization. This is merely the line or military organization assisted by a staff of experts—chemists, engineers, and other experts—who investigate the problems of the business and make recommendations, which may or may not be accepted.⁴ The hierarchy of managers, accepting from above the profit-seeking attitude, seek advice of the experts at any part of the line, but accept or reject it according to its effect on profits.

¹ Gerstenberg, *Principles of Business*, 190-193.

² *Ibid.* 193.

³ *Ibid.* 195.

⁴ *Ibid.* 195-196.

The line or line-and-staff organization represents the extreme of autocratic control of business.⁵ In making decisions and issuing orders the manager is influenced only incidentally by the suggestions of the staff.⁶ In some establishments an attempt has been made to modify this arbitrary management by "committee management." Advisory committees are formed composed of department heads and workmen selected by the workmen of the department or appointed by the management.⁷ There may be, also, a suggestion system for encouraging workmen to make written suggestions for the improvement of the business.⁸ But the management may make much or little use of advice from these various sources, and the whole arrangement may be used merely to give the appearance of consulting the workmen. Industrial democracy conceivably might develop out of autocracy little by little in this way, leaving autocracy merely a form, as political democracy developed out of autocracy in England, leaving a merely formal political autocrat. But, so far, the industrial autocracy remains vital, in spite of the democratic forms, for at any moment the private owners may do away with the advisory committees or even dismiss the general manager who should go too far in surrendering the absolute control with which they had vested him.

Scientific management developed under the impulse to lessen the discontent and inefficiency caused by this autocratic management of business. It had resulted in the "soldiering" or "stalling" of workmen,⁹ that is, in indifferent work, in doing as little as possible, and this appeared to be the greatest obstacle to the increase of the productivity of workmen. Accordingly a system was devised with a view to lessening discontent and inefficiency and thereby increasing profits. The basic idea of scientific management is the analysis of the work of supervision and of manual labour into distinct tasks, and the distribution of tasks in such a way that each supervisor and each group of workers shall have so few distinct tasks as to be able to work at the highest efficiency. The work of supervision is divided among foremen each with his particular function; gang-bosses and superintendents are abolished and the foremen all are made co-ordinate, and subordinate to the works manager and he to the general manager.¹⁰

⁵ *Ibid.* 198.

⁶ *Ibid.* 199.

⁷ *Ibid.* 199.

⁸ *Ibid.* 200.

⁹ Taylor, *Principles of Scientific Management*, 13-24.

¹⁰ Gerstenberg, *op. cit.*, 201-206.

The work of manual workmen in like manner is divided into tasks, workmen are shifted to tasks for which they are best fitted, are trained to perform those tasks with the least expenditure of effort, and are given increased pay as a reward for their greater efficiency.¹¹ But the basis of the increase is arbitrarily determined by the management. Under scientific management as it has developed, therefore, management is as autocratic as before.

Scientific management in its development did not follow the ideal of its founders because this ideal was contrary to the profit-seeking attitude of employers. A profit-seeking attitude begets a dominating attitude to labour, the idea being that wages must be kept down if there are to be profits, and this made scientific management as it developed as autocratic as any other form. According to Frederick W. Taylor, the father of scientific management, it must *begin* with a change in the attitude of the employer, and without this change scientific management does not exist in the fundamental sense that he conceived it. It is merely a new way of more effectively handling labour in the interest of private profits. He stated his ideal emphatically as follows: "Now, in its essence, scientific management involves a complete mental revolution" in the attitude of the management to the workmen and of the workmen to the management. "I think it is safe to say that in the past a great part of the thought and interest both of . . . the management, and of . . . the workmen in manufacturing establishments has been centred upon what may be called the proper division of the surplus resulting from their joint efforts. . . .

"The great revolution that takes place in the mental attitude of the two parties under scientific management is that both sides take their eyes off of the division of the surplus as the all-important matter." "And without this complete mental revolution on both sides, scientific management does not exist."¹² As Mr. Taylor emphatically stated in conversation with the author, "There must be a new attitude on the part of employers and workmen toward one another; it is like a religious attitude, it is the most fundamental thing in the mind." There

¹¹ Taylor, *Shop Management*, 26; Gantt, *Work, Wages and Profits*, 39-40; Emerson, *A Comparative Study of Wage and Bonus Systems*, 36; Babcock, *The Taylor System in Franklin Management*, Ch. VI; Knoepfel, *Installing Efficiency Methods*, Ch. XVII.

¹² Hearings before Special Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management, III; 1387-1388, 1491.

must be "the substitution of hearty, brotherly co-operation for contention and strife."¹³

The founder of scientific management therefore recognized the inevitable conflict between the dominating or "military" type of management¹⁴ and scientific management as he conceived it. The scientific attitude includes an impulse for contact with and understanding of workmen¹⁵ and a carefully thought out direction of their work. This attitude would, he maintained, increase production to such an extent as to increase both wages and profits. But this attitude is contrary to the profit-seeking attitude—"that both sides take their eyes off of the division of the surplus as the all-important matter."¹⁶ Unfortunately the mental revolution he called for has not taken place perceptibly—not among employers, and not even among scientific managers themselves. Consulting engineers generally unconsciously assume the prevailing profit-seeking attitude of business enterprise in their reasoning, occasionally explicitly defend it, and in their work as consulting engineers serve employers who have that attitude. To them "efficiency means the best, easiest and most economical means of production."¹⁷ To increase production with decreased labour cost is their essential aim,¹⁸ wherefore workmen are paid just enough bonus to elate and satisfy them and make them willing to follow the detailed directions of scientific management, while the rest of the profits go to the employer. Opposed to the general run of engineers who accept the profit-seeking attitude and aim to get for employers the greatest production with least labour cost are those who maintain that we cannot hope for a permanent increase of production at the expense of the development of the personality of the workers. For "the 'Efficiency Expert' whose primary object is *product*, must

¹³ *Ibid.* III: 1389.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* III: 1411-1413.

¹⁵ "The employer who goes through his works with kid gloves on, and is never known to dirty his hands or clothes, and who either talks to his men in a condescending or patronizing way, or else not at all, has no chance whatever of ascertaining their real thoughts or feelings.

"Above all it is desirable that men should be talked to on their own level by those who are over them. Each man should be encouraged to discuss any trouble which he may have, either in the works or outside, with those over him. Men would far rather be blamed by their bosses, . . . than to be passed by day after day without a word, and with no more notice than if they were part of the machinery." (Taylor, *Shop Management*, 184.)

¹⁶ Hearings, *op. cit.*, III: 1388.

¹⁷ Smyth, *Efficiency, Industrial Management*, Dec. 1918, 464; Loomis, *Efficiency, Industrial Management*, Jan., 1919, 43-44.

¹⁸ Smyth, *Efficiency, Industrial Management*, Sept, 1918, 234-235.

act in accord with '*compulsory militaristic efficiency*' " and this is bound in the long run to stir resistance among the workers, as it has stirred political resistance among subjects.¹⁹ The attitude of this second type of engineer is, therefore, opposed to that of the engineer who accepts the dominating, profit-seeking attitude.

Like political autocracy, industrial autocracy has had some justification in the past but is less and less justified with the progress of industry. The great stream of immigration to the United States year after year brought to our shores a mass of unskilled labour; and, at the same time there was taking place the development of large scale production which made it profitable to employ this mass of foreigners in great enterprises. The industrial leader became the important figure in the nation's development and made the most of the ignorant immigrant class. There presently developed a bitter warfare between employers who were intent on maximum profits, and organized labour, and scientific management was widely adopted to give employers the advantage in this struggle. Trade unions stood for a union rate of wages to be adopted by collective bargaining, while scientific management stood for a differential rate of pay according to the efficiency of workmen under the "scientific standards" set up by employers. Thus the central principle in scientific management "became the forging of a very tight and somewhat mechanical grip upon employés, through a skilful regulation of their pay."²⁰

Among the general run of workmen under the modern factory system, the interest of workmen is not in their work but in their pay. Their talk is about their pay. The standing of workmen among themselves is determined by their pay. Foremen and other officials may be looking forward to possible promotion but the common labourer has little or no hope of promotion. He does not think of his work as requiring intelligence or skill. The old days when a workman's standing among his fellows depended on his strength and skill²¹—on his personal power as a workman—have passed. The machine has reduced all workmen more or less to the same level. Their rivalrous interest does not direct their attention to each other's strength or skill, except when this is very extraordinary, but to their pay. The rank and file of workmen tend to be satisfied with pay that is "as good as

¹⁹ Smyth, Is the "Art of Efficiency" Efficient? *Industrial Management*, Nov., 1917, 203-207.

²⁰ Drury, Scientific Management and Progress, *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, II: 7-8.

²¹ Williams, *An American Town*, 31-40.

the average," that is, which does not betoken conspicuous inferiority. This great mass of workmen are to be distinguished from those in whom the rivalrous disposition seeks not merely to escape conspicuous inferiority but to excel. This latter class makes a psychological distinction between itself and the class which "seems to have no ambition."

Scientific management has sought to increase the numbers of this latter class by paying a bonus for unusually efficient work. To train men to do work efficiently, experts called "time study men" are employed. They study the movements of men while at work and prescribe the way in which work is to be done in order to economize time and energy to the utmost, the speed at which it shall be done, and the kind of men who shall do certain work. Scientific management has aimed, therefore, to enlist the docile acquiescence of workmen in a mechanical procedure based on a superficial study of their working movements,²² not to enlist and train their creative impulses.²³ The time study men generally accept the profit-seeking attitude of employers and, therefore, do not sufficiently take into account the welfare of the workmen. Says Professor Hoxie: "The time study man is, from the viewpoint of labor, the central figure in scientific management—its vital organ and force. To perform his functions properly, . . . he must be a man exceptional in technical and industrial training, a man with a broad and sympathetic understanding of the workers as well as of the economic and social forces which condition their welfare, a man of unimpeachable judgment, governed by scientific rather than by pecuniary considerations, and, withal, he must occupy a high and authoritative position in the management. . . .

"But as things actually are, this emphatically is not the type of man who is habitually engaged in time study work, . . . nor does the time study man of the present occupy this exalted position in the

²² "Scientific management, since it begins and ends with individuals separated from their fellows, has the defects of autocracy. It means government by experts. An expert comes into the factory and makes a study of the operations of the selected individual. That individual and his fellow-workers are much concerned about his time-studies. . . . which decide for them the amount of work that shall be portioned out for the task. But they cannot be consulted. They are objects to be investigated but not investigators." (Commons, *Industrial Goodwill*, 19, 158, 159.

²³ "The question of adequately training workers . . . is one to which American manufacturers, with a few notable exceptions, have given little attention." (Quoted from a letter by the director of the United States Training Service, April 2, 1919.) See bulletins published by this bureau for methods and extent of training of workmen in the United States. See also Frankel and Fleischer, *The Human Factor in Industry*, Ch. IV.

hierarchy of scientific management. The best men in this work are perhaps technically qualified, but . . . with little knowledge of the subject of fatigue, little understanding of psychology and temperament, little understanding of the viewpoint and problems of workers, and almost altogether lacking in knowledge of and interest in the broader economic and social aspects of working-class welfare."²⁴ In most of the establishments studied by Professor Hoxie, "time study and task setting were almost universally looked upon as primarily mechanical tasks in which the ability to analyse jobs and manipulate figures rather than broad knowledge and sound judgment were regarded as the essential factors."²⁵ It is evident that the extension of this kind of scientific management will narrow instead of increase opportunities for self-realization through work; hence the system needs to be amplified by co-operative features which will give workmen a part in the management of industry.

The regulation of pay under scientific management sought a temporary satisfaction of the rivalrous disposition of workmen by making the pay of the workmen who were more efficient under the "scientific" standards, slightly higher than that of the less efficient, and so stimulating the former to maintain their superior position and the latter to increase their efforts. Workmen are to be given just enough of a bonus to make them happy in their superiority over other workmen, not enough to make them feel so superior that further effort is unnecessary. This appeal to the rivalrous disposition may increase the productivity of some workmen but decrease that of others. For the effect of superior pay for superior workmen is often to discourage inferior workmen. For instance, in one case one group of workmen produced less than formerly because of their discouragement and resentment felt on account of another group in the same department who were earning much more than they under the scientific standards. Instead of the inferior workmen being stimulated to excel the others they simply stalled in their work. When the ratio of bonus to wages increases with the wages received, a bonus may greatly stimulate highly paid labour and, at the same time, discourage the efforts of individuals or groups that are less skilled. It is curious that the aggrieved group may feel no grievance against the company but their entire resentment may be directed against the favoured group. A regulation of pay solely with reference to its effect on

²⁴ Hoxie, *Scientific Management and Labor*, 54-56.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 56.

rivalry fails to make a sufficiently broad appeal either for the development of the personality of the workers or for maximum production.²⁶

The predominance of the rivalrous disposition of workmen is a survival from the period of agricultural industry, with its independence and free individual initiative. In the early American rural community where men owned the essential instrument of production—land—there was keen rivalry to excel in those personal traits—strength and skill—which made a man a successful farmer.²⁷ But when the workman ceased to use his own tools on his own land and became subject to the speed of the machine over which he had no control,²⁸ when instead of acting as an individual he became a part of the machinery,²⁹ he ceased to take satisfaction in showing how much he could do. Except where artificially stimulated by the employer in his own interest,³⁰ the rivalrous disposition became less prominent in the behaviour of workmen and was succeeded by others, enlisted in adaptation to the new situation. In fact intelligent adaptation requires the suppression of the rivalrous disposition, inasmuch as effective trade union action requires that individual rivalry shall fall in abeyance, that the speedier and more skilful individuals shall be willing to accept the same wage as their less capable comrades³¹ and that workmen of various degrees of capacity should be admitted to the union.³²

This development is impeded by the American tradition that any wage-earner of capacity may rise into the employing class. But an increasing proportion of wage-earners is rapidly becoming conscious that such a rise is impossible for most men, that, for good or ill, their fortunes are identical with those of other wage-earners. The result is an increasing sentiment for trade unionism which, however, as between its separate unions, has suffered from the action of the rivalrous disposition. The intimate working conditions of modern

²⁶ Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, Ch. XV, Drury, *Scientific Management and Progress*, *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, Vol. II, No. 4, 7; See also Drury, *Scientific Management* Chs. VII-IX.

²⁷ Williams, *An American Town*, 35, 40.

²⁸ McCabe, *The Standard Rate in American Trade Unions*, J. H. U. S. H. P. S., Series xxx, No. 2, 231.

²⁹ Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, 306-307.

³⁰ Scott, *Increasing Human Efficiency in Business*, 49-51; Fitch, *The Steel Workers*, 186.

³¹ McCabe, *op. cit.*, 15-16, 114-116; Stockton, *The Closed Shop in American Trade Unions*, J. H. U. S. H. P. S., Series xxix, No. 3, 167.

³² Wolfe, *Admission to American Trade Unions*, J. H. U. S. H. P. S., Series xxx, No. 3, 98.

industry stimulate rivalry. When the workmen of an industry in a certain city are first organized the rivalry and jealousy of the union workmen in the different plants, though members of the one union, often make the existence of the union precarious—until some gratifying gain in wages or shortening of hours of work through union action makes the advantage of union action plain to all. Even then the rivalries and jealousies do not cease. Another cause of rivalry is the correspondence schools, the advertisements and agents of which kindle illusory anticipations in discontented workmen and, by stirring the hope of rising out of the trade, distract workmen from efforts and plans for the improvement of the trade by union action. In thousands of men these hopes are stirred not by the inner prompting of capacity but by alluring advertisements and verbose, clever agents. So the discontented workmen spend months, perhaps years, in a vain effort to rise out of their trade, instead of casting their lot with it, identifying their hopes and aspirations with it, contributing to its solidarity and to the improvement of its organization and thus making it worth remaining in.

Another evil of rivalrous behaviour is that each union regards a particular kind of work as belonging to it; and, where the distinction between the work of different unions cannot be clearly drawn or is changed by changing conditions, there are jurisdictional disputes, which often become very bitter.³³ This bitter rivalry between unions has been one of the greatest obstacles to the development of unionism. In 1903 the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor declared: "Many of the unions appear to be more engrossed in the problem of securing new adherents from unions already existing, or to extend the work of their members at the expense of other organizations, than they are in resisting the aggression of employers or securing higher wages, shorter hours, and better conditions of work."³⁴ These rivalries stimulated intelligence in their satisfaction,³⁵ but it was not an adaptive intelligence, for this would have inhibited the rivalries in question.

³³ Whitney, Jurisdiction in American Building-Trades Unions, *J. H. U. S. H. P.* S., xxxii, No. 1, 124.

³⁴ Quoted by Whitney, *op. cit.*, 122.

³⁵ Their effect on intelligence was noted by President Gompers in his report to the convention of the American Federation of Labor in 1905: "None will dispute the fact that with you I deeply deplore the jurisdictional controversies, and particularly, when they assume an acute and often bitter antagonistic attitude, but that they have developed a high order of intelligence in discussion

The preceding paragraphs have prepared us to appreciate the psychology of the opposition of trade unions to scientific management. On the one hand we have the fact that workmen are gradually learning the evils of rivalry in their own ranks and the absolute necessity of organization and the subordination of the individual to the organization. They are becoming convinced that whatever a workman may gain as an individual of superior capacity by working non-union is apt to be more than offset by what he would lose without union backing; that however capable as an individual he may be, he is as nothing before the power of the employer.³⁶ On the other hand, scientific management appeals to the rivalrous disposition of the individual workman to gain a substantial recognition of superiority "beyond that which is given to the average of the trade",³⁷ and to gain this his allegiance must be to his employer and not to the union.³⁸ Hence the conflict between the dispositions called into play by scientific management and those called into play by trade unionism.³⁹ This has proved one of the essential conflicts of interests in industrial relations.

Professor Hoxie has analysed the opposition of trade unionism to scientific management.⁴⁰ He finds that trade unionists give var-

among our unionists, keen perception in industrial jurisprudence, is a fact which all observers must admit. That these requirements and attainments will be of vast advantage in the administration and judgment of industrial affairs, no thinker can gainsay." (*Ibid.* 125 n.)

³⁶ Fitch, *The Steel Workers*, 232.

³⁷ Taylor, *Principles of Scientific Management*, 33-34.

³⁸ "Scientific management wants two things; foremen in the labor market to fill the positions of functionalized foremen, . . . and it wants an army of workers who will follow directions, follow them, as one of the managers said, as soldiers follow them. (Marot, *Creative Impulse in Industry*, 55.)

³⁹ This conflict led to a Congressional investigation. See *Hearings Before the Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management*, 1912.

⁴⁰ The attitude of organized labour to scientific management is stated in resolutions passed by the National Convention of the American Federation of Labor, November 22, 1912, as follows: "We are opposed to any system of shop management which requires one man to stand over another, timing him with a stop watch in order to speed him up beyond his normal capacity. In addition to the brutality of such a proceeding, no stop watch time study can possibly be accurate. Every physical act performed by man is preceded by a mental process. The greater the amount of skill required in the work, the greater the mental process preceding the physical expression of it, and there is no method known to efficiency engineers or others by which a time study can be made by a stop watch or any other time-measuring device of the mental process which precedes the physical act. The mental process being a necessary part of the work itself, the failure to make a time study of that operation of the work makes the study inaccurate, and

ious "beliefs," as he calls them, for their opposition but that these do not constitute its essential motive.⁴¹ This motive is not an "almost instinctive distrust of the new, strange and different," though this "has played a part in rousing union opposition and to a certain extent is effective in continuing it,"⁴² but is a result of the experience of workmen "that industrial change through invention and the application of new machinery and processes, however beneficial it is to society as a whole and even to labour in the long run, usually results in taking toll immediately from the individual worker or the working group concerned."⁴³ That is, it is not novelty as such that repels but the fact that change and novelty have proved to be disadvantageous to workmen. He further points out that this has been the case because the improvements "have created conditions of increased competition among the workers."⁴⁴ They have made it possible to stir the rivalry of workmen profitably for the employers, and this has been particularly true under scientific management. Furthermore the superior workmen who get the bonuses "generally cease to be 'good unionists' in spirit,"⁴⁵ and the union is, to that extent weakened.

Under the "revolution" in the attitude of employers to workmen and of workmen to employers called for by Mr. Taylor, scientific management promised greater opportunities for labour. But the revolution did not occur, the individualistic profit-seeking attitude continued essential, and the result was that, instead of enlarging, scientific management narrowed opportunities.⁴⁶ It narrowed "the scope of the workers' industrial activity,"⁴⁷ "furthered the modern tendency toward the specialization of the workers,"⁴⁸ eliminated the

secondly, worthless as a basis for computing compensation.

"To establish a bonus or premium system upon such a time study is wrong, induces the workman to toil beyond his normal capacity, and the whole system has a tendency to wear the worker to a nervous wreck, destroy his physical and mental health, and ultimately land him as a charge upon the community in some of our eleemosynary institutions." (Proceedings of the National Convention, 346.)

⁴¹ Hoxie, Why Organized Labor Opposes Scientific Management, *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, XXXI: 64-66.

⁴² *Ibid.* 68.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 68.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 75-76.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 67.

⁴⁶ Hoxie, *Scientific Management and Labor*, 7-25, 99-103.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 39; Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 119.

⁴⁸ Hoxie, *op. cit.*, 123.

necessity of skill and craft knowledge,⁴⁹ and stimulated intensity of labour.⁵⁰ Its essential aim was not to improve the welfare of workmen, but to decrease cost of production, to strengthen industrial position against competitors, to increase profits⁵¹ and especially to make workmen more subservient by weakening their unions, which was done by undermining the uniform wage policy of unions by paying bonuses to superior workmen. Under scientific management as before, therefore, the essential aim of the employer is maximum production at least labour cost that the employer may retain maximum profits—the “golden egg” as one manufacturer termed them.⁵² The interests of capital and labour thus continue to be in irrepressible conflict.

The industrial conflict, with the growth of the great industries, has become more and more menacing to the public welfare, and employers are forced to seek a panacea. The one next tried was joint management through shop committees. The purpose was to substitute for scientific management which had centred on the mere mechanical movements of labour a system of management that centred on the psychology of labour.⁵³ Management was to be by shop committees⁵⁴ made up of representatives elected by workmen and representatives of employers, and through these committees workmen were to be given such managing functions as, in view of their psychology, would make them contented and increase production. As in the case of scientific management the aim was to combat the growing power and resistful attitude of labour unions, which, in England, where shop committees originated, had developed into a formidable political party.

The shop committee system is a device to secure contentment with all the fundamental relations remaining unchanged. The employer institutes the system and may abolish it. Profit seeking continues essential, business cycles continue, depression follows prosperity, and in depression factories close down and the workmen, including the

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 129.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 53.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 116-117.

⁵² Hearings before Special Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management, I: 643.

⁵³ Wolfe, Works Committees and Joint Industrial Councils, 17-19.

⁵⁴ Wolfe, *op. cit.*, Chs. III-V; Gleason, What the Workers Want, 169-215, 281-358; Kellogg and Gleason, British Labor and the War, Pt. IV, Appendices, VIII-XIV; Stoddard, The Shop Committee.

committees, are discharged. On the resumption of business, labour representatives on committees, who proved too independent, may not be re-engaged.⁵⁵

The essential conflict in industry is not between labour and capital but between workmen and profit seekers. Capital might conceivably limit itself to a reasonable fixed return, like that paid on bonds, and industry might be managed jointly by the active managers and representatives of workmen, under government supervision, with a division of the profits between capital and labour, and a diversion of a share to the government. It is when the capitalist and investor, whose connection with the industry is purely financial, refuses to be content with a reasonable fixed return and becomes profit seeker and insists on managing the business exclusively in the interest of private profits, that a conflict with labour arises. The profit seeker, whose "concern is dividends and production only as a means to dividends," "cannot be worked into an organization of industry which vests administration in a body representing all grades of producers, or producers and consumers together, for he has no purpose in common with them; so that while joint councils between workers and managers may succeed, joint councils between workers and owners or agents of owners, like most of the so-called Whitley Councils, will not, because the necessity for the mere owner is itself one of the points in dispute. . . .

"In industries where management is divorced from ownership . . . there is no obvious halfway house, therefore, between the retention of the present system and the complete extrusion of the capitalist from the control of production. . . . And since the capital needed to maintain and equip a modern industry could not be provided by any one group of workers, even were it desirable on other grounds that they should step completely into the position of the present owners, the complex of rights which constitutes ownership remains to be shared between them and whatever organ may act on behalf of the general community."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Five of the members of the committee appointed by the English government in 1916 to supervise the formation of shop committees reported that "while recognizing that the more amicable relations thus established between capital and labour will afford an atmosphere generally favourable to industrial peace and progress, we desire to express our views that a *complete identity of interests between capital and labour cannot be thus effected*, and that such machinery cannot be expected to furnish a settlement for the more serious conflicts of interest involved in the working of an economic system primarily governed and directed by motives of private profit." (Quoted by Gleason, *The Whitley Councils, Survey*, Apr. 12, 1919, 76. See also Wolfe, *Works Committees and Joint Industrial Councils*, 47.)

⁵⁶ Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, 110-113.

The unrestricted right of the employer to profits is based on the assumption that he assumes all the risk and responsibility. It is true that he is the initiator, the responsible agent, and a loser if the enterprise proves unsuccessful. In new enterprises he takes a risk which comparatively few in the community are willing to take and the extension of industrial activities is dependent on employers assuming this risk. "But these cases can fairly be left out of consideration because of their relatively small number in proportion to the total production. Setting aside these exceptions, and viewing the problem as industry exists today—not as it has been developed but as it stands today—the extent to which investors and enterprisers in industry assume risk is a matter as to which each case must be considered separately. The risk is one thing in a highly competitive business where the demand is new and destined to rise; it is another in a monopoly; it is still another in a declining business doomed to disappear.

"Moreover, the risk that the employés assume is by no means inconsiderable and is consistently ignored in most discussions of the subject. It frequently happens today that the capital owners or enterprisers have 'more than one iron in the fire' and 'their eggs are not all in one basket.' Furthermore, the owners are in a position to wait for their returns. And, finally, they definitely plan to compensate themselves for bad years by the reserves and surpluses of good years. Not so the workers. Their eggs *are* all in one basket. They cannot wait long for their returns. They have little or nothing to tide them through bad years. They are expected to come to work where the work is offered; work for little more than subsistence rates while it is offered; and get out when it is finished. Theirs is the greater risk in the sense that they put all their strength—their working capital—at the disposal of a given enterprise. Its success or failure is their livelihood or unemployment.

"There appear, therefore, to be really two kinds of risk distinguishable by their consequences. To the capital provider the risk is a property one—usually a matter of only part of his holdings. To the manual worker it is a human one—a matter of personal and family sustenance."⁵⁷ Because workmen as well as employers take risk, it is assumed that both have a right to the profits of risk-taking

⁵⁷ Valentine and Tead, *Work and Pay: A Suggestion for Representative Government in Industry*, Quart. Jour. Econ., XXXI: 249-250. The plan outlined is a result of the experience of Mr. Valentine as Director of the Joint Board of Protocol Standards of the Dress and Waist Industry of New York City.

and a plan for a division is worked out. This plan involves publicity as to profits. Of the advantages of such a rational order in industry it is said: "It automatically gives the workers and the public the protection which comes from knowledge of expenses, of gross earnings, and of the residuum. It tends to make individual earnings more nearly correspond to the worker's interest and effort. It makes participation in the control of industry not simply a 'right' but an arduous responsibility of workers and consumers. It protects the employer from the temptation to false economy in low labour costs. It tends to give to owners of capital only as much as it is necessary to pay to get capital; since it states separately the costs of managerial ability, risk and capital *per se.*"⁵⁸

A system like this one outlined by two distinguished engineers might aptly be termed scientific management. The great obstacle to the general introduction of some such plan is the controlling influence, throughout industrial organization, of business men of the individualistic type. This type is supported by the law, by the prevailing economic order and by strong egoistic dispositions. The problem is how to turn the ingenuity and inventiveness, which, under profit seeking, has wrought our great material progress, to the account of inventions in industrial relations that shall serve the public welfare. Obviously the beginning is to recognize, as we have, just what the profit-seeking motive is and what it has done and has failed to do. But merely that will not give the necessary impetus to a new economic order. Perhaps the coming of public ownership in several of the great monopolies, as railways and coal, if the government stood the test as a good business manager, would weaken the individualistic attitude of employers generally and stimulate the impulse to hold the remainder of industry in private hands by proving the superiority of private ownership from the point of view of public welfare. Perhaps it would stimulate the invention of devices of real joint management, with profit sharing, under governmental regulation. This might eventually develop an industrial democracy under forms of private ownership, as political democracy has developed in England while retaining forms of autocracy.

The alternative to this development of industrial democracy is the ultimate development of trade unionism into a great labour party and the transference of industrial conflict to the political sphere. The shifting of industrial conflict from the economic to political and other

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 257.

spheres is a principle that requires some explanation at this the close of our review of industrial conflict. The propertied classes feel that their political control is threatened by the development of labour organization. They fear that the industrial resistance of labour organizations will be transferred to the political sphere. The "open shop drive" in the United States in 1920-1921 was due in part to the fear that labour unions would develop into a political party in the United States, as they had in England, and, as there, would threaten the political control of propertied classes. Both in England and in the United States the public has sympathized with the industrial and political control of propertied classes (1) because of the wealth power of those classes, which enables them to exercise the social control; (2) because the public acquiesces in a propertied class control of government which is exercised secretly, as opposed to a mass control by working classes which cannot be exercised secretly; (3) because capitalistic control of government means a maintenance of things as they are, of social order, while working class control would mean change, which would involve some disorder; (4) because the press and other means of educating and controlling voters is largely in the hands of the employing classes. These causes of public sympathy with the propertied classes imply a deficiency of knowledge.

The conflict thus shifts from the industrial and political spheres into the sphere of education. The voters must be educated if they are to think independently instead of accepting the attitudes of the classes that exercise the social control. But capitalistic interests have an immense influence over public and higher education. The conflict is, then, between those who would perpetuate a traditional education, which has nothing to do with vital human problems, thus keeping voters in ignorance and making possible the traditional industrial and political control, and those who would make public and higher education the chief means of the development of a rational social order. The conflict shifts, also, to the sphere of religion and there is a conflict between those who stand for traditional ecclesiasticism and those who believe that without a vital relation with the Unseen, which will stir in mankind the sympathy that is required as an incentive to thought and behaviour on behalf of opportunities for self-development for all, there is no hope for the world. The conflict affects also professional relations in so far as the social control of propertied classes gives the behaviour of professional men a bias for those classes. It affects family relations, also, and husband and wife

may be opposed on economic questions, whereby children are subjected to the influence of diverse attitudes and, as they grow up, may find themselves fundamentally opposed to one another. The economic attitudes acquired from parents reach far down into the mental and moral life of children and condition the possibilities of education and of a vital religious experience. The effects of economic conflict extend, therefore, throughout the entire social organization. The tracing of these effects is a part of our further work.

BOOK III

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN POLITICAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER XII

THE POLITICAL RIVALRY OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS

THE conflict of interests in political relations discloses increasingly, as its essential cause, conflicts between economic classes and interests, with their spheres of influence.¹ To be sure non-economic groups, as religious sects, are involved in political conflicts, but analysis is apt to show them to be associated rather than vital factors. Different sects often represent, roughly, different economic classes in the community and, though the clearly conscious elements in a political conflict may be sectarian prejudices, these are merely associated factors; the vital factors are the economic interests. To arrive at the vital factors requires an analysis of the processes of non-rational inference in political behaviour.² Politicians use great cleverness in superficially associating with the policies they advocate sectarian and other beliefs that enlist impulses of approval and, therefore, appear to prove the desirability of their policies.³

Rival economic classes seek control of government in order to protect and advance their interests. International conflicts appear to be essentially conflicts between propertied classes situated in different nations.⁴ Non-propertied classes won the franchise through the rivalry of the propertied classes of a nation to enlist the support of more voters; and, from that time, propertied classes have rivalled each other for the support of non-propertied voters by promises of legislation they desired in return for their support.⁵ But labour organization has suggested the possibility of political control by the non-propertied. Before the organization of labour the mass of the political community is a group of fairly equal but indifferent individuals

¹ This subject is treated at length in the author's *Foundations of Social Science*, and the reader can amplify the necessarily abstract and general treatment of this chapter by reading Books I and II of that work.

² This analysis must be deferred to the volume on social processes of feeling and thought.

³ Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, 31.

⁴ Williams *op. cit.*, Chs. VIII-X.

⁵ *Ibid.* 77-78.

who feel their political powerlessness.⁶ When a section of these individuals unites in an economic organization, the individual ceases to be the political unit, for the organization soon realizes that its apparently purely economic purpose has political aspects. As these groups multiply the body politic ceases to be a mass of politically inert individuals and becomes differentiated into politically alert economic units.⁷ These are at first keenly rivalrous but gradually become conscious of a common economic purpose that can be achieved only by united political action. Thus develop national unions with political aims and this facilitates the political co-operation of all labour as soon as the great issues in which all labour is involved become of paramount interest.⁸

This political organization of labour is a recent phenomenon and not yet fully developed. Political parties have represented, primarily, propertied classes and there has been a division in their leadership into conservative leaders who stood for the traditional property rights and progressive leaders who demanded changes required for the public welfare. This division of leadership became conspicuous as a result of the industrial revolution. The factory system put men, women and children under the domination of employers as they had not been since the days of the feudal system,⁹ and this industrial subjection, ameliorated by labour legislation but nevertheless essential in an economic system based on profit seeking, has continued to the present day, even in the most advanced states.¹⁰ The domination exercised by employers and the resistance of workmen were projected into politics, and gave rise to the conflict between political leaders that stood for unregulated industry and those that stood for governmental regulation on behalf of the working hosts.¹¹ This was essentially a conflict between leaders of different dispositions. Some members of upper classes were leaders in the movement for legislation to protect women and child labourers, others opposed it. Nevertheless, the tendency of membership in an upper class is narrowly to limit the capacity for sympathetic understanding of the needs and aspirations of lower classes.

In the conflict between conservative and progressive leaders, the

⁶ Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, 127.

⁷ *Ibid.* Ch. X.

⁸ *Ibid.* Chs. XI-XII.

⁹ Webb, *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions*, Chs. II-IV.

¹⁰ Ogg, *Economic Development of Modern Europe*, 371-372, 396-398.

¹¹ Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England*.

sympathetic and intellectual impulses of the sensitive and thoughtful public had to be quieted by the conservative, who aimed to keep the masses where they were. This heretofore had been accomplished by an alleged religious sanction of such a condition, but certain ecclesiastics now denied and discredited this justification of existing conditions. Poverty, crowded homes and overworked children had to have a justification. "It was found in a very simple statement of what seemed to be true. The poor were weak. They were the unfit. They were the defeated in the struggle for existence. Life was a struggle for the survival of the fittest and they who did not survive as capitalists, continued as workers."¹² This justification, with the others that previously had been used, have continued in common use to the present day as justifications of the reactionary propertied attitude. And the masses, suggestible to the ideas and attitudes of the upper classes, have accepted their attitude of contempt for the lower, in some cases with the justifications, and have felt that they were contemptible, that their status was indeed hopeless because they were the weak and unfit, that they were so created and that a pious resignation required that they accept their condition and hope for a better one in the next life. But, as the masses have become organized and have ceased to be suggestible to upper classes, this religious attitude has weakened, wherefore the Church will have to take cognizance of the new industrial and political attitudes of the masses if it is to reformulate effective religious beliefs.¹³

The conflict between a progressive and a conservative political leadership has generally resulted in two political parties that represent propertied class interests, one a conservative party that stands uncompromisingly for traditional propertied interests, the other a more liberal party that caters to rising propertied classes, and advocates some modification of property rights in the interest of the public welfare. If the conservative party has long been out of power it may become more liberal in some of its promises than the liberal party, in order to get back to power. Both parties ostensibly stand, primarily, for the public welfare, for no party could successfully appeal to voters by emphasizing the interests of a particular class. The nearest approach to such an appeal is that of a long dominant party which relies on the allegiance of a large mass of voters to enable it openly to seek the interests of the class it particularly serves. When a new

¹² Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, 84-85.

¹³ See Chapter XXI.

party arises, its leaders are too aware of the necessity of winning the public support to make its avowed purpose the realization of the interests of a distinct class. It must appeal to voters of diverse economic interests and, in so doing, its platform emphasizes public welfare interests.¹⁴ But if the support behind the new party is analysed far enough it will be apt to be found to be some particular economic interests.

Party organizations require funds for political campaigns,¹⁵ and are dependent on the interested classes to furnish the funds.¹⁶ The propertied classes also largely control the press so that a political leadership which represents public welfare interests that conflict with propertied interests is not apt to get an adequate hearing. For these reasons the influential party organizations represent largely propertied classes. One party may serve the larger capitalistic interests, another the smaller manufacturers and merchants and agrarian interests which desire, primarily, freedom from the domination of the big interests; and a third party that makes more liberal promises to the working masses may yet be obliged to include in its platform clauses favouring legislation desired by capitalistic interests in order to get the necessary financial support. This control of political parties by propertied classes is maintained as unobtrusively as possible because universal suffrage and secret voting make it possible for the masses to resist effectively a class control which is openly and flagrantly exercised. Hence the shibboleth of government by the people is proclaimed by all parties, while each loses no opportunity to proclaim that the other is controlled by particular economic interests.

The political control maintained by propertied classes up to the present time has encouraged a tendency to reaction rather than progress in political policy. One reason for this is that possession of political power increases the assurance given by possession of economic power, and stimulates the determination of propertied classes to maintain things as they are. They have, also, the immense social power that comes through their control of the press, which enables them to control the information and impressions that the public shall

¹⁴ For instance, the leaders of the incipient Labor Party in the United States "were too aware of their obligations" to adopt a platform confined to labour interests. (Merz, "Enter: The Labor Party," *New Republic*, Dec. 10, 1919, 54.)

¹⁵ Ray, *An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics*, 268-269, 450.

¹⁶ Though some money comes from men in moderate circumstances, much more comes from capitalistic interests. (*Ibid.* 270-271).

receive.¹⁷ By eliminating influences that make for changes in the attitudes of the people, they are able to perpetuate the attitudes that have supported their traditional right to political control.

The law and custom as well as the theory of the state inherited from the past have developed in the course of social, economic and political control by propertied classes, and the prevailing attitudes of society are still in harmony with the social control exercised by those classes. We are too apt to think of those classes as exerting a conscious and deliberate control over the government. This is often done, but, until recently, it has generally been unnecessary. The propertied classes always have subconsciously assumed their right to govern; and other classes have acquiesced in that attitude of authority. We are apt to think of the subordinated classes as constantly resenting any assumption of authority on the part of upper, but such resentment has, until recently, been exceptional. These exceptional occasions of popular resentment are more vividly conscious to the public mind than is the prevailing subconscious acquiescence in the authority of propertied classes.

The acquiescence of the masses in the political control of propertied classes is due also to the fact that the natural attitude of man is one of response to social suggestion. It is this suggestibility that perpetuates the prevailing political attitudes. Both in England and in the United States, which are commonly regarded as the two most progressive nations, there is a strong tendency among the masses to adulation of propertied classes.¹⁸ Where this is weak fear insures a suggestible attitude of lower to upper. Even where voters vote in secret they may still be influenced in their voting by fear of a dominant political class, that is, fear that "if the election did not go to suit the capitalists they would give us hard times." It is a problem in how far this fear—justified or not—is an essential motive for supporting the party of a propertied class, and in how far it is merely an excuse given for continuing the habit of voting the old party ticket, or for indulging the sporting propensity to "pick a winner" in voting, or for yielding to the social suggestions of propertied classes that play upon the minds of voters through the press.

The natural tendency of subordinated classes to follow the suggestions of upper makes possible the social control of upper until a dis-

¹⁷ Angell, *The British Revolution and the American Democracy*, 244-245; Lippmann, *Liberty and the News*; Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, I: 107-110; Ross, *Changing America*, Ch. VII.

¹⁸ Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 96-101.

tinct conception of the opposition of their interests to those of upper arises. But until such opposition is effectively organized, it is comparatively easy for the propertied classes through the press to maintain their political control by appeal to the proper impulses of the masses. To escape such control it is necessary only to assume a critical attitude to what is read in the newspapers. But such an attitude is a product of training. Education alone, however, will not suffice, for the sources of information as to national and world conditions are, for the most part, under the control of the press, wherefore contact with the facts never can be first hand.

The classes that control governments have, therefore, immense power, which tends to make them reactionary. The non-propertied are, for the most part, unorganized politically and without effective leadership. There are certain reasons why the rule of propertied classes does not insure a permanently progressive democracy. When a new propertied class has made good its claim to political recognition, domination on the part of an old class is no longer possible, and the situation makes for freer rivalry, at least for a time. The propertied classes, in their rivalry for political control grant some demands of the working classes. However, domination is closely connected with property ownership. Under the impulsion of the profit-seeking impulses a controlling class inevitably seeks privileges that bear hard on other classes. And resistance by the latter stimulates an impulse to repress the resistance. Particularly is there an impulse to keep the working hosts docile for on their regular work depend all profits. Hence the impulse to keep the non-propertied masses "down" and "quiet." Whenever the non-propertied show an increasing influence over the government, reactionary propertied interests become apprehensive, and there is a drawing together of erstwhile competing interests.

When this reactionary spirit spreads among propertied classes, there results an indiscriminate protection by the government of all capitalistic interests. For instance, the disposition rigorously to regulate railroads weakens, and there is an averseness to prosecuting profiteering and monopolistic corporations. The courts, as well as legislatures, become reactionary. Justice Holmes writes that "when socialism first began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of the community were a good deal frightened," and looked to the courts to protect their property; that as a result the courts were influenced by individualistic economic theories that favoured propertied interests, and thus were "led

into taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions."¹⁹ This effect of socialism in causing apprehensiveness and a reactionary attitude on the part of legislatures, executives and courts has continued to the present day.

The tendency of propertied interests to reaction is encouraged by the increasing power of the modern state. This is due to the increasing size of the populations, to the increasing number of functions and the vastness of the business of the government, to the tendency of the increasing numbers of the mass to discourage individual initiative, and of positions of great power to make officials dominating.²⁰ These officials are, in turn, still further strengthened in their feeling of authority by their consciousness of the backing of propertied classes. They represent and protect those classes. "The opinion of the state, at least in its legislative expression, will largely reproduce the opinion of those who hold the keys of economic power. There is, indeed, no part of the community of which economic power is unable to influence the opinions. Not that it will be an absolute control that is exerted by it. The English statute-book bears striking testimony to the results of the conflict between the holders of economic power and those who desire its possession; and, often enough there has been a generous co-operation behind the effected change. But the fundamental truth remains that the simple weapons of politics are alone powerless to effect any basic redistribution of economic strength."²¹ Hence the political unrest due to the possession by the propertied classes of the political bulwark. For increasing intimacy of association and education tend to make the masses less ignorant and subservient.

It is this widening conception of the control over government exercised by propertied classes that is weakening the partisan attitude of voters and making them "irregular" in their voting. The "independent voter" is one who is breaking away from the conventionalized mass of partisan voters. But when a large number of such voters vote against a party which appears to have become committed to class interests they do not think of themselves as thereby constituting an opposing class but as voting on behalf of the people against a privileged class. The independent vote is numerically weak and politically ineffective against a privileged class, owing to the limited education of the independent voters and to the fact that they do not come into

¹⁹ Holmes, *The Path of the Law*, Harv. L. Rev., X: 457, 467.

²⁰ Russell, *Why Men Fight*, 63-64.

²¹ Laski, *Authority in the Modern State*, 81-82.

direct contact with the national and international situations that require political action. They become acquainted with those situations through the press, so that the independent vote is not the vote of those who really think independently on first-hand or reliable information, but of non-partisan minds that are more or less subject to the social suggestions of the interests that control the press.

The political control of propertied classes is, therefore, not yet seriously menaced by other classes. Voters generally resent the idea of a class openly trying to control the government; at the same time they acquiesce in the traditional political control exercised by propertied classes. The conventional rank and file of voters, tend, therefore, to oppose a labour party as being an open and avowed effort of the working classes to control the government. Voters oppose a mass movement to influence the government, which they can see, as against propertied class control, which they cannot see. Furthermore, the law as it has developed is mainly for the protection of private property, wherefore the propertied classes appear as the classes to be protected and respected. The propertied classes are not only the legally protected and respected classes but also the popularly admired classes, while the working classes are the contemned classes; wherefore the rank and file of voters will support a political party that represents, primarily, the propertied classes when they would not support a labour party. This attitude of the public is a more serious obstacle to a labour party in the United States than in England and Germany where a larger proportion of the population are wage-earners.²²

In our analysis we come finally, then, to "the public." The public is not a unit, whose will is represented by the law, as the legal theory of the state holds. The public includes self-conscious, conflicting classes so that the will of the people as a whole is represented by only a part of the law. Besides the classes there is an undifferentiated mass, which votes year after year as partisans, or as personal impulse prompts, with little or no consideration of issues or capacity for such consideration. Sovereignty is vested in the people, which includes the undifferentiated mass and the classes. Many members of classes shade into the mass, for instance, members of a conservative upper class whose political allegiance is a matter of tradition and habit, and whose class interests would be better served by voting with a more liberal party. The body politic is predominantly conventional and

²² Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, 380.

partisan and, for this reason, a politically dominant class that does not too violently disturb the conventional mass of voters can go a long way in the use, in its own interest, of the sovereignty. The "will of the people" is a vague acquiescence which a dominant class turns in the direction of its own interests. This acquiescence is a marked trait of lower classes and is due to the survival, among the masses, of the attitude of subservience to a ruling class, which characterized them before they were sovereign, and to the impulses above referred to—admiration and fear—that perpetuate this attitude.

This attitude is weakened when, in the struggle between organized labour and reactionary propertied interests, the latter are seen ruthlessly to control governmental agencies and force them to act on their behalf contrary to law, or to secure the repeal of laws that stand in the way of the exercise of their will.²³ These instances in which the strong arm of the state is conspicuously wielded by a dominant class create a profound impression because they dramatically contradict the oft repeated principle of government by the people. The first effect of this realization of a class control of government is a distrust of government as such. The distrustful population does not immediately constitute itself a distinct class seeking to wrest control of the government from the controlling class, but there is a tendency to a weakening respect for law and government which results in a weakening power of governmental control.

Though people still have much respect for law as such, and for law as having behind it the strong arm of the state, these attitudes are less fixed than formerly. The attitude of unthinking deference to law as such has been much disturbed of late by the law's invasion of the sphere of personal liberty which is required by the increasing complexity of modern life, and by unpunished violations of law by interests thus restrained. The attitude of deference to law as having behind it the strong arm of the state also has been weakened. Respect for the strong arm reaches the vanishing point when an employing class regards legislators, executives and governors as its puppets,²⁴ and when organized labour looks upon government thus manned as merely an entrenchment of the opposing class. The great majority of workmen in the United States are still unorganized and lack the assurance which organization gives. But the attitudes of organized labour infect the unorganized. Where the law fails effectively to regulate the

²³ See chapters XXVIII and XXIX; Lindsey and O'Higgins, *The Beast*.

²⁴ For citations of instances see Williams, *op. cit.*, 28, 87-88, 146.

relations between capital and labour, there is a sphere of conflict in which the contestants very easily step over the line from legal to illegal conflict. Under these conditions it is inevitable that contesting parties should be impatient with the finespun legal distinctions by which the line is drawn which may interfere with their accomplishment of their purpose. Because there is no absolute, objective standard of justice, and no agreement on a workable standard, respect for law as the instrument of justice has been on the wane.

The projection of industrial rivalry and conflict into the political sphere is probably a more important cause of the decreasing traditional subservience to law than any other. While it is difficult to describe in one paragraph the political aspect of the industrial conflict, it may be summarized as follows: Labour unions have distrusted attempts by governments to better conditions of labour because of their belief that governments were controlled by the employing classes. Yet they have avoided making the labour movement a political movement because of the apparent hopelessness of organizing and uniting all labour in one political labour party. Employers have hesitated to use their full power of governmental control against labour because they were afraid labour would in that case abandon the employer-controlled political parties and form one of its own, and thus eventually come to control the government. But, in spite of these conditions that have deferred the development of the political phase of the labour movement, industrial conflict is projecting itself more and more into politics for these reasons: (1) with the increasing intensity of the industrial struggle, employers, in a crisis, more and more yield to the temptation to use the government ruthlessly against labour; (2) labour unions, therefore, learn that they will have to win political control in order to protect their right to collective bargaining and to the strike, which, with the government in the hands of employers, are the only available means which labour has for its defence and its immediate betterment;²⁵ (3) but employers prefer even governmental fixing of wages and other conditions of labour, to collective bargaining, because they now have the dominant influence over governments; (4) because control of government gives the ultimate advantage in the labour struggle, the most progressive labour organizations are advocating the development of a labour party.

The obstacles to the development of a labour party are: (1) there is a lack of efficient leadership owing to the fact that the more in-

²⁵ Babson, Religion and Business, 42.

telligent individuals in the community are bent on a career, and, even if in sympathy with the labour movement, do not care to jeopardize a business or professional or academic or ecclesiastical career by taking a prominent part in aiding the formation of a labour party; (2) the public, because of its predilection for social order and dislike of the inconvenience caused by conflict, and for other reasons above given, favours the employing class which also desires the maintenance of things as they are, and opposes the idea of a labour party; (3) the mass of labour has traditionally acknowledged the right of the propertied classes to political control, and, because it is conventionally-minded, and also because it distrusts the intelligence of its own numbers, as well as the soundness of the views of those who would have labour seize the political control, is slow to drift into a labour party.

Because of this lack of leadership, of the support of public opinion, and of the enthusiasm of labour itself for a labour party, the obstacles seem well nigh unsurmountable to those labour groups which are most enthusiastic for political resistance. Hence the rise of the revolutionary labour movement, which, impatient with the slow processes of political action, counsels direct action by large bodies of workmen, that is, sympathetic strikes, whether strikes have been declared illegal or not.²⁶ To meet these tendencies to impulsive social action, labour organizations advocate an education which shall train workmen to co-operate politically,²⁷ and which shall train the public to decide impartially political issues that affect labour, thus removing the obstacle to a successful labour party that most exasperates labour leaders—the predilection of an ignorant public for the attitudes and opinions of employers.

Largely owing to this industrial struggle, the decreasing respect for law seems, for the time being, inevitable, for law is now passing through a period of transition. Law is no longer a command set by a dominant class to subjects whose economic condition is unchanging. Subjects are organizing into groups and classes of distinct economic interests, and law is the determination, reached as a result of compromise between those classes, of the recognition that shall be accorded their claims by the state. Law as compromise inevitably compels less implicit obedience than law as the expressed will of a dominant class. The law is now framed to invoke, rather than compel

²⁶ Cannon, *The Story of Alex Howat, The Liberator*, Apr., 1921, 25-26.

²⁷ See the chapter entitled, *The New Attitude of Labour*.

obedience. That is, its appeal is more to intelligence and common sense, less to abject submission.

Obviously the development of law on this new basis requires jurists who are above the influence of any class. The conventional jurist, who emphasizes legal tradition, will have a bias for propertied classes, which classes determined the development of legal tradition as long as class grievances were inaudible. Judges of this type differ from the rare sympathetic and intellectual type, which distrusts broad general principles and analyses the particular case in the light of social and economic conditions. The decision of such a judge is not merely a compromise between clashing rights and conflicting classes; rather he takes advantage of the conflict presented for adjudication to advance as far as possible the welfare of the whole.²⁸

In the last analysis the problem of the adjustment of class conflicts resolves itself into a political problem, that is, the problem of getting elected or appointed to office law-makers who will be guided by a rational social purpose, and of getting effective endorsement of their action. While law-making will probably continue to be more largely the business of lawyers than of any other class, and while training in the law does tend to make a man deductively-minded and conservative, nevertheless, there are lawyers not thus affected, and these progressive lawyers should become the judges. But the propertied classes ordinarily exercise a predominant influence in determining nomination or appointment to judicial office. The lawyers who have the influential backing for judicial office are those whose dispositions have made them the effective servants of corporations or of party organizations and who, in the course of a career in which it was their business to serve those interests, developed those attitudes that would cause them, as judges, to take the attitude of those interests to juristic problems that would be presented for their decision. Judicial attitudes are essential in determining how a judge will decide a case. The question is, has his attitude been formed in the course of a life-long attempt sympathetically and intellectually to comprehend the lines of social progress; or has it been formed in the course of a life-long attempt to satisfy his rivalrous disposition—to reach a position of superiority in his profession and in his party, to win which his beliefs and behaviour must commend him to the political and propertied interests on which promotion depends. As soon as a way has been found to ad-

²⁸ Williams, *op. cit.*, Chs. XIV-XV.

vance the former instead of the latter type of lawyer in public life, then the way to win superiority will cease to be the service of propertied or party interests, and will become service for the progressive welfare of the whole people.²⁹

²⁹ *Ibid.* Ch. XVI.

CHAPTER XIII

THE RIVALRY OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

THE nucleus of a party organization consists of politicians who make politics their business. They enlist voluntary workers and make use of every social agency possible for the success of the party, but they themselves work primarily for political profits—offices and money. Party organizations in the United States have from the first reflected the motives of business enterprise. In the first century of American development conditions stimulated the profit-seeking attitude to an extreme degree, both in business and in politics. Land and other natural resources were rising in value, railroads and manufactures were developing, speculation was rampant in business, and this affected political behaviour. It gave rise to the spoils system which made political activity an affair of adventure. Any position might lead anywhere, and that quickly; removal was constantly impending; government service was speculative.¹ Just as the business man was impatient with every attempt to restrain his impulse for profits by governmental regulation, so was the politician impatient with every effort to restrain his impulse for the political profits by governmental regulation of the conditions of office-holding and of raising and disbursing campaign contributions. This individualistic profit-seeking attitude in politics has continued strong to the present day.

If the party organization is to make profits, if it is to win offices and large campaign contributions, it must beat the rival party in the struggle for political control. Consequently the essential aim of a party organization is to defeat the opposing organization. The politician studies carefully the trend of public sentiment, the opinions of men of influence and of representatives of economic interests, and policies and platforms are framed that will appeal to men and organizations of influence, that will get the support of newspapers and magazines and, at the same time, will not alienate the financial interests that make the campaign contributions.

¹ Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage*, Chs. IV-V.

The sentiment of the unorganized mass of voters usually is not seriously considered, except as their conservatism is taken into account in the formulation of policies. Until voters have been organized in support of policies that vitally effect their economic interests, their interest in politics is largely a matter of partisanship or of sport. The sporting attitude is widely prevalent. The voter does not want to belong to a party that constantly loses, unless partisanship causes him to adhere to his party, as one who is sectarian adheres to the tenets of a sect that is passing, in defiance of the opposing sect. As long as the masses are largely indifferent to political issues, and politics are a means of indulging the partisan or sporting propensities, it is easy for capitalistic interests cleverly to exploit these impulses of voters—who are elated by large campaign contributions to their party. Owing to this prevailing political behaviour, a third party that is honestly and wisely for the public welfare has great difficulty in making headway against the old parties. It has against it the capitalistic interests which will not contribute to a progressive party, and whose contributions mean so much for political success. It has against it the partisan attitude which inclines voters against a new party, and finally, it has against it the sporting propensities of voters that incline them against a party that has little chance of winning. Because of this situation there has been evolved the plan of a non-partisan political league,² which aims to direct the small but increasing number of voters who stand for public welfare interests in the support of that one of the great parties which promises most for the public welfare.

The purpose of a party to defeat the opposing party furnishes the point of view from which politicians reason as to the desirability of proposed reforms. For them the question is, what will the reform do for the success of our party? For instance, it was argued against the direct primary that it would encourage a contest between candidates for party nominations in which the political career of each candidate would be ransacked and made public, and that this would furnish the candidate of the opposite party, in the campaign for election, with material for his campaign, which would give him an advantage if there had been no similar contest in his own party. It was urged also that a contest of candidates for party nominations might leave in its wake a bitterness between opposing factions which would weaken the party. From the point of view of the exigencies of a party ri-

² Munro, *The Government of American Cities*, 367-373.

valry this, inasmuch as it was true, was a strong argument against the direct primary. But, from the point of view of the public welfare, it was an argument *for* the direct primary. For the object of primary, as well as of election campaigns is to make the public acquainted with the gentlemen who offer themselves for public office. No scrutiny can be too minute if the election of the best men is really the object of the campaign. If a bitterly contested primary campaign brings out facts that make a candidate undesirable as a public official, this is unfortunate for the party but fortunate for the public welfare.

The tendency of any form of group rivalry, as it becomes intense, is to cause ways of doing that have developed out of higher impulses to break down before ruthless impulses. This is the tendency of rivalry between nations, between business enterprises and even between families and it is true also of rivalry between political parties. When this is intense, rival party organizations ruthlessly violate moral standards whenever this is necessary to win an election. "Many a local political manager would not hesitate to say that he has bought votes directly, or, at any rate, furnished the means to buy them. Many political leaders speak freely of political tricks that they have performed in order to secure the success of their party . . . but if you inquire how it is that they as honourable men can do these things, they say: 'Why, these acts are done for our party. We must do them; the other party stands ready to do them; it is a greater harm to the state to have the other party win than for our party to do these things.' "³ In just the same way the cruelties and violations of international law practised by a nation in war are justified on the ground that the welfare of the world requires that that nation win the war; any military practices necessary in order to win are, therefore, justified. It is this motive to win in group rivalry, by any means whatever, that corrupts so many men in politics who had previously been men of integrity, and brutalizes so many men in war. We note the same tendency in the rivalry between business enterprises and between capital and labour. The keener the competition, the stronger the tendency to the immoral and even illegal behaviour that is deemed necessary to win; and the justification offered is that such behaviour is necessary in order to keep from being crushed in the competition.

In their rivalry party organizations appeal to the rivalrous disposition of voters. The aim is to make the party appear the one above

³ Jenks, *Principles of Politics*, 26.

all others whose policies will make for national prosperity. The impulsive pride of the masses in national superiority gives an affective valuation to policies, which prevents the latter being subjected to a critical analysis as to their relation to the public welfare. For instance, just as an impulse for family superiority gives the various means of displaying that superiority a value, while these may have no other value, so the governmental policies dictated by a class interest and championed by the political party of that class may be given an attraction, in the eyes of the masses, by making them appear necessary for national superiority. As merchants take advantage of the impulse for family superiority to sell goods which have no value except to satisfy that impulse, so economic interests use the popular impulse for national superiority for their own profit. A protective tariff is given an aura of satisfyingness by being represented as necessary for the national superiority, though it is dictated by the economic interests of a nation primarily for their own profit, and means an increased cost of living for the masses.

The party organization appeals to the rivalrous disposition of voters, also, by selecting as candidates for high office men whose personalities appeal to that disposition, for instance, a man who is reported by the newspapers to have made a success of some conspicuous undertaking, not necessarily political. Voters are apt to follow uncritically their impressions derived from reading the papers,⁴ and support the candidate who satisfies the impulse to admire the successful man. The result is that candidates strongly supported by so-called intelligent voters, even for nomination for the office of President of the United States, often are men who have a reputation for success as business or professional men, but who are without political experience or the broad intelligence necessary for progressive political leadership. Still less intelligent is the action of the mass of voters. A candidate is apt to win the admiration and support of such voters by the same traits through which a military leader evokes enthusiasm. Consequently candidates for office appeal to these popular impulses. Among those appealed to is the impulse to admire displays of physical superiority and fearlessness, so that candidates display their power of action and endurance by long speech-making trips and by advertising the number of miles they have travelled and the number of speeches made each day, and their fearlessness by speeches in which they aim to convey the impression of direct attack

⁴ Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, I: 99-103.

upon their opponents and of "hitting hard." People expect a candidate to show confidence in his personal power and superiority, and in his success; wherefore candidates frequently express confidence in their election; and the management of each party, the day before the election, gives to the press a mathematically supported forecast of victory.

The members of a party organization, local, state, national, include the men who make politics their business,⁵ not the voters. The rank and file of these politicians are men of mediocre mentality, whose horizon is largely limited to their local and face-to-face relations. The public sentiment the office-holder particularly heeds is the feeling of his home town. He likes to be on good terms with all the "factors" in the community, even with men of influence in the opposite party. His interest in the beliefs of his party and in its state and national leaders is due largely to the fact that they stand for the party—are its shibboleths, as the flag is the shibboleth of the nation. They are the things that his crowd acclaim. His chief interest is in the voters of his locality, in their impulses of liking or dislike with reference to proposed measures. He does not understand the measures and has little interest in them but seeks to acquaint his party leaders with the weight of sentiment in the community. Furthermore, he has personal relations as benefactor with a great number of voters. His vital interest is in the local and face-to-face relations. This makes for efficiency if voters demand it, as they sometimes do in village administration, which is a matter that the citizens can comprehend. They can see how the local tax money is used and can criticize every move made by officials. The latter have their haunts and homes in the village and, being easily accessible and often met, are amenable to personal rebuke or praise.⁶ In matters of local administration that they can understand, voters require efficiency; in state and national politics, their motives are personal or party allegiance.

Politicians find in politics a gamble that stimulates anticipation in even the most mediocre mind. According to the strength of their rivalrous disposition, they seek, primarily, political position and power, and, often, money. This type of leader has little or no genuine public welfare interest, but may accept reforms that will strengthen his party with the people. His essential aim is to elect the party candidates and "keep the organization in power." In some

⁵ Ray, *op. cit.*, Ch. IX.

⁶ Williams, *An American Town*, 179.

cases a party organization falls under the control of a little clique which aims to enrich itself even at the expense of the continuance of the party in power. At the other extreme of political leadership are men of pronounced idealistic tendencies who constitute the publicists of a group, who edit the progressive magazines and keep progressive movements alive by fostering organizations for the furtherance of particular reforms.

Political party organizations are controlled by the rivalrous type of leader because his policies are formulated, not in accordance with certain principles, because he has none, but with a view to maintaining his influence and control. He gathers from his political henchmen everywhere throughout his constituency what is the sentiment with reference to policies and compares notes with other leaders thus informed and they act accordingly. They are able effectively to control the thinking of the members of the organization, including officials, because they control the nomination of candidates for office and the election of these depends on efforts put forth by the organization.⁷ Consequently officials are under an obligation to the party organization for their nomination and election, so that the latter is in a position strongly to influence their political behaviour. For this reason, interests which seek special privileges may get them through enlisting the influence of the party organization. The class control of the government is exercised through the party organizations which profit from the service rendered interests that seek control. There is a bitter rivalry between party organizations to maintain the control which enables them to render this profitable service.⁸ Hence the extreme length to which a party organization carries its hostility to a formidable movement that has developed to break its political control over a state.⁹

The party organizations require their leaders to direct affairs in a way to deliver what their followers are after.¹⁰ The bosses "are

⁷ Ray, *op. cit.*, 434.

⁸ In the words of Mr. Havemeyer, head of the Sugar Refining Company, before a Congressional investigating committee, "wherever there is a dominant party, . . . that is the party that gets the contribution, because that is the party which controls the local matters." (Senate Reports, 53rd Congress, 2nd Sess., X, 655. Quoted by Beard, *Readings in American Government and Politics*, 574.) Where the law forbids corporations making campaign contributions it is practically of no effect because these may be made by individuals connected with corporations.

⁹ Lindsey, *The Beast*; "Farmers' Banks at Fargo Reopened," *Nonpartisan Leader*, Nov. 10, 1919; "North Dakota Leaders Come Back," *Nonpartisan Leader*, Nov. 13, 1919; Gaston, *The Nonpartisan League*, 306-309.

¹⁰ Foulke, *Fighting the Spoilsman*, Chs. III-XIII.

not the monarchs but the servants of their organizations. The members of the organizations, like every one else want power, money and place. That is the reason they are members. They get leaders who will deliver a part at least of what they want. Leaders who do not deliver are quickly decapitated. Still the organization chief must not endanger his ticklish position as housekeeper to that free and easy but irritable millionaire, the public. He must not too obviously sacrifice his patron's tastes and resources even for his own wolfish political children. . . . Hence the function of leadership, of forcing worth-while objectives to the front, which belongs under our theory to these political chiefs, is not performed by them but by irresponsible volunteers through city clubs and kindred organizations. Their discussion and agitation tend to create opinion favourable to some municipal objective which in a highly diluted and meagre form these political caterers may sometimes be cajoled into adopting and offering to the public."¹¹

The reasons why party leadership falls to men of this type are, first, that citizens who are not of the wolfish kind will not come out and do political work in support of unselfish and progressive leaders. Among the reasons why they will not come out is that "political work on top of the day's work is too much for our hard-driven burghers."¹² Another reason is indifference. Except when corruption becomes so open and flagrant as to move the mass of the people, they are inclined to "think the government is pretty good." What they do not see does not disturb them. They are impatient when it is forced on their attention and reluctantly credit stories of corruption. Another reason for the aversion to an active interest in politics is "the idea that politics is degrading and something that no virtuous individual in his right mind will touch. . . . This fallacy of the degradation of politics tends to deter the men who are best qualified for entering political life. The university graduate who has had civic duty preached to him feels that political activity involves no prestige, besides being a bore, and involves contact with persons socially undesirable and uninteresting. He salves his conscience by reminding himself that he votes his convictions and dismisses the subject. The influence which he might exert through party councils and party work is lost as his mere vote means no more than that of the lowest negro. His training in history and government, on which society through the

¹¹ Hunt, Obstacles to Municipal Progress, Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., XI: 77.

¹² Ibid. XI: 77.

colleges has spent much labour and money, serves no purpose but that of sterile individual culture.”¹³

A fourth reason for the control maintained by the selfish organization is fear to oppose it. There are various reasons for this fear. A man fears to protest against “the way things are run,” because the masses do not know how they are run and attribute to him who protests selfish motives. “He had better attend to his own business,” “He wants to get into the limelight,” are some of the ways in which the sneers are phrased. These sneers come not only from members of the organization attacked but also from the mass of indifferent citizens who do not want to be disturbed by the unpleasant thought of bad government, who, in their civic pride and impulse for the superiority of their city, do not want it “defamed.” Or they are moved by partisanship to oppose any criticism of their party organization or officials, as tending to weaken the party. Or they are moved by sectarian motives to oppose any criticism of the party which has come to be the party of their sect in the city.¹⁴ The reformer may be opposed, also, because he is “too straight-laced.” He is very apt to oppose evils which the mass of the people regard with indifference. “The fact is that political conditions in any American city will reflect . . . the standard of conduct of its people. Greed, indifference to wrong, obscenity, ignorance, lack of imagination, and cynicism will be faithfully reflected in the municipal government. Business codes, particularly, control in large measure the conduct of municipal officers. If politics in any city is corrupt, business in that city is also corrupt.”¹⁵ For all these reasons, there is apt to be a strong popular reaction against a reformer, and men who have impulses to be public-spirited fear this possible reaction against them.

Men fear, also, the power of newspapers which are controlled by the political powers or by corporate interests. Those who would lead an independent movement well know that a boss and his organization fear an independent leader in their own party much more than they fear the organization of the opposing party. They can make deals and “bi-partisan” agreements with the machine of the opposing party but not with an independent leader in their own party. Furthermore, the power and prestige of a boss depend entirely on his ability to control the voters and get his candidates elected. It depends on his group

¹³ *Ibid.* XI: 83.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* XI: 84.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* XI: 83.

backing. Personally he may amount to little, but he is mighty as long as he controls the voters. Just as soon, therefore, as there is evidence of the independent leader's getting the support of voters his power begins to wane rapidly and may suddenly collapse as his organization ceases to have confidence in him. Hence his strenuous efforts to crush the independent leader at the start. Nothing is too low or mean for the typical boss to resort to. Through the newspapers he controls, he will insinuate damaging behaviour and opinions with an effectiveness that only a subtle knowledge of human nature and a diabolical cleverness of expression could suggest. The independent leader knows that, however innocent he may be, some of the insinuations and calumnies will stick. He knows that he risks reputation and business or professional position.

If, in spite of all this, he is elected, if the corruption of the forces against him has perchance become so notorious that the voters are moved by an extraordinary impulse for a "house-cleaning" and defeat the organization candidates, then the organization will "lay for him" at the next election. Their newspapers "will falsify and ridicule the policies of the administration and minimize its accomplishments, endeavoring at all times to create in the minds of the people an impression of failure and futility. The enemy's high command will direct the organization rank and file to strive to create the same impression by conversational means wherever they go. Careful intelligent administration will seldom show any quickly obvious or spectacular results, hence these efforts at depreciation are often effective."¹⁶ The personal attacks will continue. If the leader himself is of so exalted a character and of such superhuman endurance that these cannot move him, the effort may be made to injure his wife and other members of his family and so compel him, for the sake of loved ones, to give up. The reason this treatment of progressive leaders by political organizations is not more common is that progressive leaders who fearlessly oppose selfish political organizations are uncommon.

The most powerful of the sinister interests and hence the most feared are the financial interests behind the boss and his organization. Public utility and other corporations find it convenient to do business with political leaders of this type. "Their shareholders are made acquainted with and tend to follow this preference."¹⁷ Profiteering

¹⁶ Ibid. XI: 85.

¹⁷ Ibid. XI: 82.

corporations by making large profits increase the value of their stock. Then, in order to be able to continue to charge the high prices and maintain the inflated values, they must control the government. This control they find it possible to maintain through the boss and his organization. "The friends of unofficial power, therefore, wish to restrain everything tending to hamper and limit the power of the people."¹⁸ Therefore, to the fury with which a boss and his organization aim to crush an independent leader is added the determination of the corporations behind the organization, which must keep it in power in order to keep their ill-gotten gains and continue their predatory policies.¹⁹ They aid and abet the attempt to calumnize the independent leader through the press. They use their influence over educational institutions,²⁰ over the church,²¹ and the various organizations of the city to intimidate and rebuff him. If a leader arises of sufficient courage to brave all these difficulties, he is not apt to find a sufficient body of citizens to furnish the money for newspaper and other political enterprises and to do persistently the political work necessary to elect or re-elect the reform candidates.

The party organization is, therefore, seldom compelled to exert itself to the utmost, wherefore its ultimate motives and means of control are seldom in evidence. On the surface its control is maintained by a benevolent solicitude for the personal welfare of voters. The local divisions of the party organizations keep in close touch with the voters, and the workers know how to appeal to them. The organization of a city boss maintains its control by relieving the poor, getting the children of the voters out of trouble, working up a reputation for compassion through helping the "down-and-outer," and by taking the lead in anything which the popular mind has become strongly set on.²² Thus the members of the organization appear as benefactors and munificent leaders in their various wards—not in their real rôle as the servants of an egoistic organization—and attach the voters to their organization,²³ and win their votes for its candidates no matter who they are.

By these methods the party organization can mislead the masses; but the more intelligent and independent voters are not amenable to

¹⁸ *Ibid.* XI: 82.

¹⁹ Lindsey and O'Higgins, *The Beast*.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 271-272.

²¹ *Ibid.* 273-279.

²² See the description of the activity of a district leader in Beard, *Readings in American Government and Politics*, 579.

²³ Theodore Roosevelt—*An Autobiography*, 164-166.

such control. With them the personality and ideas of the leading candidate on the ticket have great influence. Consequently, the problem for the boss is to find a candidate to "head the ticket" who is a man of influence, a "vote-getter." With such a man at the head of the ticket, he can place after him, as candidates for other offices, non-entities, of whose pliability he is sure. The political organization, therefore, has used a mechanism like the party-column ballot²⁴ which has at the top the name of an influential candidate for high office, and, under this, the names of candidates for legislative and other offices who are selected by the organization with a view to their availability for its purposes. The tendency of voters to vote the "straight ticket" is relied on to elect, along with the leading candidate, the organization candidates whom they do not know and whose names come under his. Through these organization officials, including members of the state legislature and members of Congress, the organization expects to control any possible show of independence on the part of the executive. The organization aims to keep in its control the nomination of candidates for office by maintaining the convention system of nomination,²⁵ and by repressing any movement to establish a system of direct nominations whereby the voters of the party shall choose the candidates for office.²⁶ The party organization also opposes the separation of municipal from state politics, because a municipal machine is a powerful cog in the wheel of the state machine.

The organization of the bosses is thus extended from its centres in the large cities over the states and the nation.²⁷ Officials are not all in equal degree under the domination of these party organizations. Congressmen have tended to be controlled by the organizations of their localities, while the president has less absolutely been the tool of the party organization. The situation is thus described: "The average congressman, . . . is primarily interested in getting local appropriations for his district. . . . If he gets these things, or, to use the current political phrase, 'gets his hands deep enough into the pork barrel,' it makes little difference to his constituents what his vote may be on national questions. He therefore too often uses his

²⁴ Evans, *A History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States*, 36-39.

²⁵ Beard, *Readings in American Government and Politics*, 119-123; Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, II: 551.

²⁶ Merriam, *Primary Elections*; Holcombe, *State Government in the United States*, 184-204.

²⁷ Cleveland, *Organized Democracy*, 443-444; Goodnow, *Politics and Administration*, 169-170.

vote to secure the support of the leaders of Congress for his local measures. A body made up of local representatives whose chief motive is to retrieve as large appropriations as possible for their constituents, can never be genuinely representative of the nation. . . . The President, therefore, has become the only real representative of the whole people, its only hope of controlling the government in its own interests. In consequence, it has come to demand that the President take the lead not only in matters properly pertaining to the executive department of the government, but also in matters of legislation as well.²⁸ "The President, however, has no constitutional way of controlling legislation. . . . Repeated experiments have proved that Congress cares little for the pledges of the party platform or for any kind of preëlection promises. The only way in which the President can carry out his policy is by the leadership of public opinion, to which Congress is somewhat responsive, and the application of the 'big stick.'"²⁹ The "big stick" is simply the President's power to injure a representative by refusing to give him a voice in dispensing the patronage of his constituency. Thus the President's power over the legislature reduces, in the last analysis, largely to his power to enlist the support of legislators by threatening, otherwise, to interfere with their satisfying the dominant interests of their constituencies.

The "locality idea" in American government rests on a tradition that dates back to the beginning of the nation. The tradition is that political advancement, even up to the highest office of the government, is not restricted to certain social classes but is something which any man may aspire to. If a man will do what is required of him by his party organization, then his advancement depends largely on his personal qualities. Hence the keen rivalry for political office, and the loyalty of officials to the organization on which their advancement depends. Hence the rivalry of Congressmen for appropriations for their district. This rivalry of legislators, state and national, together with the traditional rivalry between the different departments of government, interferes with governmental efficiency, for instance, in the financial branch of administration.³⁰ During the long fight for a system of responsible budgetary procedure, Congressmen urged various justifications for their opposition but these were merely secon-

²⁸ Reed, *Form and Functions of American Government*, 248-249. See also Cleveland and Shafer, *Democracy in Reconstruction*, 424-436.

²⁹ Reed, *op. cit.*, 252.

³⁰ Plehn, *Government Finance in the United States*, 96-100.

dary explanations for their impulse to maintain their superiority over the President.³¹ Thus were public welfare interests sacrificed to the rivalry of egoistic party organizations.

The exigencies of the rivalry of party organizations sometimes require the nomination of a man who stands for public welfare interests. But this is done not because of what the candidate stands for but because it is "good politics." For instance, he is nominated by a party organization which has long been out of power, in a last desperate effort to gain public confidence and "get back to power"; or by an organization which is about to lose power because its class bias and corruption have made it notorious. Once in office, he may act with such conspicuous and disinterested independence as to gain an immense prestige, so that the organization dare not refuse him a renomination lest it lose control. These occasional interferences with the smooth running of its control, the party organization has to make the best of.

It sometimes happens that, rather than elect a candidate who will be difficult to manage and who may reveal the corruption of the organization or arouse public suspicion as to its sincerity, the organization will help elect the candidate of the rival party organization who can be safely controlled by that organization. Another form of co-operation between rival party organizations is the so-called "bipartisan agreement" in directing legislation. Legislators of the minority party will be instructed by their organization to vote with the legislators of the majority party, who also work under orders from their organization. Thus the reactionary legislators of both parties combine to defeat the progressive legislators. Economic interests which can exert a decisive influence over both party organizations are quite apt, therefore, to get the governmental privileges they seek.

This rivalry of egoistic party organizations is the conspicuous process in politics.³² Leaders who stand for public welfare interests have little chance of winning political power. Such men are rarely

³¹ Willoughby, *Budgetary Procedure in its Relation to Representative Government*, *Yale Law Journal*, XXVII: 752.

³² The play of egoistic motives in American politics is by no means limited to the era of the great party organization. These motives are seen in American politics from the time of the early New England town meeting. See the Works of John Adams, edited by Charles Francis Adams, II: 144-188. Extracts from this passage are quoted in Hart, *American History Told by Contemporaries*, II: 220-223. The same motives, leading to the exertion of influence over officials by the giving of presents and the paying of money, far more openly than is practised today, obtained in England from the very beginning of town life. See Green, *Town Life in the Fifteenth Century*, I: 212.

nominated for political office.³³ Even though the reform advocated by such a leader ultimately becomes a popular demand, his long course of opposition to the party organization makes him an "unavailable" candidate, and the reform is taken up by a party leader who can be trusted to make it as innocuous for the organization as the situation permits. No fact is more conspicuous in the history of American politics than that the agitator, the bold champion of reform, the absolutely essential figure in social progress, is not a popular figure. The abolitionists were contemned even in the most morally-in-earnest centres. "The followers of Garrison and Phillips were few; society looked upon them as dangerous fanatics and the very name of *abolitionist* was covered with an opprobrium which clung to it long after the course of political events had justified their moral convictions."³⁴ The term socialist is destined to be one of similar opprobrium, because of the contemned non-propertied classes whose uplift is involved in the movement, and because the movement, as in the case of the American slaves, calls for an extensive modification of property rights. These reforms that are advocated by a party contemned for its radicalism are gradually taken up, when they become popular demands, by the other parties.

In this great conflict between an egoistic and an altruistic political leadership, the stronghold of the former is the ignorance of the masses—so that they are easily controlled—, and the fear of those who might enlighten the masses. Nevertheless, the only hope for social progress lies in enlightenment.³⁵ Candidates for office are not intelligently chosen because the people lack the intelligence to choose. Projected ballot reform and reforms in nominating systems may give the leader who stands for public welfare interests a somewhat better opportunity of gaining political control; but the essential requisite for a steadily progressive political control is an increase of public intelligence, which requires education for citizenship.³⁶

³³ These leaders organize private political organizations that agitate for particular reforms and thus stir a public sentiment that the boss may be compelled to consider. (Beard, *American City Government*, Ch. III.)

³⁴ Trowbridge, *My Own Story*, 215.

³⁵ Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, 153.

³⁶ Lippman, *Public Opinion*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CONFLICT OF ATTITUDES AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS

THE conflict of interests in political relations centres in the conflict of different types of leaders. Politicians of a rivalrous disposition seek governmental position to satisfy their impulse for superiority, and for the sake of political advancement accept the attitudes of the classes that control the government. Those attitudes thus infiltrate through the leadership of political party organizations, just as do the attitudes of the directors of a corporation through the management. From this reactionary type of politician the progressive is distinguished by the fact that he works, primarily, not for propertied interests and their political representatives but for the public welfare. The progressive leader has a pronounced sympathetic disposition, which inclines him to certain reforms. He has compassion for those suffering hardships but who are without the will to resist or the means of resistance. He sympathizes with the aspirations of a rising class struggling for equality of opportunity against a long dominant class. These altruistic impulses, if strongly felt, bring a leader into conflict with those whose sympathies are limited by their family and class attitudes.¹ The altruistic impulses make for democracy,² the egoistic impulses for the perpetuation of the control of reactionary propertied interests.

Throughout the course of history, there have been political leaders moved by altruistic motives, who opposed the controlling interests but who failed to win popular support because the masses had long been habituated to industrial and political and ecclesiastical domination. The first ruler of this kind in history was Ikhnaton, Pharaoh of Egypt in 1378-1375 B. C. He temporarily revolutionized the religion of the empire and made the desire for justice one of the

¹ Dickson, Some Twentieth Century Problems, in a report of the Amer. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sc. entitled, Modern Manufacturing, 1919, 13.

² Perry, What Do We Mean by Democracy? Intern. Jour. Ethics, July, 1918, 452-460.

attributes of the god of the new religion.³ Yet he did not have sufficient support to make his reforms permanent. The traditional political and ecclesiastical organization was reinstated on the death of Ikhnaton.⁴ In the same way the Hebrew prophets⁵ and Jesus called for justice on behalf of the masses,⁶ but, though their teaching has lived, their vision has not been realized. The ancient condition of habituation to class control has prevented the masses sharing the vision of progress of idealistic leaders and supporting political movements therefor. The working masses are still creatures of habit except under the pressure of extraordinary hardship. The stimulus of prosperity is apt to cause discontent, but the distress of adversity alone is adequate to stir a menacing resistance of upper class control.

The distinction between the reactionary and the progressive types of leadership may be illustrated by comparing the careers of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas. Lincoln had a strong sympathetic disposition while Douglas was dominating. Of Douglas' personality, Wilson writes: "His short and massive figure, his square head, steady, deep-set eyes, and mouth cut straight and firm, in lines unsensitive and full of will, bespoke him the man he was: a man to make and have his way, fearless, sincere, compact of force; commanding others, but not to be commanded himself; coarse-fibred, daring, ready-witted, loud, and yet prepossessing withal, winning friends and receiving homage."⁷ Lincoln, was equally forceful when his sympathies were aroused. Sympathy, not rivalry, was his essential disposition. His opposition to slavery was due to his compassion for the slave, of which he was strongly conscious from the time of a visit to New Orleans at the age of twenty-two.⁸ One of his friends and supporters, Karl Schurz, wrote: "It is certainly true that he could not witness any individual distress or oppression, or any kind of suffering, without feeling a pang of pain himself, and that

³ Breasted, *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, 339.

⁴ Breasted, *A History of Egypt*, Chs. XIX-XX.

⁵ In the Hebrew state the essential process was the struggle of the people, under the leadership of the prophets, against king, priesthood and aristocracy. In their rivalry for social control each claimed Yahweh was on their side and read into his nature the traits that would serve their purpose. The prophets claimed he was a God who cared for social righteousness rather than for mere ritualistic worship, while the priests maintained he most wanted a fearful submission and a conventional adherence to the letter of ritualistic requirements. (Kallen, *The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy*, 47-53.)

⁶ Kent, *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*, Pts. I-III.

⁷ Wilson, *A History of the American People*, IV: 165-166.

⁸ Hapgood, *Abraham Lincoln*, 25.

by relieving as much as he could the suffering of others he put an end to his own. This compassionate impulse to help he felt not only for human beings, but for every living creature. As in his boyhood he angrily reproved the boys who tormented a wood turtle by putting a burning coal on its back, so, we are told, he would, when a mature man, on a journey, dismount from his buggy and wade waist-deep in mire to rescue a pig struggling in a swamp. As the boy was moved by the aspect of the tortured wood turtle to compose an essay against cruelty to animals in general, so the aspect of other cases of suffering and wrong wrought up his moral nature, and set his mind to work against cruelty, injustice and oppression in general.⁹ Lincoln never gave much serious thought and study to political issues like "the tariff, internal improvements, banks and so on," because, "His soul had evidently never been deeply stirred by such topics. But when his moral nature was aroused his brain developed an untiring activity until it had mastered all the knowledge within reach. As soon as the repeal of the Missouri Compromise had thrust the slavery question into politics as the paramount issue, Lincoln plunged into an arduous study of all its legal, historical, and moral aspects, and then his mind became a complete arsenal of argument."¹⁰ His political philosophy was, therefore, in a fundamental sense, a system of ideas that satisfied his sympathy for, and resistance on behalf of the negro. He himself understood the dispositional source of his opposition to slavery, as well as the dispositional cause of the support of that institution by Mr. Douglas. Thus he said of Douglas: "I suppose the institution of slavery really looks small to him. He is so put up by nature that a lash upon his back would hurt him. But a lash upon anybody else's back does not hurt him."¹¹ Douglas' crocodile argument shows his dispositional impulse toward the Negro to have been contempt rather than compassion. Paraphrased by Lincoln, this argument was as follows: "As the negro is to the white man, so is the crocodile to the negro: and as the negro may rightfully treat the crocodile as a beast or a reptile, so the white man may rightfully treat the negro as a beast or a reptile."¹²

In the South, the contempt for the Negro, the impulse to use him in acquisition of wealth, the fear of what would happen if he were free, and the resentment against those who would interfere with the

⁹ Schurz, *Abraham Lincoln*, 32-33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 26.

¹¹ Hapgood, *op. cit.*, 148.

¹² Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, V: 205.

institution were essential in the attitude to the slavery question. This attitude prompted secondary explanations in justification of slavery. In the North compassion for the slave and indignation against his owner were widespread and prompted arguments against slavery. Contrary attitudes thus represented opposing impulses, and gave rise to conflicting explanations. The attitudes were irreconcilable, hence the irrepressible conflict. This was explicitly stated by Lincoln in his great Cooper Union speech: "Holding as they do, that slavery is morally right and socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition of it as a legal right and a social blessing.

"Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground save our conviction that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality—its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension. All they ask we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as readily grant, if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and our thinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full recognition as being right; but thinking it wrong, as we do, can we yield to them? . . . If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty fearlessly and effectively."¹⁸

A leader who reflects on the essential causes of a difference of opinion in a controversy does not, for several reasons, attempt a thorough-going analysis of these causes. One reason is that attitudes are largely subconscious and their position as essential causes could not be convincingly shown; another, that to acknowledge a sympathetic attitude as an essential motive has no effect on those who have no compassion, except to stir derision for the man who thus "advertises his morality." The method used by political leaders is, therefore, not to analyse their motives and the motives of their opponents, except casually, as Lincoln did, but to stir in voters impulses that serve the end in view and thus to contest with the opposition for social control. For instance, the movement on behalf of low-paid labour is strengthened by appealing to the impulse for national superiority and showing how national superiority requires an improvement in the condition of low-paid labour. Thus the public is stirred to support measures on behalf of low-paid labour more strongly than from mere

¹⁸ Nicolay and Hay, op. cit., V: 326, 327.

sympathy for low-paid labour. Thus, those who have sympathy may be stimulated to act with those who have contempt for low-paid labour by stirring an impulse common to both—the impulse for national superiority.

Light may be thrown on problems of causation in history by a comparison of differences of opinion of national leaders with differences in their characteristic attitudes. For instance, a good deal of the early history of the United States centres around the rivalry between John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson. Natives of the same state, eminent students of the same political problems, and leaders in the same great crisis in the development of our political institutions, their radically different attitudes and ideas cannot be explained without understanding the differences in their characters. While the characters of the two men cannot be delineated in any great detail, certain traits stand out clearly: particularly, the self-confident, dominating, aggressive attitude of John Marshall,¹⁴ his habitual delight in the attention of men of influence,¹⁵ his impulsive espousal of the interests of this class, and his vigorous, logical support of a strong, central government; as contrasted with the more sympathetic, imaginative, persuasive character of Jefferson,¹⁶ his interest in the welfare of the working masses, particularly of the agrarian class, and his resentment of assumptions of political authority on the part of the larger capitalistic interests.¹⁷

The individual seems to select subconsciously certain attitudes of the group, because these are more congenial than others to his disposition; then the attitudes selected determine the association of ideas and develop the character along the lines of those attitudes. For instance, a man of strong sympathetic and intellectual dispositions chooses teaching as a vocation, which, in turn, fosters those dispositions. As a result of profound thinking, the way of political progress becomes clear to him, and he becomes a pronounced progressive in politics. He deals with the minds of the young whose original nature is plastic and whose thinking is not impeded by strong prejudices, and this confirms his progressive attitude. On the other hand, a man of strong rivalrous disposition may choose the legal profession, and his disposition and mental trend are confirmed by the practice of law, in which the rivalry of opposing counsel is the essential process, and in

¹⁴ Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, II: 168-169.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* II: 216.

¹⁶ Morse, *Thomas Jefferson*, 191, 291.

¹⁷ Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, 417, 437.

which success depends on dealing with adult human nature in its more obvious aspects,—a complex of family, sectarian, class, political, and national attitudes and prejudices which show comparatively little tendency to change. Furthermore, his professional activity consists of construing social relations in legal formulations, and he is more interested in the legally fixed than in the impulsively plastic aspect of social relations. The significant aspects of popular movements are, to him, those that take legally possible lines. His main interest does not lie in stirring or organizing public opinion for progress, but in giving the predominant and controlling opinion legal expression. This is not the inevitable effect of the practice of law, as we shall see, but the tendency is in that direction. Men of opposite dispositions will, therefore, select different group memberships and will be subject to different social attitudes as premises of reasoning and reach opposite conclusions; this process will confirm the development of their characters in opposite directions and make their personal differences inevitable and irreconcilable. Political leaders, thus antagonistic, rarely reflect on the essential causes of their differences.

The dispositional impulses of political leaders determine their selection of the social attitudes that determine the premises of their thinking and, therefore, the development of their political policies. This is true not only of national, but also of international policies. A ruler of a pronounced dominating disposition will incline to an imperialistic international policy, even if the traditional policy of the government has been otherwise; his inclination will be strengthened if it is in line with the traditional governmental policy, or if the nation is so situated as to require conquest of territory to reach or maintain a position of superiority. A leader in whom intellect serves a rivalrous disposition will put his nation first but will disavow any imperialistic ambition. A leader of sympathetic and intellectual disposition will have a tendency to appreciate the needs and aspirations of other nations as well as his own and will place above ambition for national superiority an idealistic conception of the welfare of humanity.

We have to accept as fundamental, therefore, the fact of opposite types of leadership and to enquire what are the social-psychological conditions that have to be met in order to advance the progressive type in public life. How is it that we have so few progressive leaders in public life? One of the reasons given in the preceding chapter was the ignorance of voters, so that they do not support progressive leaders. Ignorance is not a merely negative condition. It means that

voters have attitudes and prejudices which incline them against the new ideas of the progressive leader. For instance, the rank and file of workmen, long used to industrial domination, have the attitude of submission likewise in political relations, and do not have confidence in the capacity of the progressive leader to "make good" and "put it over" his rivals. The voters argue, "Even if he was elected (to the legislature), what could one do among so many?" They, therefore, acquiesce in the rule of the boss and his organization, and, since the voters are indifferent to the appeals of progressive leaders, the reactionary leaders are able to prevent social progress.¹⁸ The revelation of the connection of the boss with the financial interests gave a popular impetus to the movement against the boss in this country. But this movement was due largely to the suggestive power of certain fearless leaders, whose leadership was slowly accepted by the fearful masses. There is much talk among workmen of repressive political conditions much inveighing against "the politician"; but when they are told of the powers behind the politician, the support given him by powerful financial interests, they are apt to say no more. The really controlling agencies are then before them, and they have felt the power of these forces from the time they began life as workmen. The employer is to the workingman the one who controls the jobs and it is natural that they should feel more secure in voting for the party of these employers than for a "progressive" party that might make jobs more "uncertain." Anxiety for a chance to work or for a better chance, gratitude for a job or a better job, and a feeling that the party of employers is the solid, substantial party, are feelings that ordinarily determine the political attitude of the great mass of workmen.

Industrial subservience inevitably invites exploitation, and organized labour makes "political demands" to remedy these abuses. But organized labour has not yet played any responsible part in politics. Far-sighted employers have discerned the psychological fact that, if workmen are to have a "responsible" political attitude this attitude must be developed by fostering a responsible industrial attitude.¹⁹

The subservient industrial and political attitude satisfies reactionary propertied interests and is, therefore, apt to be perpetuated as long as the alliance between those interests and party organizations con-

¹⁸ Merriam, *Outlook for Social Politics in the United States*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., March, 1913, 678.

¹⁹ For instance, see Filene, *The Shop Committee*, *Current Affairs*, Mar. 17, 1919, 6.

tinues. As indicated in the preceding chapter, this alliance is due to the mutual service rendered. It is due also to congeniality between the dominating figures in party organizations and the dominating figures in business. A political boss inclines to the service of corporate interests not only for the money he gets out of it but also because successful corporation officials are the kind of men who impress a political boss. They are masterful like himself and he feels they are the men who ought to have whatever privileges a government has to give. Conversely, the successful political boss in a large city, who maintains his position through a period of years, is a man of administrative ability, whom business men respect for his ability and his masterful qualities, though they may dislike some of his methods. This mutual respect is justified by secondary explanations. It is maintained that the men who have risen to industrial domination, or to political domination, have risen through their own power, and have a right to use their position in their own interest. The political boss reasons that men who have risen to positions of power in the industrial and financial world are bound to dominate simply because they are masterful and influential and can overcome resistance. Therefore a political leader would be a fool to pay any attention to idealists who oppose the political influence or economic behaviour of these men of power. Whenever a champion of public welfare interests arises and begins to acquire a formidable influence, it is felt that his power inheres in his personality or in some extraordinary conditions which cannot last, while the dominance of the great corporation continues on, whoever among them may drop out. As this political situation becomes more clear to the masses, the essential political fact is seen to be submission to the economic classes of the state that wield the political power; at the same time there is more and more of a tendency to sneer at politicians and office-holders as the beneficiaries and servants of the ruling propertied classes. The old-time conventional political obedience thus becomes less and less prevalent and there develop industrial and agricultural organizations whose purpose is to dispute the political control of the capitalistic classes. This psychological situation of the voting masses is fertile ground for the influence of progressive leadership.

Economic conditions are developing in a direction that will inevitably challenge the interest of the masses in political affairs. Are we developing leaders who will be capable of a progressive political leadership? This requires, primarily, a training of the intellectual

attitudes. These attitudes are straightforwardness, openmindedness, singlemindedness, and fidelity to conviction.²⁰ By straightforwardness is meant going straight at a problem, selecting quickly the relevant aspects for analysis, and unerringly following those lines of thought without being diverted by irrelevant details or social distractions. By openmindedness is meant a frank intent on all facts that may bear on the problem, a willingness to learn from all, high and low, a resourceful and constructive imagination. By singlemindedness is meant intellectual integrity, which is possible only by subordinating other dispositions to the intellect. If the intellect serves rivalry, then that is taken for true which satisfies the impulse for superiority. If the intellect serves the dominating disposition then that is taken for true which serves the dominating disposition. If the intellect serves the impulse for approval, praise, popularity then that is taken for true which makes a man popular. Only as the intellect is not subservient to other dispositions is that taken for truth, true only because it satisfies the impulse for truth.

By fidelity to conviction is meant willingness to take the responsibility for one's opinions. This requires an intellectual thoroughness that leaves no doubt in the mind as to the truth of an opinion. Opinion then becomes a rational conviction and an individual obligation, the significance of which for the behaviour and fortunes of the individual is thought out and accepted, with the determination to act according to the conviction and take the consequences. A man in whom this rational action has become habitual is characterized by fidelity to conviction. This characteristic came out again and again in the behaviour and addresses of Abraham Lincoln, for instance, in his address at the flag-raising at Independence Hall, Philadelphia: "I have said nothing but what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the pleasure of Almighty God, to die by."²¹ Fidelity to conviction means, then, not merely a verbal assent but thinking a problem through to conviction and then thinking it through to action,—to the action to which one is logically and practically committed by the conviction. Fidelity to conviction requires, therefore, not merely intellectual capacity and knowledge but a power of action that may involve a wide range of dispositions in the service of the conviction. A man may have to rival for social control those who stand for untruth, may have to dominate those who stand for untruth, may at

²⁰ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 204-210.

²¹ Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, VI: 158.

times have to tactfully avoid unpopularity, but none of this action ever at the sacrifice of the truth.

In addition to this development of the intellectual disposition, or rather in the course of its development and as a prerequisite for its full development, the individual must achieve a certain organization of the other dispositions. This organization involves the banishment of fear and the power to induce at will the expansive or sympathetic disposition. The highest efficiency is best insured by preserving throughout the day an underlying expansive goodwill. This interaction of dispositions will be further explained in a future volume, but its application to politics is this: Politics is the great American game, and, therefore, should be *played*. While the political fights between the great party organizations are desperately in earnest, due to the fact that the rival politicians and the economic interests behind them have much at stake, the progressive leader has nothing at stake and can play the game as it ought to be played, in a disinterested spirit. This does not mean that he lacks convictions but that his convictions are disinterested. It means also that while he has convictions he does not regard these as absolute and eternal truths. Back of fidelity to conviction remains the openmindedness. As Justice Holmes says: "Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things that were not so."²² And again, men "may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . ."²³ The well-trained citizen has this love of free discussion, this reliance on unhampered political appeal. He stands above all for entire freedom of thought and speech. He stands, also, for experimentation in legislation. He would like to see many reforms tried out. Whatever their outcome, he knows he can take care of himself. His main interest is not in preserving his property rights intact, but in social experimentation, in progress. Until the political game comes to be played with this friendly, intellectual attitude, the possibilities of a democratic government and social progress will never begin to be realized.

Leaders must have also that comprehensive knowledge and sagacity that will enable them to lead men of diverse interests to reasonable conclusions. Many men who are unusually keen in the direction of

²² Holmes, *Natural Law*, *Harvard Law Review*, XXXII: 40.

²³ *Abrams v. U. S.*, *U. S. Supr. Ct. Reporter*, Vol. 250, p. 22.

their own economic interests often are as ignorant in other lines as men who lack keenness in their own line; wherefore, in politics, which is nobody's line except the politicians', everybody is more or less ignorant. For this reason and because so many men are keen in their own economic lines there is a conflict of interests. Hence the difficulty of leading diverse interests to reasonable conclusions. The situation requires a progressive leadership not only among holders of public office but also of the organized industrial, agricultural, commercial and other economic interests that seek to influence the government.

The preparation the leader must have is, then, a discipline in the intellectual attitudes and in disinterestedness, and a training for a comprehensive grasp of political problems. And this training must also reach a considerable body of citizens if he is to have the necessary support. Citizens often are well-meaning but utterly inefficient in the exercise of their citizenship. The impulse of the untrained citizen is to seek governmental action and avoid individual initiative and responsibility in any public welfare project. Men may have initiative enough and may readily assume responsibility in their private business. But they are timid when acting on behalf of the public welfare and seek to instigate the government to accomplish for them what requires individual initiative. Hence the tendency to assume that the government will enforce the law against an evil, or is enforcing it, and to be satisfied with merely getting a law passed or with the consciousness that one has been passed against the evil. Therefore the lack of individual initiative in prosecution of public welfare interests causes an over-emphasis on the sovereignty of the state as a mere obedience-compelling power. The idea that law enforces itself assumes a servile attitude to law, and also to those in authority, which tends to cause them unduly to feel their authority, and to be repressive in the exercise of it, for instance in a zeal for repression of free speech and assemblage.²⁴

The lack of this initiative also enables self-seeking politicians to interfere with the functioning of experts, even where they are most vitally needed. For instance, in food inspection the experts see indolent and ignorant politicians occupying the higher salaried positions while they who have acquired expert knowledge are over-worked and underpaid. They feel, "If the public allows this state of things why should I care for the public welfare?" and this tends to make them indifferent and inefficient in the performance of their duties

²⁴ Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, 281-282.

and, in some cases, willing to ignore harmful adulterations and to pass diseased food in return for pay from private interests or the favour of politicians who are financially interested. One of the chief menaces to high-grade professional work is the effect on professional men employed by the government of control of government by profit-seeking politicians.

The lack of initiative on behalf of public welfare interests has been encouraged by the emphasis that is often laid on the complexity of government and the need of leaving it to expert administration. "Municipal reformers have been dinning into our ears the doctrine that municipal administration in all its branches is so highly technical a matter that we should intrust it always to experts and leave them alone. What does the citizen know about street paving, sewage disposal or fire prevention? What can he expect to know about these technical matters? Let him accordingly refrain from asserting his own opinions, which arise from ignorance, and let him take on faith the opinions of those who are qualified by education or experience to render them. Even men of broad information in many other fields, successful business and professional men, are inclined to talk as if a professed confidence in the expert quite justified a complacent ignorance as respects both principles and methods of public administration."²⁵ The objection to this attitude is that it assumes that the employment of experts in administration obviates the need of educating the electorate to a proper comprehension of its administrative affairs. On the contrary, unless the electorate is educated and alert, the experts cannot function, for the politicians and commercial interests whose profit seeking is contrary to the public welfare will get control of the situation and restrain, corrupt and use the experts for their own advantage. And the men who seek the expert jobs will be those who are by nature most pliable and mercenary.

Under the rivalry of egoistic party organizations efficiency has not been required of officials. Efficiency has been sacrificed to partisanship. The voters have been indifferent or partisan and have acquiesced in the use of offices as party spoils. Voters exult in a victory over a rival party and applaud their leaders in making the most of the victory, for the future of the party and not for the efficiency of the government. If voters are intelligently to hold government officials responsible, they must have a correct conception of efficiency. For

²⁵ Munro, *Principles of Municipal Administration*, 6.

many voters the word efficiency has gained a disagreeable connotation from its use in connection with the management of business for private profit. Efficiency, essentially, has nothing to do with profit seeking and is not necessarily a business term. The lone farmer is inefficient if he lacks ability to plan and co-ordinate his work in a way to achieve the greatest result with the least effort. A business corporation is inefficient unless all departments, and the workmen and management in each department, so co-operate as to achieve a maximum result with least effort. A government is likewise inefficient unless its work is so co-ordinated as to achieve a maximum result with least effort. Most governmental work is purely administrative and should be taken out of politics because the currents of political rivalry prevent its being done efficiently.²⁶ Efficiency requires the employment of expert knowledge in connection with legislative,²⁷ judicial²⁸ and executive work. Government officials should regard themselves as elected not to represent their class or party but to do business efficiently for the whole people. But the people themselves must first cease to acquiesce in a party rivalry which results in officials being the creatures of egoistic party organizations. The voters must rise above partisanship through grasping a rational conception of efficiency and realizing the necessity of expert knowledge. But this requires education. "Is it fair to ask millions of democrats to have a profound respect for scientific accomplishments whose possession is denied them by the prevailing social and educational organization? It can hardly be claimed that the greater proportion of the millions who are insufficiently educated are not just as capable of being better educated as the thousands to whom science comes to have a real meaning. Society has merely deprived them of the opportunity. . . . The best way to popularize scientific administration, and to enable the democracy to consider highly educated officials as representative, is to popularize the higher education. An expert administration cannot be sufficiently representative until it comes to represent a better educated constituency."²⁹

²⁶ Beard, *A Government Employment Policy*, *Good Government*, XXXVI: 15.

²⁷ McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea*, 214-225.

²⁸ Pound, *Legislation as a Social Function*, *Pub. Amer. Social. Soc.*, VII: 160-161.

²⁹ Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, 376-377.

BOOK IV

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER XV

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL AND THE BUSINESS ATTITUDES

A PROFESSION is distinguished from business by the fact that it requires technical knowledge that can be acquired only by extended study by persons who have an aptitude therefor. A vocation is denied professional recognition if it does not require this knowledge and training, or if its members as a class get along without it, though it is necessary for the highest efficiency, as in social work.¹ A distinct body of knowledge must be mastered in order to practice successfully a real profession. Wherefore the professional man is apt to be of a more pronounced intellectual disposition and capable of a keener interest in problems for their own sake than the business man, who, lacking the purely intellectual interest, is more apt to be moved by the profit-seeking motive. This distinction does not hold in all cases. There are business men who make business a profession in the sense of finding their main interest in its problems instead of its profits, and there are professional men who lack capacity for a keen interest in problems and are mainly moved by the impulse to make money. But the fact remains that a vocation that requires a good deal of technical knowledge is apt to select the more intellectual type of man. The technical knowledge may be acquired by men of good memory, who have little capacity to apply it, and little of the problem interest; but the distinctly professional man is one who glories in his command of the exact knowledge of his profession as that which guides him unerringly in the solution of problems.

All professions have, to be sure, in addition to the purely intellectual interest, other motives: the doctor, his impulse to save life, the lawyer, his impulse to secure for his client legal justice. The intellectual interest is distinct from these other motives. It rests on the possession of exact knowledge. Often there is a pride in this exact knowledge, which is contrary to the intellectual motive. For instance, natural scientists sometimes ridicule the knowledge of the

¹ Bogardus, *Methods of Training Social Workers*, 5.

social scientist as inexact, and, for that reason, take no interest in social science and, in their opinions on economic and political problems that face all men, show as entire a lack of intelligence as uneducated men. Pride in the possession of a restricted specialized knowledge limits the intellectual interest of the professional man to his own little field and hampers the exercise of the intellect in other directions. The distinction between the intellectual interest of the professional and the business man must not, therefore, be carried too far. The interest of the former is apt to be very restricted.

The professional man enjoys greater advantages than the business man so far as the free use of the intellect is concerned. He has greater freedom, for he requires little capital. His chief assets are his professional education and his own ability, whereas the business man is dependent on financial institutions for loans, and on a variety of business connections.² Furthermore, the professional man works largely by himself or has his own distinct problems, even when a member of a large organization, while the business man's function is less distinct and often the records fail to distinguish his performance from that of others. Consequently there is less incentive to creative activity in business than in the professions. In the absence of the independence conferred by technical ability, and of the incentive to creative work that comes from opportunity for distinct performance, employés in business are more apt than professional men to find their main interest in pull, promotion and pay. Here again the distinction is not invariably true for, where independence and distinct performance is possible in business, positions are apt to be won by men who can make wise use of independence and are capable of distinction in performance. But, on the whole, the employé in business is less free and independent and less capable of independent creative work than the professional man.

Professional men consider themselves to be distinguished from business men by their greater freedom, by their primary interest in problems and their comparatively disinterested attitude, by their possession of specialized knowledge—which has not until recently been thought necessary for business, and which is not now generally thought necessary,—and by a high sense of moral obligation.³ The high class lawyer does not plead a cause according to the pay he expects nor does a high class physician treat a case according to pay. While he works

² Gerstenberg, *Principles of Business*, Chs. VI-X.

³ Carnegie, *Empire of Business*, 159.

for pay the professional man does not work according to the pay, but has "but one grade of work, namely, his best."⁴ This distinction between business and professional behaviour may, however, be overdrawn by the professional man. Many men go into the professions as they go into business, to make money. Nevertheless, this professional pride is, to a certain extent, justified. The product of the professional man is a mental product, not a physical thing. We do not speak of taking up the practice of business as we do of taking up the practice of a profession. This is because the profession involves the putting into practice of more technical knowledge than business. To be sure, business management is coming more and more to require technical knowledge, which, however, is less easily acquired in a school than professional knowledge because of the diversity of business conditions. The essential difference between business and the professions is that, while in both vocations the aim is to make money, professional men sell a mental product which they identify with themselves, while the product of the business man is less identified with himself as evidence of his knowledge and skill. In many cases, to be sure, the old pride in workmanship continues to animate firms whose essential aim is to make goods of distinctive quality, but in many more cases there is little hesitancy in cheapening the product for profit if it can be done without detection. The great corporation has not the pride in its products that a lawyer or doctor has in his skill. This is due to the fact that the product of the professional man is a product of himself, an evidence of his ability or lack of ability. His prestige requires that his product be a high class product. This is the more true because his relations with his clients or patients are personal relations. They know when he fails while the producer of material things is no longer invariably liable to the praise or blame of those who use his products. For the same reason the professional man is less free to profiteer. The personal nature of the service rendered by professional men interferes with an inclination to profiteer, except in the case of wealthy patients, or clients, while business interests can unite and profiteer with impunity on all alike.

Because professional men are dependent on their own knowledge and skill rather than on an employer they are more independent than the member of a business organization. The freedom of professional men imposes obligations on them individually that do not rest on one

⁴ Ross, *The Making of the Professions*, *Inter. Jour. Ethics*, XXVII: 69.

employed in business, where responsibility rests on the officials of the organization. Because of the freedom enjoyed by professional men, the professions have felt the necessity of controlling socially inexpedient behaviour of their members; and the national professional associations have set forth standards of high class practice in their constitutions and by-laws and in codes of professional ethics.⁵

The public is dependent, for the efficient service of professional men, on their sense of ethical obligation. For patrons cannot judge of the worth of professional services, as they can of those of the plumber or painter, because a professional service involves the use of highly technical knowledge. "The patient cannot pronounce upon his doctor's treatment. The client cannot test the value of the advice his counsel gives or know whether his cause is properly presented. The student cannot plumb his teacher's learning, the reader gauge the editor's disinterestedness, nor the creditor verify the audit of the public accountant. One will hesitate to commit one's dearest interests to such men unless one has ground for believing them to be worthy of trust. There is need, therefore, that callings of this confidential character be restricted to men of honour acting with reference to a high standard."⁶

Another reason why a high standard of professional ethics is imperative is that professional behaviour cannot be so carefully regulated as business can. The government can make it illegal to practise a profession except under certain conditions and it can forbid certain behaviour of lawyers and doctors, but it cannot correct bad professional behaviour as it stops bad business, for instance, the adulteration and misbranding of foods. Professional services can be adulterated with impunity unless there is a vital sense of ethical obligation. In this connection the behaviour of the professional man has points of resemblance with that of skilled and unskilled labour. As the work of the labourer may be indifferent or deliberately inefficient, so may that of the professional man. Physicians may be indifferent in diagnosing diseases among the poor, as workmen "soldier" or "stall" on a job in which they are not interested; teachers may

⁵ American Bar Association, Constitution and By-Laws, 1915-1916; American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics; American Medical Association, Constitution and By-Laws, 1916; American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, 1915; National Dental Association, Constitution, By-Laws, Code of Ethics, 1913; American Institute of Architects, The Canons of Ethics, The Annual, 1916, 46; Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, Dec., 1915.

⁶ Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 472.

deliberately make mental reservations, as workmen deliberately injure goods, though the teacher does it from fear of, instead of resentment toward employers, as in the case of workmen's sabotage. Professional men and business men indulge in behaviour which, among workmen, is termed soldiering or sabotage.⁷ And, though somebody is injured by such behaviour, professional men usually are able to escape censure because, on account of the technical nature of professional knowledge, their soldiering or sabotage is not detected. Where inefficient work is uncovered, those guilty are apt to be protected because of "professional etiquette." The technical nature of the professional equipment makes it difficult to demonstrate inefficiency to the public and, indeed, to the profession itself, especially in cases where some extenuating circumstances can be made much of, so that professional men are generally content with inwardly condemning an inefficient member. This conduct makes the competition of the inefficient hard for the efficient, inasmuch as they often appear to patrons to be equally efficient. Hence the need of a code of ethics that each profession will take seriously and of a vigorous treatment of offenders.⁸

The codes of professional ethics set forth the aims and objects of the professional associations, among which are: to hold meetings for discussion of problems before the profession; to publish information which shall promote the efficiency of the profession and enlighten the public; to encourage cordial intercourse among the members of the profession; to raise the standard of, and improve the effectiveness of the education of the members of the profession; to formulate rules for the recognition of eminence in the profession; to prescribe such standards of behaviour as shall foster high-class practice, protect the honour of the profession and promote its usefulness; to secure the enactment of just laws that affect the profession; to promote the co-operation of the profession throughout the world and with other professions and vocational groups. Not all these are the aims and objects of all national professional associations, but they represent the aims and objects of the associations collectively.

The motives of a profession are ascertained from their official codes of behaviour and from discussing the codes with members of the profession. It is instructive, as one talks with men in a profession not his own, to observe how he is referred, in the course of

⁷ Veblen, *On the Nature and Uses of Sabotage*, *The Dial*, Apr. 5, 1919, 341-346.

⁸ Ross, *The Making of the Professions*, *Intern. Jour. Ethics*, XXVII: 75-76.

a talk on the ideals and practices of the profession, to other men with the comment, "He has the same attitude I have on these things." Likeness of attitude is felt to imply a fundamental likeness which determines the point of view with reference to professional ideals and policy and typical situations in professional experience.

The code of ethics of each profession implies that its members are expected to have a "professional spirit" which distinguishes them, as professional men, from other men. Essential in this spirit is the sense of the distinction enjoyed by an individual on account of his membership in a profession, and of responsibility to live according to its code of behaviour, formulated or implied. The rivalrous disposition is satisfied by the superiority incidental to membership in a profession, and is annoyed by behaviour of members which impairs its superiority before the public. The same professional men may, however, secretly engage in disreputable behaviour. Yet they will strongly condemn such behaviour in others. There are many men with these contrary motives. They have the impulse to be proud of membership in an approved or admired group; and they have impulses to do things which, if known, would reflect disapproval and contempt on the group. With these men the wrong consists less in doing the thing which brings disrepute than in getting caught at it and bringing discredit on the group.

The interests of professional rivalry are contrary at several points to the public welfare interests that a profession should subserve. First, professional rivalry does not in itself deter members of the profession from behaviour that is contrary to the public welfare, if the behaviour will not bring discredit on the profession, because it may be done secretly, or because the profession has not yet come to prefer the public to professional welfare in respect to that particular behaviour. Second, what a profession demands, under the motive of rivalry is that members shall not bring discredit on the profession. The discredit may be due to a revelation of truth that is beneficial to the public welfare, nevertheless the rivalrous disposition is annoyed by anything that lowers the prestige of a group of which one is a member. The impulse, therefore, is to cover up behaviour that discredits. Third, we find that elements of professional behaviour that are determined, in the first instance, by public welfare requirements may become the object of the personal rivalry of the members of the profession, and, as such, may degenerate into pedantic qualities or obsessions which mark a deterioration in professional behaviour.

There is, then, a conflict between merely rivalrous professional interests and those that arise from a carefully thought out conception of public welfare interests that the profession must subserve. Finally the rivalrous disposition, in spite of codes of ethics to the contrary, tends to fix on money-making as the standard of professional success. This, as will be shown below, is contrary to the public welfare.

Professional rivalry may also cause a professional pride that is deadening to the progress of the profession, and is, therefore, contrary to public welfare interests. Each profession has a special field of knowledge which is the stock in trade of its members and the basis of their claim to superiority in the community. Hence the impulse to preserve this knowledge intact and to oppose new ideas that discredit it. Lawyers are opposed to interpretations of law not based on tradition, doctors to changes in medical practice springing from new knowledge, ministers to changes in dogma arising from new knowledge, teachers to changes in the subject matter of their teaching. Because of this professional conservatism, changes on behalf of the public welfare often have to be forced by the criticisms of men outside the profession, by social scientists and publicists whose knowledge is not exclusively that of a profession and who have no rivalrous interest in maintaining the traditional professional knowledge intact. Physicians sometimes force changes in the law and lawyers sometimes force changes in medical practice. What is required for progress in the professions is, therefore, a professional education that will train professional men in openmindedness, and co-operation between the thinking men of different professions for professional advancement generally.

The strain between the professional and the business attitudes has become more pronounced in recent years because business organizations have come to include a great number of professional men, experts in various lines, who perfunctorily acknowledge the sway of the profit-seeking attitude over the corporation, and to whom profits are a matter of little or no interest, as they work on salary or on a fee basis and have their chief interest in their work. In some cases these experts, through their organizations, profess a pronounced public welfare attitude.⁹ Engineers, accountants, credit men and others have

⁹ There are in the United States 120 to 130 societies of engineers and allied technical branches with a membership approximately of 200,000, publishing between 130 and 140 technical periodicals. These are organized into the Federated American Engineering Societies. The preamble of the constitution of this organization reads: "As service to others is the expression of the highest motive to which men respond and as duty to contribute to the public welfare demands the best

a highly specialized type of ability that makes them practically professional men. They are interested in efficiency rather than profits. For instance, the credit man is interested in perfecting arrangements to make credit secure, and there is in the United States a National Association of Credit Men which has an extensive organization with various committees each of which has a line of work looking to increasing the security of credit.¹⁰ And it promulgates a code of commercial ethics to regulate the conduct of the business man, not only in his credit relations but generally, since all his behaviour may effect, directly or indirectly, the security of credit on which modern business is based.¹¹ In like manner engineers, accountants, and other groups of experts of the business organization have their associations and ethical standards that look to maximum efficiency, not in the sense of profitable enterprise but of professional practice. This development of the professional spirit in business conflicts with the dominant profit-seeking motive. For, while expert knowledge is more and more necessary in modern business, owing to industrial concentration, to diminishing natural resources, and to the consequent necessity of highly intelligent management, industrial concentration has resulted in placing small groups of profit seekers in dominant positions. There is, therefore, an increasingly intense conflict between professional employés in business and the profit-seeking management.

Not only is the profit seeker ascendant in the business organization, but also he has attained a dominant position in social control generally. As a result the money-making motive has become influential outside of business in the professions. Until the development of modern business the professional man excelled in social control because of his superior education—and the requirement of a superior education selected into the professions the more intellectual men—, and because he more frequently appeared as a civic or political leader than did the business man. But modern business has subordinated the professional man to business standards. The professional men employed by large corporations—chemists, engineers, physicians, statisticians, lawyers and, occasionally, clergymen—are not allowed

efforts men can put forth, now, therefore, the engineering and allied technical societies of the United States of America . . . realize a long cherished ideal—a comprehensive organization dedicated to the service of the community, state and nation."

¹⁰ Hagerty, *Mercantile Credit*, Ch. XIV.

¹¹ Ettinger and Golieb, *Credits and Collections*, 380-382.

free scope in their work. "Higher authority is assigned by the money economy to another class of experts, business men who are skilled not in making goods, but in making money."¹² "Yet the men who dominate our manufacturing processes could not conduct their business for twenty-four hours without the assistance of the experts. . . . Modern industry depends upon technical knowledge; and all that these gentlemen did was to manage the external features of great combinations and their financial operation, which had very little to do with the intimate skill with which the enterprises were conducted. I know men not catalogued in the public prints, men not spoken of in public discussion, who are the very bone and sinew of the industry of the United States."¹³ Nevertheless, "As an employé of the business man, the engineer must subordinate his interest in mechanical efficiency to his superior's interest in profitable investment."¹⁴ In like manner, the lawyer must subordinate his interest in legal justice to his superior's interest in profitable investment. The economist and statistician employed by the corporation must accept the corporation's business attitude and promote the business interests of the corporation. The social worker employed by the corporation must solve the social problems of the communities of the workmen of the corporation in such a way as suits the interests of the corporation. The clergyman must cherish religious attitudes among the workmen that are not contrary to corporation domination.

Professional men who work independently are comparatively free in the selection of clients and may work with a singleminded devotion to the interests of clients or patients. Professional men differ in capacity for conscientious attention to the interests entrusted to them, with indifference to financial and other selfish considerations, but conscientious attention is generally encouraged by independence. The attention of the professional man in the pay of a corporation, on the other hand, is primarily on the interests of the corporation. Where these conflict with the public welfare his behaviour is apt to be contrary to the public welfare. Where they conflict with the requirements of justice under the law or with conscientious attention to patients, he is apt to be less insistent on justice under the law and less conscientious in attention to patients. The corporation lawyer will take a case for a corporation that he would not take if he had never

¹² Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, 32.

¹³ Wilson, *The New Freedom*, Master Worker's Book, 71-72; Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, 69.

¹⁴ Mitchell, *op. cit.*, 32.

come under its influence. Physicians hired by insurance companies that insure corporations against liability for compensation for industrial accidents in some cases get rid of patients with a minimum of attention in order to commend themselves to the company. Physicians hired by the state to examine applicants for workmen's compensation sometimes make light of the injuries suffered from industrial accidents, ascribe the pains to "rheumatism," and so, by reducing the expense of compensation, commend themselves to the politicians that administer the law. The tendency is for the lucrative corporate positions to fall to lawyers and physicians in whom ambition for money or position or some other selfish desire is unusually strong. These financially and socially successful members of the profession then become exemplars of success and success comes to be measured in terms of money or social power instead of professional excellence.

The increasing predominance of the money-making attitude in professional behaviour is seen not only among professional men in the employ of business interests but also among professional men seemingly uncontrolled. The increasing prestige of the business man, due to the great increase in the number of very wealthy men who have made their money in business, also to the magnitude of modern industrial enterprises and financial operations, and to the political and social power wielded by business men, has given the business attitude an influence which has caused it subconsciously and irresistibly to permeate the professions. Furthermore, business men have the means to hire the ablest of those professional men who make money-making their chief end. The ablest lawyers in the community often are the corporation lawyers, and, because they are making more money than other lawyers, they come to be known to the public, and to those other members of the bar who are influenced by the attitude of the public and by the propulsion of their own money-making impulses, as the most successful lawyers in the community. Thus success within the profession comes to mean success in making money. But a lawyer's success depends not merely on his legal knowledge and ingenuity but also on his standing in the community in so far as his standing may affect his influence over a jury. However, the public cannot know a lawyer's record intimately, wherefore low class practice may injure a lawyer far less, and high class practice may increase his influence far less than it should. Unprofessional behaviour on behalf of propertied interests that largely patronize the legal profes-

sion may impair his influence, and, therefore, his worth to those interests, far less than it should.

The same is to a degree true of the physicians. Moneyed men have the means to hire the physicians that are reputed to be the ablest in their line. Consequently physicians often make a specialty of this class of practice and gain prestige because of the prestige of their distinguished patients, and also because, being physicians of such patients, they are assumed to be the most efficient. Thus success as a physician comes to be gauged by the money made, and money-making becomes to the young physician the standard of success in spite of his code of ethics to the contrary. In the same way the money-making standard insinuates itself into the conscience of other classes of professional men.

Is income a true indication of professional excellence? In the legal profession income depends on doing effectively what propertied interests want done without primary reference to whether or not this is for the public welfare. In the law, therefore, a large income is not necessarily an indication of devotion to public welfare interests. In medicine income depends not only on efficiency but also on prestige. More than one doctor got his start toward a superior income by marrying a girl of high social standing and through her influence building up a practice in a wealthy class, association with which class gave him the prestige that enabled him to charge high fees. Physicians sometimes say of one of their number that he is "over-rated," meaning that his prestige is greater than his efficiency warrants. His colleagues know it but the public does not, and the cleverness with which a physician has worked up a reputation that over-rates him may win him thousands of dollars a year more than he would otherwise get. Income in case of physicians is not, therefore, a true index of professional excellence.

This commercializing of a profession, by making financial success as contrasted with professional excellence the standard of superiority, is retarded according to the effectiveness with which a group-conscious profession frowns on forms of individual rivalry that spring from the money-making motive. While the business man may advertise, under-bid and otherwise solicit patronage, professional men are generally forbidden by their code to do this. The motive is "the fear lest competition degenerate into an undignified scramble for business by all manner of self-laudation, falsehood and depreciation

of rivalry."¹⁵ Thus the group consciousness of a profession makes it possible to limit individual rivalry in the interest not only of the public but also of the profession itself. For this competition would increase the expenses of all and would enable the more reckless and deceitful members to attract an ignorant public, thus injuring the honest and efficient members of the profession.

This guild spirit of the professions may, however, prompt professional men to hang together at the expense of the public. This tendency is very ancient, in fact comes down from the most primitive peoples, while the public welfare point of view is very modern. Take, for instance, the guild spirit in the medical profession. The medicine men of the primitive group combined the functions of doctor and priest. They formed a closed guild and endeavoured to shroud their art in mystery and thus to keep the people in ignorance of a good deal that was pure chicanery.¹⁶ We find a later stage of development in the ancient Greek oath in which the physician swears "to impart a knowledge of the art to my own sons and those of my teachers and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath according to the law of medicine, but to none other."¹⁷ In modern times this spirit survived in the ethical code of physicians in which they sought to protect each other even to the extent of injustice to patients. The code provided that "Neither by words nor manner should any of the parties to a consultation assert or insinuate that any part of the treatment pursued did not receive his assent."¹⁸ However flagrantly the attending physician may have erred, "No hint or insinuation should be thrown out which could impair the confidence reposed in him (the attending physician) or affect his reputation."

"This rule is at once a betrayal of the truth, of the sick man who pays for the consultation, and of the public who have a right to know if the attending physician has bungled the case. Hence the later code says that 'the benefit to be derived by the patient is of first importance' and declares that the consultant should be permitted to state to the patient or his friends the result of his study of the case in the presence of the physician in charge.

"Even when codes are flawless, the guild spirit is at work prompting members of the same profession to hang together at the expense of the laity. We see this in the difficulty of extracting an adverse

¹⁵ Ross, *op. cit.*, 72.

¹⁶ Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 355-359.

¹⁷ Quoted by Ross, *op. cit.*, 74.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 74.

opinion from medical witnesses in a suit for malpractice. Far more flagrant is the tolerance by judges of the outrageous fees charged by attorneys appointed to administer the estates of bankrupts and decedents and as receivers of corporations in difficulties. The way judges will allow property to be devoured by the rolling up of big fees for imaginary or superfluous legal services by their brothers of the bar is nothing less than scandalous.”¹⁹

Public welfare interests are ignored by professional men not only because of guild selfishness but also because of selfish loyalty to patient or client. Loyalty may be selfish or unselfish. Unselfish loyalty is necessary in the professional man as “counsellor in the intimate matters of life. . . . Hence he not only keeps locked within his breast the secrets entrusted to him, but he forbears to use to the disadvantage of his patron anything he has learned in a confidential relation.”²⁰ But supposing what he has learned shows the doctor that his patient’s condition constitutes danger to the public safety, as when patients with an infectious disease are working in bakeries, at soda water fountains, or in other places where they may spread disease. He acts contrary to the public welfare if he keeps silent. Again, supposing a person comes to a lawyer, confesses he is guilty, and wants to be defended. The public welfare is violated if a lawyer takes such a case and uses all his ingenuity to clear a guilty man. If he is assigned to a questionable case by the court he may properly undertake a defence in order that the accused may have the benefit of those forms of procedure which have developed to safeguard the innocent, but it is contrary to the public welfare to use all his ingenuity and influence with judge and jury in order to get a reputation as an attorney of extraordinary ability who can win the hardest kind of a case.

When income becomes the standard of professional success, then rivalry for professional excellence degenerates into rivalry for income. When this tendency has developed in a profession, the professional spirit is contrary to public welfare interests. Hence the hopelessness of trying to make a profession in this stage of development more public-spirited by appealing to the professional spirit. This type of professional spirit causes the lawyer to become the selfish servant of corporations and to aid them in getting around the law. It causes physicians to seek the patronage of the wealthy, to

¹⁹ Ibid. 74-75.

²⁰ Ibid. 69.

refuse to expose social causes of disease such as bad tenements, and bad sanitation in factories. It causes the young journalist to write the stories wanted by the commercial interests behind the paper without any regard for the public welfare.

If it is vain to hope to develop a public welfare standard of professional excellence merely by stimulating the professional spirit, when the standard of professional excellence has come to be defined in terms of money, then it is vain to hope to improve business behaviour by fostering in the business man a professional pride. Professional pride of this kind amounts to the same thing as the business man's pride in private profits. The right professional attitude and the right business attitude should be inculcated at the start in the professional and the business school. There young men should be trained to look at professional and business problems from the point of view of the public welfare. Until the instruction in the schools is given from this point of view the conflict between egoistic and public welfare interests will continue in the professions and in business, and will be traceable away back to the very beginning of the professional and the business man's life. When the instruction has once been given uncompromisingly from the point of view of the public welfare, then the conflict will be between practitioners who continue to hold the point of view of their school and those who abandon it for the sake of quick success. In the last analysis this conflict is inevitable and irrepressible. It is a conflict between men of contrary dispositions. But, as things are, the egoistic dispositions are, too often, encouraged in professional schools, which fail to emphasize public welfare interests. The educational institutions are those in which the reform on behalf of the public welfare must begin.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

THE attitudes of the legal profession are ascertained from the official code of ethics of the American Bar Association¹ and other publications of that association,² from the publications of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York County Lawyers' Association,³ and through a discussion with lawyers, of their code and of problems of professional ethics. The professional attitude, as set forth, is that of "ministers" of the law.⁴ "As well in the domain of public as of private law, the great fundamental principle for judge and counsellor ought to be, THAT AUTHORITY IS SACRED. There is no convenience so great, no private hardship so imperative, as to justify the application of a different rule to the resolution of the case, than the existing state of the law will warrant. 'There is not a line from his pen,' says Mr. Binney of Chief Justice Tilghman, 'that trifled with the sacred deposit in his hands by claiming to fashion it according to a private opinion of what it ought to be. Judicial legislation he abhorred, I should rather say, *dreaded*, as an implication of his conscience. His first inquiry in every case was of the oracles of the law for their response; and when he obtained it, notwithstanding his clear perception of the justice of the

¹ American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics.

² The most important of these is Sharswood's Professional Ethics, Reports of the American Bar Association, Vol. XXXII, 1907. A former secretary of the American Bar Association writes: "I do not know of any conflict between the Canons of Ethics and anything in Sharswood. The Canons, however, are the official code adopted by the American Bar Association, and the treatise of Sharswood is simply an interesting volume published by the American Bar Association for the benefit of its members."

³ This committee passes upon questions submitted to it and renders decisions which are published from time to time. Over one hundred and sixty of these decisions have been published. See the pamphlet published by the committee entitled, *Questions Respecting Proper Professional Conduct with the Committee's Answers, Questions 1 to 149 inclusive*, and leaflets giving other questions and answers.

⁴ American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Sec. 32.

cause, and his intense desire to reach it, if it was not the justice of the law, he dared not to administer it.”⁵

The justice of the law, as applied to a particular case, is not so easy to interpret as it might seem to a layman. Even if a lawyer or judge strives to interpret exactly according to precedent, no two cases are exactly alike. When a client brings a case the lawyer considers under what law he may get justice for his client, and, in so doing, makes his own interpretation of the law. He decides that the law applies to this new case, and makes the interpretation of the law that will make this application plausible. He cites legal authority for his interpretation, and, in so doing, makes his own interpretation of the authorities. That is, the premises even of the lawyer or judge who tries to be severely deductive in his interpretations are as truly individual assumptions as are those of one who assumes a wider discretion. As Professor Corbin says of judicial thinking,—and it is true, also, of the thinking of lawyers before the court:—“In a superficial aspect, the application of rules to cases may seem to be a deductive process; a pre-existing general rule is the major premise from which the judge arrives at a particular conclusion applicable to John Doe. In fact, however, the . . . supposed general rule is an inductive conclusion on the part of the judge from preceding individual instances. His decision of the case is a new instance which later judges and theorists will use as the basis of a new induction. In all cases the judge must construct his own major premise, and this he does not find an easy matter.”⁶

Law must, in the nature of the case, be regarded as inexorable rule, for a rule of conduct that could be changed at the whim of a judge would not be a rule of conduct. But the very inexorableness of the rule requires that it be intelligently applied. The tendency of lawyers and judges has been to emphasize inexorableness at the expense of intelligent interpretation, not only because the conventional attitude is the easy one, but also because legal tradition has emphasized the rights of propertied classes as against those without property. As Judge Learned Hand of New York has written: “Conservative political opinion in America cleaves to the tradition of the judge as passive interpreter, believing that his absolute loyalty to authoritative law is the price of his immunity from political pressure and of the

⁵ Sharswood, *Professional Ethics*, 40-41.

⁶ Corbin, *The Law and the Judges*, *Yale Review*, N. S. Vol. III: 239-240. See also Cook, *Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life*, *Yale Law Journal*, XXXVII: 796, n.

security of his tenure. . . . In its passionate adherence to this tradition such opinion is not disinterested; it would as eagerly encourage judicial initiative, if the law were framed by labor unions, as it insists upon rigid obedience in a system framed for the most part for the protection of property and for the prevention of thorough-going social regulation.”⁷

The law, as it has developed, is, for the most part, for the protection of property. It is largely concerned “with the property relations of men, which reduced to their simple terms mean the processes by which the ownership of concrete forms of property is determined or passes from one person to another.”⁸ The result is that the emphasis on law as inexorable rule is apt to be justified on the ground of the necessity of such emphasis for the security of property rights. It is held that the law must be made certain, even at the expense of justice, “that it may be a certain rule of decision, and promote that security of life, liberty and property, which, as we have seen, is the great end of human society and government. Thus industry will receive its best encouragement; thus enterprise will be most surely stimulated; thus constant additions to capital by savings will be promoted; thus the living will be content in the feeling that their earnings are safely invested; and the dying be consoled with the reflection that the widow and orphan are left under the care and protection of a government, which administers impartial justice according to established laws.”⁹

In their zeal to emphasize the authority of law, lawyers have tended to lose sight of their own authority, and their obligation to use the law to promote justice. There are always two factors in a case, the law and the situation that demands justice. Lawyers are as much under obligation to consider all elements in the situation, including the social and economic conditions, as to consider the law. And the changing social and economic conditions will of necessity change the interpretation of the law in its application to the situation.

Different types of lawyers will emphasize in differing degrees the authority of the law in its traditional aspects, and will limit correspondingly their consideration of social and economic conditions. The type that will do this extremely will be the conservative type, which has no vigorous intellectual interest in social and economic conditions, nor any pronounced sympathy with those whose condition

⁷ Hand, *The Speech of Justice*, *Harvard Law Review*, XXIX: 617-618.

⁸ Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, 12.

⁹ Sharswood, *op. cit.*, 53.

appeals for justice under the law. This type conforms to the traditional authoritative attitude of the expounder of law, either because of a conforming disposition or because the traditional attitude is congenial to a pronounced dominating disposition. This attitude emphasizes the commanding or order-preserving function of the law. This function, rather than the justice-secur ing function, is the one that is congenial to the lawyer and judge of a pronounced dominating disposition. The judge of this type feels his part as the exponent of the will of his group and interpreter of the criminal law. This judicial attitude is in accordance with the attitude to law and the courts of the common man, who commonly thinks of law as criminal law.¹⁰ This attitude of judge and lawyer emphasizes the authority of law as the command of the state, which, as a sovereign power, can compel unquestioning obedience to its commands. As a stern father enforces his command literally, even though in a particular case it involves some injustice, lest failure to do so should impair his authority in the family, so the law is conceived as necessarily unchangeable command. In thus declaring the law lawyers and judges of a pronounced dominating disposition develop a more or less dogmatic attitude. And many lawyers to whom to "lay down the law" is not congenial accept the dogmatic attitude because it is the attitude of the more vigorous and impressive lawyers; they accept it because to do so is congenial to the conforming disposition. It is difficult to convince lawyers and judges of a dominating or conforming disposition that they should consider social and economic conditions in the interpretation of law. They resent the suggestion that they need to know anything outside of the law. The law constitutes the learning of the lawyer. It is his stock in trade, his source of pride; he feels the law to be part of himself much as the clergyman of similar disposition feels dogma to be a part of himself. It is truth which other professions have not, which it is the prerequisite of his profession to declare as command. He is impatient with the suggestion that there is any very desirable justice which the law as traditionally interpreted is not able to achieve. He is averse to changes in the law. His dominating attitude is similar to that of the dominating property owner, whose position of advantage is guarded by the law, and who opposes reforms as personal injuries. As far as it is under the influence of lawyers of this disposition, the legal profession tends to

¹⁰ Pound, *Juristic Problems of National Progress*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., May, 1917, 728.

become a closed guild, guarding the law as sacred and opposing change as such.

The most lucrative class of clients are property owners,¹¹ and the dogmatic attitude of unquestioning respect for legal tradition gives these clients confidence in a lawyer and wins him legal business, for legal tradition places an extreme emphasis on property rights. The propertied classes are well satisfied with their legal status and opposed to changes on behalf of non-propertied classes. They distrust a lawyer whose interpretations of law favour such changes. Nevertheless, such a lawyer may build up a lucrative business, for his reputation as a liberal lawyer may, in cases defending property rights, give his arguments added influence.

Another class of cases in which a too dogmatic attitude may not be in line with the pecuniary interests of a lawyer is that in which propertied interests require a lawyer's help in getting around the law as traditionally interpreted. The lawyer best fitted by nature for this rôle is the lawyer of rivalrous disposition, who is dogmatic only when it is in line with his ambitions. The essential aim of this type of lawyer is superiority, not only in his profession but also in the community. Inasmuch as wealth is a means of winning a superior position, and is itself the most important evidence of social superiority, the aim of the rivalrous lawyer is to acquire wealth; wherefore he will use the law to advance the interests of corporate wealth, the service of which is most lucrative. This is not so difficult to accomplish when we consider, that the attitudes of business men, as the influential class among the public, are influential in determining lawyers' and judges' interpretations of law. Wherefore the rivalrous lawyer finds that the mind of a judge of similar disposition moves along with his own in a variation from traditional interpretation. Business men are quick to discover the lawyers who are fitted by nature to carry through interpretations that suit their interests.

The standing of a lawyer among his professional associates and his standing among business men act and react on one another in the determination of his reputation. "Nothing is more certain than that the practitioner will find, in the long run, the good opinion of his professional brethren of more importance than that of what is commonly called the public. . . . Sooner or later, the real public—the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits and are valuable clients—endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his

¹¹ Lindsey and O'Higgins, *The Beast*, 35-36, 48-49.

associates of the Bar, unless indeed there be some varying defect of popular qualities."¹² The process may be the reverse of this. The lawyer's professional associates may be decisively influenced in their estimate of him by his prestige in the community achieved as an attorney of great corporate interests. That is, the attitude of business men to a lawyer affects his standing in his profession, as well as the attitude of his profession to him affects his standing among business men. To be sure he will sometimes have to choose between the approval of the one and that of the other. His rise depends on serving business men in a way that does not sacrifice his professional reputation.

Distinct from this type of lawyer is the one of pronounced sympathetic and intellectual dispositions, who is mindful of social and economic conditions in his interpretations of law, and who, while he accepts law as an inexorable rule of conduct, uses it on behalf of social justice.¹³ The conflict between this type of lawyer and the egoistic types is similar to that between the progressive and the conservative judge, for judges are also lawyers, and the lawyer must so plead his case that the mind of the judge will move along with his own. Judge Learned Hand of New York has described the conflict between the two types of judges as follows: "Much of the law is indeed written in formal shape, the authoritative emanation of the state. . . . Nevertheless, the judge has, by custom, his own proper representative character as a complementary organ of the social will, and in so far as conservative sentiment, in the excess of caution that he shall be obedient, frustrates his free power of interpretation to manifest the half-framed purposes of his time, it misconceives the historical significance of his position and will in the end render him incompetent to perform the very duties upon which it lays so much emphasis."¹⁴ "The pious traditionalism of the law has its roots in a sound conviction of" the necessity of "a background of social acquiescence, which gives it the voice of infinitely greater numbers than those of its expositors." It "must be content to lag behind the best inspiration of its time until it feels behind it the weight of such general acceptance as will give sanction to its pretension to unquestioned dictation. Yet with this piety must go a taste for courageous experiment."¹⁵ Modern

¹² Sharswood, *op. cit.* 75.

¹³ Judge Cuthbert W. Pound (New York Court of Appeals), *Some Recent Phases of the Evolution of Case Law*, *Yale Law Journal*, Feb., 1922, 361-366.

¹⁴ Hand, *The Speech of Justice*, *Harvard Law Review*, XXIX: 617-618.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

conditions have increased the necessity of experimentation. It was less called for while the propertied classes, which law-makers represented, were the only classes which had political power so that "class grievances were inaudible." "All this has changed; the profession is still drawn, and so far as we can see always will be drawn, from the propertied class, but other classes have awakened to conscious control of their fate, their demands are vocal which before were dumb, and they will no longer be disregarded. If justice be a passable accommodation between the vital and self-conscious interests of society, it has taken on a meaning not known before. But the profession has not yet learned to adapt itself to the change; that most difficult of adjustments has not been made, an understanding of and sympathy with the purposes and ideals of those parts of the common society whose interests are discordant with its own."¹⁶ The progressive type of lawyer and judge is therefore, rare, as rare as the progressive political leader. Judge Hand notes certain developments in jurisprudence due to "the very inability of the profession to show a more enlightened sympathy with the deeper aspirations of the time." In another place he notes the judges' need of the assistance of experts in the determination of the social and economic conditions that bear upon a case.¹⁷

The kind of training required by lawyers will depend on the prevailing type of judge, for the lawyer must have the training that will enable him to present cases forcibly before the court. Hence the training will emphasize a knowledge of the law and of those interpretations that give reputation as a "sound" lawyer, also such a knowledge of polite literature as will make his address as an advocate seductive and effective.¹⁸ If the lawyer has not merely the rivalrous aim to win cases but also the impulse to get justice done in organized society,¹⁹ his training must include not only a knowledge of law but also a training in economic and social science. This type of lawyer will not hesitate to make his own constructive interpretations in his application of law to economic and social situations, even though these interpretations may in some cases raise suspicions among the rank and file of the profession as to his "soundness" as a lawyer. Many lawyers fail to grasp the relevant aspects of a situation which calls for legal justice

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Park, Davis and Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co.*, 189 Fed., 115.

¹⁸ *Sharswood, op. cit.*, 125-132.

¹⁹ *Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, Harvard Law Review, XXVII: 195-198, 225-227.*

because they lack the necessary knowledge of social and economic conditions; so their traditional interpretation of the law may be sound for a judge who knows no more about the situation than they do, while it is unsound for any one who realizes that the situation which the traditional interpretation had in view has changed. The traditional and apparently sound interpretation is the unsound one, the novel and apparently unsound interpretation is the true one. For this reason, "lawyers and judges should have an extensive knowledge of economic conditions. The acquisition of such knowledge should be a part of their training for their profession. It may be added that just as the lawyer must, to be successful, keep up his legal studies after admission to the bar, so the really great and successful lawyer and judge must keep up his economic studies if he is to wield the proper influence he should have on the development of the law."²⁰ Though this is coming to be recognized in law schools, President Goodnow's generalization of ten years ago, still remains true: "Eternal principles of universal application are, as a rule, still the basis of most legal treatises and the reliance of most lawyers and judges. Apart from that branch of the law which is known in the United States as constitutional law, little attempt is made to show the gradual development of specific legal principles. None at all is made to show the influence upon such principles of the social and economic conditions in existence at the time they were being formulated. The ordinary lawyer or judge who is called upon either to influence or make the law is not, as a result of the distinctly professional training which he has received, prepared for the work which he has undertaken, and the development of the law suffers as a consequence."²¹

The prevailing attitude to the law has been one of conventional deference, and the professional attitude to the court, as the agency for interpreting the law, has been correspondingly deferential.²² This deference, it is maintained, must be paid to the incumbent of the office as such, without regard to his ability or personality. Thus will the lawyer's influence encourage a deferential attitude to the authority of the law and the courts.²³ If logically carried out this attitude implies the maintenance of an attitude of deference regardless of a judge's incompetency, thereby concealing the same for the sake of protecting

²⁰ Goodnow, *The Relation of Economics to the Law*, Survey, March 4, 1911, 937.

²¹ *Ibid.* 936.

²² American Bar Association, *Canons of Professional Ethics*, Sec. 1.

²³ Sharswood, *op. cit.*, 62-63.

the influence of the courts. It is further maintained by many lawyers that no man should be appointed a judge whose fitness has been questioned by lawyers, even though the charges of unfitness are proved false. He should, it is said, be above suspicion. Opposed to this professional attitude is that of the lawyer of progressive impulses and constructive mind whose deference is determined, in good part, by the fitness and competency of the incumbent of the office, though, as counsellor before the court, he may observe the traditional mannerisms. Furthermore, he holds that to turn down a nominee for a judicial position because unfounded charges of unfitness had been made would enable economic interests to prevent an appointment they did not like simply by making plausible charges which they could not substantiate.

The traditional popular attitude of unintelligent acquiescence in the decisions of courts is not any longer possible or desirable. Unless government is founded on blind and unquestioning submission, an intelligent criticism of a court decision is not an attack on the foundations of government. "Those who assert that by criticism of the Supreme Court we are attacking the foundations of our political system forget that we are living under a practically unamendable constitution and that unless it is proper to bring popular opinion to bear upon a governmental authority which has the power absolutely to prevent political change we may easily be tied up so tight in the bonds of constitutional limitation that either development will cease, and political death ensue, or those bonds will be broken by a shock that may at the same time threaten the foundations not merely of our political but even our social system."²⁴ The dominant position of the courts in our governmental system, together with the fact that the courts have legislative powers, and that United States judges are appointed instead of elected, make intelligent criticism of decisions the more imperative. "As long as the power to enact laws shall hinge on the complexion of benches of judges, so long will the ability to control a majority of the bench be as crucial a political necessity as the ability to control a majority in avowedly representative assemblies."²⁵ It follows that the decisions of judges are no more entitled to unquestioning assent than are the acts of a legislative body. The rank and file may submit to judicial decisions without criticism but reactionary propertied interests never do. Those interests even used

²⁴ Goodnow, *Social Reform and the Constitution*, 358.

²⁵ Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, 54.

their influence to oppose the appointment of a justice of the United States Supreme Court whose professional attitude was known to be progressive.²⁶

An intelligent criticism of judicial decisions increases respect for them, in that their authority no longer rests on an attitude of blind acquiescence when it is known that they challenge criticism. Furthermore, the realization that a thoughtful public opinion feels free to criticise decisions is an incentive to careful and unbiased thinking on the part of judges. As Justice Taft wrote: "The opportunity freely and publicly to criticize judicial action is of vastly more importance to the body politic than the immunity of courts and judges from unjust aspersions and attack. Nothing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subjected to the intelligent scrutiny and candid criticism of their fellow men. . . . In the case of judges having a life tenure, indeed, their very independence makes the right freely to comment on their decisions of greater importance because it is the only practicable and available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve.

"On the other hand, the danger of destroying the proper influence of judicial decisions by creating unfounded prejudices against the courts, justifies and requires that unjust attacks shall be met and answered. . . . Courts must ultimately rest their defence upon the inherent strength of the opinions they deliver as the ground for their conclusions and must trust to the calm and deliberate judgment of all the people as their best vindication."²⁷

Whatever the type of mind and disposition of a lawyer, all lawyers are, in the exercise of their profession, advocates. As such the professional aim tends to be primarily to win cases. The "lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an officer of the court. The party has a right to have his case decided upon the law and the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the judges, which can legitimately bear upon the question. This is the office which the advocate performs. He is not morally responsible for the act of the party in maintaining an unjust cause, nor for the error of the court, if they fall into error, in deciding it in his favor. . . . The lawyer,

²⁶ Reports from the Subcommittee to the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 64th Congress, 1st sess., on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 59.

²⁷ Taft, *Present Day Problems*, 291-292.

who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury.

"As an answer to any sweeping objection made to the profession in general, the view thus presented may be quite satisfactory. It by no means follows, however, as a principle of private action for the advocate, that all causes are to be taken by him indiscriminately, and conducted with a view to one single end, *success*. It is much to be feared, however, that the prevailing tone of professional ethics leads practically to this result."²⁸ In his pleading the advocate aims to make his side of the case as strong and seductive as possible, realizing the advocate on the opposite side will do the same. A lawyer carries this professional habit into public life, wherefore his analysis of political problems, as a candidate for office, is apt to be keen but one-sided, so that his rivalrous attitude in thinking contrasts sharply with the intellectual attitude of the scholarly man. The tendency of a lawyer to over-emphasize his side of an argument has necessitated as an essential function of the judge, that of impartial arbiter. In discriminating between the over-drawn statements of lawyers, judges develop a "judicious" habit of seeking a "reasonable compromise." One often sees this same judicious habit of mind strongly developed in managers of corporations who constantly have to adjust differences between rivalrous subordinates. As a way of thinking it is contrary to the method of the scientist. Because of this difference between judicial and scientific reasoning, the judicial mind is apt to be incapable of appreciating scientific studies of social and economic conditions that bear on a particular case before the court. Scientific remedies are too thorough-going to allow of compromise between conflicting interests.

The practice of the legal profession more than any other involves the rivalrous disposition. Pitted against one another, opposing counsel seek primarily to win the case, and interest in the truth or justice of the matter is subordinate to the impulse to win. Under this impulse a lawyer often will go to great lengths in invoking technicalities, in insinuations in cross-examination, in making petty objections as to the admission of evidence, and in otherwise taking a small advantage. While the best professional practice is against this petty rivalry, the main business of a lawyer is to win his case. The "conscientious practitioner" must show entire "devotion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defence of his rights, and the ex-

²⁸ Sharswood, op. cit., 83-84.

eration of his utmost learning and ability. . . ." ²⁹ "When he has once embarked in a case he cannot retire from it without the consent of his client or the approbation of the court. To come before the court with a revelation of facts, damning to his client's case, as a ground for retiring from it, would be a plain breach of the confidence reposed in him, and the law would seal his lips." ³⁰ That is, the lawyer's business is, practically, not to speak the whole truth but to plead in a way to win his case.

Though adjudication was originally invented not to render justice but to settle disputes that were subversive of social order,³¹ and though this motive often appears foremost in the pleading of lawyers and even in court decisions, it is possible to practise law in a way to satisfy a sense of justice—by an exercise of discrimination in the selection of causes, and, in the development of a case, by such an examination of witnesses, and other procedure as may bring out the truth, whatever it is, that justice may be done. To espouse the cause of a client means, to this type of lawyer, to aid the client in placing the whole truth before the court in as accurate and thorough and judicious a manner as it can be presented. It is this rare type of lawyer that represents the ideal described by Justice Holmes, the ideal of a "free trade in ideas," of a free trial of intellects in the public forum, with the faith that the truth thus brought to light will "get itself accepted,"³² and will result in a decision that embodies the highest attainable justice.

The intellectually conscientious lawyer will not accept the defence of a client whose cause seems to him unjust. Section 32 of the American Bar Association's *Code of Professional Ethics* reads: "No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, or any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should any lawyer render, any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are. . . ." And the *Oath of Admission to the Bar* recommended by the American Bar Association and in use in some states contains this provision: "I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust nor any defence except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land."³³ However, a client's case must involve palpable

²⁹ *Ibid.* 78-79.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 84-85.

³¹ Giddings, *The Responsible State*, 49.

³² Abrams v. U. S., U. S. Supr. Ct. Reporter, Vol. 250, p. 22.

³³ American Bar Association, *op. cit.*, 13.

injustice to cause a good lawyer to refuse to have anything to do with it; for it is usually difficult or impossible, when a client requests legal services, to be certain as to the merits of his case. A distinguished teacher of law writes in a private letter: "I can say with assurance from experience that a client does not come to a lawyer and say 'I have a bad case and I want you to maintain it for me.' On the contrary, he comes swearing by all the gods that he has a righteous case, and that he is a much wronged person. If the case is palpably bad good lawyers at all times have refused to maintain it. But one soon learns by experience that cases which seem bad turn out to be good, and that one cannot really tell until the cause has been thoroughly thrashed out in the forum whether it is good or bad. I remember a case in my own experience which taught me a lesson on this point. After I had been at the bar but a few years, the office in which I was employed required me to try a case for a company, for which we had a general retainer, which seemed to me an outrageous case. I was fully persuaded that the evidence upon which the company relied was downright fabrication, and was very indignant when I was ordered peremptorily to try the case. To my astonishment when the case progressed I began to perceive that what I had supposed to be a fabricated story because of the unusual character of the facts was actually the truth, and that the plausible story of the other side was the fabrication. As a result what I had supposed to be a very bad case turned out to be in all respects a sound and righteous one. Repeated experiences of this kind have taught the profession that where a man insists that he has a good case the right thing to do is to try the case properly on his behalf and let the truth come out. I suppose outside of a few cases of notorious shysters it never happens that an accused comes to a lawyer and says, 'I am guilty, defend me.' If he did the advocate's duty would be plain enough."

Thus far in our analysis we have made explicit the effect of disposition on lawyers' behaviour and have only implied the effect of degree of mentality. The great mass of lawyers as of other professional men are of that ordinary mentality that subjects them largely to the influence of their local and face-to-face relations. Among these are the contacts of the court-room and with clients. Much of this contact is far from elevating. Many clients are poor samples of human nature, and litigation tends to arouse the lower passions in men. The lawyer is in constant contact with vengeful

clients,³⁴ with vengeful or soft-hearted juries³⁵ and with a small, often low type of office-holder.³⁶ In the court-room the influences are all against a thoughtful interpretation of law, which is one of the reasons for the prevailing conservative attitude to law. The intensity of the rivalry of advocates inhibits thoughtfulness. It causes jealousies, indulgence in personalities, and efforts to over-reach one another. Furthermore, where legal business is done on commission³⁷—if the lawyer wins he gets a percentage of the winnings—the pecuniary motive adds intensity to the rivalry. Hence the rules of the professional code to regulate the rivalry. Counsel are enjoined not to plot surprises, and to avoid personalities.³⁸ They are warned to shun the reputation of a sharp practitioner, not to be quick to take advantage of the slips and oversights of an opponent.³⁹ Lawyers are commanded not to endeavour to create business by advertising⁴⁰ or by stirring up litigation.⁴¹ There are rules limiting fees,⁴² forbidding the acquiring of interest in litigation,⁴³ and the delaying of cases “for lucre or malice.” All behaviour is to be avoided by the individual lawyer which, if practised by the profession as a whole, would bring the profession into disrepute,⁴⁴ for “In America, where the stability of courts . . . rests upon the approval of the people,” “the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession” must be “such as to merit the approval of all just men.”⁴⁵

This injunction of the code implies that there are lawyers of sufficient mentality to rise above their local and face-to-face relations and consider the nation of which they are a part. As already pointed out, unusual mentality in the legal profession inclines the rivalrous lawyer to the service of corporate interests because this service is most lucrative and otherwise satisfies the rivalrous disposition. Thus this

³⁴ In most cases clients prefer to institute a criminal rather than a civil action for damages, preferring to forego the chance of financial gain in order to satisfy their vengeance. (Pound, *Criminal Justice in the American City*, Survey, Oct. 29, 1921, 152.)

³⁵ Love, *Justice in the Stocks*, Survey, Oct. 29, 1921, 142; Pound, *op. cit.*, 152.

³⁶ Love, *op. cit.*, 138-140.

³⁷ This is apparently contrary to the code of the American Bar Association which forbids a lawyer acquiring interest in litigation.

³⁸ American Bar Association, *op. cit.*, sec. 17; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, 73.

³⁹ Sharswood, *op. cit.*, 74.

⁴⁰ American Bar Association, *op. cit.*, sec. 27.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 28.

⁴² *Ibid.* 12-14.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 10.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 29.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Preamble.

type of lawyer plays a conspicuous part in that period of business development in which the ultra-rivalrous business man plays a conspicuous part.⁴⁶ But the service of propertied interests is important from the point of view also of the public welfare, in so far as that service may contribute to the material welfare of the consumer or to the socialization of private property. Therefore, such service, as opportunity offers, may well be undertaken by the idealistic type of lawyer already referred to. But the special field of this type is that of service on behalf of the classes which otherwise would not get justice, also in cases of the government against predatory economic interests, and in progressive political leadership.

One of the lines of service on behalf of classes for which otherwise justice would not be done should, perhaps, be described at some length. This is in connection with legal aid for those who deserve but cannot afford to pay for legal services. The need of legal aid arises from the growing evil of the law's delays, "which gives to monied might the means abundantly of wearying out the right."⁴⁷ Delay increases legal business, especially with wealthy clients, and enables a lawyer to display his ingenuity, as well as to make more money. That it results in grievous injustice to people of limited means⁴⁸ has not checked this evil of delay. Another evil is the undue increase of court costs and fees and of expense of counsel, so that "a vast number of persons are . . . debarred from legal advice and the essential services of the lawyer in court. . . ."⁴⁹ The remedy of these evils presents no fundamental difficulty, but the mechanisms suggested require for their adoption and efficient working a change in the character of the legal profession, an increase of sympathy and conscientiousness. The foremost authority on this point writes: "It is the general rule that each attorney, on his admission as a minister of justice and agent of the court, becomes subject to assignments from the court to represent needy persons without charge or for any fee they may be able to pay. The theory of this obligation is not peculiar to our law; it is a characteristic of the lawyer's position in all civilized communities, and there is evidence that it has been recognized from the earliest times. In criminal cases the legal nature of the obligation is clear because it is enforced. . . . In civil cases, . . . the power has fallen into such disuse that its existence is forgotten or

⁴⁶ See Chapter V.

⁴⁷ Smith, *Justice and the Poor*, 17.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 18.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 33.

denied. Because it is not employed there is an absence of authorities squarely on the point, but in a number of decisions the language shows unmistakably the court's opinion of the rule of law. The reason for the rule is precisely the same in civil as in criminal cases, and the court has the same inherent power to command the services of counsel in the aid of persons unable to pay. . . .

"This obligation owed by every lawyer to the poor, which is stated with reasonable clearness in the American cases, and which is undisputed in other systems of law, finds unmistakable support in the accepted standards of ethics. In other words, this duty is in part a legal obligation because the lawyer is a minister of justice, and in part an ethical responsibility because of his membership in a profession. In matters of this sort accepted canons of ethics are entitled to as much weight as decisions in adjudicated cases and most attorneys so regard them.

"When the adoption of the present canons of ethics of the American Bar Association was under discussion, Mr. Justice Brewer pointed out that the most important part was the Oath of Admission, which included within itself the final statement of the lawyer's duty. . . . 'I will never reject from any consideration personal to myself the cause of the defenceless or the oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice'. . . .

"By well-settled principles of professional ethics and by the voice of authority, so far as the courts have been called upon to express their judgment, the attorney is called upon to render services to the needy. This he has not done. The legal aid society has done it for him. The attorney for the Pittsburgh Legal Aid Society appeared as counsel for a woman, the prosecuting witness in a criminal case, only a few years ago. The attorney for the defendant in his address to the jury remarked that the legal aid appearance was unwarranted and that the entire county bar stood ready to assist such a needy woman. The facts were that the woman had consulted several members of that bar, who had relieved her of what little money she had without doing anything for her, and only then did she seek the help of the legal aid organization. As a fact of general application it is not true that the members of the bar despoil the poor—some of them do, but they are a small minority; yet it is the fact that the bar as a whole has done almost nothing to assist the poor in securing that justice which our institutions profess to guarantee them. With the existence of organized legal aid work, blame does not attach to the bar for allowing such

organizations to undertake the cases of the poor. But having permitted the legal aid societies to perform for them their own professional obligation, censure justly attaches to the members of the bar for having failed to give something of their earnings for the support and something of their time for the leadership of this legal aid work."⁵⁰

It is possible to note in the behaviour of members of every profession wide variations from its ethical code. This is especially true of the law because of the public character of the lawyer's work. The trial of cases is conducted in the public forum. In no other profession is the work of the professional man so open to the public gaze, wherefore the short-comings of his behaviour have an unusually evil influence. For instance, Mr. Arthur Woods, writing of the degrading influence in the lives of policemen, includes the influence of low class legal practice. "Even nowadays policemen may see lawyers in good standing at the bar, carefully framing perjured evidence. They also see judges listening to the whispers of influential friends of the accused and guiding their judicial conduct accordingly."⁵¹ Because the work of the lawyer in the court-room is conspicuous, as well as because of the influential position of the lawyer in our political and social order, the effect of improper behaviour on his part is pronounced, hence the necessity of vigorous action on the part of the profession on behalf of high class practice.

One of the essential purposes of law schools should be to train students for high class practice. Most schools give some lectures on professional ethics,⁵² but the subject is generally inadequately treated. While the greatest influence for high character among students is the unconscious influence of the teacher of high character, still, all teachers are not such men, and, if they were, law students are subject to outside influences, which they discuss and weigh against the influence of high character in the law school; and the opinions thus formed enter into the attitudes that determine their careers. Students are constantly comparing the money-making lawyer, the ambitious lawyer, with the lawyer of ideals; they are debating the advantages of a school which fits for immediate success, with a school which makes it more difficult for a young lawyer to get adjusted at the start, but makes it

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 230-233. (Quoted without foot-notes.)

⁵¹ Woods, *The Policeman and the Public*, 93.

⁵² Ross, *op. cit.*, 77. In addition to this instruction, some schools require students to do a certain amount of work for a legal aid society free of charge. This gives students experience in legal work and also in philanthropic work. (For instance, see Hunter, *Legal Aid in Chicago, The Family*, March, 1920, 5.)

possible for one who has it in him, in the long run to exert an influence for the progress of his profession. The changes in professional attitudes that are necessary for the proper functioning of the profession in a progressive society ought to be thoroughly discussed in every law school. And a student's fitness for his profession, from the point of view of the proper professional attitudes, ought to be more emphasized than it is, as one of the considerations in bestowing the law degree.

In addition to the training in professional ethics given in law and other professional schools, the general subject of professional ethics should be taught undergraduates in colleges and universities, and the ethics of each profession should be related to underlying social-psychological principles. Education ought to include a knowledge of what conduct to expect and require of lawyers, physicians, and other professional men. The obligation of professional standards would gain added force if backed by an intelligent public opinion. And public opinion, thus trained to recognize and insist upon definite standards of professional behaviour, would eventually extend this requirement to all the professions and semi-professions and to business and industry. Economic groups need to recognize their social responsibility, wherefore they should be held accountable by a trained public opinion. Eventually each group may develop a tradition of its relation to the whole, which may be handed down as is craft or professional knowledge.⁵³

⁵³ Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, 294.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN MEDICINE, DENTISTRY, AND ARCHITECTURE THE MEDICAL PROFESSION

THE medical profession is concerned with problems of illness, which require, above everything else, a careful diagnosis.

Every case the doctor visits in his daily rounds differs from every other. Even in epidemics the treatment of a case depends not only on the nature of the disease but also on the constitution of the patient. Hence the professional attitude of the physician is inductive and not deductive, as is that of the lawyer. Where life is to be saved the essential aim is not apt to be to preserve the authority of formulas that constitute the learning of a profession. The problems of the physician are such as to stir a keen intellectual interest, but his busy life, his frequent loss of sleep, the prolonged periods of work during the seasons when most illness occurs, make habits of intellectual thoroughness difficult to maintain. And, above all, the indifference of patients to the ultimate causes of an illness, their lack of self-control and common sense in avoiding illness, discourage a doctor from attempting to do more than help the patient over the immediate illness.

The work of the physician appeals also to the sympathetic disposition. His life is given to responding to calls for help and he is a friend in need. The pleasure of such service to be sure weakens as it becomes habitual and more or less mechanical, much as sympathetic behaviour in the family tends to become mechanical and less satisfying than doing good outside the family. Nevertheless there is a constant appeal to the sympathetic disposition not afforded by other professions. The physician's response to appeals would be more satisfying if patients and their families were less whimsical and more intelligent, for his aim is to get results and this requires that patients co-operate by following his directions. Also, patients seldom show

the proper gratitude for the faithful and conscientious service of a physician.

The work of the physician enlists the intellectual and sympathetic dispositions, nevertheless one finds plenty of physicians who are more alive to the financial returns than to medical problems. There is, also, in many physicians, a noticeable reaction against new ideas, a disposition to distrust young physicians entering the profession with new ideas. The rank and file of professional men generally seem to think it inconsistent with their *amour propre* to acknowledge that there is any professional knowledge worth knowing which they do not know. In addition to this rivalrous assertion of superiority and disposition to dominate those who question it, there is the fear of losing practice to the men with new ideas and methods, if once the public becomes convinced that the services of these men are superior.

The ethical code of the medical profession not only, like that of the legal profession, imposes restraints on individual rivalry, in the matter of advertising,¹ soliciting practice,² seeking the practice of another physician,³ indulging in personalities,⁴ but also enjoins free care of the sick poor⁵ and co-operation in the medical societies⁶ and on behalf of the public health.⁷ The co-operation of physicians is seen at its best in consultations. "In every consultation, the benefit to be derived by the patient is of first importance. All the physicians interested in the case should be frank and candid with a patient and his family. There never is occasion for insincerity, rivalry or envy and these should never be permitted between consultants."⁸ The purpose of a consultation is to bring about a co-operation of minds in the study of the causes of the illness and the action of remedies, not to get a verdict favourable to one or another of the parties to a controversy, as in the law. The rules for a consultation are intended to facilitate this end.⁹

In addition to the conflict of interests within the medical profession between egoistic and altruistic, conservative and progressive physicians, there is more or less conflict between the profession and the

¹ American Medical Association, *Principles of Medical Ethics*, Ch. I, Sec. 4.

² *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. I, Sec. 4.

³ *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. IV, Sec. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. IV, Sec. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. VI, Sec. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. I, Sec. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.* Ch. III, Secs. 1, 2.

⁸ *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. III, Sec. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.* Ch. II, Art. III, Secs. 3-8.

public. This is due to the popular distrust of physicians and to physicians' distrust of the people. The latter is due in part to the peculiar experience of physicians and in part to their own ignorance. They are in constant contact with human nature in its weakest and most apprehensive moments, and much of their contact is with the weakest, most stupid and unfit specimens of human nature. They find a sufficient explanation of the misfortunes of people in their own weaknesses and stupidities and are slow to take an interest in social or industrial causes of, and remedies for illness. From his specialized contact with people the physician thinks he understands human nature, and does in a superficial but not in a scientific way, as he understands medicine. Because he distrusts the power of self-control and the common sense of patients, he lacks the insight and skill to appeal to their self-control and instruct their common sense.¹⁰ His distrust also stands in the way of a proper consideration of the social and economic and psychological antecedents of the condition he is called on to diagnose.¹¹

As the ignorance of the physician causes a more extreme distrust of human nature than is warranted, so the ignorance of people causes a distrust of the physician. "Among the causes of the present distrust of medicine I would place . . . the appalling ignorance which people possess of their own bodies and their bodily processes. . . . Of how to maintain his health he thinks he knows much. . . . But if he has so little clear conception of what goes on within himself normally, how does he behave when disease comes. . . . He feels certain symptoms, but he does not understand their diagnostic significance. . . . He trusts blindly to the hope that if he neglects them they will pass away. If they persist, he diagnoses his own disease and attempts to treat it. . . . And so, from the beginning to the end, there is ignorance . . . of the body and of what the physician can do for it."¹² Owing to this ignorance the public fail to understand the problems of the physician and to appreciate the necessary uncertainties of diagnosis.¹³ Another cause of distrust of physicians is that little or no effort is made by them to educate the public in the care of their health; and the public infers from this lack of interest in the public health that physicians are interested in keeping the public in ignorance "in order to

¹⁰ Alexander, *Man's Supreme Inheritance*, Ch. V.

¹¹ Cabot, *Social Service and the Art of Healing*, 18-19; Cabot, *Social Work*, Chs. I-V.

¹² Lee, *Scientific Features of Modern Medicine*, 167-169.

¹³ *Ibid.* 169-170.

have something to do." Another cause of the popular distrust is that, in their relations with their patients, physicians are often not so frank as they should be. They do not frankly tell their patients what is the matter with them nor explain carefully why they should do as directed. The patient should be made to realize that he must co-operate with the physician and should feel in honour bound to do his best inasmuch as on the outcome of his case depends, in a measure, the reputation of the physician. However, the patient seldom looks at it from this point of view, but considers his relation with his physician merely a commercial one, and the physician seldom makes an effort to indicate to the family that he has any other relation in mind. Both on the side of the physicians and on the side of the public, therefore, there is ignorance and "traditional criticism"¹⁴ and distrust, where there might be, with the proper education, mutual understanding and co-operation.

The cultivation of high professional character in the medical profession should not be left to chance.¹⁵ Students are given a long grind of months in memorizing the names of muscles and other masses of facts, which they will soon forget, while the attitudes that will determine their efficiency are scarcely brought to their attention. To be sure, the strongest influence for the formation of right attitudes is the influence of great teachers; right attitudes are formed in the course of work as students, if it is directed by great teachers. But, in opposition to these influences, there are the contrary outside influences, the examples of physicians who are charging big fees and "making loads of money," the lack of interest in the public health and preventive measures on the part of physicians, except when they are driven to it in an emergency. These outside influences have a marked effect in determining the attitudes of students. Students are largely left to determine their own professional attitudes, and yet these are what will determine their professional careers and their reaction on society at large. More than one young physician's career has been marred initially, sometimes permanently, by lack of wise training in professional attitudes. He may err thoughtlessly from lack of training, and, when the lesson is learned, it may not happen again. It is to be regretted that these lessons are not learned in the school where other lessons are. It may be said that these lessons must be learned

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 157.

¹⁵ Ross, *op. cit.* 77.

by experience, but this cannot be accepted until a more serious effort has been made to reach them in the schools.

THE DENTAL PROFESSION

The dental profession, in its code of ethics, formulates rules to restrain rivalry for the sake of efficient work and the public welfare. As the public "are in most cases unable correctly to estimate the character of his operations, his own sense of right must guarantee faithfulness in their performance."¹⁶ The code requires the dentist not to advertise conspicuously,¹⁷ not to claim superiority over rival practitioners,¹⁸ and not to speak disparagingly of a rival.¹⁹ But the codes of both the physician and the dentist enjoin the practitioner to expose, without fear or favour before the proper professional or legal tribunal, corrupt or dishonest behaviour of a member of the profession.²⁰ This is rarely done in either profession.²¹ Nor do physicians or dentists frankly tell a patient of an injury or of poor work that they find has been done. The failure of reputable practitioners to expose those who have done disreputable work is contrary to the public welfare. However, in extenuation of this short-coming, it must be considered that many patients would assign a discreditable motive to a conscientious doctor's or dentist's exposure of the disreputable work of another. Many patients would infer that he was "running down" a rival in his own interest and would not take his criticism seriously. Doctor and dentist are, therefore, entitled to use their best judgment as to the patients to whom they should reveal defective work. As a matter of fact the prevailing practice is neither to disparage a rival nor to disclose poor work for the benefit of patients. Doctors and dentists often seem over-solicitous to avoid the appearance of professional jealousy.

As in the medical profession, so in dentistry, the rivalrous disposition tends to cause egoistic behaviour which is contrary to the public welfare. The rivalrous dentist works for money and a big practice and does much poor work; the conscientious dentist does only good work, for the satisfaction both of his intellectual disposition, which

¹⁶ National Dental Association, Code of Ethics, 1914, 34.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 35.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 35.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 35.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 37; American Medical Association, *op. cit.*, Ch. II, Art. I, Sec. 7.

²¹ On the failure of the medical profession see Hendrick, *How Should a Doctor Behave*, *The World's Work*, December, 1916, 215.

prompts him to "do the work right," and of his sympathy for the patient. No profession requires stronger conscientious impulses than dentistry, because of the comparatively small chance either of conscientious work being recognized by the patients, or of poor work being found out. For these reasons there is needed a thorough training in professional ethics in dental schools.

THE PROFESSION OF ARCHITECTURE

The code of ethics of the American Institute of Architects lays down rules intended to restrain the rivalrous and other egoistic impulses of architects and to encourage an intellectually conscientious performance of the obligations assumed. The work of the architect appeals especially to the intellectual impulses, for it requires an exercise of the constructive imagination and a variety of intellectual processes. And the business relations of the architect call for a judicious temper and the exercise of tact and for intellectual integrity of the highest order. For instance, while the immediate relation of the architect is to his client, when "a contract has been executed between his client and a contractor by the terms of which the architect becomes the official interpreter of its conditions and the judge of its performance, an additional relation is created under which it is incumbent upon the architect to side neither with client nor contractor, but to use his powers under the contract to enforce its faithful performance by both parties. The fact that the architect's payment comes from the client does not invalidate his obligation to act with impartiality to both parties."²² The architect thus requires, in his business relations as well as in his professional work, highly intellectual qualifications. To prevent the intellectual impulses being hampered by others, in which case he could not give his client disinterested advice, there is a variety of rules in the code that regulate his relations with clients, contractors and other architects. For instance, he should not engage in any of the building trades, and if he has any financial interest in any building material or device, he should not specify or use it without the knowledge and approval of his client; he should not receive any commission from a contractor; he should not advertise, nor attempt to supplant another architect, nor compete with a fellow architect by lowering charges, nor injure maliciously the professional reputation of a rival.²³ The code uses the

²² American Institute of Architects, *The Annuary*, 1916, 62.

²³ *Ibid.* 63-64.

term "fellow architect," not "rival," implying that a relation of friendliness rather than rivalry is the desirable relation between architects. One of the essential purposes of all professional associations is to develop an attitude of friendliness between the members of the profession so that this, instead of rivalry, shall be essential in their relations.

The analysis of professional relations has made it evident that different dispositions predominate in the behaviour of different professions. At the same time, men of various dispositions are found in every profession, so that there are tendencies to variation in the behaviour of all professions. It is possible, therefore, to point to exceptions to any generalizations which may be made as to vocational traits. Nevertheless, a profession does tend to select members whose dispositions fit them to find the practice of the profession satisfying. For instance, the law is essentially a rivalry of advocates and it selects men and women of a strong rivalrous disposition because rivalrous impulses find satisfaction in legal work. Whatever may be said of the theory that opposing lawyers are not really opponents, because each is trying to get justice for his client and an arrangement that is just for one is just for the other, the fact remains that the spirit of opposing counsel is quite different from that of physicians in consultation. Inasmuch as lawyers occupy perhaps the most conspicuous position in the leadership of the nation, this places the rivalrous disposition more conspicuously before the youth of the nation than the sympathetic and intellectual.

Though the law is an extremely rivalrous profession, all professions, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, are marked by rivalrous behaviour which the codes aim to regulate. There is only one way in which a profession can be made less extremely rivalrous and egoistic and more cognizant of its possible contributions to the public welfare, and that is by men of a sympathetic and intellectual disposition entering the profession, and by the force of their personality and convictions, doing something to raise the level. In spite of the tendency of men to select a profession congenial to their dispositions, which would, for instance, eliminate men of a sympathetic and intellectual disposition from the law, men of these dispositions are found in all professions, including the law, for there is no profession entirely congenial to men of such dispositions. Such men find the extremely rivalrous aspects of the law uncongenial, and their behaviour as lawyers has some tendency to change law and legal

procedure in a way to make the practice of law less obnoxious to sympathetic and intellectual impulses. If enough such men went into the law this development would become more marked. Likewise with other professions.

If life is not for working but working for life, for self-realization, then work, whether industrial, business or professional, should be such as to contribute to self-realization, for most of men's waking hours are spent in work. To this end there are two points to be borne in mind. First, the work should be made congenial to as wide a range of impulses as possible, particularly to the higher dispositions. But, in business, and to a lesser degree in the professions, under the money-making motive, the most vigorously rivalrous characters naturally make their way to the top, so that the action of the rivalrous disposition in business and professional activity is stimulated by the influence of the leaders. This condition works against a development of business and professional behaviour for a realization of the higher dispositions in the course of work. To combat this influence of the inordinately rivalrous characters, men animated by sympathetic and intellectual impulses should indulge these to the limit in their work and thus contribute toward making the behaviour of their vocational group afford a fuller satisfaction of those dispositions. This behaviour may be stimulated by fixing the attention on ideals of high-class business or professional practice, and reacting according to those ideals, instead of to the suggestions of the prevailing behaviour. This type of business or professional man is termed an idealist in that his behaviour is determined by ideals and not by business or professional practice.

The second point to be borne in mind is that industrial, business and professional work always will involve, predominantly, certain dispositions and mental processes at the expense of others. Work will never become play. No work will give the most fully satisfying play to the sympathetic and intellectual impulses. Business and professional men find problems coming at them so thick and fast that they cannot fully satisfy intellectual impulses in attention to any one problem. As one young business man said: "I find I want to go into our problems here more thoroughly than the occasion requires. What a man needs in this place is the practical sense to know just how thoroughly a thing needs to be done and to give it that much attention and no more." Nor does business and professional work

give thoroughly satisfying opportunities for the action of the sympathetic disposition. Every kind of work is bound to be somewhat narrowing from the point of view of the subconscious yearnings of the original nature. For instance, when a teacher talks with a busy physician, what is it that wells up within him? It is a desire to *do* things, to feel the more *active* side of life, to feel the joy of *doing good*. The physician, on the contrary, as he talks with the teacher, feels a longing for time to think. It is through social contacts, then, that men get what they fail to get in their work. Through these contacts they learn the undeveloped possibilities of their original nature. Work always will involve certain dispositions and mental processes at the expense of others, and recreation should afford opportunities for making good the deficiencies.

BOOK V

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN FAMILY
RELATIONS

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SEXES

THE attitudes of husband and wife are the essential influences in family relations. Their attitudes to one another, and their joint attitudes, or their respective attitudes, to the prevailing beliefs as to family relations determine, in part, the attitudes of the children. Mere familiarity, to say nothing of added sanctions, predisposes children to this influence.¹ Furthermore, the dispositional attitude of each parent to the children, which so largely determines children's attitudes to the parent, is quite apt to be similar to the attitude of that parent to the other. A man who is sympathetic toward his wife is quite apt to be sympathetic toward his children. A woman who selfishly ignores her husband for the pastimes of social rivalry is apt to ignore her children also.

The relations of husband and wife depend on the dispositions that determine their behaviour. The sexual bond is by no means necessarily essential in the relation. They may be comrades in acquisition of property or in social rivalry; or the husband may be the dominating figure in the family and the wife submissive; or their relation may be sympathetic, the wife acting in a maternal way toward the husband, and the husband perhaps similarly caring for the wife; or their sympathy may take the more intellectual form of an understanding interest in each other's problems. These possible relations are by no means mutually exclusive but denote merely what may be the predominant feature in the relation. A comradeship in acquisition or social rivalry would imply some degree of congeniality; the capacity for sympathy and understanding still more. On the other hand, instead of making for congeniality, their dispositions may be conflicting. Their impulses may be uncongenial. One may be for "saving," the other for "spending"; one may be for social rivalry and the other for the home pleasures; one may be sympathetic and the other selfish; one intellectual and the other impatient of all mental exertion. The number of possible combinations of uncongenial dispositions makes

¹ Cooley, *Social Organization*, 213.

the problem of family relations much more complicated than is ordinarily assumed.

The relation between husband and wife depends also on their intelligence and training. If both are intelligent and have been properly trained for the responsibilities of married life, the training will have developed a conception of a rational social order for the family, particularly that perfect congeniality is so rare that the practicable ideal is one of mutual adjustment; that this requires a control of personal impulses and the meeting of problems of personal relations that arise as problems that are to be discussed impersonally and with perfect frankness; that the attitude of one to the other must be one of comrades in an enterprise in which each is to think first of the welfare of the family, and of the larger society for which the family exists, not of himself or herself. This rational point of view is contrary to that of traditional family relations. The remainder of the present chapter will be devoted to the traditional relations. The next chapter will have to do with conflicts of dispositions and the basis of congeniality, and the next with the rational point of view and conditions that oppose it.

The wife traditionally has been subservient to the authority of the husband. Consequently in case of conflict due to uncongenial dispositions, or to different tastes developed by similar dispositions, the husband has been in a position to enforce his desires. Owing to his position of authority, he has not realized the necessity of mutual adjustment; he has been encouraged not to make of conflicts problems to which both are to take an intellectual attitude, not to forget self and consider problems from the point of view of a rational social purpose, but to settle conflicts in a way that satisfied his own desires.

This relation of masculine domination and feminine submission has a sexual origin.² To dominate the female is a part of the sexual disposition of the male.³ To admire and submit to the male is a part of the sexual disposition of the female. She admires the strong and successful fighter, the soldier, the protector, and submits to his domination. This admiration and submission causes the male to be habitually in an indulgent mood toward his female.⁴ The wife soon learns that the more adroitly she manifests her submission and stirs the indulgent mood, the more successful she is in attaining ends for which she needs

² Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I: 657.

³ Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, 117-133.

⁴ Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 238-239.

male assistance. In so far as the indulgent mood of the male springs from satisfied sexual domination, in which mood he may seek to do things for his mate which give her pleasure, the indulgence is incidental to a satisfied egoistic motive and the relation is essentially egoistic. It is in the parental rather than the conjugal relation that we find sympathy pronounced.

Masculine domination, because of its connection with the sexual disposition, has exaggerated the sexual aspect of the relation between husband and wife. This has made the marriage relation unstable, first, because domination requires a submission that involves repression of impulses that cry for satisfaction, and so weakens the wife's attachment,⁵ and, second, because the sexual disposition is attracted by novelty, wherefore, familiarity destroys the husband's attachment.⁶

Masculine domination is strengthened among human beings by conditions that have accentuated the power of the male over the female. Among primitive peoples man's superior aggressiveness made the most dangerous occupations, war and hunting, male occupations, in the course of which he acquired skill in the use of weapons, and could use them on the women when his own strength was insufficient. Also, women were weaker than men, at least during menstruation, pregnancy and the suckling period.⁷ Man still further strengthened his domination by acting as woman's protector against enemies in war; and one of the arguments that has been most persistently advanced against the political equality of men and women is that women cannot fight in war and must have men's protection. Primitive man strengthened his domination, also, by claiming exclusive possession of supernatural power and excluding woman from religious rites.⁸ In these ways man maintained the mastery of woman and used her to do the drudgery, and often treated her brutally.⁹ Among primitive peoples, a man who lacked the strength or nerve to dominate his wife incurred the contempt of the community as a weak-

⁵ This is one of the most common causes of unhappiness in conjugal relations, and of divorce. "The wife more frequently than the husband is seeking in divorce a release from marital ills; for in her case it often involves an escape from sexual slavery. The divorce movement, therefore, is in part an expression of woman's growing independence." (Howard, *The History of Matrimonial Institutions*, III: 250.)

⁶ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, II: 372.

⁷ Among primitive peoples, "The child is frequently suckled from four to five years, and occasionally from ten to twelve." (Thomas, *op. cit.*, 56.)

⁸ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I: 663-666.

⁹ Thomas, *op. cit.*, 77.

ling, which reflected on the woman as his wife; wherefore women often refrained from resisting and punishing husbands who abused them. Woman developed the patient, enduring qualities, and accepted man's ideas as to her inferiority and duty to obey.

Thinkers have raised the question: If man is so superior to woman why has he through the ages been so persistent in asserting his superiority? The reasons would seem to be, first, that the rivalrous disposition is not satisfied unless superiority is recognized, wherefore men have constantly asserted and displayed their superiority before women from whom recognition is so easily gained; second, that those who are superior are solicitous for their position and suspicious of every manifestation among the inferior that suggests a desire to excel, and are, therefore, constantly asserting their superiority. But this explanation does not satisfy certain thinkers who maintain that the reason man has so persistently asserted his superiority is that he is really inferior to woman (because woman has the supreme function of child-bearer), and realizes his inferiority, and tries to conceal it by persistent assertions of superiority. These thinkers admit, however, that, whatever his motive for asserting his superiority, he has asserted it with such force that women have acquiesced and that "Probably the majority of women in such countries as England and America still believe in male superiority in a vague sort of way at least. . . ." ¹⁰ The continued dominance of the male is due to the tradition of male superiority and to certain dominant positions which he still occupies. He usually is bread-winner and property owner. He is the directing force in business and the professions, in politics, and in education.

He still has the determining voice as to sexual relations. This is the reverse of the relation between male and female among animals. Among animals "it is the female who has the chief voice in the establishment of sexual relationships. The males compete for the favour of the female by the fascination of their odour, or brilliant colour, or song, or grace, or strength, as revealed in what are usually mock-combats. The female is, in these respects, comparatively unaccomplished and comparatively passive. With her rests the final decision, and only after long hesitation . . . she calls the male of her choice. . . . In civilized man, on the other hand, as we know him, the situation is to some extent reversed; it is the woman who, by display of her attractions, competes for the favour of the man. The final invitation does

¹⁰ Davenport, *The Sex of the Inferiority Complex*, *New Republic*, Oct. 12, 1921, 186.

not come, as among animals generally, from the female; the decision rests with the man. It would be a mistake to suppose that this change reveals the evolution of a superior method . . . it has clearly had its origin in economic causes. The demands of nutrition have overridden those of reproduction; sexual selection has, to a large extent, given place to natural selection, a process clearly not for the advantage of the race. The changing status of women, in bestowing economic independence, will certainly tend to restore to sexual selection its due weight in human development.”¹¹

This change in the relation of male and female has obtained everywhere among primitive people;¹² and it was accentuated by the development of private property. With the rise of pastoral and agricultural industry, man’s control of woman was riveted by the buying of women in exchange for property.¹³ Girls were valued according to the property they would exchange for, and they accepted the male view and were proud to bring the father a high bride price and to acknowledge the ownership of the husband.¹⁴ With property a man bought a wife for his son with an eye to her usefulness as a servant in the house. The essential relation of the young wife was one of submission to her husband’s parents. This is the prevailing relation in a large part of Asia and in eastern Europe today,¹⁵ and the tradition of it persists “even today among the so-called Latin nations, notably in the French tradition (now dying out) of treating marriage as a relationship to be arranged, not by the two parties themselves, but by their parents and guardians. . . .”¹⁶ The subjection of boys as well as girls to parents survives in France to the present time in the form of a variety of beliefs as to filial duty.¹⁷

Under male domination, whatever property might fall to a woman belonged to her husband.¹⁸ In the feudal régime, “the husband was chosen by the father or suzerain, and the feeling of the young girl to be married was not consulted in any way. The feudal heiress passively received the knight or baron who was destined for her. She

¹¹ Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, 59-60.

¹² For instance, among the native tribes of Australia and Tasmania, the older men monopolized the girls and the young men had to take up with widows until they were old enough to have a young girl. (Thomas, *op. cit.*, 178-181.)

¹³ Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, 390-402; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, I: Ch. V.

¹⁴ Summer, *Folkways*, 109-110.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 366-367; Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, Ch. VII.

¹⁶ Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, 115.

¹⁷ Wendell, *The France of Today*, 129.

¹⁸ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, II: 30.

was, in a sense, absorbed in the estate and the castle; she formed a part of the real estate; she passed with the land to the one who was to possess it, and her consent mattered little.”¹⁹ Among the peasantry of the Middle Ages, husbands, “were gross and brutal, treating their wives like beasts of burden.”²⁰ This condition survives in certain parts of Europe today.

With the growth of cities and of a middle class of tradesmen and artisans, young men were freed from subservience to parents because they could earn their living independently, and the result was freer choice in marriage. But the dependence of the wife on the husband’s support continued as before. “In England, before 1857, even a man who had abandoned his wife and left her unaided to support his family might at any time return to appropriate her earnings and to sell everything she had acquired, and he might again and again desert her, and again and again repeat the process of spoliation. In 1870 a law was passed securing to women the legal control of their own earnings, but all other female property, with some insignificant exceptions, was left absolutely unprotected. And it was not until the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 that a full right to their own property was given to English wives.”²¹

The economic dependence and submission of women have continued to the present day. “In both England and the United States notable progress has already been made in equalizing the property rights of the sexes; but the process is yet far from complete. . . . Girls are trained, or they are forced by poverty, to look upon wedlock as an economic vocation, as a means of getting a living. The result is that under the old order marriage tends to become a species of purchase-contract in which the woman barter her sex-capital to the man in exchange for a life support. The man—not the woman as originally—has become the chooser in sex-selection.”²² This attitude of man and of woman to marriage must be considered in interpreting economic facts, for instance, the wages of women. Women expect to marry and hence are willing to accept lower wages than men. Furthermore, married women who work usually rely also on the wages of the husband to supplement their own in supporting the family and so demand less wages than if the entire support of the family devolved on

¹⁹ Krehbiel, *Luchaire’s Social France at the Time of Philip Augustus*, 357.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 398.

²¹ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, II: 30-31.

²² Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, III: 248-249.

them. Again, because of their long dependence on man, women are more timid and less resolute in demanding higher wages and in organizing for that purpose than are men. And because of their long attitude of domination to women as well as because of the difficulty, owing to the above conditions, of developing in woman a vigorous union spirit, workmen are not inclined to accept them as fellow workers on equal terms and as entitled to the support of organized labour in attempts to raise wages.²³ All this is a result of the traditional economic dependance of woman. "Indeed, from an economic standpoint, marriage for a woman is in some respects analagous to an occupation for a man; . . . The resemblance is twofold. Through marriage, as from an occupation, a woman usually secures at least a livelihood and perhaps the enjoyment of wealth and luxury; and again, marriage, like an occupation, normally imposes upon a woman certain duties and responsibilities. . . ."²⁴ In countries where many young women inherit considerable property, as in the United States, the customary masculine domination is weakened and there are many instances of feminine domination, particularly when a woman with money marries a man with none.

With the increasing rivalry for superiority in accumulation of property, questions of property are coming to have more and more influence, in the middle and upper classes, in determining unions. If a young man has property, his inability to satisfy the sympathetic and other higher impulses of the woman is not apt to be noticed by her or her parents so long as her attention and theirs are on his property. The propertied young woman or one who has prospects of inheriting some money likewise attracts the ambitious young man. The self-deception practised from the impulse for property, leading to marriages for property, is one of the essential causes of the disintegration of the family.²⁵ The evil may be less but still exists when women marry merely "for a home." Men and women find that the mercenary marriage brings none of that varied satisfaction which their original natures crave in a relation so very intimate. The result is silent and subconscious discontent, with occasional cases of acute suffering, which may ultimately lead to breaking the unnatural bonds.

Female submission to masculine domination has profoundly affected the character of woman. Submission results in ignorance, lack of

²³ Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 189-190.

²⁴ Bureau of the Census, *Statistics of Women at Work*, 1900, 11.

²⁵ Hobson, *Work and Wealth*, 318-319.

intellectual and physical initiative,—a condition of general inferiority that incurs contempt. Shameful acceptance of the contempt with a passive sense of inferiority still further accentuates the lack of initiative. This is one reason for the conservatism of woman. The masculine contempt for woman has isolated woman, because men were averse to associating with women, owing to the fact that to be seen with a contemned person or class incurs contempt. This condition gave rise, among primitive peoples, to many restrictions on intercourse between men and women, which survive among backward peoples.²⁶ The same impulsive relation of man to woman continues, though less extreme, among all peoples and is one reason for men's aversion to associating with women in industry, in politics, in the professions and in education. Another reason is the impulse of men to preserve their superiority and dominating position by keeping women out of industry, politics, the professions and from educational privileges. In the past women generally accepted the male ideas of their inferiority and of the disgrace to men and women alike of women going into industry or the professions or into politics. The tendency of members of a submissive class is to seek the favour of the dominating class by magnifying its power, accepting its beliefs, and so magnifying their own weakness and submission. Hence, the tendency of a relation of domination-submission, once established, to differentiate the sexes far more than exists in original nature.²⁷

Man's contempt for woman has been intensified by superstitions. As these have been dispelled by the progress of science, contempt has diminished and woman's shameful acceptance of contempt has

²⁶ Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, 183; Burton, *The Education of Women in China*, 189.

²⁷ Thus, "It appears that if the primary sex characters—the instincts directly related to courtship, love, child-bearing, and nursing—are left out of account, the average man differs from the average woman far less than many men differ one from another.

"In no trait of those studied has a gap been found between the distributions for the two sexes. The upper extreme of one sex always overlaps the lower extreme of the other. Some girls like to fight better than some boys; some men are fonder of babies than some women.

"The overlapping is, in most of the traits studied, very great. For example, popular belief would perhaps select as impressive sex differences the greater originality, activity, independence, and frankness of the male, and the greater emotionality, interest in personal appearance, and religiousness of the female. These are indeed probably among the largest sex differences. But . . . Nearly all women are more original than the least original man, and probably over a third of women are more original than the average man. Nearly all men are more religious than the least religious woman, and probably about a third are more religious than the average woman." (Thorndike, *Individuality*, 30-31.)

changed to resentment of it. For instance, among primitive peoples men did not understand the psychological significance of many of their aversions, and gave them a superstitious interpretation. Women were said to be permeated with a baneful magic which would contaminate man or his belongings if he was too closely associated with them.²⁸ This superstition caused girls to be confined during the period of adolescence, caused women to be secluded at child-birth until after the rites of purification, and to be excluded from religious ceremonies because, being shunned by men, it followed that they were shunned also by the gods.²⁹ In the Middle Ages women sat or stood in the church apart from the men, entered by a separate door, were not allowed to sing in the choir, were enjoined not to come near the altar or other holy places of the church and were not allowed to speak in church.³⁰ This superstition persists in the behavior of the Church of England to the present day,³¹ though the primitive aversion to women as unclean has passed away.

Under the attitude of masculine domination man has attempted to monopolize the three great symbols of power, property, political power and education. We have already noted his monopoly of property. His dominating attitude in connection with political rights is seen in his set opposition to extending those rights to women, justified by secondary explanations, which, however follow the reaction instead of determining it so that refuting them does not change it. Of this type of opponents of woman suffrage it is said: "Their attitude is particularly interesting, being quite uncolored by political considerations or ulterior motives. It is difficult to get expressions of their opinion, for they are seldom given voluntarily and must be sought out. . . .

²⁸ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I: 663-668.

²⁹ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I: 664.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 665-666.

³¹ In 1916, in England, "A National Mission was decided upon—what we in America would call a series of revival services—and one of the principles which it was designed to emphasize was, in the words of the Council of the Mission, 'the equality of men and women in the sight of God—equality in privilege, equality in calling, equality in opportunity of service.' This sounds harmless enough to American ears . . . but the High Church wing of the Established Church rose in wrath and denounced it as 'pestilential heresy.' . . .

"Most of the bishops refused to allow the women to speak in the churches under any circumstances, but the Bishop of London rashly consented to permit them to address congregations of women and girls only, providing that they did not speak from the pulpit, the lectern or the chancel steps. . . . But slight as this concession was the Bishop of London was obliged to retract it because the High Churchmen threatened to strike and not take any part in the mission. . . ." (Independent, Sept. 18, 1916, 401.)

"This group is more or less out of sympathy with the whole woman's movement and the demands for equality. It holds that women are demanding what all the power of man could not grant. It maintains that woman is dependent whether she likes it or not, and all the laws that could be written never would alter the fact. In the plant, animal, and human kingdoms alike, in all the fundamental, instinctive family relations, the female is bound in the very nature of things to be dependent . . . the male creature is always the leader, the protector, and the ruler of his kind. An act of Congress, it maintains, will not alter the fact that women instinctively seek and glory in the protection of men, that men will lead, will control and dominate and rule, and that normal women will be content with the masterful domination of their men; . . ." ³² These secondary explanations of the dominating attitude are not reasons for opposition to woman suffrage but justifications of an attitude that exists prior to reasons.

As man's persistent monopoly of political power springs from masculine domination, so the essential cause of woman's demand for the suffrage was, in the first instance, her attitude of resistance. For instance, the Woman's Rights Convention, held at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848, passed resolutions as follows: "Whereas, the great precept of nature is conceded to be, that 'man shall pursue his own true and substantial happiness,' . . . therefore:

1 Resolved, That such laws as conflict in any way with the true and substantial happiness of woman, are contrary to the great precept of nature and of no validity, for this is 'superior in obligation to any other.'

2 Resolved, That all laws which . . . place her in a position inferior to that of man are contrary to the great precept of nature, and therefore of no force or authority.

3 Resolved, That woman is man's equal—was intended to be so by the Creator, and the highest good of the race demands that she be recognized as such." ³³ Then follow resolutions condemning the dual standard of morality, declaring for political equality and for an equal participation of women with men "in the various trades, professions and commerce," and asserting the right and duty of women to write and speak publicly on behalf of every righteous cause and to occupy the pulpit. These resolutions express woman's attitude of re-

³² Porter, *A History of Suffrage in the United States*, 249-250.

³³ Quoted in the Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1908, 7-8.

sistance to man's assumption of superiority and especially to certain aspects of this,—his claim to exclusive political power, to an exclusive right to speak in public, to an exclusive right to participate in industry and the professions; the latter involves resistance to his claim to an exclusive right to higher education. The reasons given for the resistance are secondary explanations, particularly that woman is by the law of nature and the intention of the Creator "man's equal," therefore all laws which place her in an inferior position "are contrary to the great precept of nature." This doctrine of natural rights is a justification of an attitude of resistance existing prior to and independently of the justification.

Under the attitude of masculine domination man has attempted, also, to monopolize education.³⁴ In the United States the movement for the education of women was opposed because men regarded education as their own exclusive right and women were said to unsex themselves by aspiring to learning. For this reason when Mary Lyon began her agitation for the higher education of women in Massachusetts, she "was handicapped by not being able to get at her object directly; etiquette required a woman to be seen, not heard. The propriety of opening her lips, even at a prayer-meeting, agitated the thirties in pamphlet discussion. Miss Lyon's experience . . . had taught her . . . the greater chance of success . . . for a scheme which appeared to originate with men. Otherwise, as she remarked to Miss Grant, 'many good men will fear the effect on society of so much female influence, and what they will call female greatness.'"³⁵

The justifications of this phase of the attitude of masculine domination were numerous. The higher education of women "was an innovation uncalled for, unheard of until now since the foundation of the world, and unthought of now except by a few strong-minded women and radical men, who would level all distinctions and overturn the foundations of the family, of society, of the church, and of the state. It was unnatural, unphilosophical, unscriptural, unpractical and impracticable, unfeminine and anti-Christian; in short all the epithets in the dictionary that begin with *un* and *in* and *anti* were hurled against it and heaped upon it. Had not Paul said, 'I suffer not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence; and if they will learn anything let them ask their husbands at home'? It would be the entering wedge to woman's preaching, practising, lec-

³⁴ Ross, op. cit., 203.

³⁵ Gilchrist, *The life of Mary Lyon*, 183-184.

turing, voting, ruling, buying and selling, doing everything that men do and perhaps doing it better . . . and so overstocking all the trades and professions . . . such occupations as mathematics and philosophy were not suited to the tastes or the capacities of women . . . would ruin their health, impair their gentleness . . . unsex them, and unfit them for their proper sphere.”³⁶ These explanations imply the motive of man’s opposition to the higher education of woman; a symbol of superiority would no longer belong to him exclusively; women would cease to be gentle and submissive if they acquired this superiority, and might even become more efficient in certain lines than men.

The education of woman in the United States has been determined by at least three distinct motives. The sex motive to excel in feminine attractiveness led to the finishing school education with its music, languages, literature and manners, which produced the “accomplished young lady.” The motive to escape a position of inferiority and become equal to man led to the women’s college with its emphasis on a curriculum exactly like that of the men’s college. The motive to prepare for life led to the modification of this curriculum in the direction of studies that prepare women for life, including preparation to enable them to earn a living. The first type of education is approved by many parents because such an education is thought to enable daughters to get a superior husband. The second type is approved because the family acquires prestige by having a girl who is “smart enough” to go to a college of high standards. The third type is approved because it prepares girls for life.

The motive of education with which we are concerned here is that of resistance to man’s claim to superiority. Man’s impulse to maintain his superior position, his professed contempt for woman’s capacity for education, his fear of the competition of women in industry and the professions, combined to cause a strong opposition to the education of women. This opposition was ameliorated, in the case of many men, by sympathy with the aspirations of women. Nevertheless, even men who were too high-minded to share the conventional attitude of contempt feared the effect of the competition of women. Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman admitted to a complete medical education, found that the chief motive for medical men’s opposition to women’s entering the profession was their fear of the rivalry of

³⁶ *Ibid.* 229-230.

women. "The fear of successful rivalry which at that time often existed in the medical mind was expressed by the dean of one of the smaller schools, who frankly replied to the application, 'You cannot expect us to furnish you with a stick to break our heads with'; so revolutionary seemed the attempt of a woman to leave a subordinate position and seek to obtain a complete medical education. A similarly mistaken notion of the rapid practical success which would attend a lady doctor was shown later by one of the professors of my medical college, who was desirous of entering into partnership with me on condition of sharing profits over 5,000 dollars on my first year's practice."³⁷

Woman's resistance to masculine domination is in line with social self-realization because the submission of one half of the human race to the other half is contrary to the health and self-realization of women and their posterity. "Human nature was made for action; and perhaps the most distressing and disconcerting situation which confronts it is to be played on by stimulations without the ability to function. The mere superinducing of passivity, as in the extreme case of solitary confinement, is sufficient to produce insanity; and the emotion of dread, or passive fear, is said to be the most painful of emotions, because there is no possibility of relief by action. Modern woman is in a similar condition of constraint and unrest, which produces organic ravages for which no luxury can compensate. . . . Many women, more intelligent and energetic than their husbands and brothers, have no more serious occupations than to play the house-cat, with or without ornament. It is a wonder that more of them do not lose their minds; and that more of them do not break with the system entirely is due solely to the inhibitive effects of early habit and suggestion."³⁸ Shut out from practical affairs and reared in the idea that, in order to "hold" her husband she must be an obedient and devoted wife, the young wife thinks she must keep her husband constantly in mind and the monotony of this fixation of attention wearies her and makes her unhappy. Furthermore, having no variety of practical interests, she becomes extremely emotional. With her attention on her husband, she becomes vividly conscious of his changing emotional states and, failing to understand them, makes false interpretations. Her attention rests also on the different varieties of her own feelings.

³⁷ Blackwell, *Pioneer Work in Opening the Medical Profession to Women*, 61.

³⁸ Thomas, *op. cit.*, 239-240.

This situation has so differentiated emotional woman from practical man that many men declare that they cannot understand women and have no patience with their moods.

The traditional position of woman is contrary to the welfare of woman and, therefore, to the public welfare. The result is a conflict between men who stand for their traditional rights and those who seek those changes in family relations and in the social attitude to women that will give them ample opportunities for self-development. The argument against the movement that the majority of women are indifferent to it is not vital, because the indifference of women and their ready acquiescence in existing conditions are just what we should expect from their long submission. Submission includes suggestibility to man's ideas as to what constitutes woman's welfare. The acquisition of property and political rights, of industrial and educational opportunities was achieved while the rank and file of women were indifferent to the acquisition of those rights and opportunities, because suggestible to the traditional ideas as to woman's duties. However, among the women of the more highly civilized countries, submission is less abject than formerly. Women in general willingly submit when male control does not involve personal hardship, because to defer to man pleases him, makes sure of him and reassures her. She cannot but realize that the bearing and care of children falls on her, wherefore she likes to feel that other responsibilities, those of protector and provider, are carried by one of whose loyalty she is perfectly certain. Where his authority does not involve hardship, it is, therefore, gladly acquiesced in. But hardship is more apt to cause resentment than formerly. There is resentment on account of sexual domination which weakens both man and woman physically, mentally and morally; resentment on account of economic domination—the man "carrying the purse" and determining how the family income shall be spent. There is resentment on account of the domination and petty exploitation practised by employers against their female employés; resentment on account of laws which fail to give women equal protection with men, and equal wages for the same work. There is no doubt of the increasing female resentment on account of the lax enforcement of laws against vicious resorts which increase the danger of wives contracting venereal diseases. Women have, from the beginning, showed resentment where submission caused suffering, but, otherwise, they have been submissive and conservative, and have shown

little interest in their own advancement. Here as elsewhere in social organization, the advancement has been wrought by a progressive leadership, including both men and women of extraordinary sympathy and intellect and power of resistance.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BASIS OF CONGENIALITY

WHATEVER the particular conscious motives with which people enter the married state, most of them probably have a subconscious undercurrent of expectation of fuller opportunities for self-development. Does marriage offer opportunities for the development of personality not offered by the single state? The satisfaction of several of the dispositions is facilitated by marriage. States of fear and depression are most readily escaped by living intimately with one who may detect such states when the other is hardly conscious of them, and who may suggest courage, hopefulness and cheer. The sympathetic disposition is encouraged by living with a good comrade, whose unselfishness and willingness to help always can be relied on. The intellectual disposition, also, is satisfied by the intimacy of married life. In the fellowship of kindred minds each understands the mental processes of the other and nothing enables one to give and to receive enlightenment as does this intimate mutual understanding. The immense satisfaction of the clarification of a problem is associated with the other who contributed the illuminating suggestions, and this satisfaction enters into and enlarges the attitude of affection. In like manner experiences of the strengthening effect of a courageous personality, and of good comradeship are associated with the one who is a part of such experiences, and these various and repeated experiences of personal development through the marriage relation lay the basis of a constantly deepening affection.

The development of personality requires not only realization of satisfaction of insistent dispositions through contact with the other but also the continuance of anticipation. A young couple need to continue to dream, as they did before marriage, and to find in each other encouragement in dreaming. Too great intimacy, strange as it may seem, discourages anticipation for it tends to repress the personality of each. Aspiration requires a sense of freedom, wherefore each must cultivate respect for the individuality of the other. An under-

standing sympathy will avoid the extreme familiarity that masculine domination and sexual jealousy insist on.

Development of personality in the marriage relation requires that the traditional relation between husband and wife be renounced. Development is impossible in a relation (1) in which the right of one to the satisfaction of any one instinct at the expense of the other is maintained, or (2) in which the male assumes that the female is economically dependent on him and that the burden of sacrifice should therefore fall on her,¹ or (3) in which it is assumed that the male alone is capable of self-development, wherefore the part of the female is to manifest the sympathy which contributes to that end. The traditional relation is apt abruptly to bring to an end the anticipation of romantic love, as the wife finds her attention constantly occupied with the growing family, and the husband faces the stern economic necessity of an increasing number to feed and clothe. As parents lay this burden on themselves, usually with little or no thought, they become capable of great self-sacrifice because their anticipations are centred in their children. But self-sacrifice usually falls more largely on the mother than the father, because he expects it of her and because she is apt to be more solicitous for and more constant in her care of the children. The advent of children should not be determined solely by the instinct of the male or of the female, but should be subordinated to the mutual development of personality of both as the essential purpose of marriage.

The realization of this purpose requires, in addition to a clear conception of it, some congeniality, and some sympathy on the part of both husband and wife. Congeniality means that the dispositions and attitudes of each are such that each satisfies through association with the other a wide range of impulses. Congeniality is not sympathy though it facilitates it. Sympathy is the disposition to find satisfaction in the happiness of another. Both husband and wife may be weak in this disposition and still be congenial in their egoism. For instance, two people may have a strong acquisitive disposition and be very thrifty and take great satisfaction in their joint savings and still have little sympathy. In fact they may be very hard in their requirements of each other and their conception of the purpose of the family may fall far short of development of personality.

Though congeniality is not the only requirement, it is essential and

¹ Parsons, *Social Rule*, 55-57.

its importance often is overlooked. For instance, a wife who enjoys dressing for display will not feel congenial with a husband who is averse to display, who does not enjoy displaying a fashionable wife, who, in fact, dislikes people who enjoy display. The instinct for display is not satisfied by making the display, but by seeing it produce its desired social effect, and is annoyed by failure to produce that effect. It is, therefore, impossible for a woman with a strong impulse for display to be happy, in the intimate relations of family life, with a husband of a contrary disposition. She is annoyed by her husband's companionship, and he is annoyed by that of his wife. These dispositional traits are essential; they persist through life and determine congeniality; if not satisfied, the marriage is bound to be more or less unhappy. Uncongenial married people may worry along or "get along," as they say, but there is a vast difference between getting along and being supremely happy together.

Uncongeniality may be due to a difference in tastes in connection with the satisfaction of the same disposition or to a more radical difference in disposition. As an illustration of difference in tastes, a wife may enjoy dressing for display while a husband may enjoy learning for display. He may give a good deal of time to reading in order to be known as a "well read man," while she devotes her time and money to clothes in order to be known as a "well dressed woman." As an illustration of difference in disposition, one may be acquisitive and "saving" and the other may be for spending; one may be rivalrous and the other contented with a life of obscure well-doing. Opposition of dispositions may, likewise, divide brothers and sisters.²

Uncongeniality is due not only to opposite dispositions but also to opposite attitudes owing to difference of social class. A woman may

² For instance, *The Survey* published a letter which a sister of a manufacturer sent to a leader of the striking workmen in her brother's company, as follows: "It may not be of any importance to the striking . . . people what one member of the family believes about the present industrial condition, but I feel sure that I must at least give my testimony.

"I am sure that my brother believes, and he is encouraged to believe it by his business associates, that he is a good and generous employer, but that cannot hide the fact that the . . . family is gaining every year enormous sums of moneys from the labors of others without anything like commensurate returns to society for it.

"That is a sufficient evil in itself, but besides that we have through our organization a power over the lives of the employés that is intolerable in modern society.

"For that reason I believe that the strike for the unionization of the . . . Company is absolutely wise and right, and the gradual assuming of control of their lives by the workers in the . . . Company, is and must be only a question of time." ("Theory and Practice," *The Survey*, Aug. 23, 1919, 751.)

feel personally congenial with a man and marry him because of this sense of congeniality, and then come to dislike him as she becomes better acquainted with him and discerns the points of view of one reared in a lower class. For instance, his ideas as to simple food and house furnishings, as to the nobility of gainful work for man and woman alike, may stir her aversion. She may find herself alternately incensed with his ideas and then remorseful as she realizes this or that point of congeniality. Similarly he may be stirred with dislike for her upper class ideas, and incensed because of her contempt for his ideas as those of a lower class, and then may appreciate this and that evidence of congeniality. This incompatibility of two people personally congenial but divided by class antagonism may become evident to both of them only gradually, and would not be fatal to happiness if both had sufficient common sense to revise their social valuations.

The problem of two young people who find themselves attracted to each other is to ascertain in how far they are congenial, in disposition and in social attitudes. A high degree of likeness of essential dispositions does not necessarily imply a type of congeniality that conduces to the highest happiness. Congeniality is more perfect when the dispositions which are weak and which one seeks to have strengthened in oneself are strong in another. For instance, a man of strong intellectual disposition may desire to cultivate a greater capacity for sympathy and appreciation. He may feel that his intellect will not come so near to being worn threadbare if he is influenced to feel and act sympathetically. Therefore, a woman of a strong sympathetic disposition is potentially congenial to him. If such a woman has an impulse to cultivate an intellectual attitude, if she desires to become less impressionistic in judgment and seeks encouragement in more careful and sensible attention to the problems of life, then the man to whom she is potentially congenial will be potentially congenial to her. They will understand and appreciate each other. This is the most secure basis for marital happiness.

One of the essential conditions of such congeniality is freedom of choice of a mate. Choice may then be determined by the requirements of the nature as a whole, and not by some socially goaded impulse, as social rivalry that prompts to marriage for wealth, position or other symbol of superiority. Another essential condition is the education of boys and girls in this branch of social psychology. The psychological knowledge required is simple and the importance of the subject fundamental. Thus instructed in the public school, young

people would be in a better position to appreciate the importance of congeniality. As it is, this fundamental question of fitness scarcely enters the heads of the young. Occasionally a wise parent is able to impress a son or daughter with the necessity of bringing up the question of congeniality, and the boy or girl finds himself or herself for the first time considering what are his or her fundamental dispositions, and inquiring whether these are such as will adapt him or her to a life of intimate contact with the other. One is forced to self-examination when it is a question of whether one is capable of a life-long intimate and congenial comradeship with another. Such self-examination, if it is to be intelligently made, requires a knowledge of social psychology.

Although most people have no such education, because public education does nothing along this line, yet young people generally have a subconscious sense of a nature which must be considered if they are to be happy in married life. In the courtship of young people of average refinement, each feels the effect on his or her nature of the personality of the other, and reflects whether it is fully satisfying. Why does a man love a particular woman who does not appeal to other men? Because his nature differs from that of others, and he finds the particular woman satisfying to his particular nature. The apparent fickleness of many young people is due to the fact that none of their "affairs" have been entirely satisfying. The youth is still looking for the "ideal" woman, or the girl for the "ideal" man. Because the ideal is a matter of subconscious satisfaction, it is none the less essential, and an approximation to it is necessary for happiness in married life. The case for early marriage, from the psychological standpoint, lies in the fact that, if married early, the nature of each is still plastic and there is a greater possibility of congeniality than later when the characteristic attitudes have become fixed. On the other hand, if marriage is delayed until the character is formed, then both the man and the woman are more sure of what their natures are and of the kind of person with whom they will be congenial.

The conditions of courtship are not favourable to a wise decision as to congeniality because the impulses active in courtship and which determine conclusions as to congeniality at the time are apt to become subordinate after marriage to others which are hardly felt in courtship. Courtship is more or less exciting and, if the various impulses of courtship are satisfied—the impulses to

give and crave admiration, deference, caresses—, each is apt to feel that the other will be entirely satisfying after marriage, and is not apt to reflect on the entirely different ways in which each must be satisfying to the other. The man realizes only those impulses and desires of the woman which harmonize with his own and she realizes only those of his impulses and desires which harmonize with her own. If differences in characteristic impulses are plain, these are apt to be ignored. Or they are interpreted in an egoistic way. The rivalrous woman is attracted to the intellectual man, in spite of lack of congeniality, because she imagines a marriage with him will offer her a career. The intellectual man is attracted to the rivalrous woman of wealth because he imagines a marriage with her will give him leisure for intellectual pursuits. Evidently such a union will have little of the congeniality that is necessary for happiness in a relation of life-long closest intimacy.

Very often the reason why the other seems congenial lies not in a wide basis of congeniality but in some narrow impulsive attachment.³ For instance, submissive women appeal to dominating men because they satisfy the dominating impulse, and, less often, submissive men appeal to dominating women for the same reason. In both cases, the real reason for the attachment is subconscious; and if a mistake is made, if a woman is of such a disposition as to feel and assert her individuality,⁴ she will be unhappy with such a man. Nevertheless, an attempt of an outsider to explain the situation is almost sure to be met with a rebuff. The man will not admit that the reason why the girl seems to him "so conscientious" is that she satisfies his dominating attitude and he feels that a woman of that kind will be conscientious in her conventional wifely "duties." The girl, on her part, if warned that the man is domineering, replies that she "would not respect a man unless he had some pride." She resents being told that she is assuming the rôle of the conventionally submissive woman for which she is not by nature fitted. Again, a woman sometimes appeals to a man's compassion and a man sometimes appeals to a woman's compassion. The appeal is subconscious so that the real reason for the attachment is not understood. More conscious is the admiration of a woman for a man's physical or social superiority. In the sexual excitement and anticipation of courtship, any narrow impulsive attachment is eagerly

³ Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*, 223.

⁴ Goodsell, *The Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, 465.

accepted as proving the wisdom of an engagement. Instead of encouraging reflection the man does what he can to complete the satisfyingness of the situation by giving the girl a good time—chocolates, flowers, the auto—and by suggestions of the satisfactions which marriage will bring her. The thrills of courtship prove little as to the wisdom of a life-long union.

While reflections as to congeniality are not generally thorough-going, they might be with the proper training. In these reflections the girl imagines intimacy with the man⁵ and hesitates if she feels unpleasantness in connection with this or that impulse—if she feels that she cannot admire him, or that she cannot sympathize with him or that she cannot think of him as the father of her children, or that he is so exacting that often she would not have his approval. These reflections often are not clearly conscious and she may not clearly discern the particular impulses dissatisfied but may explain her hesitation by saying she does not “trust” him enough to marry him. In these pre-marriage reflections of men and women, considerations of sexual adjustment may figure more prominently than is justified by the experience after marriage, as compared with the adjustment of other impulses which are given no consideration at all. This does not mean that there is too much consideration of sexual adjustment. There is not enough even among the most thoughtful men and women, and there is very little or none at all among the thoughtless. But even less consideration is given to other essential impulses. Married people are often much surprised to find that the differences of opinion which cause most friction are not differences over sexual relations but over seemingly irreconcilable points of view in which in the less intimate relations of courtship they had not been conscious of any difference at all. For instance, the wife finds that the husband is essentially rivalrous. He is absorbed in business rivalry and he desires to use their surplus income in various forms of social rivalry as dressing, joining the clubs, and entertaining extravagantly. The wife, sympathetic in disposition and disappointed, may reluctantly give up satisfactions of that disposition to fit in with her husband’s rivalrous aims. Again a husband of intellectual disposition may find his wife to be rivalrous and may reluctantly give up his intellectual pursuits to earn money for her social rivalry. Serious incompatibility of disposition comes out also in the bringing up of children. The rivalrous father wants

⁵ Buck, *The American Girl*, 77-79.

to train the boy to become a successful man, the mother to train him to become a "good" man. Or the intellectual parent may want to follow a rational scheme of bringing up while the impulsive parent wants to coddle and indulge the child. These dispositional mis-matings are, in a relation so intimate, fatal to self-realization.⁶

Probably in the great majority of unions the sexual relation is an important factor. Therefore, in cases of unhappiness that lead to separation, or threaten to lead there, the social worker is forced to inquire as to sex incompatibility. "It is well known that this single cause operates disastrously to disrupt many marriages or else to render them insupportable."⁷ Anything which would encourage an intelligent discussion of sex matters before marriage would improve the situation. Few children learn anything from parents on these points so that public education should include instruction as to sexual relations and the social purpose of the family. The social purpose will depend upon the international relation which is assumed to be desirable or inevitable. If the relation between nations is a struggle for domination, sex education will seek to train boys and girls for those family relations which will result in an overflowing population of vigorous children. An overflowing population spreads beyond the boundaries of the nation in time of peace and prospers in the territory of other nations, whence it renders effective aid to the national ambition of the fatherland in peace or war. Under these international relations, sex education will inculcate habits of "sex morality" which will further the breeding of the greatest number of vigorous human beings. The family will exist for the state and family relations will be such as to make the state strong. On the other hand, if the international relation assumed to be desirable is international co-operation, the welfare of the family need no longer be subordinated to the requirements of a strong state. The emphasis will be on the cultivation of the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions of husband and wife, and the effect of this will be to subject the sexual impulses to an "ideal restraint." This, of course, does not mean a childless marriage for a normal healthy couple look forward to fatherhood and motherhood as one of the greatest joys of life. They should have the training that is necessary for healthy parent-

⁶ Because congeniality is so necessary for marital happiness, the social worker must look into the psychological history of the family in which she is working and must be keen in detecting the impulsive maladjustments in their relations. (Richmond, *Social Diagnosis*, 138-139.)

⁷ Colcord, *Broken Homes*, 38.

hood, and for rearing children,⁸ which involves the limitation of the number of children to what can be reared well, without overwork or painful self-denial on the part of the parents.⁹ Economic conditions should be such as to enable every able-bodied and able-minded male to support well a family of wife and three children, and sex education should include a training in the means of raising wages to this level and in intelligent expenditure. Birth control has a much broader significance than is commonly understood. Aside from its economic aspects, in its narrower sense it means that parents should "decide when to have a child, work and prepare for its arrival, welcome it as the fulfilment of their heart's desire, . . . tenderly care for and educate it, and raise it to be what every child should be destined to be—a being happy, healthy, strong in mind, body and soul."¹⁰ In the course of such rearing of children there develops one of the essential bonds of sympathy between husband and wife, namely, the satisfactions of each intensifying those of the other and the annoyance or anxiety of each mitigated by the reassurance of the other. When the problem of sexual relations and having children is thus viewed as parts of a larger problem, as merely an aspect of the larger problem of mutual development of personality, the subject loses that morbid sensitiveness which otherwise attaches to it. Where mutual self-development is the ideal, each will be appreciated by the other not only for economic and sexual qualities but also for those qualities of disposition and character which last long after youth and beauty and prime vigour have passed away.

Though congeniality is essential to happiness in married life, it is never perfect. Except in those rare ideal unions in which each seems to have been made for the other, each is imperfectly adapted to satisfy the cravings of the other. Consequently the only psychological situation which insures happiness in a permanent union, in the intimate relations of that permanent union, is where each is animated by the sympathetic disposition, for this is the disposition through which each finds satisfaction in the satisfaction of the other, even though that is not, at all times, the satisfaction which one would choose for oneself. But the sympathy of each, to be effective for the other's happiness must be intelligent. We come finally, then,

⁸ Parsons, *The Family*, 343.

⁹ Knopf, *Birth Control; its Medical, Social, Economic, and Moral Aspects*, Survey, Nov. 18, 1916, 164.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 165.

to the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions as those that need to be cultivated in order to resolve the conflicts of interests in family relations.

Where there is congeniality and understanding sympathy, the consciousness that a union is "for life" still further increases happiness. One is at rest in the feeling that this happy relation is permanent. Undoubtedly, also, the consciousness that a union is for life is a stimulus to try to develop sympathy and mutual understanding where congeniality is very imperfect. It is rarely perfect and the incentive to sympathy and understanding needs to be as great as possible in order to offset the strong selfish dispositions. But the increasing intimacy of modern life tends to make it easy for each party to a strained relation to find relief in the fancied or real congeniality and sympathy of others, wherefore the power to maintain unions by an exercise of civil or ecclesiastical authority has weakened. It may be added that the necessity of a considerable degree of congeniality in a relation so intimate and so close has not always been appreciated by those in authority and, perhaps, could not be because a considerable portion of them never were married. A proper appreciation of the necessity of congeniality would suggest more careful instruction of the young in what the marriage relation involves than is given by church or state and greater caution than is used in putting the stamp of approval on a union by the performance of the marriage ceremony.

Under modern conditions the wife is expected to make a greater effort than the husband to develop that sympathy that is necessary for marital happiness. The impulses, satisfaction of which the husband will seek in his home, are determined by the selection exercised among his impulses by his work; he will seek, in his home, stimulation of impulses not stimulated by his work, and relief from impulses that are over-stimulated.¹¹ Unhappiness results when the

¹¹ Mr. Gladstone wrote to his wife in 1841: "You interpret so indulgently what I mean about the necessity of quiescence at home during the parliamentary session, that I need not say much; and yet I think my doctrine must *seem* so strange that I wish again and again to state how entirely it is different from anything like disparagement, of George for example. It is always relief and always delight to see and to be with you; and you would, I am sure, be glad to know, how near Mary (Lady Lyttleton) comes as compared with others to you, as respects what I can hardly describe in few words, my mental rest, when she is present. But there is no *man* however near to me, with whom I am fit to be habitually, when hard worked. I have told you how reluctant I have always found myself to detail to my father on coming home, when I lived with him, what had been going on in the House of Commons. Setting a tired mind to work is like

wife is given to social rivalry and insists that her husband, though weary with the day's work, join her in the pastimes of social rivalry. A woman who is not tired by a day's work cannot understand a man who is. If the wife is a woman of unusual vigour, and not much occupied with family duties, happiness is facilitated if she, like he, has her own serious occupation; then both will be sufficiently tired at the close of the day to become comrades in real recreation. Women who are not relieved by servants from the care of a home have an occupation which requires as careful and constant an exercise of attention and as thoroughly trained an intelligence as does business or professional work.

In families of the middle and upper classes, where the wife is relieved of much of the work in the home, while the husband is not relieved of business and professional work, it is obviously the part of the wife to adapt her behaviour to the requirements for his health and full vigour. The solicitude for each other should be mutual but he, by force of circumstances, is harder driven than she and, unfortunately, his experiences are less favourable than hers for the development of considerateness and gentleness which are so essential to domestic happiness. In this solicitude for each other, the essential requisites are an unselfish purpose and a perfectly frank understanding of each other. Young couples often realize this and long for a full and frank understanding. The young wife suffers her first disappointment when she finds her husband has concealed something from her. If a young couple persist in sensible frankness in their thoughts and feelings, as life goes on each grows wiser in making the other happy. As Mrs. Palmer expressed it, each must "grow wise in keeping another happy. . . . You must teach him how to sympathize in the broad sense with you, and to let you sympathize with him, in little as well as great things. Then you will feel . . . that everything you each do is full of the other. . . . That, I think, must be being married; . . ." ¹²

Sympathetic understanding often is prevented by surviving traces in man of masculine contempt for woman. Many men regard the wife as incapable of taking an intelligent interest in serious problems. This male attitude that survives from a past era should be dealt with by eliminating from public education whatever suggests the in-

making a man run up and down stairs when his limbs are weary." (Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, I: 187.)

¹² Palmer, *The Life of Alice Freeman Palmer*, 86.

feriority of girls to boys. An emphasis on school athletics, in which boys play the grand part and girls stand by and cheer, emphasizes sex differences and female inferiority. The emphasis in the public school should be on activities which boys and girls can undertake in common. When boys and girls have been trained in the right attitude of man to woman and woman to man, it is possible for them, when married, to get the point of view of perfect frankness as between equals, and to seek perfect understanding. Such an understanding is necessary for self development. One begins to "feel freedom" with another when one begins to realize that the other understands one's nature. To feel freedom implies not merely to realize that higher impulses are tolerated, but that these are enjoyable to and encouraged by the other. Freedom must not only be given but facilitated by discriminating and helpful suggestions that look toward the other's fuller satisfaction. Compare such a relation as this with that of domination-submission, which involves restraint and annoyance of impulses, or with that of power—admiration. Power to excite admiration is not a permanently satisfying relation, because admiration represents no all-round satisfaction.

The sympathetic-intellectual relation is exceptional in the families of civilized nations today. "An examination, also, of so-called happy marriages shows very generally that they do not, except for the common interest of children, rest on the true comradeship of like minds, but represent an equilibrium reached through an extension of the maternal interest of the woman to the man, whereby she looks after his personal needs as she does after those of the children—cherishing him, in fact, as a child—or in an extension to woman on the part of the man of that nurture and affection which is in his nature to give to pets and all helpless (and preferably dumb) creatures."¹³ This maternal relation comes more natural to the woman than to the man and the result is that while wives give to their husbands and crave from their husbands more attention than husbands give or expect from wives, they get less. "The demands for attention from husbands on the part of wives are greater than is compatible with the absorbing general interest of the latter, and women are not only neglected by their husbands in a manner which did not happen in the case of the lover, but they are jealous of men in a more general sense than men are jealous of women. In the absence of other interests they are so dependent on the personal in-

¹³ Thomas, *op. cit.*, 246.

terest that they unconsciously put a jealous construction, not only on personal behavior, but on the most general and indifferent actions of the men with whom their lives are bound up; and this process is so obscure in consciousness that it is usually impossible to determine what the matter really is.”¹⁴

The ideal relation between husband and wife is possible only when both have pronounced sympathetic and intellectual dispositions. This relation is one in which each enjoys freedom for self-realization, and each is helped by the other to a realization of that freedom, and stimulated along the lines of his or her self-realization. In such a relation, the husband will treat his wife “as his equal; he will not be ‘kind’ to her, but fair and frank and loving, as one equal should be with another; he will no more have the impertinence to pet and pamper her, to keep painful and laborious things out of her knowledge, to ‘shield’ her from the responsibility of political and social work, than he will make a Chinese toy of her and bind her feet. He and she will love that they may enlarge and not limit one another.”¹⁵ He “will be no partisan for wife and family against the common welfare. His solicitude will be for the welfare of all the children of the community; he will have got beyond blind instinct; he will have the intelligence to understand that almost any child in the world may have as large a share as his own offspring in the parentage of his great-great-grandchildren.”¹⁶

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 245-246.

¹⁵ Wells, *Social Forces in England and America*, 395.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 395.

CHAPTER XX

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FAMILY EGOISM AND IDEALISM

HUSBAND and wife may be actuated by one of three contradictory motives, the motive so to treat other members of the family as to satisfy self; or impulsively to sympathize with, and seek the satisfaction of the family before that of self; or to seek the self-realization of the family with a view to its necessary contribution to the public welfare. They may be selfishly rigorous in their treatment of children; or may so pamper them that they become useless as citizens; or, regardless of the satisfaction of the moment, they may rear their children with a view to their self-development as men and women and their obligations as citizens.

Family egoism begins with the impulsive attachment of wife to husband or husband to wife or parent to child. An impulsive attachment tends to be exclusive. Such an attachment may be due to a variety of impulses, to the attraction of beauty or power, to mutual sympathy, or to intellectual compatibility. The attachment is strong because of its strong impulsive basis, and because of the intimate relation whereby each is constantly susceptible to the suggestions of the other. Hence the tendency of each is to become absorbed in the other, to the exclusion of outside interests. Each becomes partial to the fancies, whims, ideas, and attitudes of the other and the horizon of both is limited thereby. This family egoism is intensified by the rivalrous disposition, which causes each to regard the other as a part of his or her prestige outfit, to magnify the good qualities, cleverness, or other pride-causing characteristics of the other, and to ignore or deny the other's defects. Thus each magnifies the other as the centre of social suggestion for himself or herself, and thereby excludes influences outside the family that ought to exert an influence on behaviour. Each prides himself or herself on the exclusive devotion of the other to his or her beliefs, ideals, and personality, and on his or her exclusive devotion to the other.

This family egoism may be still further intensified by the absorption of parents in a child or children. In her fondness for her child, the mother is susceptible to its every cry of annoyance. It must have what it wants. The mother accepts without question her own child's account of trouble with a neighbour's child, and thus encourages the child to falsify, because it knows its falsehood will be believed. She even will conceal the moral defects of a child from the public and from herself if possible, and resents any honest intimation of such defects from teachers. Exonerated by her it comes to believe in its blamelessness and exemplary conduct. Praised by her it comes to believe in its superior brightness and courage. A natural brightness and courage may thus become a conceited cleverness and a tendency to bulldoze. The basis is laid for an egoistic character which is destined not only eventually to create another egoistic family but also to become a centre of egoistic influence in industrial or professional, and in political relations.

Family egoism is still further intensified by the reaction of the public indiscriminately to members of a family. This causes each member to desire all other members so to act as to "be a credit to the family." This indiscriminate reaction of the public is one of those superficial processes of social judgment which are an extension of the psychological processes of association by contiguity and by superficial resemblance¹ of the individual mind. As these superficial processes have to be corrected by the proper training of the individual mind, so training is necessary to develop the faculty of judging each individual as such and not merely from his or her family connections. Lacking such training the tendency is for the judgments of the public to be indiscriminate. This causes one member of a family to share the credit gained by another member, as well as the blame incurred by another. Children early learn this tendency of the public. They see themselves shunned or flattered according as their family is contemned or highly regarded by the community, regardless of their own individual deserts. They see the children of a distinguished family excused for bad conduct, and extravagantly praised for any little achievement, while the children of a contemned family are unduly accused and contemned. As children grow to manhood and womanhood it becomes increasingly evident to them that the public is incapable of an analytical and strictly just estimate of the worth of the individual. For this reason the impulse is to seek to attain

¹ Thorndike, *The Psychology of Learning*. *Educational Psychology*, II: 28-30.

creditable group memberships. The youth who thinks of establishing a family finds those girls attractive whose qualities, he thinks, will give his family a standing in the community; and girls are attracted to youths from the same motive. This is one reason for the importance given property considerations in marriage. After marriage the family works and strives as a unit. The egoism of each member becomes a group egoism.

The importance of property considerations in marriage is seen in the history of the American family from the beginning. These were less important when all families were poor, but essential in the motivation of the individualistic family was rivalry with other families of the community in the accumulation of property, and this rivalry affected family relations. As legal owner of the family property, the father directed the rivalry. "The father ruled his family rigorously, often harshly, priding himself on the amount of work his wife could do and the amount he could 'get out of' his boys."² These family relations survive to the present day. The husband does not usually acknowledge a right of the wife to a part of the family income. He does not recognize the money value of her work in the house and discuss with her how their joint earnings shall be spent for the best interests of the family. Such a relation requires an exercise of intelligence on the part of the husband and the wife. In many cases the wife is apt to be incapable of understanding and desiring such a relation because, as a school girl, she received no instruction therein, and, as a working girl, her first impulse was to spend her wages on dress and other things for herself. If not a working girl, her habitual impulse in many cases was to spend her allowance for dress or otherwise selfishly. And, when married, her first thought continues to be for self. In her childhood home she was more or less jealous of brothers or sisters lest they should receive more from the parents than she received, and her attitude to her husband, in connection with the family expenditures, continues to be one of jealousy instead of intelligent fairmindedness. She is chiefly intent on getting as much out of the family income for herself as he gets for himself. Her egoism is due to her girlhood training or lack of training, and to lack of a proper education. Public

² Williams, *An American Town*, 229. See also Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography*, 200-210. In European communities the position of the father is much like this. See Stern, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit in Russland*, II: 293; Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, 94, 501; Hupka, *Über Entwicklung der westgalizischen Dorfzustände*, 368-371.

education does not touch these points. In just the same way the boy lacks the training necessary to convert his egoism into a capacity for intelligent behaviour in domestic relations. As a husband he insists on his sexual and property rights, and uses the latter to enforce the former, and uses his natural advantage as a wage-earner to enforce his property rights.

In the analysis of the relations of the egoistic family we find at least four different possibilities: (1) they may be both uncongenial and unsympathetic; (2) they may be congenial without being sympathetic; (3) they may be sympathetic without being congenial; (4) they may be both congenial and sympathetic. An uncongenial and unsympathetic relation is one in which both husband and wife are egoistic but egoistic in different ways, as when one is impulsively for "saving" and the other for "spending." A congenial but unsympathetic relation is one in which both are for saving or for spending but with little sympathy for one another. A sympathetic but uncongenial relation is one in which one is for saving and the other for spending but both have a strong enough impulse for the satisfaction of the other to control the impulse to save and the impulse to spend in a way that is fairly satisfying all around. A sympathetic and congenial relation is one in which both are either for saving or for spending and, in the one or the other, consider primarily each other's satisfaction.

The members of a family may be sympathetic and congenial and yet the family may be egoistic. The family sympathy may be absorbing. The intimacy of family relations intensifies the annoyance caused by conflicts of egoistic impulses, and it fosters sympathetic behaviour. In those face-to-face relations, annoyance on the faces of others is very annoying and satisfaction very pleasing.³ For the same reason people "don't want to have any trouble" with their neighbours. The relation is too intimate. But very much more intimate is the relation between members of the same family. Wherefore, a member of a family may surrender altruistic ideals because it annoys the egoistic members. Through following his sympathetic impulse not to annoy others he comes to find their egoism congenial and so encourages and confirms the family egoism. Thus sympathetic family relations may be so satisfying as to weaken a family's sense of obligation to the community and the nation.

The effects of family egoism are pronounced in the training of

³ Bosanquet, *The Family*, 250-251.

children. From their earliest years children hear their parents magnify their good qualities, because superior children raise the family standing. What shall be taught and what not taught children in the home is a good deal determined by this motive. "Parents . . . often encourage their children in their attempts to be 'exclusive' and to mimic their elders in forming secret societies, attending theatres, balls, and the like. They refuse to co-operate with teachers in their efforts to keep the high-school life simple and wholesome."⁴ Children are trained in this way until they get an exalted idea of their own importance. They are told to aim high, that the family expects great things of them, and the family sacrifices in order to train the bright boy or girl for that position of superiority in which the whole family will find satisfaction.

The egoistic family often seeks education for its children in order to make good social inferiority in some other line. Families which lack wealth superiority are apt to take a special pride in the education of their children, and those which have wealth superiority aim by a display of it to cover up deficiencies in education. Because wealth is pre-eminently the symbol of superiority wealthy families often contemptuously regard education, inferiority in that line being, in their view, more than made good by their superior wealth. Other families, not satisfied with wealth superiority, lay a great emphasis on a fashionable education. Egoistic families of the middle class seek superiority by sending their children to colleges where sons and daughters of superior families attend, in the hope that they will distinguish themselves among socially superior people and enter circles which will be a credit to the family. The teaching in some of those colleges is supervised with a view to preventing the dissemination of ideas which are contrary to the prejudices of the socially superior. An education for public welfare interests will conflict with the attitudes of the egoistic family, and the college must devote a large part of its time to correcting those attitudes. And because the student so frequently returns to the family and its influence, his or her education experiences repeated set-backs. The effectiveness of an institution of learning should increase as its trained graduates found idealistic families, which send their children to the institution.

The impulse for family superiority affects not only education but

⁴ O'Shea, *Social Development and Education*, 339; Lewis, *Democracy's High School*, 15-16.

also the distribution of wealth in a way that is contrary to public welfare interests. Mr. Andrew Carnegie declared that a man should use his wealth for the public welfare, and that the greatest obstacle to this use of wealth is family pride. "I have endeavoured to prove that at the root of the desire to bequeath to children there lay the vanity of the parents, rather than a wise regard for the good of the children."⁵ The impulse for superiority impels the head of a family to bequeath property to children in the hope that they will preserve and add to it. From this impulse to perpetuate family superiority have developed laws of bequest and inheritance,⁶ which result in an unwise and unjust distribution of wealth.⁷ In this respect, therefore, as well as in its effect on education, family egoism is contrary to the public welfare.

Another result of inheritance as we have it is that it makes it difficult to rear children of well-to-do or wealthy families in a way to make them efficient citizens. It is almost impossible, in families that have an abundant income, to emphasize the strong virtues of self-control and power to endure hardness, because self-indulgence is the line of least resistance. The tendency is to spend for whatever the child happens to want, because there is no necessity of saving. One argument for private property is that thereby men are incited to get along without things that the spenders enjoy; they save because what they save is their own. But this argument ceases to have force when, through inheritance, money comes to one without saving, and in such quantity that saving is discouraged. Laws of inheritance should not be allowed to interfere with the training of children in self-control. Many boys who grow up lacking in self-control, who are self-indulgent, idle and lazy are so not because of innate depravity but because they have all a boy wants without working, and they expect to be taken care of through their lives whether they work or not. They are conceited and arrogant because they are regarded by their associates as superior, and so regard themselves, just because of the family into which they happen to have been born. Thus having a position of superiority by accident of birth, personal effort is felt to be unnecessary. "There is nothing so enervating, nothing so deadly in its effects upon the qualities which lead to the highest achievement, moral or intellectual, as hereditary

⁵ Carnegie, *The Gospel of Wealth*, 54.

⁶ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, II: 53-54.

⁷ Fisher, *Economists in Public Service*, Amer. Econ. Rev., IX (Supplement): 12-13.

wealth."⁸ It is for this reason that "the very rich families, so far from growing rich indefinitely, usually do not even continue rich more than a few generations. . . ."⁹ "Most fortunes rise and then fall, the turning point being due to the abandonment of thrift and the substitution of thriftlessness which the fortune itself sooner or later engenders."¹⁰ Inheritance tends both to unfit the child to make wise use of wealth and to unfit him for life if the expected inheritance does not materialize. It is contrary to the public welfare to permit family egoism thus to make possible for children the use of property income in a way that is contrary to their self-development and their usefulness to society. It is true that "the satisfactions of sex indulgence or of absolute mastery over other human beings (as by position or wealth) are so potent and so disturbing to modern plans for Man's welfare that chastity, equality and poverty should probably be the rule until the individual, by having been taught to find satisfaction in the welfare of others, the maintenance of an ideal self and the impersonal pleasures, has proved himself fit to use his body, position, and wealth."¹¹

The evil effects of inheritance as we have it are, then, an unjust distribution of wealth, an enervating self-indulgence in the consumption of wealth, and an arrogant sense of mastery over others and of contempt for those who are inferior in wealth power. Family egoism is intensified by inheritance and this is a strong case for a higher inheritance tax in all countries. Furthermore, as a means of raising revenue such a tax has advantages that others do not have,¹² and would ease burdens now caused by excessive taxes of other kinds.

The arrogant sense of superiority that is fostered in children of a dominating disposition by the possession of wealth affects unfavourably the industrial conflict. For many of these spoiled boys become employers of labour and, in their industrial relations, are actuated by the same arrogance. They select, as managers and foremen, men of this type from poorer families, and so the autocratic aspect of industrial relations is intensified. In their up-bringing, children seldom have that training in fairmindedness which will fit them as men and women to promote a rational industrial order.

Family egoism in bequest and inheritance causes a caste tendency in

⁸ Carnegie, Empire of Business, Master Workers' Book, 80.

⁹ Fisher, Elementary Principles of Economics, 489.

¹⁰ Ibid. 488.

¹¹ Thorndike, The Original Nature of Man, 296.

¹² Seager, Principles of Economics, 508.

society. An employer who has himself accumulated his property in the course of intimate contact with workmen is apt to have a more or less comradely attitude toward them even though he has selfishly made large profits while paying low wages. But the son who inherits the property is not apt to have either the comradely attitude to labour or the ability of his father. Very probably he has grown up with an idea of his superiority over the working class, and has taken little or no interest in his father's work. On the death of his father he inherits "a money power wholly independent of his own qualifications or deserts."¹³ The heirs to a business may take little interest in it, and may administer it through managers who are apt to be zealous to commend themselves to their chiefs. Thus family egoism, with bequest and inheritance, results in a caste feeling, which is intensified if these aristocratic families exercise a strong control over the government. The system is passed on from generation to generation as the children acquire the caste attitudes of their parents and take their privileged places in the economic and political system. When the religion and education of the group is so ordered as to contribute to the perpetuation of this system, it is difficult to see what can break through and make possible social progress, except the organized resistance of the masses.

Where economic opportunities make it comparatively easy for families in a lower class to rise to an upper, these extreme results of family egoism have not yet taken place. The successful families have not yet reached the stage of arrogance and contempt for the less successful but have merely a good-natured sense of their own superiority. This is the condition in a population where the rivalrous disposition is strong and is encouraged by abundant opportunities to acquire wealth. In a new country family pride prompts to the acquisition of, rather than the display of wealth. The head of the family exercises a restraining effect on the impulse of the members to spend, and children are jealous of what one another may get, from time to time, and are intent on their patrimony. There is a good degree of equality between families in possession of wealth and they pride themselves on the superior industriousness of their family over others. In the next stage certain families have become prosperous and parents then relax their rigorous rule. The increasing sympathy in family relations largely takes the form of impulsive generosity of parents and attachment of children to an indulgent

¹³ Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, 203.

parent. Parents simply indulge the impulses of children, instead of teaching them a wise choice in expenditures. Often the parent satisfies his own impulses in gifts to wife and children. He dresses his daughter well in order to enjoy the satisfaction of the family superiority thereby achieved. He expects her to dress for dinner as he would a hostess; and the daughter expects attention from father and brothers as from men outside the family. Thus do the communal relations infringe on the family relations; and there is a lack of that sense of perfect freedom and understanding, of that sensible and whole-hearted affection, showing itself in homely ways, which is the blessing of family life. The family now becomes more and more conscious of its superiority in the community and of the enjoyment of that superiority as its chief satisfaction. Thus begins the arrogant sense of superiority and the impulse to preserve the social status unchanged which marks the beginning of a caste tendency in society.

Communal relations of family rivalry tend to impair sympathy within the family because the members find themselves rivaling one another in what the family as a whole rivals the other families of the community. The family rivalry in industriousness of an early period constantly caused rivalry between members of a family in displays of work power. The family pride in wealth power and its display, of a later day, results in a strife between the children in the matter of having things, particularly between daughters in the matter of dress. The daughter who shines in society is quite as apt to be elated over her superiority to a sister as over being superior to girls of other families. Family superiority is desired, in the last analysis, because it means personal superiority for each of the members of the family. The rivalry between the families of the community reacts on the motives of the members of each family, stimulates their rivalry and jealousy, and thwarts sympathetic impulses that are more natural in the intimate relations of family life.

The standards of family superiority may change from age to age while the rivalry itself continues undiminished. In early rural America there was a keen family rivalry for property. Through enlisting the members of the family in this rivalry the head escaped the odium incident to his domination of the members of the family to satisfy his money-making impulses. With increasing intimacy of association in towns and cities in recent years, and with the increasing number of families which have inherited wealth, and the decreasing tendency to thrift and frugality, and the stronger tendency to

spend for display, the standards of superiority have come to emphasize symbols of display, instead of industriousness and thrift. Rivalry for superiority by display of wealth gives a value to things that otherwise have little or no value. These prestige values have a great range, extending all the way from the higher education, much of the value placed on which is due largely to the fact that a child who has it satisfies the family impulse for prestige, down to the more obvious rivalrous value of having the members of the family "well dressed." The wife or daughter escapes the dislike with which members of the family might regard her personal extravagance by carrying the idea that her display raises the standing of the entire family in the community. In the same way, the disproportionate bestowal of the family income on the bright child, for his or her education, which would otherwise be regarded as extravagant and unjust to the other children, is justified on the ground of what that child will do for the credit of the whole family.

There are a great variety of things which have no value at all except as evidences of family superiority. For instance, there are things which do not attract popular attention and are useless for display, but derive their sole value from the fact that, to the initiated, they mean wealth power. Among such things are genuine antiques, rare jewelry, and the finest linen. Families which make these expenditures despise expenditures made to display a superiority which one does not possess. The social recognition which they seek is not the recognition of the masses but that of rivals who understand the more subdued and solid evidences of superiority. Except in wealthy circles, expenditures made for social recognition of superiority or to avoid appearance of inferiority satisfy also other impulses. But even then the expenditure is apt to be made primarily to satisfy the impulse not to appear inferior. "I know I can't afford it, but I can afford it just as well as they can and I don't want people to think I can't," is a common confession. The motive for the expenditure is to escape the imagined social contempt for inferiority. The thing gets its value from the fact that having it relieves this annoyance. And then it is easy to imagine what other satisfactions also may be gained from having the thing. In their sober and more intelligent moments families recognize that they are foolish to spend, from this motive, money they need for much more necessary satisfactions. But the socially suggested impulse is to "keep up" with other families. Husband and wife work and plan to gain for the family a superior position

in the community. From this motive they accumulate property, locate the home on a street of superior families, and furnish it according to the standards of superiority recognized by those families. They dress, provide equipage, educate their children, choose their church and seek positions in the church and in the community with a view to gaining for the family recognized superiority. They associate with influential people in order thus to increase their influence, and avoid associations that would impair their influence. They profess beliefs and express ideas which will maintain or raise the "standing" of the family, and avoid beliefs and ideas which would injure social standing. All this behaviour springs from the impulse of families for superiority or to avoid inferiority. To these ends, husband and wife will deny themselves and their children nourishing food, needed rest and recreation, and open dissent from prevailing ideas and behaviour. They will gratuitously do work that is distasteful, associate with people of influence who are disagreeable, and otherwise sacrifice the impulse for a wider self-realization to the satisfaction of the rivalrous disposition. They assert they have to do this; they have to maintain or protect their position in the community. To do this they ignore the highest interests of the community and the nation, which require the free expression of opinion, and action according to personal conviction. They ignore their own personal welfare and development because of their susceptibility to these socially suggested standards of superiority. When the occasionally independent parent asserts that this family rivalry is not inevitable, that it is the duty of parents to act independently and rationally in the determination of family expenditures and in the expressions of opinion, such a family is regarded as ostracizing itself from the community life.

The prevailing forms of family rivalry not only ignore self-development and the public welfare but also often do physical and moral harm to the members of the family. As an instance, one of the first forms of display that arose in the early American rural town was the display of being able to afford to "keep a hired girl."¹⁴ The larger propertied families kept two or more servants, and the husband was proud of the fact that his wife did not have to work. In many cases this made idle wives and impaired their physical and moral stamina. Husbands were proud of idle wives because this was one of the standard evidences of wealth superiority. This was conventionalized

¹⁴ Williams, *An American Town*, 89.

waste, not only because of the money spent for "hired girls," but also because it wasted the health and character of the idle wife. Daughters were brought up for this sphere of an idle and "accomplished" wife. They were given that "finishing school" education which would make them accomplished, and pride was taken in the fact that they had "never done a stroke of kitchen work." The daughter, thus pampered from her youth up by her parents, when she married expected to be pampered by her husband. The occasionally vigorous girl, who resented this house cat existence, who showed a disposition for efficiency in domestic work or a predilection for social work, was a disappointment to her parents' pride.¹⁵ As the wife of a country doctor said to her daughter, who went into the kitchen, during a vacation from college, to show what she had learned in domestic science, "We didn't send you to college for that."

The interests of family rivalry are, then, contrary, at several points, to public welfare interests, and to the development of personality. First, family rivalry values behaviour according to the social reaction to it, according to whether it wins recognition of superiority, not according to whether it is for the public welfare or for the development of personality. Second, family rivalry values beliefs and opinions according to the social reaction to them and not according to their truth or falsity. If they are beliefs and opinions held by the influential classes, and, therefore, the ones that go with superiority, they are professed and expressed just as other things that go with superiority—particular manners, house furnishings—are copied. Family rivalry is contrary to a serious intellectual interest. It gives a bias to opinions, which must be considered in any study of families.¹⁶ Third, family rivalry is contrary to the intelligent choice of material means of satisfaction, because it impels the family to consider not its own circumstances and needs but what is necessary in order to escape the social contempt for inferiority. Fourth, family rivalry does not deter a member of a family from behaviour that is contrary to the public welfare but which will not bring discredit on the family because it can be done secretly, or because families have not yet come to prefer the public welfare in respect to this behaviour. Fifth, very superior families, because of their exceeding power of social suggestion can act contrary to what is generally regarded as for the public welfare, and to prevailing moral standards, without losing their prestige and

¹⁵ Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 82-86.

¹⁶ Chapin, *Field Work and Social Research*, 77.

power of social suggestion. They thus exert an influence that is contrary to the public welfare and contrary to morality. Sixth, elements in the standards of family rivalry that are determined in the first instance by public welfare considerations may be perverted, as objects of rivalry, to such an extent as to promote behaviour that is contrary to the public welfare. Philanthropy thus degenerates when families rival one another in conspicuous philanthropy.

The motive of family rivalry is not, therefore, an intelligent motive for social valuation. This involves a conception of the family as an organization for the self-development of its members and for the performance of certain obligations to the community and the state.¹⁷ Valuations of behaviour should be made from this point of view and not from the satisfaction the behaviour promises rivalrous impulses. The highest type of family development is that of the family that is individualistic not by reason of its egoism but by reason of its idealism. Between these two types of family there is an inevitable conflict.

¹⁷ Ellwood, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 135-136.

BOOK VI

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN CULTURAL
RELATIONS

CHAPTER XXI

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN ECCLESIASTICAL RELATIONS

THE essential ecclesiastical relation is that between minister and people. The God of the Christian is a God of love, and the essential function of the Christian religion is to save man from the control of his egoistic dispositions by giving him personal contact with the God of Love,¹ and by fostering those changes in social relations and institutions that are in line with this development of personality.² The genuine Christian minister exemplifies before the people this effect of Christianity on personality. He is a man of sympathetic intuitions, breadth of view and entire fearlessness on behalf of public welfare interests.

This type of clergyman often becomes such through deliberately making a great and intelligent sacrifice on behalf of public welfare interests. The sacrifice means the inhibition of egoistic dispositions for altruistic. Perhaps he had to give up a high position in the church and take a lowly position, or to suffer even more,—thus did he become unworldly through the same experience as his Master. It is this experience of power to control worldly ambition, to banish fear, to choose the hard road, that gives a sense of a power, not his own, that makes for righteousness.³ The meaning of this power is learned by a progressive experience of it. There is a sense of exaltation, of being saved from the egoistic interests that other men struggle to realize. Hence the renunciation of the monastic orders—their plain living, their indifference to the admiration of the other sex, to worldly position, to the praise of men. This power of control gives the Christian a sense of being saved, of freedom in the pursuit of a lofty ideal. He realizes that his salvation has a solid basis in personal experience and his one desire is that others might have the same

¹ Brent, Leadership, Lecture, II, "The Power of the Single Motive."

² The Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, The Church and Industrial Reconstruction.

³ Hocking, Human Nature and Its Remaking, 20, Chs. XL-XLIII.

experience.⁴ His rivalrous disposition seeks, not the interests of worldly rivalry, but to excel in influence over those who stand for the worldly interests. The unworldly interests are, in the rivalry for social control, given the prestige of supernatural sanction. But it is the immediate experience of the saved man, the joy of relief from the annoyances incident to the pursuit of worldly interests, which, in the long run, is the solid basis of a religious experience, as contrasted with the attention-compelling, control-winning ideas that are added to theology in the course of the rivalry with apostles of worldliness for social control.

The relation between minister and people requires an intimacy of contact analogous to that of the physician with the family into which he is called. The wise physician considers not only the illness itself but the causes of it, the conditions in which the family lives and works, and their lack of intelligence. The clergyman likewise deals not only with the religious needs of his people but also with conditions in which they live, which may make a joyous religious experience and an unselfish life difficult to live. He realizes that if, instead of ignoring, he helps his people to solve their secular problems, then he can speak with more authority and influence with reference to their spiritual condition. Some troubles are due entirely to lack of a proper religious attitude. For instance, many people are foolishly sensitive with respect to some form of inferiority they have to endure,⁵ and need to be freed from foolish rivalrous impulses. Other troubles are due to living and working conditions that need to be improved, and the genuine clergyman is one who understands economic and social conditions and is fearless and sagacious in his efforts to improve them. Without any personal or class bias, with a sense of fundamental justice, and with common sense, he enters into every situation; and his worth as a minister depends on his efficiency as an intimate, fearless, sensible, and far-seeing friend.⁶

The full realization of religious experience requires, for most people, the leadership of religious men. But this must be distinguished from the exploitation of religious yearnings in the interest of ecclesiastical control. Religious beliefs include those which satisfy the home-loving attitudes by a symbolization that gives the sense of protection that men and women enjoyed as children; and those in line with class attitudes which have developed in the course of upper class

⁴ *Ibid.* XLIV.

⁵ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 138, note 2.

⁶ Federal Council of Churches, *Information Service*, Apr. 1, 1921, 2, 3.

domination of lower classes. The heart of man yearns toward the first class of beliefs; theology has emphasized the second; and ecclesiastics have maintained this traditional theology in spite of the rising intelligence of the masses. Those who have emphasized the fatherly attributes of God always have found themselves in conflict with those who have emphasized His august and avenging qualities.⁷ The rise of free contract in industry and the progress of democracy resulted in greater emphasis on the family attitudes. Some theologians, following the family attitudes, assert that the atonement means not that God visited his wrath on all mankind for the sin of one and forgave all when his anger was satisfied by the sacrifice of one, but that God is a kind father who grieves when men do wrong and points them to the example of His eldest son. With the increasing interest in social uplift, theology has diverged from these narrower lines and is following two lines of inquiry. One of these is an inquiry into the psychology of the religious consciousness. The other, assuming the essential thing in religion to be the salvation of man from the control of his egoistic dispositions by a personal relation with a God of love, inquires into the family, industrial, and other social behaviour which both results from this religious experience and is the means of a deeper experience of it.

We are not here concerned, primarily, with either of these lines of inquiry. Our purpose is to point out the part played by the conflict of dispositions in the conflicts in ecclesiastical relations. There has been, and still is, a conflict between Christian sects that emphasize their exclusive ecclesiastical authority and sects that dispute these pretensions.⁸ The emphasis on exclusive authority is a survival from the period of keen sectarian struggle for domination. In addition to this conflict between sects, there is, within every sect, a conflict between clergymen of a strong dominating disposition, to whose disposition the traditional theology is congenial, and who, for this reason, are conservative, and clergymen of a strong sympathetic disposition, to whom, for this reason, the traditional theology is uncongenial. The conservative conflict, also, with clergymen of an intellectual disposition who are not dogmatic in their theology and therefore, cannot accept the traditional theology as true just because it is traditional belief. Distinct from all these types is the rivalrous

⁷ For a theological formulation of the two ideas compare Dale, *The Atonement*, Lecture IX, with Tymms, *The Christian Idea of Atonement*, Lectures VI-VII.

⁸ Cutten, *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, 461-463.

type, which emphasizes "building up the Church" and preaches what will accomplish that end. Finally there is the large number of clergymen who have no pronounced impulses but conform to the prevailing ecclesiastical behaviour.

The clergyman of the dominating or reactionary type receives the dogmas of his sect as "absolute truth" handed down to guard and to preach. He looks for a worshipful acceptance of, rather than an intelligent and critical attitude to dogma. He has little sympathy with intelligent doubters and with those who crave a vital personal experience. He performs his duties primarily with a view to maintaining or improving his ecclesiastical position, and hence with a view to pleasing the powers on whom place and promotion depend. If ministers of this unsympathetic, egoistic type predominate in an ecclesiastical organization, the relation of the clergy to their parishioners will be essentially one of preachers of beliefs which they expect to be taken without question; and parishioners long subject to such an exercise of authority may come to expect it, and may seem content with a merely formal worship. Between this type of minister and the sympathetic and intellectual types there is an inevitable conflict. As in the great business corporation so in the great ecclesiastical organization the men of masterful personality are apt to rise to the positions of authority and in those positions to repress the men of sympathetic and intellectual disposition.⁹

The conflict between the reactionary and the sympathetic and intellectual types is due also to a difference in habits of thought. The reactionary type reasons deductively, the other inductively. The attention of a minister of the former type is on the dogmas, his ideas are deductively drawn therefrom and not from any keen interest in the lives of his people. His people are expected not to criticize his message or even spontaneously and joyously to accept it as an utterance of real insight into their life problems, but to receive it reverently as an utterance of absolute truth. This attitude is similar to that of the dominating type of lawyer with reference to the law whose minister he is. It is conspicuous on an occasion when a national assembly of a sect re-affirms vehemently some minor dogma that has been questioned or slightly treated by some of the ministry of the sect.¹⁰ This deductive habit of thought has made dogma of primary importance. Interest in the spiritual and secular prob-

⁹ "The Way to Unconstitute Authority," *New Republic*, Feb. 11, 1920, 306.

¹⁰ *The Christian Herald*, June 14, 1916, p. 715.

lems of the people requires induction, which is beyond the power of the deductive mind.

The traditionally-minded clergyman is encouraged in his attitude by his protected life. He is a part of a great organization, which owns property of enormous value, and the economic and social power of which gives those who rise to control therein great prestige. The large property of "an established institution has a tendency to warp men's judgments as to the excellence of the institution."¹¹ This applies not only to ecclesiastical, but also to educational institutions. The rich university has a great prestige, which causes youth to think its instruction is correspondingly excellent. And this may embolden an administration to repress free teaching, which is not apt to be seriously resented by students or by the public because of the hold of the physically great institution over the popular imagination.

Another kind of prestige that the clergy have enjoyed is their reputation for excellence of virtue. This often persists where behaviour is of just the opposite kind, for it is possible for a clergyman to be devoid of manly qualities—of intellectual vigour and independence, of a virile compassion and a passion for social justice—without losing his influence.¹² Thus it is that the egoistic type of clergyman, in his conflict with the altruistic type, has been able easily to hold his own in ecclesiastical organizations.

Another condition that strengthens the influence of the reactionary type of clergyman is the support given him by two influential reactionary groups that are found in most churches, those reactionary in regard to dogma, and those reactionary in regard to property.¹³ As to the first class we note that assent to the traditional creed is still regarded, in ecclesiastical bodies, as necessary for membership therein. A member may think and even say in private what he or she pleases about the creed so long as he or she publicly professes acceptance thereof. The insincerity of publicly professing what is privately dissented from is justified on the ground of "the good which it will enable them to do."¹⁴ But is not this merely a secondary explanation of an egoistic motive—either fear not to conform, or a rivalrous impulse for the social or business or professional position that church membership and associations contribute to, or a narrow sectarian pride that prompts one publicly to "stick to" beliefs that are privately

¹¹ Russell, *Why Men Fight*, 219.

¹² *Ibid.* 218.

¹³ Jackson, *The Community Church*, 17, 50.

¹⁴ Russell, *Why Men Fight*, 219.

doubted? Those who invoke the idea of doing good as a justification "fail to realize that, in those whose mental life has any vigour, loss of complete intellectual integrity puts an end to the power of doing good."¹⁵

When the dominating type of clergyman was the prevailing type, sectarian rivalry took the form of a struggle for domination. This was the era of extreme intolerance. "Religious intolerance is in a large measure the result of that feeling of uncertainty which can hardly be eradicated even by the strongest will to believe. It is a means of self-persuasion in a case where such persuasion is sorely needed."¹⁶ As a result the rivalry of sects causes each to hold its beliefs with a fanatical tenacity. The beliefs of the group become shibboleths to be defended or forced upon another group, as the beliefs of a rival group are shibboleths to be avoided or attacked. In an era of struggle for domination between sects, hostile impulses are active and demand satisfaction and much of the satisfaction derived from religious beliefs lies in the satisfaction afforded hostile impulses. Because a sect believes one thing, a hostile sect believes the opposite, and the opposite is valued as true because it satisfies hostile impulses.

The higher criticism has discredited the less essential dogmas and weakened the position of the dominating clergyman. Intolerant sectarianism has fallen in abeyance but sectarian rivalry still continues. The rivalrous clergyman is interested, primarily, not in dogma but in winning for his church the accepted emblems of superiority. Clergymen of this type aim primarily to increase the membership and the contributions and so "build up the church." They aim to take a conspicuous part in the social gatherings of the city, to take the lead in social movements that the public mind is strongly set on and so get for their church favourable attention. They ignore traditional beliefs when preaching these would interfere with their purpose. Nor do they care much for that intimate contact with parishioners required for effective religious guidance. Their preaching is directed by the impulse for recognized success and avoids combating influential interests. There is rivalry between churches thus led in membership campaigns and to increase contributions. Says Bishop Brent: "It is, I fear, all too true that the competitive spirit is strong in most of the churches, as their tables of comparative growth, their open or secret efforts to win over adherents from other Christian

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 219.

¹⁶ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, II: 644.

folds, their aloofness from one another, bear witness. It would not be so bad were it not for the fact that the *casus belli* is superiority not of life, but of theology and organization. There is today not a church, great or small, Catholic or Protestant, that is in a whole-souled manner down among the crowd, or that can justify its claim to superiority in theology and organization by displaying a marked superiority of life. . . . But the fact that so many recognize and deplore these things is a harbinger of better days and a call to men of magnanimous minds to come in and hasten the steps of progress. . . . Jesus was a critic of the Church of His day, though a critic within. He did not reject the Church, the Church rejected Him. *He came unto His own, and His own received Him not.*¹⁷ The rivalrous desire to excel other churches in size, in the church music, in winning members of influence is an egoistic motive that is contrary to the spirit of Christianity. It is similar to the attitude of rivalrous nations and economic groups. "How then," ask the apostles of church unity, "can the Church hope to do anything toward Christianizing political and economic relations, as long as it, also, is actuated by the motives that require change?"¹⁸

The rivalry of the churches is one of the situations that sometimes raises the question "Can Christianity tolerate the Church?" Can organized Christianity in the nature of the case maintain the spirit of the Founder of Christianity in its purity?¹⁹ Does not organized Christianity, with its stimuli of the egoistic dispositions—its hierarchical organization provocative of a dominating attitude on the part of those in authority, its insignia of superiority inviting to personal rivalry, its sectarian rivalry,—make impossible the pure experience of the love which it professes?²⁰ Undoubtedly there is an irreconcilable contradiction between officiousness, personal ambition, and sectarian rivalry on the one hand and the Christian spirit on the other. Undoubtedly clergymen are under a peculiar necessity not to think of a pastorate as their "job"—as their means of earning a livelihood,—or as a means of attaining a position of social superiority in the community, or as a means of satisfying the impulse to exercise authority. All

¹⁷ Brent, op. cit., 239-241.

¹⁸ For a discussion of this and other aspects of the problem of church unity see the report by the Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook entitled "Christian Unity."

¹⁹ For instance, see McAfee, *Can Christianity Tolerate the Church?* New Republic, Jan. 18, 1919, 331-332.

²⁰ The contradiction is aggravated where there is a state church but it is found in churches that never have been state churches. (Cole, *Social Theory*, 177-178.)

these are egoistic impulses; they are contrary to the altruism of Christianity of which the clergyman professes to be an exemplar. It is not impossible thus to become an exemplar of altruism, but the difficulties require a subtle conscientiousness which is possible only for a strong and fine sympathetic disposition, and through prayer without ceasing, and habitual utter fearlessness in speech and action.²¹

It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that disposition is an essential force in determining ecclesiastical relations. The dominating disposition finds the conservative church congenial. The rivalrous disposition finds satisfaction in sermonizing and in initiating church and civic enterprises that will bring the clergyman and his church favourable public attention. The sympathetic disposition finds satisfaction in such parish work as calling among the people, commiserating with the unfortunate, promoting social gatherings of various kinds. A strong intellectual disposition is less apt than others to find the church congenial, though, recently, certain sects have taken a decided stand for freedom of thought and speech on industrial problems. But the clergyman is apt to feel forced to a "conscientious" suppression of his doubts about religious beliefs. The intellect of the church-member is not thus suppressed because he exercises his intellect daily in his particular vocation and gives his beliefs little thought; his intellect gets action in his vocation. Hence he is not tempted to doubt or think in connection with his beliefs. But the work of the clergyman deals directly with his beliefs. He must think about his beliefs if he has any capacity to think. But, instead of letting his intellect go free, in the joyful quest for truth, and spontaneously preaching the truth as he sees it, he is apt to feel that he must keep his thinking and expression within the limits of the traditional formulas. This causes merely a temporary irritation for the young minister of weak intellectual impulses; he soon acquires the "arguments" which make the traditional formulas plausible. But it more seriously disturbs the intellectually earnest man.

The young clergyman of weak intellectual impulses is disturbed by the suggestion of doubts from without rather than by doubts from within and develops a series of arguments with which he answers ob-

²¹ Read the editorial in *The Nation*, commenting on the decision of the Church of the Messiah in New York City to follow its pastor, John Haynes Holmes, and leave the Unitarian sect and become a non-sectarian Christian Church (*The Nation*, Jan. 18, 1919, 81). Mr. Holmes believed that outside of an ecclesiastical organization the church would find a new spontaneity of the Christian spirit and a new freedom of mind in meeting the problems which confront the Christian Church. See also Holmes, *What is Religion?* *The Arbitrator*, Sept., 1919.

jections from without, and which serve also to quiet doubts which may happen to arise from within. Thus he tranquillizes himself by developing a closed system of, to him, logically perfect ideas. He assumes that he is a representative of God on earth and that, as such, it is not necessary for him to *think*. All truth is absolute truth that has been revealed by God to His priesthood and his attitude is one of worshipful acceptance of the revelation; this he passes on to his people, with the arguments therefor, and seeks to develop in them an attitude like his own. Thus tranquillized by the logically complete circle of ideas, the intellectual impulses become quiescent and other impulses arise, particularly those that find satisfaction in social control. The clergyman prides himself on the fact that he has brought his people to the point where they accept, without a shadow of a doubt, anything he says. He brooks no rival influence over his people. "After a year here I am to my people the only priest in town." This impulse for control, and this intolerance with reference to contrary beliefs he expects from his people with respect to other sects, as well as toward those who profess no beliefs. Thus the ideas which tranquillize his intellectual impulses become the ideas with which to control others. Their logical perfection makes them serviceable for the satisfaction of impulses for social control. At the same time the clergyman satisfies his own impulse to accept control by the worshipful attitude with which he accepts the traditional ideas as absolute truth. Distinct from this attitude to control is the intellectual attitude, that is not afraid of doubts, that insists on analysis of the premises, on singleminded thinking and the formation of rational convictions. This does not destroy faith, which, as we shall see,²² is inevitable for a deep thinker.

The preceding paragraphs imply another classification in addition to that based on disposition, namely, that according to degree of mentality. The majority of clergymen, as of men in other vocations, are of the ordinary mentality that permits absorption in local and face-to-face relations. To get public attention and foster a worshipful loyalty among their people, to enjoy sociability and approval, are their characteristic impulses. They are not particularly interested in dogmas but in winning assent to dogma. They would condemn petty rivalry as worldly, make the intellect quiescent, and mould the individual into a kind, conforming member of the community. Clergymen of more mentality are ambitious to rise in their calling, to become recognized preachers, to build up the church, to gain a high position

²² The chapter entitled, *The Conflict of Interests in Academic Relations*.

in their ecclesiastical organization. Or, if more intellectual than rivilrous, they are alive to the hard and interesting problems in the parish and beyond.

The intellectual type of clergyman is primarily interested in the spiritual problems of his people and in whatever secular problems are connected with these. The central spiritual problem is to get in touch and keep in touch with those religious influences that make for unselfishness, humility, tolerance, patience, openmindedness, sincerity, courage, self-control, and other sympathetic and intellectual attitudes.²³ Christ has continued to be the principal influence in the religious world because sympathetic and intellectual attitudes in a superlative degree actuated his behaviour. This brought him into violent conflict with the dominating ecclesiastical, economic and political interests of his day. The intellectual clergyman aims to foster such a vital relation between Christ and the individual as to make His attitudes an absorbing influence in the personal life. The new point of view and the new impulses that result then begin to affect every phase of the social behaviour of the individual. As a member of a family, of an industrial, commercial or professional group, as a citizen, his attitudes to group beliefs and problems become just the opposite of what they were before he became a Christian. It is this common faith and this common practice of Christianity that is the basis of the movement for church unity.²⁴

The intellectual type of clergyman is interested also in problems beyond his parish. For his people will find it very difficult to become Christians in their industrial or commercial or professional relations unless those beyond the parish with whom they have relations also begin to become such. Furthermore, the Christian citizenship of the members of one little parish will amount to little, indeed is hardly possible, unless citizens beyond are likewise being Christianized. It makes a difference with our political attitude in America and in a particular city of America if Japan is paternalistic and militaristic. It makes a difference with the industrial attitude of a particular factory in America if industry in Japan is autocratic. The clergyman who is conversant with religious problems as they face missionaries in Japan and Korea and Mexico is thereby better fitted to meet the problems of his own parish.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Brent, "Concerning Unity," in Smyth and Walker, *Approaches Towards Church Unity*, III; Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, *Christian Unity*, 180.

With religion vitalized by its great appeal to the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions, the other requisite for its effective functioning is an extensive and intensive understanding of social relations. One reason why such understanding seems secular and not a part of religion is that the religious impulse arises from the trying uncertainties of life,²⁵ particularly from a sense of the mystery of what follows this life, and the affective processes that relieve from this agitation, or use it for the sake of personal exaltation, are contrary to the intellectual processes that are involved in a study of social relations. The extremely religious person has an aversion to severely intellectual work because the religious attitude differs from the scientific.²⁶

Another reason why the religious attitude is unfavourable to a study of social relations is that, while traditional religion has not been exclusively concerned with the mystery of the future life, that mystery and the agitation thereby occasioned have been used to foster in social relations impulses and attitudes that were favourable to the maintenance of their position by the dominant ecclesiastical organization,²⁷ and the propertied classes. A new religious interest due to a new condition of trying uncertainty may be exploited in this way.²⁸ Christian theology has emphasized, primarily, the attitude of submission in social relations, and to this end has worked out fear-inspiring doctrines of an avenging God and eternal punishment, which might be escaped by a formal observance of the ecclesiastical requirements. It was assumed that submission would make the individual amenable to the suggestions of the church including suggestions as to conduct. Hence the idealization of submission, which made it tolerable to intellectual minds—the “three rounds in the mystical ladder; first, the purgative life; second, the illuminative; third, the unitive life, or state of perfect contemplation.”²⁹ Thinking people demand of religious teachers a system of ideas which have proven their efficacy for religious exaltation and are in this sense “authoritative.”³⁰ But for the unthinking it is mere superstitious submission; and, in the man or woman of strong impulses and weak cog-

²⁵ For instance, the uncertainties of war made the finer among the fighting men more religious. (Wells, *God, the Invisible King*, 4-6.)

²⁶ Shotwell, *The Religious Revolution of To-day*, 115; Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, 59-60.

²⁷ Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, II: 639-646, Chs. L-LII; Jastrow, *The Psychology of Conviction*, 5, 335.

²⁸ Wells, *The Religious Revival*, *New Republic*, Dec. 23, 1916, 206-207.

²⁹ Cutten, *op. cit.*, 31.

³⁰ Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Chs. III-V.

nition, it may develop a suppression of impulses that results in a great variety of religious ideas originating in suppressed impulses.³¹ Wherever this attitude of religious submission survives, its effect in social relations is to cause a tendency to accept things as they are; consequently there is little incentive to a critical study of social relations. But a religious attitude that is exclusively submission is a survival that is passing. For, with the passing of political absolutism and the rise of free government, opportunity has been given for the development of personality, particularly for resistance of oppression on behalf of others; and these progressive leaders stir in the masses the new political attitudes of democracy—admiration, devotion, intellectual assent and confidence,—as contrasted with the mere submission of an autocracy; and these new political attitudes cannot but have a profound influence in enlarging the range of attitudes that will seek an ideal satisfaction in religious contemplation. Religious teaching must satisfy these new religious aspirations if ecclesiastics are to maintain their control. Hence the recent emphasis on the manliness of Christ, on the fact that he was a resister and not merely a passive sufferer or sharer of the sufferings of the down-trodden.³² This new emphasis of progressive clergymen on other attitudes than resignation cannot but reopen the question of what conduct is Christian conduct, and this will inevitably lead to an inquiry into the whole subject of social relations.

The question then arises, what kind of conduct is required of the Christian? The religion preached by Christ and the apostles was one of love and resistance even to the point of the sacrifice of life. It was maintained that "there is no fear in love"³³ and that "God has not given us the spirit of fear but of power and of love and of a sound mind."³⁴ The traditional Christian theology, based on fear, is contrary to this Christian spirit. Another point of opposition between the two is that the religion of fear seeks salvation in a future state primarily, while the religion of sympathy and intellect seeks a transformation of character and social relations in this life.³⁵ The conduct required of the Christian is, therefore, precisely the kind that will make for progressive social adjustment in the industrial and political relations of the present day.

³¹ Cutten, *op. cit.*, Ch. XXIX.

³² Cutten, *op. cit.*, 296.

³³ I John 4:18.

³⁴ II Timothy 1:7.

³⁵ Williams, *The Christian Ministry and Social Problems*, 11-19.

The church's claim of possessing truth that is not ascertainable through the senses, which calls for behaviour contrary to worldly behaviour, whatever the theological ideas with which this claim may have been supported in the past, rests today on a psychological basis—the opposition between the altruistic and egoistic dispositions. The prevailing behaviour is predominantly egoistic; the behaviour preached by the founder of Christianity is sympathetic, and, to be effective, such behaviour must be highly intelligent. There is, then, a psychological opposition between worldliness and unworldliness. The church's theological system of "absolute truth" enabled those clergymen who knew in their hearts what unworldliness meant to preach effectively a gospel of love and self-sacrifice to an incredulous world; for their theological system endorsed their teaching as absolute truth, direct from God, so that they did not care for the approval of men. With the weakening authority of the dogma of absolute truth, those exceptional clergymen have ceased to preach with the same assurance, concretely and incisively, the unworldly gospel of love and self-sacrifice. It may, possibly, encourage such preachers to realize that what they once could have preached as absolute truth now has a psychological basis. From the point of view of social psychology the distinction between worldliness and unworldliness is affirmed; and the preaching of unworldliness is affirmed to be one of the essential requisites for social progress.³⁶

Those who stand for this type of religion find encouragement in some recent pronouncements of ecclesiastical organizations which recognize a conflict of interests in social relations and maintain that it is the duty of the church to lend its support to the sympathetic and intellectual industrial and political leadership. The degree of emphasis of these pronouncements varies between different sects,³⁷ and between different organizations of clergymen and laity in the same sect.³⁸ And a great body of clergymen and laity are indifferent to or opposed to such pronouncements. That is, over the question of

³⁶ For an attempt to remove this antinomy see Babson, *Religion and Business*, Ch. XIII.

³⁷ For instance, read the bulletin for September, 1919, of the Methodist Federation for Social Service which gives the text of declarations of Baptist, Episcopalian and Methodist national conventions, on the church's social mission, and the bulletin for August, 1920, which gives Presbyterian and Congregational declarations.

³⁸ For instance, compare the declaration officially promulgated by the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1916 with the Statement of Principles of two organizations of Episcopalian clergymen and laymen, namely, the Church League for Social and Industrial Democracy and the still more radical Fellowship of Reconciliation.

the attitude to be taken to the conflict of interests in political and industrial relations, there develops a conflict of interests in ecclesiastical relations. The "majority group of leaders" in the church, says a prominent Denver business man who gave up his business in order to give his time, as a layman, to the movement for social justice within the church, "will not tolerate the church's having any relation to mooted industrial questions. . . . There is as yet no lay leadership on this subject. One can scarcely blame a minister for giving up in despair when he finds little or no response from the pew to the social message which he believes constitutes the very heart of the Gospel."³⁹

Until recently the Christian church has accorded little recognition to the conflict between capital and labour, because its main interest has been in the deductive preaching of dogma. It has stood for an attitude of conformity, for unity and harmony, which would be disturbed by recognizing conflicting interests in society, and in the church. The church has accepted the traditional relation of employer and workmen because, until recently, this was thought to be the Biblical view, and has preached the duty of benevolent treatment of workmen by their employers. Another reason for accepting the traditional view is that the men of prestige and influence in the church belong to the employing class. Wherefore, that part of the working masses in which class consciousness has developed has come to distrust the church. This is inevitable for, as Professor Small says, "capital as it is legally established in modern industrial countries, is bound to answer to the charge of having acquired legal rights which public policy cannot permanently concede"; and "a church which has no positive attitude, no definite policy towards the group of problems thus indicated, can scarcely hope to impress men whose lives pivot upon these problems as dealing with anything very close to reality."⁴⁰

That the traditional relation of employer and employé is not in accord with the spirit of Christianity, and, therefore, is not endorsed by the Bible, whatever texts may be found to the contrary, has been urged with great force by ecclesiastical leaders.⁴¹ The leaders and organizations that stand for the Christianizing of industrial relations

³⁹ Federal Council of Churches, Information Service, Apr. 1, 1921.

⁴⁰ Small, *The Church and Class Conflicts. An Open Letter to the Layman's Committee on Inter-Church Survey*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., March, 1919, 495-496.

⁴¹ Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*; Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order*; Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, 111-117; Williams, *The Christian Ministry and Social Problems*; Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, *The Church and Industrial Reconstruction*.

are bound to incur the opposition of reactionary propertied interests.⁴² Those interests aim to perpetuate the old type of religion which is interested only in the eternal welfare of man, and which preaches rest in heaven and so tranquillizes man on Sunday for the patient endurance of hardships during the week. Those in governmental positions who take the reactionary propertied attitude note with concern that "in large numbers the masses during the present generation have been drifting away from"⁴³ the church; they deplore the tendency to experiment "with new and more or less radical principles" of Christianity and applaud the "old-fashioned crusade" alleged to be being made by "the larger bulk of all religious teachers" on the basis of "historical principles that lie at the foundation of Christianity."⁴⁴ To perpetuate industrial domination it is declared that "regardless of creed, we should give individual and united support to the agencies of Christianity in the promulgation of the faith, thus aiding in diverting human unrest into its proper channels."⁴⁵

The conflict between the reactionary propertied attitude and a sincerely Christian attitude to property has been prevented from coming to the fore because of the influence of reactionary propertied interests in the pews,⁴⁶ and because the church has, like the law, from the beginning been one of the buttresses of unsocialized private property.⁴⁷

⁴² For instance, reactionary employers' associations sent out letters to their members in 1921 denouncing religious organizations that adopted a social creed contrary to their own and threatened such organizations with a withdrawal of funds. In some cases funds were greatly reduced. (Methodist Federation for Social Service, bulletin for May, 1921, *Christianity Under Fire*.) For the reply of clergymen and the religious press to these threats see Methodist Federation for Social Service, bulletin for June, 1921, entitled, *The Reply of the Church*.

⁴³ Report of Legislative Committee of New York Investigating Seditious Activities, I: 1122.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Chas. S. Keith, Chairman Governmental Relations Committee, National Lumber Manufacturers' Association, First American Lumber Congress, Apr. 1919, 68.

⁴⁶ Babson, *Religion and Business*, 12.

⁴⁷ The function of religion as viewed by the egoistic property owner is expressed in a letter to clients, sent out January 27, 1920, by a well-known agency which serves the interests of business men: "What is our real security for the stocks, bonds, mortgages, deeds and other investments which we own? . . . the real security . . . is the integrity of the community. . . . The value of our investments depends not on the strength of our banks, but rather upon the strength of our churches. . . . The religion of the community is really the bulwark of our investments and when we consider that only 15% of the people hold securities of any kind and less than 3% hold enough to pay an income tax, the importance of the churches becomes even more evident.

"For our own sakes, for our children's sakes, for the nation's sake, let us business men get behind the churches and their preachers. The safety of all we

There is, however, this disturbing factor: if it is to the interest of propertied classes to keep the masses under the influence of the church, the teachings of the church as to property must not be such as to repel the masses. Furthermore, a theology of fear of future punishment is less and less effective in keeping the masses in the church and amenable to the influence and discipline of the clergy. On the other hand, propertied classes are becoming less and less contented with an exclusive church; they want the masses to be in the church and under its influence. Wherefore, that part of the clergy that is controlled by those classes will more and more find themselves in this dilemma: they must reach the masses, but how can they reach them and, at the same time, take an attitude to property that is repulsive to them?

A group of ecclesiastical leaders has recently attempted to define the "Unchristian Aspects of the Present Industrial Order,"⁴⁸ "The Christian Attitude toward the System as a Whole,"⁴⁹ and to recommend methods of reform.⁵⁰ Their report declares that profit seeking is not a justifiable motive of industry because, under it, the business man feels he is entitled to "all he can get," regardless of the welfare of the public or of workmen;⁵¹ that, while "a permanent personal control over certain kinds of material things is an essential basis of the good life," private property as we have it is unjustifiable,⁵² that the wage system is unjustifiable in so far as it makes the position of the worker insecure,⁵³ gives him little or no opportunity for development of personality in the course of work,⁵⁴ and does not give him a just share in the product.⁵⁵ The industrial system is declared to be fundamentally wrong in its "emphasis on self-interest. It is not simply that men do not act from Christian motives, but that the existing organization of industry does not sufficiently appeal to them. . . . Private profit has been assumed as the goal of industrial activity. In the case of the great mass of workers we have relied on the fear

have is due to the churches, even in their present inefficient and inactive state. By all that we hold dear, let us from this day give more time, money and thought to the churches of our city, for upon these the value of all we own ultimately depends."

⁴⁸ Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, *The Church and Industrial Reconstruction*, Ch. II.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Ch. III.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* Chs. IV-VIII.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 69-70.

⁵² *Ibid.* 85-90.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 91.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 93.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 91-92.

of hunger or unemployment to spur them on. But greed and fear never were Christian motives."⁵⁶ The conflict between the profit-seeking employer, who seeks to buy labour as cheaply as he can and to get the highest price for his product, and employés, whose interests lie in the direction of low prices and in selling labour as dearly as possible, makes a spirit of Christian brotherhood "exceedingly difficult."⁵⁷

This pronouncement of the leadership of an inter-denominational body indicates how far at variance is the progressive ecclesiastical leadership with the other types, on industrial problems. In how far does the progressive attitude have the sympathy of the rank and file of clergymen? We do not know. Probably only a small minority of clergymen approve the attitude of dominating and reactionary employers toward workmen, but only a very few fearlessly and concretely preach an attitude of sympathy and mutual understanding and co-operation. The majority seem to be moved by sympathetic impulses, but lack understanding of the class conflict,⁵⁸ and, in their ignorance, are suggestible to the attitudes of employers. They are painfully conscious of the power of organized capital, and find refuge from their sense of impotence in the thought that their "God is a just God, who can move the hearts of men." But should they not exemplify in their own lives and speech the sense of justice, courage and fearlessness of the God they preach? As it is do they not exemplify a yielding to injustice, lack of courage, and fearfulness? Yet it is on personal influence, preaching and education that the church relies for the development of Christian personality and Christian social relationships.⁵⁹

There are several reasons why, in spite of the backwardness of its leadership, the Christian Church seems destined to play a more important part than formerly in the adjustment of industrial and political relations. First, exclusive interest in tradition and dogma tends to weaken as Christianity spreads over the earth, and is adapted to the needs of all sorts and conditions of people. When ecclesiastical systems are transplanted to a new country, there arises a sectarian rivalry for social control which results in putting tradition into the background.⁶⁰ Thus, in Japan, where Christianity is in bitter rivalry with

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 104.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 92.

⁵⁸ Small, *op. cit.*, 496-501.

⁵⁹ Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, *The Church and Industrial Reconstruction*, 108-110.

⁶⁰ Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 214-215.

Buddhism for social control, both religions are abandoning their ecclesiasticism and are keenly rivaling each other in appealing to popular desires. The Buddhists rival the Christians in social and charitable work; Young Men's Buddhist Associations spring up to rival the Young Men's Christian Associations; both systems, having largely abandoned the preaching of traditional theology, rival one another in depicting the admirable and lovable qualities of their founders. This development is facilitated by the fact that, when a religion is transplanted to a new country, as Buddhism and Christianity are in Japan, the people have not the respect for the traditions of the system which obtains where the religion has been firmly fixed for ages. Those doctrines are preached and those policies developed which further the purposes of the sectarian rivalry.⁶¹

Another reason for the closer touch of the church with social problems is the fact that in all countries the conflict of interests in industrial and political relations is approaching a crisis, and clergymen and missionaries are forced to oppose the anti-Christian militaristic attitude in the state and the autocratic attitude in industry. For instance, Christian missionaries in Korea found themselves in conflict with the Japanese militaristic policy in that country and were forced to denounce militarism as contrary to Christianity,⁶² not historical Christianity but Christianity as exemplified in the attitude of Christ. Again, Christian missionaries in Mexico were forced to denounce American capitalistic interests that were trying to force the United States into war with Mexico in order to bring Mexico under the sovereignty of the United States "so that they can easily obtain these billions of dollars of oil properties which are certain to be developed in the future."⁶³ In all countries the Christian churches necessarily will be forced to take a stand against political and economic policies dictated by an attitude that is contrary to the Christian attitude.

Another reason for the increasing attention of the church to social problems is the magnetic power of its great progressive leaders. The conservative man lacks sympathetic and intellectual power, does not want his peace of mind disturbed, while progressive leaders are men of

⁶¹ This principle is seen in other lines of imitation. The technology of the industrial revolution in England was adopted in Germany and was adapted to conditions in a way not possible in a country more bound by technological traditions. (Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, 182-186*.)

⁶² "The Korean Horrors," *The Survey*, Aug. 23, 1919, 752.

⁶³ Church League for Social and Industrial Democracy of the Episcopal Church, Bulletin No. 2, quoting from a report on the Mexican situation made public by the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church.

sympathy and intellectual vigour and courage and these are the men who excel in personal magnetism. Their opinions are bound to have influence because of their power of social suggestion.

The development of an ecclesiastical leadership of this type should not be left so much to chance as it has been in the prevailing theological training. The tendency has been too much to regard as inevitable a favourable effect of the exalted truths of Christianity on the character of students for the ministry, and to give too little attention to whether or not the effect is actually taking place. In many cases the reaction to those truths is merely sentimental, and not effective in the formation of genuine Christian attitudes. One may hear a young minister preach fervently on the duty of love and self-sacrifice, who in private does not hesitate to say that he is going into the ministry for "the social advantages." But he can in his preaching sentimentally work himself up to a high pitch of lofty endeavour. The unfortunate thing about theological instruction is the lack of effort to carry along with the teaching the development of the character of those taught. If ever there was a school in which development of character should be an integral part of the training, it is the theological school. What is needed is not so much a definite code of behaviour as a new insistence on Christian conduct. The life of the Founder of Christianity furnishes the code; but the worldly influences are insidiously active, and, if ministers are to exemplify Christian conduct, students for the ministry need to be taught a rugged honesty in squaring their attitudes of character with those of the Master they profess to follow and to hold up before men.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AS REFLECTED IN LITERARY AND OTHER ARTISTIC STANDARDS

LITERARY and other art criticism must begin with the questions, "What is literature?" "What is art?" The Greeks maintained the imitation of nature to be essential in the art impulse,¹ wherefore, in their criticism of art, the implied standard of judgment was the relation of the work of art to the artist's nature. Modern critics, on the other hand, consider, primarily, its relation to the audience.² What art does for people is becoming more and more the essential consideration.

The primary function of art for the masses is to stir the emotions in a way to relieve from the intensity or monotony of life. Emotions that relieve are those that are unduly suppressed in the engrossing social relations.³ This functioning of art in the development of personality was at first largely subconscious and still continues so in the esthetic enjoyment of the masses. But, in the few who enjoy literature and fine art, the process is conscious. This function of art in serving the conscious development of personality is seen in the increasing prominence of the subjective or introspective element in literature and in all fine art.⁴

The nature of the art that appeals to people will depend not entirely on their impulses as human beings but on the trend that has been given to the organization of their dispositions by their occupation, social class and national allegiance. There is also the bent to character imparted by personal disposition and capacity of imagination. The degree of idealization, as distinguished from mere emotional reinforcement, of which a person is capable must enter into the determination of what is art and what is not art for that person. Similarly the different degrees of idealization of which the different classes

¹ Plato, Republic, X: 597-599; Aristotle, Poetics, Chs. I-VI.

² Buck, The Social Criticism of Literature.

³ Hocking, Human Nature and Its Remaking, Ch. XXXV.

⁴ *Ibid.* 3.

of a nation are capable must enter into the determination of what is art and what is not art for the different classes. The artistic product must be such as to stimulate some idealization, some imagination.

The rise of the conception of art as serving a socially limited development of personality has been gradually affecting artistic standards as it has religious beliefs. But there is this difference between art and religion: the former stimulates the free exercise of the imagination while the latter cultivates attitudes of suggestibility to certain symbols. The suggestive power of these symbols may be enhanced by esthetic treatment,⁵ but the object of such treatment is not to give an esthetic experience but to enhance the appeal of the symbols.

Religion in its simpler forms is an expression of the impulse for protection, which is satisfied in children by their relation to the parent and later attaches to the religious symbols. Art is an expression of the impulse for an effortless flow of sensation or harmony of ideas. It releases the imagination from the service of a set purpose⁶ and the imagination serves it by releasing repressed impulses. In natures in which opposing dispositions are strong and there is intense spiritual conflict, religion is the impulse not merely for supernatural protection but for a personal relation with a power not one's own that releases from subservience to worldly social standards, from all worries because of unsatisfied impulses for superiority or other selfish aims, and sets free the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions. Experience shifts from the egoistic dispositions and the impulse is to convey to others the joy of this great experience. An esthetic experience, also, represents a shift from the practical life to an idealistic happiness, an experience in which the artist can comprehend and voice the aspirations and struggles of a people or a class without losing his tranquillity, because of the sustaining power of the imagination. Art productions that are sublime, as Milton's, require a religious experience of release and a new life through self-elimination,⁷ as well as the more strictly esthetic experience of imagination and sensitive discrimination.

The impulse for the effortless enjoyment of sensation and ideas is a normal daily experience of people generally and appears at the end of the day's work. It is a function of art to provide stimuli and ideas that satisfy this impulse and so relieve from the concentration of work and induce relaxation. Art appreciation is, therefore, dis-

⁵ Leuba, *Art and Religion*, Intern. Jour. Ethics, July, 1917, 513-517.

⁶ See Chapter IV.

⁷ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 291.

tinct from work. But the ideas enjoyed for their own sake have also an impulsive force of their own and may, therefore, be such as to promote concentration and effort when the time for work recurs. They do not so act in the immediate esthetic experience because that is an experience of flow of sensations or harmony of ideas, of which no one produces its particular impulsive effect. But these potential effects may be such as, if produced, would enlarge the capacity of the individual for effective purposeful action. An habitual cultivation of art will conserve the idealistic side of man's nature, and provide a reserve for emergencies that tax the whole man.

We are not to think of art as only for the unusual person, but for the normal personality. The processes of the work-relaxation rhythm include imagery and ideas that promote strength, force, efficiency in purposive action, and that induce complete relaxation; and it is a function of art to facilitate the rhythm by providing imagery and ideas that suggest strength and concentration and that induce relaxation and mental play. Imagery may, also, relieve from abnormal depression which is caused by failure or exhaustion in the course of purposive action. Art has, then, this three-fold function—to stimulate in work, to induce relaxation and to exalt above depression. It does so through the imagination which stimulates impulses that raise the individual to higher levels of power and insight or that tranquillize and give more perfect rest.

The individual must put forth effort and concentrate if he is to give zest and spontaneity to the impulse for the enjoyment of sensations and ideas which asserts itself after work. When art is used to stir impulses which, because of a purposeless life, are not otherwise in action, esthetic appreciation loses its spontaneity and degenerates into sentimentalism. "Sentimentalism is the cultivation of emotion for the sake of the thrill, of the subjective experience. It is distinguished from sentiment, which is spontaneous and innocuous, because the pleasure the latter affords comes unsought, and is the result of the normal reaction of a sensitive temperament to a situation. It is similarly distinguished from passion and the more intense forms of genuine emotion for these also are spontaneous and unforced. Further, while real passion seeks its natural outlet in action, the sentimentalist is characterized by the fact that his interest in the object of his worked-up emotion ceases when it has served its purpose of providing the desired excitement."⁸

⁸ Neilson, *Essentials of Poetry*, 208-209.

Sentimentalism has a wide range outside of mere esthetic experience. For instance, men and women sometimes go about dreaming of doing philanthropic work, filling note-books with quotations and reflections, but doing nothing.⁹ They enjoy reading about social and missionary work, and form societies for studying such work. They get the satisfaction of ideas without any of the strain of effort; and their philanthropic plans are apt to be impracticable because they are made for the enjoyment of ideas rather than from any serious purpose. On the other hand, one who is in the midst of action may, in periods of bafflement and weariness, enjoy ideas without any serious purpose because one is using them not as a substitute for thought and action.

⁹ Miss Jane Addams writes that, when the settlement ideas were developing in her mind, during a long sojourn in Europe, she was filling "huge notebooks with quotations and reading lists," and enjoying the luxury of contemplated social work, without any of the effort or strain incidental to the actual doing of such work. One day she was shocked by the indifference with which she witnessed the cruelties of a bull-fight, her indifference being due to the sentimentalism with which she regarded the spectacle. "The sense that this was the last survival of all the glories of the amphitheatre, the illusion that riders on the caparisoned horses might have been knights of a tournament, and all the rest of the obscure yet vivid association which an historic survival always produces had carried me beyond the endurance of any of the rest of the party. I had no defence to offer to their reproaches save that I had not thought much about the blood-shed; but in the evening the natural and inevitable reaction came, It was suddenly made clear to me that I had lulled my conscience for years by a dreamer's scheme, that a mere paper reform had become a. *raison d'être* for going on indefinitely with study and travel. The possession of this plan had made it seem necessary to study the beginning of early Christian charity, and the changed attitude toward the slave and the poor which that wonderful group of early Roman Christians represented, but in reality it made an excellent excuse for engaging an archaeologist to interpret the catacombs day after day, I had persuaded myself that I was studying the galleries in Italy and Germany to trace the intimation of the coming change as it was set forth by Botticelli and Durer, their canvases surcharged with pity for the downtrodden, and with longing for fuller human relations, while in reality I enjoyed the picture galleries for themselves and for all they suggested. In short, I had become a dupe of a deferred purpose, of

'The will that cannot itself awaken,
From the promise the future can never keep.'

I had fallen into the meanest type of self-deception in making myself believe that all this was in preparation of great things to come, and nothing less than a moral reaction following the experience at a bull-fight had been able to reveal to me that so far from following in the wake of a chariot of philanthropic fire, I had been tied to the tail of the veriest ox-cart of self-seeking. I remember repeating to myself the scathing words of Fader,

'I use my love of others for a gilding
To make myself more fair.'

I made up my mind that next day, come what would, I would begin to carry out the plan if only by talking about it." (Addams, *Fifteen Years at Hull House*, The Ladies' Home Journal, March, 1906, 14) Miss Addams goes on to state that she did begin talking of her plan immediately and not very long afterward instituted her work in Chicago.

tion but for much needed rest and inspiration in the midst of it. Art may, therefore, function for the development of personality or for its perversion. The artist who panders to indolence by creations that substitute for the natural action of impulses a sentimental excitement lends himself to the degradation of personality. For, unless the individual has the normal daily experience of purposive action, the esthetic side of his nature ceases to retain any vitality.

An esthetic experience has, then, a vital relation to purposive action. The ideas of a work of art may at the same time be instructive and prepare the individual for a more effective participation in all his social relations. Wherefore, the artist requires, not only his hereditary endowment of sensitiveness, vigour and plasticity of the dispositions, unusual capacity of imagination and subtlety of intellect, but also a wide range of close contact with the life conditions and problems of peoples, with "poignant reality." For this reason the sympathetic disposition is closely connected with esthetic creation. There is another reason for the close connection of the two. As shown in a preceding chapter,¹⁰ sympathy is the social manifestation of the expansive mood; and it is in this mood, also, that people seek effortless enjoyment of sensations and ideas. Sympathy is one aspect of this enjoyment for it is the enjoyment of the happiness of others for its own sake. Where we find a sensitiveness to the beauties of nature we find also a sensitiveness to the physical expression of associates. A love of nature is apt to kindle human sympathy.¹¹ The word "beautiful" is sometimes applied to sympathetic people, as when we speak of a "beautiful life" in the sense of a life of sympathy and self-sacrifice. An esthetic experience enjoyed in solitude recalls imagery of loved ones.¹² Love of nature kindles in religious people a love of God.¹³ Sympathy and esthetic feeling are a means of promoting social unity. For just as the effect of genuine art is "infectious,"¹⁴ so is the effect of a genuinely sympathetic expression. Artists have dreamed of a universal sympathy that would unite all nations. The painter, Watts, declared that "Art should be a great cosmopolitan language, and for that purpose should dwell upon subjects that unite mankind. It might even be a medium for giving vitality to such interchange of ideas

¹⁰ The chapter entitled, *The Sympathetic and Intellectual Dispositions*.

¹¹ Brooke, says of Wordsworth, "The love of Nature led him to the love of Man." (English Literature, 173.)

¹² Palmer, *The Life of Alice Freeman Palmer*, 87; Muir, *My First Summer in the Sierras*, 178.

¹³ Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 47.

¹⁴ Tolstoi, *What is Art?* 453.

as are common to all nations."¹⁵ To this end he presented one of his paintings to the United States.¹⁶ Even more than painting, music may make for international sympathy. In their manifesto at the beginning of the World War in which the German intellectuals stated what Germany had done for culture, the names of the great German composers made perhaps the strongest impression. On the other hand, literature is more explicit; it alone can be used to propagate truths of importance the world over.

Artists of exquisite perception and discrimination are apt to have weak impulses, including sympathetic impulses. They do not understand the spiritual conflicts of a Carlyle, and they shrink from the intensely emotional aspects of the life of the masses. This type of artist finds the attitudes and the serene atmosphere of a leisure class congenial. The influence of a leisure class makes for an exquisite art, which lacks the range and intensity of an art that reflects repressed impulses of the personal life and forces that make for social progress. This leisure class art emphasizes conventional standards. The favourite themes are the various symbols of upper class attitudes, the favourite political and religious beliefs and characters, the favourite sights enjoyed by tourists, the favourite classical themes. An exquisite artistic treatment of a symbol of a cherished sentiment delights the soul of man; hence the selection of symbols dear to an upper class by artists whose aim is to appeal to that class. Artists who have radically broken with the conventional themes and selected characters and scenes of lower classes have been accused of radical tendencies, as if they were trying to stir compassion for lower classes and indignation against upper.¹⁷

Upper class influence has made for an artistic form from which emotional intensity has been fined away, and for a content very narrow in range. A great variety of impulses can be moved without destroying the esthetic appeal of the total production. This is enhanced if not only the process is artistic in form but also the particular ideas are interesting in their appeal to impulses that animate all men.¹⁸ But the particular interests must not be so pronounced as to interfere with the esthetic experience. The conflict in artistic standards between extreme refinement on the one hand and extreme emotional intensity on the other has, therefore, a social-psychological basis.

¹⁵ Watts, George Frederic Watts, II: 213.

¹⁶ Ibid. II: 215.

¹⁷ Cartwright, Jean François Millet, 111, 117.

¹⁸ Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude*, 69.

These extremes have been conspicuously absent in the literature of the United States, where class distinctions have been less decisively drawn and class conflict less severe than in Europe. In the United States during its period of development into one of the great nations the people were subconsciously animated by a sense of the increasing national greatness. American literature expressed state, sectional and national aspiration and exultation. "American idealism, as shown in the transformation of the lesser loyalties of home and countryside into the larger loyalties of state and section, and the absorption of these, in turn, into the emotions of nationalism, is particularly illustrated in our political verse. A striking example of the imaginative visualization of the political units of the state is the spirited roll-call of the counties in Whittier's 'Massachusetts to Virginia.' But the burden of that fine poem, after all, is the essential unity of Massachusetts as a sovereign state, girding herself to repel the attack of another sovereign state, Virginia. Now the evolution of our political history, both local and national, has tended steadily for half a century, to the obliteration, for purposes of the imagination, of county lines within state lines. . . . State lines themselves are fading away. The federal idea has triumphed. . . . The great collections of Civil War verse, which are lying almost unread in the libraries, are store-houses of this ancient state pride and jealousy, which was absorbed so fatally into the larger sectional antagonism. . . . The literature of sectionalism still lingers in its most lovable aspect in the verse and fiction which celebrates the fairer side of the civilization of the Old South. . . . But the ultimate imaginative victory, like the actual political victory of the Civil War, is with the thought and feeling of Nationalism. . . .

"The literary record of American idealism thus illustrates how deeply the conception of nationalism has affected the imagination of our countrymen."¹⁹

Not only national feeling but also the political attitude of a nation has a pronounced effect on its literature and art. Political freedom and freedom of economic opportunity give the impulses free play and stimulate individual initiative and intelligence, wherefore the literature of a politically free nation does not show an extreme emotional intensity.²⁰ Political oppression, on the contrary, represses impulses and the exercise of intelligence, wherefore the literature of

¹⁹ Perry, *The American Mind*, 117-120.

²⁰ Bunker, *Nationality and the Case of American Literature*, *The Sewanee Review*, Jan.-Mar., 1919, 88.

a repressed people shows a pronounced tendency to emotionalism.²¹

As the national life of a politically free people is more and more affected by the economic repression and unrest that develop with increase of population and the exhaustion of natural resources, behaviour partakes more and more of the character of repressed impulses. This affects the national literature, which expresses less the glad and confident individualism and healthy spontaneity of a Whitman and reflects the increasing emotional intensity. Another cause of the tendency to increasing emotional intensity in literature is the increasing interest in the lives of the masses that comes with the growing appreciation of their political importance in a democracy; literature comes more and more to depict the poignant realities in the experience of the masses. This change is seen, for instance, in the tales, poems and plays of John Masefield, who, though born in England and now living there, spent his early life in the United States. He grew up among the working masses and "faced life as he had experienced it and sought beauty in its toil and poverty, in its places of violence and sensation, such as are rarely visited by poets or modern book-makers."²²

We are accustomed to regard certain literary men as representing a particular national attitude. We speak of Whitman as the "poet of democracy," and of Carlyle as idealizing autocracy.²³ In a study of the springs of inspiration of writers, we must attend also to their different dispositions, and not merely to the influence of the different conditions under which they lived and wrote. Undoubtedly very much of the difference between Whitman and Carlyle was due to a difference of disposition; but not all, for the different dispositions were subject to the influence of different national attitudes. Whitman lived in a nation of abundant national resources, of political freedom, equality of opportunity, and, therefore, of confident and strong individualism. He was depressed by certain aspects of the behaviour of his fellowmen, particularly their greed of money, but

²¹ Wiener, *An Interpretation of the Russian People*, 42-60.

²² Thorndike, *The Great Tradition*, *The Dial*, Feb. 8, 1919, 119. "In his plays and tales Mr. Masefield oftenest finds beauty in emotional ecstasy, or to use his own words in defining tragedy, 'in the agony and exultation of dreadful acts.' But he finds it everywhere brightening experience. . . ." (Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 119-120.) See in "The Poems and Plays of John Masefield," the poems entitled, "The Everlasting Mercy," "The Widow in the Bye Street," and the play, "The Tragedy of Nan."

²³ Unjustly, however, for the dominating power glorified by Carlyle was the power of righteousness. (Stewart, *The Alleged Prussianism of Thomas Carlyle*, *Intern. Jour. Ethics*, Jan., 1918, 160.)

found that, on the whole, his contact with men gave him agreeable impressions, impressions not out of harmony with the poetic impulse.²⁴ This impulse for effortless flow of sensations and ideas was pronounced in all his behaviour. "His favorite occupation," writes his disciple, Dr. Bucke, "seemed to be strolling or sauntering about outdoors by himself, looking at the grass, the trees, the flowers, the vistas of light, the varying aspects of the sky, and listening to the birds, the crickets, the tree frogs, and all the hundreds of natural sounds. It was evident that these things gave him a pleasure far beyond what they give to ordinary people. . . . Perhaps, indeed, no man who ever lived liked so many things and disliked so few as Walt Whitman. All natural objects seemed to have a charm for him. All sights and sounds seemed to please him. He appeared to like (and I believe he did like) all the men, women and children he saw. . . . I never knew him to argue or dispute and he never spoke about money. . . . He never spoke deprecatingly of any nationality or class of men . . . or against any trades or occupations. . . . He never complained or grumbled either at the weather, pain, illness, or anything else. He never swore. He could not very well, since he never spoke in anger, and apparently never was angry. He never exhibited fear and I do not believe he ever felt it."²⁵ The esthetic impulse causes those actuated thereby to see in people only traits which are attractive, winsome, not traits which annoy or repel. Hence Whitman liked people and liked the idea of democracy. As a reformer he sympathized with the suffering of the poor.²⁶ But the poet does not react to annoyances as such because his sensations and ideas occur in the process of enjoyment of sensations and ideas for the sake of their flow; there is no impulsive reaction to any particular sensation or idea.

With Whitman may be contrasted Carlyle, in whom the resistful disposition was more pronounced and whose conflicts of opposing dispositions stirred in him a deeper sense of dependence than Whitman's; hence the religious feeling that pervades his work, and his

²⁴ Thus: "I am enamour'd of growing out-doors,
Of men that live among cattle, or taste of the ocean or woods,
Of the builders and steerers of ships and the wielders of axes
and mauls, and the drivers of horses,
I can eat and sleep with them week in and week out."

(Whitman, *Song of Myself*, in *Leaves of Grass*, 14.)

²⁵ Bucke, *Cosmic Consciousness*, 182-186; quoted by James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 84-85.

²⁶ Perry, Walt Whitman, 28.

more profound sense of the sublime. Furthermore, his inner conflicts were intensified by his living under a repressive political and industrial system. In his helpless contemplation of a society "where political forms, from the monarchy down to the popular chamber, are mainly hollow shams disguising the coarse supremacy of wealth, where religion is mainly official and political, and is ever ready to dissever itself alike from the spirit of justice, the spirit of charity, and the spirit of truth,"²⁷ his sensitive nature and resistful disposition developed a fierce resentment and a pity that occasionally became a contemptuous pity for the oppressed and ignorant masses. In his impulsive assertion of self above his agitation, he bade men learn the lesson of suffering, think little of the life that is dear to the ordinary man, and emulate the heroes.²⁸

Carlyle and Whitman lived in different nations, with different national attitudes. In the one the aristocratic political control, the submission of the masses, and the seeming inevitableness of this condition—revolting to a sensitive and independent soul—provoked an attitude of suggestibility to great personalities as the only means of human advancement. In the other the political equality that obtained in his nation and the prevailing equality of opportunity produced a

²⁷ Morley, Carlyle, in *Critical Miscellanies*, I: 152-153. See Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, and Froude, *Thomas Carlyle*, I: 106-112.

²⁸ "They seem to have seen, these brave old Northmen, what Meditation has taught all men in all ages, that this world is after all but a show,—a phenomenon or appearance, no real thing. All deep souls see into that, . . ." (*Heroes and Hero Worship*, 50-51.) "Unable to dream of swift renovation and wisdom among men, he ponders on the unreality of life, and hardens his heart against generations that will not know the things that pertain unto their peace." (Morley, *op. cit.*, I: 188.) Their salvation lies in attention to the great men, in an emulation which alone can make men worthy. The great man is "The light which lightens, . . . the darkness of the world . . . in whose radiance all souls feel that it is well with them." (*Heroes and Hero Worship*, 2.) "Worship of a Hero is transcendent admiration of a Great Man. . . . No nobler feeling than this of admiration for one higher than himself dwells in the breast of man. . . . Religion I find stands upon it; . . . Hero-worship, heart-felt, prostrate admiration, submission, burning, boundless, for a noblest god-like Form of Man,—is not that the germ of Christianity itself?" (*Ibid.* 15.) Compare with this these lines of Whitman: "I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contained,

I stand and look at them long and long,
They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning
things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of
years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth."

(Whitman, *Song of Myself*, in *Leaves of Grass*, 32.)

whole-hearted belief in the worthiness of the common man. Whitman stood forth as the poet of this exuberant individualism. He did not write to please an aristocracy, and discarded the conventional poetic methods and standards, though he knew well enough, and was skilled in the use of, the poet's craft.²⁹ His characteristic style gives an impression of revolt against conventional poetic methods, and, at the same time, has a powerful and majestic rhythm. He had the poetic impulse as it moves in a strong, sympathetic man among equals. His individualism expressed itself in a joy of living, a free, candid and ennobling treatment of the life of the body and of man's healthy impulses.³⁰ He would show that life itself is poetic, that impulsive excesses are checked if life is lived naturally, for the enjoyment of sensations and ideas for their own sake.

We have seen that artistic standards are affected by social-psychological conditions. We have, on the one hand, art that is refined to the point of eliminating all emotion or that makes only a sentimental appeal, on the other hand, art that achieves nothing beyond intense emotional appeal. Both these types show a deficiency in social-psychological insight. An art product should appeal not to human nature that has become perverted by class exclusiveness and a lazy existence, or by over-work and submission to class domination, but to the normal in human nature. The degree of emotional intensity which a sensitive discrimination finds esthetic lies between the harrowing realism which appeals to over-worked masses and the dilettantism of an inert and exclusive leisure class.

Standards need to be formulated with a view to the effective functioning of art in social progress. Social progress requires strong impulses of the right sort. Art should stir impulses that are socially necessary. For instance, the sympathetic disposition is not sufficiently strong for social progress so that representations that appeal to that disposition will further the public welfare.³¹ But the appeal must be artistic. A mere appeal to compassion, a mere intense portrayal of the sufferings of lower classes, is not artistic and it does not further the public welfare. To be artistic it must stir the imagination and to further the public welfare it must inspire hopefulness, without which men are indifferent even in the presence of suffering, or

²⁹ Perry, *op. cit.*, 31.

³⁰ Perry, *op. cit.*, 75.

³¹ Wiener, *An Interpretation of the Russian People*, 59-67.

are merely exasperated by the hopelessness of the situation.³² In pictorial art the imagination is stirred by suggestions of a wider horizon;³³ in literary art the possibilities of stimulating an intelligent optimism are immensely greater.

Crises in social progress have been the occasions of great artistic creations. The great creative ages have been periods of struggle to maintain national independence, or to resist class domination and achieve social justice within the nation;³⁴ and the work of artists who failed to be moved by these aspirations suffered as a consequence.³⁵ These periods called for artists of imagination and insight, who not merely depicted aspects of the struggle but represented the ultimate triumph of the ideals, or the triumph that had been achieved. Take the case of Milton. Though bent on a literary career, he turned aside to controversial prose on behalf of the English revolutionists, and for eighteen years ceased to be a poet. "But to regret . . . that Milton should, at this crisis of the State, have turned aside from poetry to controversy is to regret that '*Paradise Lost*' should exist . . . He himself tells us that controversy is highly repugnant to him. . . .

"But he felt that if he allowed such motives to prevail with him, it would be said of him . . . 'Thou hast the . . . parts, the language of a man, if a vain object were to be adored or beautified; but when the cause of God and His Church was to be pleaded . . . thou wert dumb as a beast. . . .'

"A man with '*Paradise Lost*' in him must needs so think and act, and, much as it would have been to have had another '*Comus*' or '*Lycidas*,' were not even such well exchanged for a hymn like this? . . ."³⁶ The revolutionists were finally defeated; and of Milton's situation it is said, "Blind, reviled, despised by his own children, his ideals shattered, his health impaired, he had but one . . . hope,—the completion of the great poem he had already begun."³⁷ *Paradise Lost* represents the movement of the imagination through which

³² Those critics who urge a necessary distinction between the esthetic and the social value of a work of art have not thought far enough to see that esthetic value is a part of social value.

³³ Cartwright, *op. cit.*, 156.

³⁴ Jebb, *Greek Literature*, 80; Newbolt, *A New Study of English Poetry*, 102-103; Smith, *Greek Art and National Life*, 234-236.

³⁵ Brooke, *Tennyson, His Art and Relation to Modern Life*, 32, 41-46.

³⁶ Garnett, *Life of Milton*, 68, 69.

³⁷ Trent, *The Life of John Milton*, 47.

Milton asserted his indomitable spirit.³⁸ It was followed by the "pure charm of the scenes in Eden"³⁹ of *Paradise Regained*. Thus did Milton realize strength and repose through a sustaining movement of the imagination, and pass on the realization to posterity.

In music also we see the effect of the aspirations of a rising and resisting class. For instance, "Mozart liked perfection of form in itself. In certain moods, Mozart reaches an expression than which a more perfect cannot be imagined. But in reality and force of passion, Beethoven undoubtedly far surpassed him. . . . Haydn and Mozart accepted their fate, their surroundings, their institutions unmurmuringly. They remained little above menials in the houses of the nobility. They were content . . . to go to the established church and sing its service; to obey the authorities,—glad to be allowed their wages, to please their patrons. . . .

"Beethoven was *first* a thinking man. He took seriously himself, his surrounding, and institutions, social and political. . . . He recognized the real mission of art—but slowly dawning upon us—to utter the highest, profoundest emotions only *by means* of beauty of expression. . . .

"His personal behavior betrayed his temper, not innocent of rudeness, when he completely reversed the accustomed relations of the nobility and the artist. Politically, he was in strongest sympathy with the struggles in France for individual freedom, for the principles on which stand our American republic and national life. This was the prevailing motive of the *Eroica Symphony*.⁴⁰ "In the great burst for freedom and like human rights, Beethoven was the tonal prophet. The setting of Schiller's 'Ode to Universal Joy,' in his Ninth symphony, was not the only evidence. In the Andante of almost every symphony Beethoven stands the clear sturdy poet of fraternity. The other cause for which men strove—the lesser, of equality—is uttered with Titanic force in other parts of later symphony."⁴¹ "Thus Beethoven found . . . the echoing voice to his half-conscious mutterings and rebellion against the tawdry and tyrannous feudal system, under which the European continent languished. In the Fifth Symphony is, perhaps, most distinctly the utterance of this spirit; though, wherever Beethoven boldly and knowingly

³⁸ Ibid. 195.

³⁹ Ibid. 196.

⁴⁰ Goepp, *Symphonies and Their Meaning*, I: 96-98.

⁴¹ Goepp, *Symphonies and Their Meaning*, II: 99.

breaks the fetters of form, he shows . . . the quality of his democratic, iconoclastic temper.”⁴²

Not only artistic creation but also mere appreciation is stimulated by aspiration for personal development and resistance of repressive social control. It is said that, in order to sing, we need “right feeling, rather than comprehension of facts, valuable as they are. . . . If the school principal, instead of contenting himself with reading some formal passage of scripture, or literature, . . . could . . . sum up one of the vital problems that affects every home represented in the audience, such as, for instance, grow out of the conflict between vested rights and the welfare of the community, . . . if the pupils were able to realize that soon they would be in this conflict, then a vigorous and appropriate song symbolizing either victory or struggle, . . . would have a significance that would immediately show itself not only in the singing, but in the desire to sing.”⁴³

The service the artist renders the masses thus moved is to lift popular feeling above the merely impulsive plane by fostering a sustaining movement of the imagination. He fails to do this if he yields to an impulse for social approval,⁴⁴ for what the masses tend to prefer is art that gives a simple, intense satisfaction of impulse. Artists with a capacity for idealistic creation develop, therefore, an attitude of independence; often they show this in their manner, perhaps even in their dress and general appearance.⁴⁵ Of Beethoven it is said: “Often unkempt, and rude in his outward bearing, he seemed at times absolutely oblivious to his surroundings. . . . His independence of spirit could brook no submission to authority other than his own conscience; and that conscience prompted him to stand firm in support of the genuine, the pure and the ideal. . . .”⁴⁶ Of Whistler, even more rude in his social relations, it is said that “Perhaps Whistler’s human soul was occupied by a double portion of pettiness, invidiousness, and malice, so that his artistic spirit might be entirely free. . . .”⁴⁷

Great artists become such not without severe self-training. Because he is temperamentally sensitive, the artist is sensitive to the physical expression of associates, and hence susceptible to their approval

⁴² *Ibid.* I:98.

⁴³ Farnsworth, *Why We Don’t Sing*, Survey, Jan. 3, 1914, 405.

⁴⁴ Burton, *The New American Drama*, 226.

⁴⁵ Fuller-Maitland, *Brahms*, 30.

⁴⁶ Baltzell, *History of Music*, 305.

⁴⁷ Singer, *James McNeill Whistler*, 19.

and disapproval. Furthermore, the work of the artist, unlike that of the scientist, is not a demonstration of fact; it is an appeal to the affective side of human nature and its worth is judged by the obscure processes of affective valuation. The creation represents not merely an uplifting and inspiring experience of the artist; he looks for this effect on the readers or spectators. And he does not always discriminate between this worthy longing for the social fruition of his creation and the desire for social approval.

From the beginning art has been a steady and uplifting influence in the crises of life.⁴⁸ This function of art seems to have run through its whole history, from its beginnings in folk songs, even in the symbols of primitive magic, to the art of poet and composer. Every branch of art has its great artists whose lives testify to the impulse, felt on a sublime scale, which all men feel at times, to think thoughts that suggest triumphant action or repose.⁴⁹ This impulse inevitably connects artistic creation with the common life of man wherever the artist has any sympathy with its aspirations, its futilities, its tragedies. However far removed from sympathetic understanding of the masses may be the poet of aristocratic attitude, in his poetry that is written in reaction to his own grief he shows a sympathetic touch with the common life of man.⁵⁰ But the great occasion for this social functioning of art is coming to be social conflict. The sensitive soul of the artist is moved by the suffering of masses of men and women and their struggle to improve their condition.⁵¹ Thus the conflict of economic interests finds one more expression in social organization—its esthetic expression. The artist experiences the emotions of his fellow men, but as states in an imaginative process rather than as isolated and intense affective states.⁵² And by the creation with which he raises himself above his own agitation he escapes the obsessions of either party to the conflict and touches the chord in his

⁴⁸ Gummere, *Beginnings of Poetry*, 219-249; Gummere, *Democracy and Poetry*, 157-162.

⁴⁹ Homer Saint-Gaudens (editor), *The Reminiscences of Augustus Saint-Gaudens*, II: 204-205; Cartwright, Jean Francois Millet, 175-176; Colvin, *The Letters of Robert Louis Stevenson*, I: xxx-xxxii, II: 5-6; Fuller-Maitland, Brahms, 11; Baltzell, *History of Music*, 303.

⁵⁰ Brooke, *The Poetry of Robert Browning*, 3-4.

⁵¹ Soleviev, Dostoievsky, *His Life and Literary Activity*, trans. by Hogarth, Ch. IV; Mayne (translator), *Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoievsky*, 85.

⁵² See the beautiful poem, "The Factories," in *Factories, Poems by Margaret Widdemer*, 9-10. See also Galsworthy's plays, *Justice, Strife, and The Mob*; also Hauptmann's play, *The Weavers*, in *Dickinson, Chief Contemporary Dramatists*, 395-438.

audience that clarifies its social vision and inspires it with a sense of social duty. The influence of these creations spreads throughout the world wherever circumstances and human capacity beget a craving for such inspiration.

BOOK VII

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN EDUCATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN ACADEMIC RELATIONS

THE adjustment of the conflicting interests that have been described in the preceding chapters involves a search for ideas that shall function for adjustment. To train for this truth seeking is the function of the liberal college. But the college itself shows a conflict of interests that interferes with its proper functioning. This is due, in the last analysis, to the different dispositions and degrees of mentality of the teachers. The behaviour of many teachers is largely determined by their local and face-to-face relations. They are absorbed in the social life of the place, its sociability, petty rivalry, and attitudes of authority and subordination. They have little or no mental initiative, emphasize the traditional aspects of their subjects and rely on the time-honoured authorities. In college administration, likewise, they emphasize "the way we always have done here." But there are many teachers of larger mentality, of two types, first, those of a strong rivalrous disposition who use their branch of learning to advance themselves, and, second, those of a pronounced intellectual disposition who resist the influence of both the other groups. The rivalrous type seeks to gain a reputation outside, by lecturing and writing, in order thus to enjoy a superior position within. The sociable, conforming type, when changes must be made, inclines to the leadership of the rivalrous rather than the intellectual type because the changes initiated by the former are less out of line with prevailing ways of doing than those suggested by the latter, for they are so planned as to enlist support and gain for the leaders the influence that satisfies the rivalrous disposition, not to meet ideal requirements. The administration is in many, perhaps most cases inclined to favour the conforming and rivalrous types rather than the intellectual.

The essential conflict in academic relations is, therefore, between types of leadership of unusual mentality, which carries them beyond absorption in their local and face-to-face relations. The conflict is

primarily in the mind of the teacher himself. It is between the rivalrous and the intellectual dispositions. The former emphasizes learning that gives prestige. It values freedom of thought in so far as it serves impulses for personal superiority, or for the superiority and prestige of the institution with which the interests of the individual are bound up. The latter values thought for the sake of the ideal satisfactions. "It gives man an escape from the noisy present into a region of facts which are as they are and not as foolish human beings want them to be; an escape from the commonness of daily happenings into the remote world of high and severely trained imagination; an escape from mortality in the service of a growing and durable purpose, the progressive discovery of truth."¹ There is a conflict, also, between the dominating and the intellectual dispositions. A scholar who has reached a position of recognized achievement may, by indifference or ridicule, attempt to stifle thought and research that would diminish his renown or discredit some of his ideas, while the thoroughly intellectual scholar is eager for the opening up of new lines of investigation without any regard to its possible effect on his position as an "authority." If rivalry or domination enters, freedom of thought is valued only as it conduces to the realization of superiority or the maintenance of authority.² Rivalry and domination pervert the intellectual processes. They make of careful observation a worship of facts that absurdly magnifies the importance of new facts;³ of the study of ancient civilizations a "linguistic fanaticism";⁴ of time-honoured hypotheses, dogmas not to be questioned. When the pride of an institution in its scientific standards, its classical learning, its great authorities is at its height, when the doctrines of the great ones become principles not to be questioned, then begins an intellectual decadence.

The function of academic institutions of promoting the public welfare by the discovery and teaching of truth implies, therefore, another function, that of exemplar of the intellectual ideal.

¹ Quoted by Neilson, Inaugural Address as President of Smith College, 40-41.

² "To the degree that professional scholars, in the formation and promulgation of their opinions, are . . . subject to any motive other than their own scientific conscience and a desire for the respect of their fellow-experts, to that degree the university teaching profession is corrupted; its proper influence upon public opinion is diminished and vitiated; and society at large fails to get from its scholars . . . the peculiar and necessary service which it is the office of the professional scholar to furnish." (Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, Dec., 1915, 25-26.)

³ Dunning, *Truth in History*, American Historical Review, XIX: 226.

⁴ Neilson, op. cit., 43-44.

This ideal implies, not a mere association of ideas that reinforce some predominant impulse, but habitually straightforward, openminded, singleminded and responsible thinking.^{4a} To maintain it requires an intellectual disposition so vigorous as to endure annoyance of every other impulse that thought may be clear and comprehensive and uncontrolled. This ideal is that for which the teaching profession essentially stands, and for the maintenance of which the academic institution must stand ready to sacrifice everything else.

The realization of the ideal requires freedom of teaching. For ideas instinctively seek expression and it is because of this that we say the expression of thought in words is "natural." For this reason, "it is extremely difficult to hide thoughts that have any power over the mind. If a man's thinking leads him to call in question ideas and customs which regulate the behaviour of those about him, to reject beliefs which they hold, to see better ways of life than those they follow, it is almost impossible for him, if he is convinced of the truth of his own reasoning, not to betray by silence, chance words, or general attitude that he is different from them and does not share their opinions. . . . Thus freedom of thought, in any valuable sense, includes freedom of speech."⁵ If dissent from prevailing beliefs is unexpressed, assent is socially assumed; this social reaction makes it still more difficult for dissenting opinions that are unexpressed to function normally in personal behaviour. Opinions must be expressed and exert their social influence or they are practically useless both for social adjustment and for development of personality.

The conventional teacher is incapable of feeling strongly the need of freedom of speech, because society agrees with his conventional ideas and he feels no restraining influence. He feels no responsibility for the use of freedom because he draws the content of his teaching from "the authorities" who have taken the responsibility for their opinions. The radical teacher, on the other hand, calls loudly for freedom but lacks care in thinking out the social implications of his teaching and so lacks a proper sense of responsibility. The liberal, progressive teacher, feels the impulse for freedom but realizes that, like other impulses, it must be indulged in society only after carefully thinking one's thoughts through and realizing their social implications. The maintenance of the intellectual ideal is, therefore, the great safeguard of freedom of speech; and a liberal

^{4a} See pp. 218-219.

⁵ Bury, *A History of Freedom of Thought*, 7-8.

freedom of speech is necessary for maintaining the vigour of the intellectual ideal.

The maintenance of the intellectual ideal is necessary for efficiency in research and teaching, particularly in the social sciences. For, "In social science in its largest sense, which is concerned with the relations of men in society and with the conditions of social order and well-being, we have learned only an adumbration of the laws which govern these vastly complex phenomena."⁶ An emphasis on freedom is particularly necessary for the social scientist because his researches are concerned with strong human interests, as property and the family. Wherefore, if he is to disengage his intellect from his social milieu sufficiently to make any real analysis of property and the family, he must facilitate this by putting himself mentally and socially and economically in a position in which he can feel free. The administration of an institution should not be in a position to bring economic pressure to bear on a teacher. On the other hand the mere enjoyment of opportunities for thought and teaching does not necessarily implant the intellectual ideal. The man in whose character that ideal becomes dominant is born and not made by emoluments or an easy economic condition.

In academic relations the essential relation is that between teacher and student. Essential in that relation is the confidence of students in the teacher's intellectual integrity. He moves among them as a leader in solving problems, working with them and inspiring them by his example. "No man can be a successful teacher unless he enjoys the respect of his students, and their confidence in his intellectual integrity. It is clear, however, that this confidence will be impaired if there is a suspicion on the part of the student that the teacher is not expressing himself fully or frankly, or that college or university teachers in general are a repressed and intimidated class who dare not speak with that candor and courage which youth always demands in those whom it is to esteem. The average student is a discerning observer, who soon takes the measure of his instructor. It is not only the character of the instruction but also the character of the instructor that counts; and if the student has reason to believe that the instructor is not true to himself, the virtue of the instruction as an educative force is incalculably diminished. There must be in the mind of the teacher no mental reservation."⁷

⁶ Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, 27-28.

⁷ Ibid. 28.

The confidence of students is not gained, however, by a mere obvious use of freedom. The teacher must be plainly a man of intellectual ability and integrity. His intent on the truth and singleness of purpose must be plainly evident. He must readily admit when he is mistaken and show no pride in superior knowledge. He must not have acquired the dogmatic attitude that is apt to develop through being constantly in contact with immature minds. He must show no impulse to dominate by teaching his own opinions obtrusively, or by teaching sensationalistically.⁸ His primary function is to communicate the intellectual attitudes to students by example and precept. The issue is the more important when we consider the far-reaching significance of the intellectual attitudes above referred to—straightforwardness, openmindedness, singlemindedness, sense of responsibility. For they are essential not only in intellectual work but also in the moral life, and in the religious attitude of reverence. Granted a teacher of such character, and absolute freedom of research and teaching is indispensable. Lacking this he must either cease to teach or cease to be what he is. Only a teacher of this kind gains the complete confidence of those students who have pronounced intellectual impulses. Under teachers who, for lack of freedom or for other reasons, are not thus intellectually efficient, students lose interest in their studies, become absorbed in extraneous activities, cram for examinations, and get their degrees. Restriction on freedom of teaching means, therefore, academic inefficiency. The students merely use the knowledge they acquire to confirm their sectarian, class and other prejudices. They get no vision of social duty and no training for discharge of that duty, which is the essential function of the academic institution.

To serve the public welfare most effectively the teacher must, then, do his work under the impulsion of the intellect, with no rivalrous or other extraneous intent. There is, therefore, a conflict between this type of teacher and those who work under the impulsion of other dispositions. The latter cannot understand the intellectual teacher. Because this type of teacher does not seek financial success these teachers never will be adequately paid. They are absorbed in other interests, unless driven to organize to raise salaries by actual or impending want.⁹

⁸ *Ibid.* 33-35.

⁹ See the report of the exhibits presented to the legislature of North Dakota by Professor Gillette and other representatives of professors organized and affiliated

Teachers of the pronounced intellectual type differ in type of intellect. Many, perhaps most, teachers of this type aim primarily at developing power of intellective control. People who clarify the thoughts and perplexities of others thereby gain an influence over them. "The good instructor is one in whom nature or discipline has produced what we may call intellectual sympathy—such an insight into another's mental state as is needed rightly to adjust the sequence of ideas to be communicated."¹⁰ The teacher's qualifications ought to include this power to enlighten and inspire. Nevertheless, to receive this enlightenment and inspiration is merely the beginning of intellectual training. The training should go further and aim to make of students *thinkers* who are *independent* of intellective control.¹¹ Some teachers present their subject so very clearly that the minds of students follow them without any appreciable effort. Teachers of this kind may illumine the mind without stimulating downright thinking; their clearness kindles admiration and intellectually satisfies and predisposes students to accept their ideas without criticism. Students who merely listen to clarifying lectures and become disciples of a brilliant teacher are not intellectually trained in the way required for solving the vexed problems of social adjustment, nor have they acquired the initiative and independence necessary for citizens who must act on conviction. To think primarily for the *satisfaction* of the intellectual impulse for clearness is not the most needed kind of thinking, for it will cause men to avoid problems like those of the adjustment of conflicting interests which involve much annoyance, in which, on account of the vagueness and complexity of much of the data, satisfying clearness is difficult or impossible.¹² Students must be inspired to endure annoyance due to the difficulty of the problem, and to persist in thinking in spite of annoyance due to the opposition of extraneous impulses in their

with the American Federation of Labor, in *Why College Professors Decided to Organize a Union*, Nonpartisan Leader, Jan. 19, 1920, 3.

¹⁰ Spencer, *An Autobiography*, II: 512.

¹¹ One of the main defects of our education to-day is "the too exclusive cultivation of the receptive attitude. It is not without significance that the non-academic occupations of our undergraduates are commonly spoken of as 'student activities,' as if the classroom were the scene merely of student passivities . . . it is necessary to . . . seek to rouse doubt, objection, resistance, that the student may become accustomed to do her own thinking and be trained rigorously to accuracy in that thinking. From the earliest stages of education, the effort should be made to call forth active curiosity as to the meaning and relation of every fact that is taught." (Neilson, *op. cit.*, 45-46.)

¹² Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, 451.

own natures. This type of thinking is rare, nevertheless, it is the socially necessary kind. It is not necessary that we should all think alike but it is necessary that we should think persistently and independently, uncontrolled and unafraid.

The great teacher is not only a center of intellectual inspiration but also a moral and spiritual force. For, in the course of his intellectual work moral and religious attitudes develop to facilitate it. The moral and spiritual preparation of the scholar must go along with his strictly intellectual preparation. Because he is not rivalrous he is not proud of his achievements; he is humble. Because he is intellectual he no sooner solves a problem than a bigger one opens up¹³ —hence his deep and sincere humility and his aversion to pride, which obstructs the free action of the intellect. Because he is not dominating he is not intolerant; instead, as an intellectual man he has a constantly broadening horizon and is patient with narrowness and opposition because, as he says, "they do not understand." Tolerance and patience are, then, two other essential moral qualities of the intellectual man. Humility and a consciousness of larger problems yet to be solved give him an ever deepening sense of the mystery of the universe and of human nature, and a feeling of comradeship with great minds that have faced that mystery, that is, an attitude of reverence. Hence the genuinely intellectual man is truly religious. Furthermore, the strictly intellectual attitudes have definite moral expressions. Because he is straightforward in his thinking he is honest and truthful. Because he is openminded, he is sympathetic. Because he is singleminded he is sincere. Because of his sense of responsibility for his convictions, he is conscientious in his consideration of all the wider social implications of his convictions, and he is courageous and resolute in action. Thus does the moral and spiritual life develop along with the intellectual.

Because the teaching in academic institutions is vital for the adjustment of conflicting interests throughout the social organization, those interests aim to influence education in their own behalf. This brings us to the second line of conflict in academic relations. There is a rivalry between institutions for students and funds. The egoistic family is averse to sending students to an institution in which the teaching is contrary in a marked degree to the beliefs and attitudes of the family. Families do not want their children to come home with ideas that will injure the standing of the family in the

¹³ Marshall, *Industry and Trade*, 673.

community. They do not want their children taught ideas that are contrary to the beliefs of their class or sect. Thus do families exert an influence over the institution. The influence is not merely unconscious but, in some cases, conscious, for influential families sometimes make much of teachers whose beliefs and attitudes are congenial and use their influence on behalf of the promotion of such teachers.

Sectarian groups, also, exert an unconscious and a conscious influence over education. They demand that education shall not invalidate the sectarian beliefs. Sects exert no inconsiderable influence over higher education, even in institutions that are avowedly non-sectarian. Usually there are progressive and conservative factions in a sect, and there is a rivalry between these factions as to which shall have the predominant influence over the institutions that the sect regards as more or less its own. Even the influence of a progressive faction fails to give the entire freedom that is necessary if the institution is to function in the highest sense for the public welfare.

Economic classes and interests, also, exert an unconscious and a conscious influence over education. Individualistic employers oppose teaching that is not in line with their determination to maintain their traditional control of labour. Property-owning interests oppose teaching that makes them apprehensive about the maintenance of inflated stock values, and these interests exercise no inconsiderable influence over education in the United States. This influence, like that of families and sects, is one of which teachers are not clearly conscious; they are subconsciously mindful of the powers that be, and accordingly discreet. But influence may be consciously and deliberately exerted, particularly in the appointment of administrative officers and heads of departments. In academic relations the ablest intellectuals are spontaneously turned to as the leaders of the group, wherefore conflict is inevitable when these natural leaders are ignored by an administration in the appointment of department heads. The motives for giving teachers of the rivalrous type the positions of "authority" are subconscious as well as conscious. As we saw in political relations, so here, business men feel congenial to men of their own disposition, and, therefore, when business men control a board of trustees they are apt to have confidence in men like themselves, and to prefer them in administrative positions; and these men, in turn, prefer men of their own disposition as heads of departments. So the men who force themselves to the top in academic relations often do so through hav-

ing pronounced those dispositions by which men force themselves to the top in business relations.

The nation, also, may seek to foster, through educational institutions, an impulsive patriotism. It may emphasize the teaching of history in a way to stimulate chauvinistic impulses, and may view as intolerantly a frank delineation of the advantages of a form of government opposed to its own, as ever a sect intolerantly opposed an intelligent treatment of an opposing sect.¹⁴ These impulses that spring from national rivalry are as subversive of the intellectual attitudes as are impulses that spring from family, sectarian or class rivalry.

That which is at stake is the intellectual ideal itself. For, in so far as aggressive particular interests are able to gain an influence over education, training in the intellectual attitudes is weakened.¹⁵ But such training never will be acquired outside of educational institutions. The manner of life of the business or professional man works against intellectual thoroughness, for problems come at him so fast that he can give only a minimum attention to each. He never will acquire the intellectual attitudes unless he has formed them in his youth. But they are indispensable if one is to take an effective part in the adjustment of social conflicts, for, without them, one is under the influence of those parties to conflicts which exercise the social control.

The administration of the academic institution takes cognizance of the desires of the groups and classes on which the institution depends for students and funds. It is more or less mindful also of what is at stake and of the necessity of academic freedom. A compromise is sought between the interests of the patrons of the institution and the intellectual interests of the teaching staff. The outcome depends on the aggressiveness of those who oppose freedom and the resolution of those who demand it, also on what is the essential purpose in making the compromise. The purpose is too apt to lay emphasis on the necessity of increasing the superiority and prestige of the institution. It is assumed that an imposing physical structure, a considerable number of students, and, later in its development, such a selection of candidates for admission as shall enhance the superiority of the institution, are essential; and that,

¹⁴ Williams, *op. cit.*, 99-101, 111, 124-126, 173.

¹⁵ Bulletin of American Association of University Professors, Dec., 1915, 30-31.

therefore, there is necessary a compromise between the requirements for superiority and freedom. The impulse for superiority is influential even in evaluating the work of teachers. Their books are apt to be evaluated according to what is said about them in influential newspapers and magazines, instead of strictly according to their worth as intellectual products. The real worth of a book is determined by a very gradual process of valuation among those who are competent to judge. Wherefore an author maintains that the institution is not involved in the momentary popular attitude, or the attitude of the powers that be, to particular researches that require a suspension of judgment perhaps for years. But the friends of the institution often are slow to grasp the point.

The professor's work as a teacher, likewise, is incompatible with rivalrous academic interests. Such work is not apt to be understood or appreciated by those who direct the rivalrous purpose of an institution of learning. The development of mind and character of students cannot be seen or recorded. It cannot be judged by the popularity of a teacher. While a decidedly unpopular person cannot do effective work as a teacher, popularity is apt to be in good part a matter of social qualities. But mere popularity in many cases goes a long way in determining a teacher's standing in a college. Because the nature of the teacher's work is not apt to be understood by those who are committed to the rivalrous purpose of an institution, he who does his task conscientiously, with thoroughness and with the utmost independence, needs a spiritual preparation that enables him to control the promptings of every impulse that is contrary thereto,—desire for approval, fear, rivalry, all of them that in any way thwart or oppose the intellectual purpose.

Because this intellectual ideal is not appreciated it is not apt to be accepted, particularly its implication as to academic freedom is not, by those who control the fortunes of an institution. Hence the conflict of interests between administration and faculty. This conflict is referred to by Professor Dewey as follows: "The case of the faculty has never been better stated than by President Schurman of Cornell . . . Consequently I make no apology for quoting him at length, especially as his official position protects his account from the charge of being an expression of unbridled professorial license. 'The American professor is apt to chafe at being under a board of trustees, which in his most critical moods he feels to be alien to the republic of science and letters. Even in his kindest moods he

cannot think that board representative of the university. The university is an intellectual organization and the American professor wants the government of the university to conform to that essential fact. His indictment of the existing form of government is that it sets up and maintains an alien ideal, the ideal of a business corporation engaging professors as employés and controlling them by means of an absolute and irresponsible authority.'"¹⁶ Not only is the trustees' control of teachers analogous to the employer's control of workmen, but, very often, the trustees are directors of business corporations. Business is their vocation and they follow, in their educational side line, the same attitudes followed in their business relations. Thus the attitudes that provoke conflict in industrial relations inevitably provoke conflict in academic relations. The resentment of teachers, says Professor Dewey, is not due to a "narrow class spirit," but to the necessity of an administration being in sympathy with entire freedom of teaching if the institution is to serve the public welfare. "If guarantees of the independence of the higher intellectual life of the nation from alien and sinister influences are worth anything to contemporary America, then professors are entitled to every meed of public support in their battle against a situation which in the language of Professor Beard makes the status of the college teacher 'lower than that of the manual laborer who, through his union has at least some voice in the terms and conditions of his employment.' For until this voice can be obtained, the calling of promotion of intelligence in the nation remains unassured, precarious, imperfectly responsible."¹⁷

The main body of the graduates, also, do not accept the intellectual ideal. They are apt to support the administration against teachers when the intellectual ideal clashes with the group rivalry ideal. Though, as students, they admired the teacher of intellectual power and fearlessness, they later acquired the ideal of worldly success, and the attitudes that conduce to success in business, professional, and other groups. Graduates are annoyed by the inferiority of their institution to others in the matter of physical structure or number of students.¹⁸ Their ambitions are in line with the policy of the administration which aims to give the institution an imposing outward

¹⁶ Dewey, *The Case of the Professor and the Public Interest*, *The Dial*, Nov. 8, 1917, 435.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 436. See also Jastrow, *The Academic Unrest*, *The Nation*, Feb. 1, 1919, 159-160; Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America*, Chs. II, VIII; Cattell, *University Control*; Kirkpatrick, *Control of University Policy*, *Survey*, Jan. 7, 1922, 555-566.

¹⁸ Veblen, *op. cit.*, Chs. III-IV.

appearance, and they are apt to oppose any use of freedom of teaching that might interfere with this development. The need of academic freedom appeals only to a small minority among the graduates, and they are unorganized and scattered over the land. The sentiment of the alumni organization is apt to be overwhelmingly for the group rivalry ideal.

It may be that, with changes in the college curriculum that give a larger place to studies that bear more directly on the problems of human life, it will be possible to increase the intellectual interest of students and more widely to develop intellectual attitudes that will last through life regardless of vocational experience. If so, an arrangement whereby trustees would be elected by graduates,¹⁹ and amenable to the principles adopted by an association of graduates, might eventually secure for teachers a more ample freedom of teaching. The standards imposed by graduates on their trustees might not be all a faculty could ask, but they would be, in part, a result of the teaching of those graduates by that faculty. And the really intellectual teachers on such a faculty would so have impressed a long line of graduates as to have created some sentiment for intellectual freedom. These possibilities, however, lie in the future and require radical changes in curriculum and teaching. Under present conditions graduates cannot be expected to do much for academic freedom unless a notorious lack of it is discrediting the institution. Then the group rivalry impulse may move them to call loudly for a declaration for freedom of teaching by the head of their university, that its prestige may be restored. A declaration for freedom apropos of a denial of it in a rival institution does not prove that such freedom really exists in the university whose head declares for it,²⁰ though the declaration carries the presumption that it does and so enables the institution to appear superior to the rival institution.

The loyalty of alumni and the confidence of the public in a college or university give it a reputation similar to the goodwill of a business enterprise, though the goodwill of a college is apt to be more persistent because of the complication of sentiment involved. The loyalty of alumni rests on the satisfying sense of superiority involved in being a college graduate, with an impulse to magnify that superiority by feeling his college is the best in the country. It

¹⁹ Meiklejohn, *The Liberal College*, 80.

²⁰ Some institutions exercise such care in the selection of the discreet type of teacher that there never is an appearance of repression because the teachers desire no more freedom than is given.

involves also memories of the manifold satisfactions of the impulses of student life and of contact with inspiring teachers. The contact with great personalities has played less, and the social satisfactions of student life a greater part in the formation of the attitude of loyalty to alma mater than ought to be the case, and this defect is increased, in many cases, by the tendency of administrations in appointing teachers to prefer the conventional good fellow to one whose vigorous intellect and character will require freedom of thought and speech. As the body of loyal alumni increases in numbers and distinction, the reputation of the university grows and its goodwill becomes an important asset. Most students go to a college or university to get a degree and are apt to choose a place whose degree has prestige regardless of why it has. So long as the institution has prestige, it is not a matter of great consequence whether this is due to its surpassing physical appearance and wealthy student body or to its intellectual product. Hence the goodwill of a university may be abused like the goodwill of a business enterprise. As business men may take advantage of the goodwill possessed by their business to cheapen its product and profit thereby, so the administration of a university may take advantage of the reputation of a university to cheapen its intellectual product by limiting freedom of teaching. An administration may go a long way in curtailing freedom, either by an unfavourable attitude toward teachers who use freedom or by more positive measures, as failing to give them due promotion or rise in salary, without impairing the institution's goodwill. The sentiment of loyalty having developed largely because of the enjoyment by students of satisfactions other than the intellectual, alumni may continue to feel loyalty to their university in spite of repression of freedom of teaching, if this is not given publicity, and in spite of a resulting intellectual decadence. For their main requirement is that the faculty continue to keep up an appearance of intellectual pre-eminence by the writing of "authoritative" works; thus they are kept satisfied of the superiority of their university in an intellectual way. Indeed a scientific masterpiece, if it set forth upsetting ideas might anger loyal alumni because of the storm of disapproval thereby brought against their university. Anything which shakes the goodwill felt toward a university is deeply resented. It follows that any hope of achieving for teachers complete freedom of teaching and writing by transferring academic control from boards of self-selecting trustees to boards of elected representatives of alumni

is doomed to disappointment as long as the rivalrous disposition and its satisfactions are essential in the loyalty of alumni. While the arrangement might increase freedom somewhat, complete freedom under alumni control is impossible until alumni recognize, and are equipped for, the responsibility of a thoroughly intelligent valuation and discriminating criticism of the work of the institution.

The case of academic freedom is essentially a case of the public welfare against egoistic group and class interests. As President Meiklejohn has well said: "A college is a place of criticism . . . the real issue is that of the intellectual leadership of a people who believe that they believe in democracy."²¹ "Unless a people find, in colleges or elsewhere, some place of criticism, some place where truth is sought, where thought is free, there is no hope for freedom of the people."²² The essential issue is none other than the survival of the intellectual ideal itself. The maintenance and the propagation of this ideal is the essential contribution of the institution of learning to the public welfare. Only through a vigorous intellectual activity can the sympathetic disposition of man become anything more, in social relations, than a vague and ineffective idealism. The sympathy of the idealist must have the voltage of intellectual vigour, if scholarship is to be productive of ideas that will function for social progress. Their ultimate source is the sympathy and intellect of the individual man and woman. Only through such teachers can the youth of the land get a vision of, and a training on behalf of public welfare interests. This idealistic point of view implies an opposition to the group rivalry ideal. It calls for the sacrifice of imposing physical structure, and of the prestige of numbers and of all other features of institutional superiority that require a sacrifice of intellectual freedom.

Teachers cannot look for the maintenance of the intellectual ideal to any outside interests. It devolves on the teacher himself. The nature of the teaching vocation fits it, of all others, to emphasize the intellectual ideal. The necessary preparation for instruction brings the teacher of a live subject into contact with problems beyond those of his own community, and so lifts him above that absorption in local and face-to-face relations that does so much to inhibit intellectual activity. A teacher should aspire to teach not only his students, not only his little community but the world beyond. If he does not do it,

²¹ Meiklejohn, *op. cit.*, 79-80.

²² *Ibid.* 96.

who will? Newspaper editors, politicians, will not but, as things are, their ideas are those that largely absorb the public attention. Aside from the world's need of being taken into the class-room, the class-room needs the world. No teacher feels the necessity of careful, thorough and judicious instruction in the class-room like one who is at the same time, through his writings, trying to teach the world beyond. For in this larger class-room the teacher maintains the same straightforward and singleminded attitude as in his relations with his students. He is not ingratiating himself with the upper classes of the various nations and their academic beneficiaries and institutions of learning, to whom the rivalrous scholar aims primarily to appeal, but addresses directly the thoughtful man in whatever class he may be found. And the aim is not for his assent but to challenge thought and perhaps dissent. Thus teaching in the wider class-room strengthens the intellectual attitudes for the immediate class-room. Of both his immediate and wider class-rooms the teacher thinks, "It is not so much what they think of this truth now as twenty-five years from now." Thus, both in space and time, the teacher aims to transcend, as far as possible the limitations of local and contemporary opinions. Truth remains relative, absolute truth is not attained, but the intellectual ideal is maintained.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

THE essential function of public education is to stimulate and organize the dispositions of children and youth in a way that will prepare them to meet, from the point of view of the public welfare, the problems that will confront them in their various social relationships. In the family they live a protected life and usually derive from family training only a very limited sense of social responsibility. At adolescence education should begin to have social objectives,¹ and, for this purpose, should include "intervals of *earning a living*,"² that the child's sense of protection³ may be transformed into a sense of mutual obligation. Nor should sense of responsibility end with relations with an employer but there should be inculcated a sense of a wider social responsibility. The final problem of the educator is to train in the child from his earliest years a process of "self-elimination"⁴ through recognition of his obligation to identify himself with the idealistic trends of his time. Only through a forcible presentation of social responsibility in this sense does the problem arise of what dispositions should be made the ultimate organizing forces in the personal life—rivalry and the impulse for success at any price, or sympathy and intelligence and impulses for truth and justice.

Children as they enter the public school bring with them the social attitudes acquired in the family. The function of the school is to train intelligence or "power of learning,"⁵ that is, the capacity to modify social attitudes as required for social adjustment. Intelligence is not a faculty that can be trained independently of the environment in which it is to function. It develops in the course of actual adjustment. The formation of connections that adjust is the intelli-

¹ "A Proposed Program of Social Studies in the Secondary Schools," Amer. Econ. Rev., March, 1922, 67.

² Hocking, *Human Nature and its Remaking*, 247.

³ White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation*, 147.

⁴ Hocking *op. cit.*, 250-251.

⁵ Thorndike, *op. cit.*, 281-282.

gence in process of development. Wherefore one important part of education is that of training the intelligence in connection with the social relations in which children are living or will live on leaving school. To educate effectively it is necessary to bring children's relations, present and prospective, into the schoolroom and there train them in analysing the problems thus presented.

This sort of education is the more necessary as the conflicts of interest in the different parts of social organization become more keen and the social annoyance more intense. Without an education that enlists the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions and develops intelligence and foresight the conflicts of interest between egoistically impelled groups will produce more and more social unrest.

Public education involves two conflicts of interests. One is between the tendency of children to follow family and other attitudes they have acquired and the tendency to develop power of learning. The other is the conflict within the school between educational tendencies that stimulate the egoistic dispositions, especially the rivalrous, the fearful and submissive, the conforming, and tendencies that make for sympathy and intellect. The two sets of conflicts are not entirely distinct because if education appeals primarily to the dispositions that are represented by the prevailing social attitudes, as education predominantly does, it fails to stimulate sympathy and intellect.

School training tends to reflect family attitudes, instead of promoting the reactions of sympathy and intellect on those attitudes, wherefore undesirable changes in family attitudes tend to be reflected in school training. For instance, in recent years there has been a marked tendency in family attitudes away from persistence in work, thrift and frugality and in the direction of indolence and self-indulgence, and this is reflected in the tendency to a relaxation of discipline in the school.

Relaxation of discipline is due also to a reaction from a period of parental domination which was reflected in schoolmaster domination in the school. This dominating attitude to children was pronounced in early rural America, where the chief impulse of the parent was to make the child "mind" and work hard, and where the schoolmaster was enjoined to continue this discipline.⁶ Parental domination is less rigorous than formerly and schoolmaster domination is consequently less pronounced.

Supplementing the parental dominating attitude of the early days

⁶ Williams, *An American Town*, 45.

was the theological attitude of those days with its doctrine of original sin and of the natural perversity of human nature. Children were naturally perverse and must be saved from their lower impulses by religious conversion and by family and school discipline. Finally, there was the surviving political attitude of autocracy, under which the educational system aims to inculcate throughout the state an attitude of obedience. As in an autocracy, so in the paternalistic family, the learning of facts was felt to be incidental to "discipline," that is, the inculcation of a "law-abiding," custom-observing, submissive attitude to the powers that be. This attitude survives in public education to day.⁷ Autocracy has passed, and the paternalistic family is passing, but industrial autocracy and the autocracy of boss-rule in politics continue to support the traditional purpose of education. Industrialism voices the old rural discontent with the traditional system as "impractical," and advocates technical training,⁸ but is satisfied with the effect of the traditional system in producing conventionality and obedience. The idea is that the social function of the masses is to contribute to the satisfaction of the few, also that the more ignorant the masses are, the more readily they submit to class domination. Hence the avoidance, in the education of the masses, of vital problems, and the limitation of it to that which will make them conventional workers in their own class.⁹ But an education for mere industrial efficiency tends to make workmen more self-reliant¹⁰ and harder to control, so that the educational program favoured by the individualistic employer will hardly achieve its end.

The persistence of the traditional attitude in education is due, also, to the impulse of parents to control the intellect of children, to stop the eternal "Why?" Parents are apt to be incensed when, in answer to their statement of a certain belief or way of doing the child asks, "Why?" If the child learns ideas in school that contradict cherished beliefs and ways of doing, parents are incensed against the school, and there develops a feeling in the neighbourhood against the teacher. Teachers are, therefore, apt to take the parental attitude, instead of attempting a thorough training. Public education never has emphasized the training of the intellectual attitudes.¹¹

As a result of the repressive influence of the family, the church,

⁷ Eggleston and Bruere, *The Work of the Rural School*, 46-47.

⁸ Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow*, 309.

⁹ Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow*, 306-315.

¹⁰ Butler, *Saleswomen in Mercantile Stores*, Baltimore, 1909, 173.

¹¹ Chapin, *Education and the Mores*, Chs. III-V.

the influential economic classes and the state, the educational system is, in every civilized nation, a reactionary influence,¹² in the midst of tendencies forcing to progress in spite of it, but forcing blindly, for the most part, because of lack of popular intelligence. Yet there is no reason for discouragement. Lack of popular intelligence is no more extreme than it has been, though more conspicuous as the need for general intelligence becomes more imperative. Democracy cannot be condemned for defects due to lack of popular intelligence until progressive education has actually been established and given trial for several generations. The most impossible people, from the standpoint of democracy, are not the uneducated mass, but the upper class cynics who sneer at the democratic experiment on the ground that the uneducated are incapable of education. The social-psychologist is above all interested in education, because it deals, or should deal, primarily with motives and motives constitute the subject matter of his science.

While there has been in the United States a sentiment for equality of education for all, public education has savoured of a bookish learning—an ideal surviving from a time when education was only for children of upper classes, and served as a mark of distinction and a diversion for leisure.¹³ This traditional subject matter has served the purpose of a dominating attitude in education which finds satisfaction in seeing a child take ideas on authority. Hence the emphasis on submissive memorizing and memory studies. Such studies are irksome, but the dominating disposition finds satisfaction in making the child do irksome tasks, which he would do only from submission and not from personal satisfaction. Secondary explanations are given for the value of irksome tasks. It is said that most boys and girls will have to spend their lives doing irksome tasks, and they need to be trained to "keep at it" and not be lazy workers. Another justification of the irksome task is that it strengthens the will.¹⁴ However, the training of the will is primarily a matter of awakening impulses that enter into the formation of the whole will,¹⁵ not of domination by an outside authority.¹⁶ In order to see why this is so let us examine the process whereby the "will" keeps the attention on the doing of an irksome task. It does this by associating interesting ideas with the task;

¹² Russell, *Why Men Fight*, 154-155.

¹³ Dewey, *op. cit.*, 314.

¹⁴ Dewey, *op. cit.*, 299.

¹⁵ Hocking, *op. cit.*, 232.

¹⁶ Russell, *op. cit.*, 171.

interest in the ideas facilitates the keeping of the attention on the task. Because attention is thus kept on an irksome task, it is maintained that irksome tasks stimulate this faculty of summoning interesting ideas. The making of education irksome or disciplinary is justified on the ground that it thus trains the will. The answer to this is, first, that even the most interesting school tasks involve enough that is irksome to put a strain on will power; and, second, that interesting, as well as irksome, tasks stimulate that association of ideas that strengthens will power. Many children are capable of attending only to interesting ideas. The development of the attention of this large proportion of children must, therefore, be begun by making studies interesting. It is said that much work is irksome and, therefore, education should be disciplinary. Much work is very much more irksome than it need to be and very much less interesting than it could be made. One of the ways of making work interesting is to reform public education and introduce interesting studies, taught in a way that interests, and thus prepare workmen to appreciate changes in their work which make work more interesting, and to demand these changes through their trade unions. After making school studies as interesting as possible, and the work of life as interesting as possible, there will still remain, in the work of life, much that is irksome, and in the school studies, enough that is inevitably irksome to give an opportunity for that training in the idealization of work that is necessary to perform the irksome tasks of the work of life.

We may now return to the thesis with which we began the chapter—that the dispositions of children should be organized in a way to prepare them for adjustment in all their social relations. "Instincts all express themselves through the body; therefore education which stifles bodily activities, stifles instincts, and so prevents the natural method of learning."¹⁷ Students should learn by doing the tasks and solving the problems that naturally arise in their social relations.¹⁸ For young children the social experiences center in the home, while older ones have a certain interest in industry and civic and political affairs. Bring all these problems into the school. Their analysis will result in the correction of the socially undesirable attitudes with which children come to school. For instance, many girls come to school with an attitude of contempt for house work and for those who per-

¹⁷ Dewey, *op. cit.*, 291-292.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 107-111.

form domestic service.¹⁹ This attitude prepares them to find house work a bore if ever, in later life, they find themselves so situated as to have to do it. What would be interesting and stimulating work, if they had the right attitude to it and were trained to do it skilfully, is made uninteresting, contemptible, because of the attitude acquired under the mistaken influence of parents. Many other attitudes do not adapt children to the world in which they live. Attitudes to food, dress, style, forms of pleasure, occupations, corporations, trade unions, social classes, a future life, and many others need to be analysed in the light of modern knowledge and social adjustment and wise attitudes inculcated. Neither vocational education nor education for citizenship expresses the total purpose of education. Its purpose is to train in pupils wise attitudes for all social relations.

As compared with social education, which would be in the highest degree interesting, the prevailing system assigns uninteresting lessons to be learned by rote. There is an aversion to study—"aversion and evasion are more frequently cultivated than power and skill through the forced pursuit of permanently uninteresting subjects."²⁰ Pupils feel the dominating attitude of teachers and the more spirited defy their teachers to make them learn, doing just as little work and just as much bluffing as is necessary to "get by"; or, if submissive in disposition, they work "conscientiously"; or, if rivalrous, they work for "marks" and prizes. Because the tasks are uninteresting the instructors must appeal to other impulses than the intellectual to get the tasks done. Consequently most of the work is done either from fear of not passing examinations or from the impulse to win high marks.

To get good work done schoolmasters appeal chiefly to the rivalrous disposition. This is assumed to be justified because this disposition has been essential in American business and politics and in professional life. Parents approve of school teachers appealing to this disposition. School teachers are dependent "upon the good opinion of parents, and secure the good opinion of parents by advertising the successes of pupils."²¹ The father expects his son or daughter to show his or her superiority in school by getting high marks in the examinations; he is little interested in what the examination is on; much less does he care for, or even think to inquire into the meaning of *learning*. The

¹⁹ Ross, *Social Psychology*, 111.

²⁰ Hanus, *Educational Aims and Educational Values*, 11.

²¹ Russell, *op. cit.*, 174.

rivalrous disposition emphasizes the memorizing of subject matter, not learning. The "cram and exam" system is a means of enabling pupils to display their superiority in absorbing and remembering for a short time, but it is futile for stimulating intellectual interest. It is futile also for stimulating even rivalry in any but the brightest pupils for the inferior ones know they have no chance to win high marks. Pupils often have intellectual interests that might be aroused by interesting studies. "Spontaneous and disinterested desire for knowledge is not at all uncommon in the young, and might be easily aroused in many in whom it remains latent. But it is remorselessly checked by teachers who think only of examinations, diplomas, and degrees. . . . From first to last there is nothing but one long drudgery of examination tips and text-book facts. The most intelligent, at the end, are disgusted with learning, longing only to forget it and to escape into a life of action."²²

The stimulation of rivalry in education causes inefficiency in the economic organization, for it makes brain and hand workers too rivalrous to do their work efficiently. They are too eager for promotion or pay without working for it; too much given to speculating where their work will lead to, and too little to doing it thoroughly and with the concentration that would cause it to lead somewhere; too much given to looking upon others as rivals instead of as colleagues in the teamwork of the organization; too much given to attending to what others, as rivals, are doing, and too little to attending to their own work.

The appeal to the rivalrous disposition does not encourage—it discourages—the action of the intellectual disposition. Marks and prizes accustom pupils to expect, for assiduity in their studies, satisfaction other than that of the intellectual impulses, and discourage work for the intellectual satisfaction of doing the work "right." A student who has been trained to work under the stimulus of rivalry will be apt to continue dependent on that stimulus and to fail in work in which there is no satisfaction to be got except that of doing it right. Therefore, tasks in school or college should not be such as to arouse no interest in themselves, so that students have to be aroused by stimulating rivalry. They should be such as to stimulate the intellectual impulses so that the task will be done as nearly perfectly as possible for perfection's sake.

When things are done for the sake of doing them right, there is

²² Russell, *op. cit.*, 174-175.

none of the hurry involved in doing things to satisfy some extraneous impulse. For instance, in working for pay, the sooner it is done, the sooner the impulse for pay is satisfied—hence the hurry. In working to win recognized superiority, the sooner the thing is done, the sooner the success is recognized, praised and then must be again surpassed—hence the hurry and strain of rivalry. Doing work right for its own sake eliminates the distraction of fruitless hurry and increases power of concentration. The enjoyment of work for work's sake is enhanced if there are comrades who also are doing work for work's sake. The school with its close associations is, therefore, an admirable place for stimulating intellectual impulses. Work that appeals to pupils as worth doing for its own sake "involves just as much persistence and concentration as the work which is given by the sternest advocate of disciplinary drill. The latter requires the pupil to strive for ends which he cannot see, so that he has to be kept at the task by means of offering artificial ends, marks, and promotions, and by isolating him in an atmosphere where his mind and senses are not being constantly besieged by the call of life which appeals so strongly to him. But the pupil presented with a problem, the solution of which will give him an immediate sense of accomplishment and satisfied curiosity, will bend all his powers to the work; the end itself will furnish the stimulus necessary to carry him through the drudgery."²³

There prevails a distrust of the intellectual disposition. It is due to the tendency of this disposition to discredit the conventional social control in the family, in industry, and in the social order generally. In the family the child is from his earliest years subjected to the influence of his elders. Infants are so constantly attended to, and their attention is so constantly engaged with their elders, that they have little opportunity for their own devices,—for looking at and manipulating objects, trying their own vocalization, and bringing their own little purposes to pass. If given an opportunity to develop the intellectual instincts of visualization, manipulation, vocalization, and mental control, they would enjoy a variety of instinctive action and would be less inclined to fret than if dependent on the attention of others. Older children, also, are subjected to the influence of their elders in a way to limit very narrowly their opportunity for intellectual initiative. This is seldom encouraged in children. "It will be said that the joy of mental adventure must be rare, that there are few

²³ Dewey, *op cit.*, 302-303.

who can appreciate it, and that ordinary education can take no account of" it. "The joy of mental adventure is far commoner in the young than in grown men and women. Among children it is very common, . . . It is rare in later life because everything is done to kill it during education. Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth. . . . Thought is . . . merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits, . . . indifferent to authority . . .

"But if thought is to become the possession of the many, not the privilege of the few, we must have done with fear. It is fear that holds men back—fear lest their cherished beliefs should prove delusions, fear lest the institutions by which they live should prove harmful, . . ." ²⁴ Parents and teachers are solicitous for any bright boy or girl whose impulse for thinking leads him or her to question and doubt the accepted beliefs. Wherefore, public and higher education everywhere exercises a restraint on the intellectual impulses; there is little encouragement of intellectual adventure.

The foregoing analysis of the conflict of interests in public education has emphasized the stimulation and training of the intellect. The social purpose of education is, however, the development of the whole personality through a sense of social responsibility and social adjustment. But this requires intellect to such a degree that intellectual development has sometimes been exclusively emphasized. As pointed out in a preceding chapter,²⁵ intelligence involves sympathy as well. The finer the sensibilities and the sympathetic appreciation the more adequate the intelligence. Conversely, the more dull the sensibilities, the more exclusively the individual feels his own impulses and the more selfish he becomes. At one extreme is the exquisitely conscientious person, at the other the delinquent who is abnormally insensitive and oblivious to others in his impulses for satisfaction.²⁶ Though the faculty of sensitive appreciation is born and not made, born sensitivity throughout our population is going to waste for lack of the encouragement that ought to be given it in the public schools. However, such a condition is not necessarily permanent, as becomes evident to a teacher of social science when he sees children eagerly appreciating problems of social relations from which prejudices shut out the parents. What is the conclusion? That if the parents had been edu-

²⁴ Russell, *op. cit.*, 178-179.

²⁵ Chapter IV.

²⁶ Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, 400-413, 755.

cated as children are sometimes educated, if they had developed intelligence instead of using what they learned to confirm preconceived notions and fix prejudices, they would be what the children are becoming—capable of playing their part in social adjustment.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (CONCLUDED)

PERSONALITY develops through organization of the dispositions in the course of adjustment in the various social relations. What processes are involved in this organization? The encouragement of sympathetic and intellectual impulses, though it involves the inhibition of others, does not involve their complete denial. On the contrary it results in their more healthy action. For, since the satisfaction of any disposition depends on its readiness for satisfaction, the inhibition of dispositions that are over-stimulated in the present social order results in that readiness which is necessary for their healthy action. Especially among classes with abundant means of satisfaction is the promotion of readiness important. Children need to be taught control of the primal instincts, to endure hunger to the point where they will enjoy and vigorously masticate coarse food, to brave cold, to disregard the pleasures of ease and the varied means of petty display. They should be taught to prefer action to passive indulgence. It is easier to restrain indulgence for the sake of some other satisfaction, than to "will" restraint. Control should, therefore, be taught by giving children opportunities for the joys of general physical activity, wholesome social gatherings and general mental activity. They should be taught to see how slight is the satisfaction of momentary indulgences as compared with the continuing joy of a sense of strong readiness of a variety of dispositions. This form of control is to be distinguished from impulsive self-denial, which we see in austere communities, and austere periods of history, where restraint to the point of annoyance, instead of strong readiness, was cultivated. To inculcate the ideal of strong readiness is one of the essential functions of child-training.

Self-control involves, also intelligent selection in the organization of the dispositions. First, children must be taught to emphasize the satisfaction of dispositions which originally have, or may develop,

many satisfying connections; and to restrain impulses satisfaction of which is intense, but with limited connections, or satisfaction of which may prevent the satisfaction of impulses of varied connections. Impulses of aggression, display and domination are among those which prevent the satisfaction of impulses of varied connections, as the sympathetic and intellectual impulses. Children often are annoyed by those intense impulses without knowing how to get away from their obsessions. For instance one boy exclaimed: "If only I could get along without this feeling of having to fight all the time!" To which another retorted, "Why don't you keep out of it? I do." A teacher can do much to assist children in a right selection and inhibition of impulses but this requires unusual tact and discriminating sympathy, and requires also an intimate relation with pupils.

Those who direct the practice of education often fail to appreciate the importance of personal influence. One fosters the development of intellectual integrity in one's own character among other ways by thinking of some one conspicuous for this attitude in his personality or writings. It is essential, therefore, that teachers should be men in whose personalities the right dispositions are pronounced. How often, instead, the influential positions are filled by men who are rivalrous, more or less conforming, and clever in winning approval of the powers that be.

Wise selection of impulses for satisfaction involves intelligent choice of the material means of satisfaction. Because most people have a deficiency of means, to increase their total satisfaction they must discriminate impulses that yield little satisfaction for the outlay, from those which yield much. Wise choice involves foresight,—the ability accurately to estimate present and future satisfaction, to choose the greater regardless of the time element, and thus to realize maximum satisfaction on the whole and in the long run. Capacity for so doing varies all the way from that of the person of sensitive imagination, capable of discriminating estimates, to that of those whose foresight is so weak that the possibility of suffering as a result of the indulgence has no effect in deterring from the satisfaction of the moment. Capacity for foresight depends, also, on the environment. The training of the habit of careful choice requires that the environment present some necessity for such choice. If children are reared in a home in which there is no necessity for exercising care in expenditures, it is difficult to train this faculty when they are sent to school.

Home training in discriminating choice is more difficult than formerly because of the multiplication of things that attract children—eatables and drinks temptingly displayed and advertised, ornaments and playthings. The rivalry of commercial interests to sell these things finds a ready support in family rivalry, which causes parents to desire for their children things that other children have. The pampering and demoralization of children, originating in the rivalry of commercial interests and of families, is scarcely touched by public education. Boys and girls should be taught not to want things just because other boys and girls have them. They should be taught to think not of what they can have but of what they can do without. Then as men and women they will be free to give themselves to high aims untempted by the material side of life.

Wise selection should be taught not only in the choice of material things but also in the choice of associates. The individual should look for the satisfaction of a particular impulse only to those from whom it can reasonably be expected. A man is foolish to expect approval from, or to be annoyed by the disapproval of, rivalrous and jealous associates; a woman is foolish to expect approval from, or to be annoyed by the snub of, a rivalrous and jealous member of her set. People are foolish to expect an understanding sympathy outside the family or friendly circle; they are foolish to expect intellectual stimulus except in a small circle of intellectual people. Yet mistakes of this kind are constantly made, resulting in much social annoyance and misunderstanding. Social adjustment involves learning to expect satisfaction of particular impulses only from definite parts of the social environment. The environment becomes differentiated into distinct opportunities for satisfaction, and annoyances of impulses from other than their proper sources of satisfaction come to be ignored. Thus do men learn wisdom in social adjustment and their efficiency increases accordingly. Lack of this discrimination causes inefficiency. An executive who looks for approval indiscriminately from various sources favours flatterers and undervalues independent men; so he weakens his organization by favouritism and himself by worry over his failure to win expected approval. The approval that is worth most to one's peace of mind is, naturally, that of one's most intimate associates, particularly of members of one's family.¹ But intelligence may at times require that even this disapproval be disregarded. Children should be taught in school the proper attitude to the approval of

¹ Karsner, Debs, His Authorized Life and Letters, 114.

their elders and of the community. They should be taught the situations in which desire for approval is in line with development of personality and the situations in which it makes a man or woman a coward. The educational system includes practically no training in this form of social adjustment; what is learned has to be learned by experience.

We hear much of education for efficiency. The social psychologist can see that much that is written about efficiency is largely comment on the externals of behaviour and does not penetrate to essential motives. Efficiency is more than a mere matter of energy, persistence, skill, sagacity in work. It involves such a mental adjustment in all social relations as conduces to a minimum of annoyance and a maximum of satisfying, smooth-running, co-operative action. Not merely industrial and political and other specialized groups but also families and communities require a development of efficiency in this intensive psychological sense. In the community this involves not merely an inhibition of an arrogant sense of superiority among members of an upper class, but also, on the part of the lower, an inhibition of suspicions of such impulses where they do not exist. Very often people who realize they are not members of an upper class show a strange incapacity to get their minds off that class. They are addicted to suspicions, to resentments of imagined slights and snubs. Just because they are not shown attention by members of an upper class, this annoyance of the instinct for attention causes them to regard the latter as "stuck up." This instinct for attention is one of the most troublesome in social adjustment and children should be trained to inhibit it. This training should be begun with infants, who are constantly trying to attract the attention of their elders, and it should continue through school and college training. Another impulse which needs to be curbed for the sake of efficiency in community relations is that which shows itself in indiscriminate expressions of disapproval of the behaviour of others, in a readiness to "talk down" the character of others. While discriminating disapproval plays an essential part in maintaining the morality of a community, in that fear of group disapproval deters from action contrary to social welfare, the effects of indiscriminate disapproval may be just the opposite. Thus, "Without doubt some women of the dependent classes are strongly braced in their morals by the rigorous standards to which we hold them. The consciousness that nothing but the best of conduct will be excused in them must serve as a constant stimulus to heroic living. But on the

other hand, there are doubtless many who have drifted to the bottom as the result of the first lapse which might have been excused and survived under a less rigorous standard.”²

The organization of the dispositions for social adjustment and efficiency is begun in childhood, continues in youth and on through adult life. When the youth assumes the responsibility of performing definite tasks, control comes to mean facilitation and inhibition of impulses in a way to further the performance of the task. Men have to learn to get along with superiors, to “put up with” their arrogance instead of resenting it, to get along with subordinates, to put up with their deficiencies instead of losing patience when they seem to lack capacity to correct deficiencies. The patient endurance of permanently annoying conditions which, in the nature of the case, must be endured requires capacity for ideal satisfaction. For instance, when an impulse is balked, and the individual is intensely annoyed but, in the nature of the case, “can’t help it,” he tries to comfort himself by thinking of his “blessings,” that is, of the satisfactions he does enjoy; in this way he becomes reconciled to getting along with the annoyance. To reflect on blessings enjoyed, to reach for happiness ideally and to find it, is a capacity of immense importance that needs to be developed by public education.

While efficiency requires patient endurance of inevitable annoyances, the proper adjustment of the worker will reduce these to a minimum. One’s vocation should be a means of satisfaction of one’s strongest dispositions. Boys in whom the disposition of rivalry is pronounced should enter a vocation that gives play to that disposition; boys in whom intellect is pronounced should choose a vocation that gives as free play as possible to that disposition. Wise selection of a vocation is facilitated if the youth has been assisted to self-knowledge by wise instruction. Hence public education should be such as to enlighten pupils as to their essential dispositions.

While vocations satisfy some dispositions at the expense of others, there is a tendency in all vocations to make work satisfying to a wider range of impulses. Economic institutions have developed into their present form under impulses to satisfy the acquisitive, rivalrous and dominating dispositions and, for this reason, have not satisfied the sympathetic and intellectual. Business men of imagination think ideas in connection with their business that satisfy the denied impulses,

² True, *The Neglected Girl*, in *West Side Studies*, 29; Paton, *Human Behaviour*, 243.

and these ideas sometimes lead to changes in economic behaviour and organization. The growing emphasis among business men on the motive of service is not due in every case to the fact that this motive has some value in attracting and holding customers but to sympathetic impulses that are not satisfied in an egoistic economic system. Dispositions not satisfied in work prompt men to feel for new experiences in work and this tends to cause variations in vocational behaviour.

If public education paid more attention to the recreation of children, to their use of imagination in play, to their "need to dream,"³ as Mr. Joseph Lee expresses it, tendencies would be fostered in children that would make them, as adults, better able to bring about variations in vocational behaviour for the sake of a fuller development of personality. As it is, the great means of satisfaction of unsatisfied impulses is recreation. In the social contacts of recreation, men are quick to feel whatever in the personalities of others meets an unsatisfied longing in themselves. This idealistic trend in human nature should be fostered in the young; it should be stimulated by contact with idealistic teachers. If it is stirred early in life and its preservation made the aim of life, a more pronounced tendency to progressive variation will be introduced into social evolution. Social organization will begin to show some capacity for a continually progressive development instead of the alternate reactionary and radical movements which have characterized social evolution thus far.

The recreation of pupils should be as carefully attended to as their instruction for recreation is the great means of enlisting that spontaneous action of the impulsive life which is the prerequisite for its proper organization. Pupils have to be taught spontaneity and thoughtfulness in play, as well as concentration in work. Impulses which predominate in work may predominate also in play, but work is in earnest while play is in fun.⁴ Animals and children play at fighting, but the play fighting differs from the earnest fighting in that the former is for the satisfaction of the instinct for general physical activity while the latter is for the purpose of injuring or subduing the other. When in earnest, a fixed purpose holds the attention and makes all impulses subservient to itself; when in play a whole series of impulses may be run through. In adults, the spontaneity of play is apt to have a narrower range than in children because of attitudes which have formed and which determine thought and behaviour. Men whose

³ Lee, *Play in Education*, Ch. XXXVI.

⁴ Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 55, 73.

essential attitudes are rivalrous, enjoy in their leisure hours games of rivalry. Men whose essential attitudes are intellectual devote their leisure hours to amusing mechanical inventions,⁵ or to amusing combinations of ideas in social intercourse.⁶ Among children play is more spontaneous and has a wider range. A wide range of spontaneity is advisable in adults as well, that impulses denied satisfaction in the work of life may be brought into action.⁷ The play is for the satisfaction of these impulses as they arise and not for the corroboration of a leading idea, so that, in play, the individual becomes conscious of the joy of free action. Hence the spirit of play is vivacious, and this spirit adds much to the charm and effectiveness of social intercourse.⁸

The stimulus to play springs from the original nature as distinguished from institutional stimulus;⁹ it develops especially impulses not habitual in work, as the sympathetic¹⁰ and the intellectual,¹¹ impulses that are not satisfied under existing institutions, but the increased action of which is essential for institutional development.¹² The play of children in the school should be directed to these social ends.¹³ Under wise direction play may be used to prepare the child wisely to act his part in the adjustment of conflicts of interests in his various social relations after he leaves school.¹⁴

⁵ Taussig, Inventors and Money-Makers, 30-31.

⁶ Spencer, Autobiography, II: 509-510.

⁷ "As immigrants to America work together in factories, every effort is made that they should conform to a common standard; as they walk upon the street they make painful exertion to approach a prevailing mode in dress; only on the playground or in the recreation center do they find that variety is prized, that distinctive folk-lore and national customs as well as individual initiative are at a premium. They meet together and enjoy each other's national dances and games, and as the sense of comradeship and pleasure grows, they are able to express, as nowhere else that sense of being unlike one's fellows which is at the basis of all progress In the play festivals of Chicago sustained in the various small parks, the Italians, Poles, Lithuanians, and Norwegians meet each other with a dignity and freedom, with a sense of comradeship, which they are unable to command at any other time." (Addams, *Recreation as a Public Function in Urban Communities*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., March, 1912, 616-617.)

⁸ Curtis, *The Practical Conduct of Play*, 123.

⁹ Lee, *Play in Education*, Chs. I-IX.

¹⁰ Curtis, *Education Through Play*, 80-86.

¹¹ *Ibid.* Ch. III.

¹² Curtis, *Education Through Play*, 74-77.

¹³ Curtis, *The Practical Conduct of Play*, Chs. VIII, XVI.

¹⁴ Bogardus, *Essentials of Social Psychology*, 62.

BOOK VIII

THE SOCIAL REACTIONS OF SUPPRESSED
IMPULSES

CHAPTER XXVI

PROCESSES OF SUPPRESSION AND REACTION

THE analyses of the preceding chapters have disclosed a suppression of impulses throughout social organization. When an impulse is suppressed, there is resentment, which may express itself in unconscious reflexes, or in the margin of consciousness, or in the intense consciousness of baffled rage or depression. Suppression, when it is consciously felt, gives rise to secondary explanations that induce resignation or justify resistance to the baffling conditions. Suppression, resentment and secondary explanations are inevitable in an economy where man's wants outrun the means of satisfaction, and where impulse outruns intelligence. Suppression is due, also, to class domination and the inequitable distribution of wealth. Class control has repressed the intellectual impulses of the masses and has intensified fear, restlessness and resentment.

The extreme of suppression from class oppression is suffered under slavery. The mere experience of emancipation from slavery in the United States stirred anticipation, even among the most kindly treated of slaves; and aroused the more intellectual among them to become leaders of the movement for the advancement of the freed race.¹ Emancipation gave the right to the satisfaction of the instincts that are essential in the preservation of one's own life (the right to life),² and of those that stir a desire for liberty of action and to acquire and own property. But equality of opportunity to acquire and own is not yet realized under the law of any civilized nation. Control of the law-making machinery by the propertied classes has prevented this development of the law of private property.

Class control has narrowly limited the opportunities of the common man. This limitation has stimulated the action of certain of the strongest original tendencies and has weakened others. One of the tendencies thus stimulated has been the sexual. To be sure, in early America, the sexual disposition was little restrained, without class

¹ Washington, *Up from Slavery*, 7-22, Chs. III-XII.

² Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I: 433.

domination. But there was a reason for the large families. The more sons a man had the more land he could clear and till. Many of the descendants of those same families, now living in the new conditions where large families mean an added expense instead of prosperity, have small families. Contrast with these families the large families of poverty-stricken immigrants who, in Europe, have lived hopelessly under the oppression of landlords, where a man "could not be worse off no matter how many children he had." The domination and exploitation practiced by landlords has there bred a condition of hopelessness³ that conduces to recklessness in the satisfaction of the strongest dispositions. Large families may even appear to the brutalized peasant to be advantageous.⁴ On the other hand, when these same peasants emigrate to the United States, they tend to lose gradually the hopelessness and brutal habits ingrained by centuries of oppression; the size of the family, especially of immigrants who settle in cities, is, in many cases, diminished for the sake of raising the standard of living.⁵ It is possible to over-emphasize this tendency, however, and to fail adequately to recognize the more conspicuous tendency, that is, the lack of restraint, which is "natural" and determines behaviour unless there is an exercise of intelligence, and which persists after conditions have become favourable to the exercise of restraint.⁶ The force of habit, supplemented in this case by the force of the strongest instinct of original nature, and supported by the subjection of woman to male force and her dependence on the male property owner,—the same habitual lack of restraint endorsed by ecclesiastical sanction, and by the sanction of universal usage and ancient custom—persists and thwarts the suggestions of prudence.

A considerable experience of resentment due to balked impulses is the normal experience of all men and women. It is frequent among children. The anger of children is usually due to the thwarting of some impulse.⁷ In cities where street children are constantly thwarted in their play, they develop a pugnacious attitude toward the restraining agents,⁸ so that playgrounds are needed where play can be so directed as to train the original nature of the child for social

³ Hupka, *op. cit.*, 56-60, 71-79, 190-193, 368-399, 435.

⁴ *Ibid.* 368-371. See also Krauss, *Sitte und Bräuche der Südslaven*, 398, 546-547.

⁵ Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 151-153, Ch. IX.

⁶ Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*, 159.

⁷ O'Shea, *Social Development and Education*, 171.

⁸ O'Shea, *op. cit.*, 309; Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Street*, 52-53; Goldmark, *West Side Studies, Boyhood and Lawlessness*; True, *West Side Studies, The Neglected Girl*, Chs. I-V; Curtis, *Education through Play*, 77-78.

ends.⁹ Also the impulses of children often are unnecessarily restrained by fearful parents and dominating teachers, so that they develop a defiant attitude. School discipline restrains the strong impulses for physical activity and creativeness instead of stimulating and training those impulses. One of the important parts of education consists in learning what impulses must be restrained in society and why. If an impulse leads to behaviour that must be forbidden, the parent or teacher can explain why and suggest some other satisfaction of the same impulse or of another in its place. If the child continues incorrigible, before punishing, the parent or teacher should make sure that this state is not due to social suggestion. That is, when threatened, a child may threaten back through social suggestion. It is best to avoid a threatening attitude and explain in a matter of fact way why that kind of behaviour will not be tolerated. Even if the child does not grasp the entire explanation he will realize that disapproval to which an explanation is attached is the most serious form of disapproval.

The intensity of annoyance experienced from a balked impulse is at its height when the annoyed individual is intimately associated with the one causing the annoyance. In industrial relations balked impulses cause keenest annoyance when felt against superiors with whom workmen are immediately in contact. Consequently foremen and managers who are in immediate contact with workmen are required to be men who "can get on with" workmen. These superiors, in carrying out an annoying order, disavow all responsibility and declare, "Those are our orders." The ultimately annoying authority keeps out of sight and out of contact with the workmen.

Because resentment is intense in proportion to the intimacy of the social relations, resentments in these relations are those which most quickly come to a head and, therefore, require sensible treatment. The very intimacy facilitates sensible treatment because the parties to the relation can thoroughly understand one another. When a resentment arises in the family it is necessary for all concerned to have a frank talk and then to "use their common sense" and so to readjust their relations that these will involve a minimum of suppression of impulses all around. The same method should be followed when resentment arises in an industrial organization. No organization of industry should be tolerated which gives such authority to an outside group as prevents the managers of an establishment talking over

⁹ Curtis, *The Practical Conduct of Play*; Lee, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV.

grievances fully and frankly with workmen with a view to reaching adjustments.

Bafflement of an impulse often may appear to stir no resentment when such is not necessarily the case. Bafflement of a disposition in one sphere of social behaviour may cause increased activity of that disposition in another sphere. For instance, women who, because of a decrease of family income, are deprived of the means to make their customary display in dress in the community, sometimes show a more conspicuous dominating attitude in the family. Conversely, women deprived by restraint or other circumstances of an opportunity to dominate within the family sometimes show an increased impulse to display in the community. Display is domination felt not toward one human being whom it is sought to compel to submit but toward many whom it is sought to impress.¹⁰ Again, when children leave home to make homes of their own, parents sometimes seek relief from the lack of wonted stimulation of the sympathetic disposition through increased activity of that disposition in communal relations. Conversely, when women lack the opportunity for sympathetic behaviour afforded by organized social work in the church or the community, they are apt to coddle and pamper their children too much. Mothers are sometimes conscious of making this mistake and say half regretfully, half longingly: "We've done everything for you children and we haven't done as much as we ought to outside."

Again, men who are disgruntled because of forced submission, or failure to get desired recognition in their economic relations, often "take it out on their families." In his family he likes to be lord, though his pride is humbled everywhere outside. Conversely, a man who is balked and disgruntled in his family relations often brings to his work a bad temper and an aggressive attitude that makes him unreasonable. Again, workmen who are repressed in their daily work, may find vent for their resentment in political resistance. One sometimes notes, among workmen who are suffering from increasing domination and suppression of trade unionism by employers, a growing resistful attitude in the political sphere. "Well, the majority rules in politics anyhow," is the way it is sometimes expressed. When the workman is thwarted also in his political resistance, in the ordinary channels of political action, his resistance may take the still more direct form of syndicalism.

It is often less difficult to ascertain what dispositions are baffled

¹⁰ Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, 94.

than to determine what social arrangements are to be held accountable. For instance, the cases of one hundred young working-girls who either had tuberculosis or were under observation for it were studied by a social worker under the supervision of a physician with a view to ascertaining the conditions that caused their illness. The result was that the doctor "could not say in any given case that industry had produced a single one of the diseases which he found, though he was not willing to swear that it had not done so. He found that a certain number of these girls, in their perfectly natural search for recreation, were running around the streets or elsewhere until the small hours of the morning."¹¹ Also, he found, as of course one would know that he would, the psychical factors in many of these cases—their love affairs and other worries which were often much more deleterious to their health than their habits of sleep or food or even their industrial conditions."¹² If the baffled impulses for recreation and the baffled sexual impulses were causes of the disease, what was the remedy? Social workers generally believe that clubs where girls can enjoy their leisure hours and where they can meet their men friends under wholesome influences offer the best kind of recreation, and also the best protection from unfortunate love affairs.

A disposition baffled in seeking satisfaction may get satisfaction ideally. For instance, men of extraordinary sympathy, who are repressed in the course of a sometimes mistaken resistance on behalf of the oppressed, find satisfaction ideally. Thus Eugene V. Debs, serving a sentence of ten years in Atlanta penitentiary for violation of the Espionage Act, said to a friend who visited him in prison: "I can feel the vibrations of the warm, firm and tender hearts beating in unison for freedom and democracy all over the world. The swelling note of their song reverberates through these corridors and I know they are active. At night in my prison cell I can feel the warm and tender fingers of little children upon my face, and all these things give me strength and courage to face the future, whatever it may hold, with serenity and composure."¹³ "So far as I am concerned, these stone walls and steel bars no not exist. I do not see them. My spirit soars beyond this institution and mingles with the spirits of my comrades, loyal and devoted all, throughout the country and the world."¹⁴ When sentiment is thus used to satisfy suppressed impulses

¹¹ Cabot, *Social Work*, 145-146.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Karsner, Debs: *His Authorized Life and Letters*, 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* I.

that the most vigorous action has failed to satisfy, it strengthens the character. On the other hand, the mere sentimentalist seeks satisfaction in imagery as a substitute for the normal action of the disposition and thereby weakens character.

The treatment of suppressed impulses involves facilitating their satisfaction where possible; where it is not possible the individual must be brought face to face with the situation and must learn why not only he or she but many others must get along with those annoyances. Teach a common sense resignation to an inevitable situation. "There are some things in this world that we cannot have, and the sooner we realize it the better." If some people have satisfactions that others have not, they also have annoyances that others have not. The great annoyances of life all must suffer. What would one not give, or get along without, to bring loved ones back to life! Yet all must learn to live with the loneliness of bereavement. Without, therefore, discouraging efforts towards a more equitable distribution of the material means of satisfaction, and towards a more harmonious social adjustment, the fact remains that mankind will continue to suffer annoyances, and that the great lesson to learn is to find satisfaction ideally. To extend the resources for ideal satisfaction is the function of religion and is one great purpose of education. Ministers of religion often are only vaguely conscious of this function so that religion often tends to degenerate into mere ritualistic observance; and public education is scarcely conscious of the problems of suppressed impulses.

Every phase of social organization is a field for the study of suppressed impulses and their reactions. In the family, as we have seen, masculine domination has required a submission of the wife that has resulted in unnecessary suppression of impulses, and the fearful or dominating attitude of parents to children has resulted in unnecessary suppression,—an attitude that has passed into public education. In industrial relations the concealment of motives by employers and their beneficiaries and by workmen, and the domination of workmen by employers has resulted in unnecessary suppression. In political relations the rule of propertied classes has resulted in unnecessary suppression of other classes. In professional relations the predominance of the egoistic dispositions results in a suppression of the sympathetic and intellectual in all those who have the latter pronounced. Professional men develop a "philosophy" which reinforces the dispositions that succeed in the profession requires should be stimulated and relieves, to some extent, the suppression of others. Some members may repudiate

the philosophy; they may require that the professional behaviour be altered in a way to satisfy dispositions which the traditional professional behaviour tends to suppress. That is, they may be idealists. One of the most interesting fields of social psychology is this study of variations in the philosophy of professional men, of the sentimental use of ideas to satisfy suppressed impulses, and of efforts so to alter professional behaviour as to diminish suppression.

The relief of bafflement by philosophizing prevails not only in the professions but in all other aspects of social organization. It is successful only up to a certain point for, when suppression is due to objective conditions which cause intense annoyance, for instance, an oppressive social control, the situation requires that the more or less subconscious resentment be voiced in order that subconscious processes in the motives of the population may be brought out of the subconscious realm and subjected to scientific analysis. This is necessary if changes in social organization are to be made intelligently with a view to setting free vital impulses that make for the development of personality.

CHAPTER XXVII

SUPPRESSED IMPULSES AND THEIR REACTIONS IN MILITARY RELATIONS

AN army has certain pronounced characteristics. (1) It has the intensity of emotion that characterizes any crowd.¹ (2) Its emotional purpose and the uncertainty of the future create a suspense that precipitates a feverish desire for action. The great aim of the men in the camps in the United States during the World War was to go across and get into action as soon as possible. This desire to get into action was aggravated by the monotony of camp life. (3) The soldier is impatient with every idea or belief that is contrary to the main purpose. He nevertheless welcomes ideas that are in line with the main purpose, that answer disquieting objections. The truth of an idea is judged by its reassuring and soothing influence, not as a result of any analysis of it. (4) The lack of all sense of responsibility in accepting the main purpose is accentuated when many accept it under duress. They do not even require a moral sanction of the purpose because they may not privately accept it, but submit, as fatalists, to the inevitable. (5) The lack of all sense of responsibility for accepting the purpose and the behaviour it implies is supplemented by a lack of responsibility due to the nature of the military organization. The soldier must learn to respond to commands, instantly, involuntarily. Hence the prevailing sense of utter irresponsibility. Responsibility is vested in officers, each being, however, responsible only in a narrow and definite sphere. (6) The prevailing sense of irresponsibility intensifies strong dispositions which, in civilized life, are put under a good deal of restraint. One of these is the dominating disposition. This is prominent in military relations as seen in the disposition of many officers to dominate subordinates in petty ways, to use the latter for their own comfort, to be over punctilious in requiring the conventional salutes, to take pleasure in catching subordinates in inadvertent infractions of rules. (7) This unnecessarily increases

¹ On the crowd See McDougall, *The Group Mind*, Chs. II-III; Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Ch. XIII.

ing rôle of the dominating disposition causes a suppression of impulses. Hence the rivalry of soldiers for promotion to positions where they will be less subject to domination, and will have more "privileges," as time off, which make it possible to relieve suppressed impulses.

The suppression exercised by military organization² can best be understood by dividing the inquiry into: (1) the effect of military discipline on the private soldier; (2) its effect on officers; (3) the influence of the soldiery on civilians and civil life.

The experience of the private in the modern army is thus described by a university man who was a private in the United States Army during the World War. Camp life, he says, "reduces all things to one level. It dresses all bodies in one cloth, and contracts all souls into one mood—irresponsibility. For the soldier's life is so arranged that the only thing to do is to be irresponsible. His food, shelter, and clothing are provided for him. He has no voice in matters of the most intimate and personal activity. He can do nothing of his own volition. . . . He lives a life where the will has no meaning, and where thought and initiative are not only not demanded but suppressed."³ This attitude of irresponsibility "is very strong. It prevails with practically all soldiers. It forces itself upon all of the men who remain in the army as privates. I am not speaking of the officer. I know very little about him, and there are influences which must have a counteracting and restraining effect. But for the private soldier this tendency to forget the world one came from, to lose interest in the serious and weighty things that filled one's life before, and succumb to the irresponsibility in thought and act that is bred in army life, is almost universal. . . . I have seen serious men, troubled and worried with heavy responsibilities and interests either personal or social, succumb to this influence, and in a little while lose themselves and become indifferent to the whole world —excepting the very immediate problem of escaping from boredom. For boredom is the curse of the camp.

"Monotony, constant repetition of the same acts, unending similarity and likeness in experience and labor and environment become the chief factors in the soldier's life as soon as the novelty of the situation wears off. This makes the one great aim, the one great ambition of the soldier in camp, to escape the weight of an uncon-

² For an analysis of the effect of the militaristic attitude on social organization the reader is referred to my Foundations of Social Science, Ch. VI. The present chapter is concerned merely with the effects of military repression.

³ Tannenbaum, The Moral Devastation of War, The Dial, Apr. 5, 1919, 333.

trollable self-subordination that destroys all difference and all individuality."⁴ "But man cannot live on obedience and submission alone. The soldier demands something else. He craves some form of . . . self-expression. . . . It would seem, of course, that this situation would provide an excellent opportunity for good and wholesome external influence along moral and educational lines. . . . Unfortunately, however, no such provision at all adequate has been provided. I do not at present want to go into a discussion of the activities of the various welfare organizations and of their value to the soldier, except to say that their activities have, as a whole, failed to reach the core of the problem—the provision of an opportunity for initiative and self-expression—and that at the very best they have reached but a small portion of the men. While they have had a very definite value in providing little things, they have failed in the larger and deeper sense—failed both as educational and as moral centers providing an imaginative and convincing interpretation of the world forces which brought the men into the army. In fact, the truth is that not only did they fail to give the soldier something of the meaning of the things involved in a spiritual way in America's entrance into the war, or of the full significance of the slogans that were abroad as indications of those values, but that they seem never to have realized that there was an opportunity to fulfil a very definite need. . . . This failure to make provision for the intellectual and spiritual needs of the men left them to their own resources to find an escape from their monotonous world—and find it in some measure they did.

"The paths to self-expression in camp are extremely limited. And some form of self-expression is essential if men are to retain any semblance of self in an environment so consistently organized to destroy individual personality. Some soldiers came to the army as lovers of books and in that way found a means of keeping alive their spiritual world. Others had the good fortune to play some musical instrument and gave vent to their pent-up feelings by playing. But most men are neither lovers of books, nor musicians, and even those who are, as a rule, find their environment unconducive to a maintenance of that interest. For men in camp are extremely restless, unable to concentrate, anxious for novelty and change, and not satisfied with the forms of expression that proved satisfactory under normal conditions. There is, therefore, for the soldier only

⁴ *Ibid.* 333.

a limited field capable of providing sufficient excitement and interest and opportunity for self-forgetfulness, and that field is chiefly represented by two things—gambling and women.

“It is no exaggeration to say that practically every soldier gambles. There is no other activity that is so popular or that seems so satisfactory. Gambling has many forms, but the shooting of dice ('craps') is the most popular. Of all games it is the greatest game of chance and luck, and is therefore the most universal. . . .

“The soldier is very much concerned about woman. Just as gambling is one of the serious occupations of the soldier, so is the search after woman one of the great games he plays. It is the game of a huntsman, and like a good hunter he displays persistence, energy, avidity, and resourcefulness in the chase. And generally speaking, this activity in the pursuit of woman is not in vain, for by and large practically every soldier who participates in this activity—and a very large majority do—finds his efforts rewarded. And in this process he reduces all social institutions within his reach, from the church to the gambling house, to an instrument for his end, and does so deliberately.

“The lack of personal interest, the freedom from care, the absence of the restraint of family and association, the close intimacy with men to the exclusion of women, accentuates the interest of and the craving for woman. This craving for escape from an unnatural and dissatisfying condition lacks however most of those sentimental and affectional aspects which we consider a normal consequence to the intimacy between man and woman. It is an expression of physical hunger desiring physical satiation. It is very much akin to the craving for food of a hungry man, and is talked about and discussed in terms applicable to food hunger, food acquisition, and food satisfying qualities.

“The deteriorating influences of camp life involve other aspects than those indicated, but the widely heralded virtues bred by military discipline—and beyond a certain readiness of give and take and greater sociability I do not know what they are—are achieved at a very heavy cost in terms of human personality. . . . For not only does gambling become the chief of the moral occupations, and the physical attitudes towards sex a reversion to a type that is not generally considered desirable, but in addition to those things it definitely de-

teriorates the sense of individuality, of self-respect, of interest, and of that something that gives to a normal being his fibre and his grip upon the world about him. . . .

"It seems a matter of great doubt whether this deteriorating influence could be modified or eliminated by giving something to the army life that it has not at present—something that is described as education. The evidence seems to point to the fact that as long as young men are herded together on a large scale and deprived of the opportunities to contribute democratically to the determination of their own destinies, their own government, and their own labours, no amount of external palliatives will destroy the more serious evils involved in army life. And to democratize an army—truly democratize it—is to undermine the present function of all the military ideology and technique as it relates to the soldier, making him an obedient unthinking instrument of another's will. There seems, in fact, no alternative. One must either accept the present scheme of army life with whatever palliatives and reforms are offered, and accept with it the general evils that come from such a life, or set one's face like flint against the whole scheme of military purpose and military ends.

"The soldier's efforts at escape from a dull environment and his efforts to find an outlet for his personal activities are rarely successful. Neither gambling nor women make such provision, and the desire to escape the immediate is always the strongest and most obvious thought and purpose that he exhibits. He is never happier than when he is on the go. Long before the war ended there was some rumor to the effect that my Division would be held on this side for a winter's training. Not only were we chagrined at being denied the privilege of going across but were made extremely unhappy at the thought of having to spend a winter in camp."⁵

The suppression of the normal life of man by military discipline results in an increased action of strong impulses—in periods of inaction those involved in games of chance, in relations with the other sex, and in sociability and bravado, in periods of action those involved in fighting, in love of dangerous adventure, and in amazing heroism. The more intellectual type of man is made radical in his thinking by the suppression experienced in war.⁶ He submits his body to the military mechanism while his mind is abnormally active

⁵ *Ibid.* 334-336.

⁶ Robinson, *Military Paternalism and Industrial Unrest*, *The Dial*, Aug. 23, 1919, 138.

and, under stress of resentment, works out a social and political philosophy that calls for fundamental changes in social organization.

When the private soldier returns to civil life he comes back with an attitude different from that with which he entered the army. He has had his individuality suppressed, his body and soul absolutely under the domination of an officer; he has realized the value of independence and free expression by being deprived of it; and he has felt that when he got free he would look out for himself first, he would become really independent by getting the means of independence—money. Hence the tendency of army life to cause so many to abandon their idealism, to give up former occupations, as teaching, which were not the most lucrative and to go into business in order to make money. Army life convinces the private that submission is the necessary lot of the mass, in civil as well as in military life, and a man can rise above it only by looking out for himself first. This is probably the reason for the self-assertiveness of extremely militaristic nations, and it is one reason for the popularity of a self-assertive philosophy in such a nation. Such a philosophy is unwholesome, and untrue from the point of view of the normal development of personality, because it is the expression of a suppressed personality, and is congenial to a people which suffers from suppressed personality.

The officer differs from the private soldier in that he is less suppressed. He must submit to those above but can dominate those beneath. Furthermore, he has more "privileges." But the satisfactions open to him, though more frequently enjoyed, are not more varied than those of the private, and his life involves much of the same suppression. This has the effect of intensifying not only the impulses that are satisfied when off duty but also the dominating and associated impulses that are satisfied in the treatment of subordinates while on duty. Many officers enjoy nothing more than catching a private in some little, unconscious violation of orders or rules. They enjoy his look of terror on being caught. The dominating disposition is intensified and this affects associated dispositions. Officers tend to be more unrestrained sexually than the common soldier and their influence on a civil population is correspondingly bad. The primitive and brutal instincts of men are intensified by the suppression of military life.

A system of compulsory military training of civilians in time of peace has a profound effect on the national character and social in-

stitutions.⁷ This is due to the fact that young men carry the military attitudes into civil life, and also to the influence of the army on the civil population. The soldier, and particularly the officer, is a figure that catches the popular eye. His uniform, his physical fitness, his function as the protector of the people, his prestige as exemplar of the obedience-compelling power of the state, stimulates strong impulses of admiration, devotion and submission and this gives his attitudes and opinions great influence. Even in the United States where we have no compulsory military training, the soldier influence is excessive and is for the most part, reactionary;⁸ the influence of the progressive element is comparatively slight.⁹ The behaviour of soldiers among the citizens in time of peace may be repressive, occasionally brutal, while the public is indulgent or servile—a condition subversive of the cherished institutions and moral standards of an originally free people.

In the formulation of the military policies of the state high officials of the army exercise a dominating influence, even in a democracy, over the highest officials of the state.¹⁰ In case of a conflict of military and civil authorities over questions of jurisdiction, the former are quite apt to ignore the latter and to act lawlessly¹¹ because their impulse to dominate magnifies their sense of their authority. Thus the army influences the policies and the administration of the state in the direction of autocracy, as well as the ideas and the subconscious attitudes and impulses of the masses. A population that has long emphasized compulsory military training develops a strange mixture of fearful submission and self-assertion. The people tend to over-value their fighting qualities and to acquiesce in acts of their government that show an averseness to conciliation and fair dealing in the settlement of international disputes. Such a people becomes the ready instrument of ambitious statesmen and greedy capitalistic interests.

There are several reasons why the people of a democracy may not appreciate the danger of compulsory military training. The effects of such training are psychological processes difficult to detect and explain, which become plainly evident only after their effects on behaviour have set the development of character in a direction opposite

⁷ Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, Ch. VI.

⁸ Warner, *The Truth about the American Legion*, *The Nation*, CXIII: 7-10, 35-37, 65-66, 89-91.

⁹ The World War Veterans.

¹⁰ Brown, *Militarism in the United States and the Conference*, *The Nation*, November 9, 1921, 526-527.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

to that of a free people. Such a people rely on their traditions of freedom to prevent such a development, not realizing that traditions are merely habits of joint action which will pass away as soon as they begin to act contrary thereto. Compulsory military training will gradually suppress impulses of freedom, which are contrary to the impulses of military life, and will foster and reinforce the latter by the secondary explanations that make of those impulses obsessions. The instincts that are suppressed are the more general, more intellectual and more modern instincts; those that are reinforced are the specific, more brutal and more primitive instincts.¹²

In a democracy the proper functioning of government depends on stimulating and training the intellectual disposition, and military training works contrary to that end. Military training teaches the citizen to regard the government as an agency that gives orders that are to be unquestioningly obeyed, while a democracy requires that the citizen assume a critical attitude to governmental policies. Once laws are enacted they are not to be merely obeyed but critically regarded, their effects noted, desirable changes in them formulated and argued before the people. An independent, critical attitude to law and governmental policy is essential in a democracy.¹³ The military attitude makes of the forms of government sacred forms, and of governmental policies doctrines that are removed from the sphere of discussion, that are to be accepted as ecclesiastical dogmas and forms of worship were wont to be in mediæval times, and, as then, dissenters are intolerantly and cruelly coerced.¹⁴ Political fanaticism is, like sectarian fanaticism, a product of the bitter group rivalry for which militarism stands. Political fanaticism invariably works to the advantage of the propertied classes that control governments and to whose interest it is to maintain things as they are.¹⁵

A progressive political organization must provide freedom for the rise of variations in behaviour, for on variations and their selection progress depends. This freedom is repressed in a nation that is subjected to compulsory military training. The effect of the intimacy

¹² Warner, *op. cit.*, 7-8; Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, 306.

¹³ The conflict of the military and the democratic attitudes became intense in the United States when, at the close of the World War, returning soldiers organized to prevent criticism of the government and there was spread abroad a spirit of intolerance, a repression of freedom of speech and assemblage, which eventually resulted in the organization, against the militaristic tendencies, of the forces that stood for the democratic attitude. (*Colcord, The Committee of Forty-Eight, The Nation*, Dec. 27, 1919, 821-822.)

¹⁴ Warner, *op. cit.*, 8-10, 35-36.

¹⁵ Warner, *op. cit.*, 89-91.

of a military encampment is such that it is almost impossible for the individual to differ with his comrades. A difference of opinion subjects him to ridicule, which, in those intimate relations, men find it hard to withstand. Workmen, who have their individual homes to which they go at night, can find some seclusion for individuality, but not the soldiers of an army. Hence, the ease with which a ruler controls a nation whose adult citizens, in the most plastic period of their lives, have undergone compulsory training and, in character, constitute a vast army. They have been habituated to submission to domination, to agreeing with their fellows. Such a nation lacks the sense of intellectual freedom in serious discussion that is necessary to encourage variations in ideas and behaviour; and its subjects are conspicuously lacking in the impulse for spontaneous, unrestrained play that characterizes a democratic nation.¹⁶ Its educational system places less emphasis on free inquiry than that of a democratic nation, and educational institutions are the vital ones for social progress.

¹⁶ Collier, *Germany and the Germans*, 371; Collier, *England and the English*, Ch. IV.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SUPPRESSED IMPULSES AND THEIR REACTIONS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

BALKED impulses among workmen are due to evil working conditions—long hours, monotonous work—, to their lack of intelligence and training for their work and to unfavourable industrial relations. Much of the suppression among them seems to be an inevitable result of their subordinate position as workmen. It is the working man and woman rather than the employer who “has to take” hot temper and injustice and petty meanness. The employer, by virtue of this dominating position, expects the workman to acquiesce in his view of a situation. The workman was to blame for the injury to the machine, not the management that set its speed; the stenographer was to blame for the mistake, not the employer with his indistinct enunciation. The attitude of authority carries with it an assumption of dignity which must not be lowered by the acknowledgment of a mistake. The employé “has to take it,” not the employer. “You have to take it,” is the common saying among workingmen and women. It is the working masses rather than employers who are suppressed in the course of the day’s work. After work, in hours of recreation, is it otherwise? The employer has his club, his automobile, his home, perhaps a home of luxury, with its varied means of satisfaction; the workman has a home of meagre satisfaction or of poverty. Here again the impulses of the masses are balked, and there is apt to be a resort to places which furnish intense satisfaction of the strongest instincts.

An industrial relation of domination of employers and submission of workmen implies the inferiority of the latter, and when they resent this attitude and its implications they are apt to be brutally reminded of their inferiority. This still further stirs resentment.¹ The public infers from the dependent position of labour, from the begrimed visage of the workman,² his inferiority, and subconsciously

¹ Watts, *An Introduction to the Psychological Problems of Industry*, 147.

² *Ibid.* 150.

contemns workmen and respects employers for their superiority. This respect carries with it a readiness to credit the employer's point of view and take his attitude in an industrial dispute. This attitude of the public still further stirs the resentment of workmen. Through his control of the press the employer easily clinches his control of public opinion and this unfavorable attitude of the press, also, aggravates the resentment of workmen. So far as the church and education favour the employer these agencies also stir resentment.

The subconscious sense of bafflement among the working masses is reacted to with hopefulness in youth, but this eventually dies out as workmen become conscious that they are "doing as well" as they ever will. They realize that nothing is "laid by" and that there is no future for them except toil to the very end.³ As an individual who has long and hopefully contemplated and worked in anticipation of some satisfaction and has finally found it impossible of attainment becomes hopeless and resentful, so the weariness, poverty and narrowness of the range of satisfactions of the large majority of adult wage-earners eventually causes a sense of bafflement and resentment. This state may be without consciousness of any particular person or situation that stirs resentment, but it is favorable to suggestions of ideas, true or only partly true, against the existing system. As in the case of the individual an active resentment is a more healthy symptom than depression, because it implies that effort and purpose to achieve satisfying conditions have not yet ceased, so vigorous resistance by men who work under conditions where self-realization is impossible is a more wholesome tendency than the depressed hopelessness which has characterized the masses through the centuries.

In a time of social unrest it is easy to exaggerate the tendency of workmen to be dissatisfied and troublesome. Workmen are naturally docile;⁴ they shrink from making enemies of their managers; they accept discipline as necessary to the successful conduct of business. They fear to express sympathy with an aggrieved workman. They realize the disadvantages under which they labour, with "nothing but their two hands," while the employer controls the instruments of production. Resentment is ordinarily subconscious and unexpressed. Resistance usually develops as a result of some definite injury, for instance, the effort of the employer to "get the best of" workmen by unfair means, as cutting the piece rate, or the employer's

³ Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, 77-78.

⁴ Watts, *op. cit.*, 182-183.

refusal to raise wages when the business shows prosperity. The latter, in view of the rising prices, appears like an effort to profit unfairly. Ordinarily, resentment merely smoulders fearfully.

This smouldering resentment has curious and devious ways. To the average workmen the great corporation for which he works seems almighty. He is incredulous toward any movement, industrial or political, for the control of corporations in the interest of the public welfare. Under these conditions his resentment works itself off against agents that are remotely associated with the controlling economic interests, especially against "the politicians" who are felt to be not so sincere in their pose against "the interests" as they would like to appear; and this subconsciously diverted resentment relieves the psychological strain and perpetuates the submission to the interests that really dominate in politics, as well as in industry. The workman realizes, in a way, when it is pointed out, that he is deceiving himself, that he is dodging the real objective because he is afraid; but this realization does not suffice to change his attitude. But, with the rise of a progressive labour leadership that does not dodge the main issue, workmen are encouraged to face the real situation.

This is the only desirable procedure. For, "though in the normal mind we may find that what is repressed apparently disappears, it is still unconsciously alive and alert, ready to burst out into expression when self-control is relaxed through fatigue or overstrain, . . . We cannot get rid of undesirable ideas or feelings by a ruthless attempt to banish them from the conscious mind, because, if we try, what happens is that they are merely thrust down deeper into the mind where they are beyond the healthy surveillance of reason."⁵ Wherefore, the only sane and healthy procedure is for employers to talk over with workmen a resentment, promptly and rationally; then all parties, having understood the situation, can plan relations that will relieve the tension. If employers lack the common sense to take the initiative in this they can rest assured that workmen will eventually find leaders who will teach them the significance not only of their psychological condition but also of the dominating attitude of the employers. When workmen thus come to understand, in its totality, the industrial relation out of which conflict arises, this understanding will arm them for an intelligent resistance. For when the relation is adequately conceived it will be understood that where there is a continued resentment there is a fundamental clash of impulses responsible for it that should be

⁵ Watts, *op. cit.*, 141.

discussed; that till this conflict is resolved there can be no peace.⁶ And this conception will raise the impulsive unrest of labour to the dignity of a struggle on the successful outcome of which social progress depends.

We have seen in industrial and political unrest certain more or less well defined stages. There is a period of subconscious resentment, which becomes more intense as a result of the experience of some definite injury, or as soon as it is voiced by certain leaders. As an impulsive state grows on the individual by his expression of it, so with a group of men. The leaders voice and thereby incite the impulses of their fellows; they organize and direct the impulsive action. Organization in turn stirs a sense of solidarity and power through organization. There is truth in the belief of individualistic employers that labor leaders strengthen resistance among workmen. There is truth in the belief of the reactionary political party leader that a popular resentment might remain smouldering for years and eventually die out if progressive leaders did not rise to voice and organize it. Progressive leaders with difficulty maintain control. In politics intellectual men who stand for efficiency and nothing else as a qualification for office-holding are apt to lose the support of impulsive leaders,⁷ who are in closer touch with the impulsive rank and file and give the movement contact with the voters, and whose support is therefore necessary to give the movement permanent success. Similarly, in the labour movement the more intellectual and conscientious leaders are often side-tracked by the more impulsive type, because of the lack of intelligence of the led. So it is in movements of employers against labour. Employers who are most influential in such a movement, and who determine the policies of employers' associations are apt to be the more impulsive employers; and the result is an uncompromising attitude against organized labour, which stirs such resentment on the part of labour that the natural tendency of labour to accept the control of the more impulsive among their own leadership is still further accentuated.

Extremely impulsive action of labour groups is due either to extremely impulsive action of reactionary employers or to a low level of intelligence of workmen. The reactionary employers endeavour to prevent the organization of their workmen by dismissing, perhaps on other pretexts, workmen who are active on behalf of,

⁶ *Ibid.* 146.

⁷ "Reform in Philadelphia," *New Republic*, Nov. 27, 1915, 92-94.

or even sympathetic with organization, and by maintaining a spy system to detect these workmen.⁸ This extreme of autocratic control causes intense resentment. Or prominent in the impulsive action may be the low level of intelligence of workmen. The psychological studies of the I. W. W. that have been made would seem to indicate that the I. W. W. groups studied are to a considerable extent recruited from workmen of low intelligence, which emboldens employers to be brutal in their treatment of them,⁹ which intensifies resentment. Thus their industrial experience co-operates with a poor heredity to intensify resentment. With the proper treatment, even though of inferior physical and mental endowment, no resentment, need be aroused among them. Aroused by ruthless treatment they lack capacity for organized resistance. "Their numerous strikes in California have been but flashes of resentment."¹⁰ "Much of their so-called syndicalistic philosophy analyses down to a motive of resentment. Investigators report that sabotage and 'putting the machine out of business' are the topics to which the road meetings turn. The group in all its characteristics is the poorest of raw material for labour organization. Shifting, without legal residence, under-nourished as a universal rule, incapable of sustained interest, with no reserve of money or energy to carry out a propaganda, they cannot put forth the very considerable energy which co-operation demands."¹¹

Labour groups differ widely in their degrees of impulsiveness and their programs. At one extreme is the direct action of the I. W. W.,¹² at the other the unionism that aims to formulate a plan of political action which will commend the cause of organized labour to public opinion. While the programs of the different types of labour organizations vary widely, they all employ the strike, and many use violence and sabotage.¹³ The strike, violence and sabotage, are natural expressions of resistance. The strike is an attempt to injure an employer in defiance of his power to injure workmen by depriving them of the opportunity of making a living.¹⁴ Though the American

⁸ Fitch, *The Steel Workers*, Ch. XVI.

⁹ Parker, *The Casual Labourer*, 73.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 88.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 87.

¹² Brissenden, *The I. W. W.*, Chs. IX-XIV.

¹³ The word sabotage "is 'a derivative of sabot' which is French for wooden shoe. It means going slow, with a dragging clumsy movement, such as that manner of foot-gear may be expected to bring on." (Veblen, *On the Nature and Uses of Sabotage*, *The Dial*, April 5, 1919, 341.)

¹⁴ Grant, *National Erectors' Association and International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers*, U. S. Com. on Industr. Rel., 1915, 108-109.

Federation of Labor and other trade union organizations are bitterly opposed to the I. W. W. and the I. W. W. to the trade unions,¹⁵ and though one branch of I. W. W. is opposed to another branch,¹⁶ they all employ the strike. When a strike is unsuccessful and the workmen are forced to return to work, their resentment is apt to continue and may manifest itself in secret efforts to injure the employer. Says Dr. Fitch: "Every strike lost and every union movement sternly repressed is the father of sinister thoughts." "Finally comes the idea, now given definite form for the first time by the industrialists. 'Are you beaten? Is the strike lost? All right, go back and strike while at work. If the boss pays poor wages, give poor work; . . . if he won't adjust your grievances put emery dust in the oil cups, spill acid that will eat the goods into the packing cases, send goods meant for Springfield, Ill., to Springfield, Mass. Let the boss know he's caught a Tartar!' There you have sabotage."¹⁷ The trade union, also, may practice sabotage for "In its mildest form sabotage is simply the time-honored trade-union practice—restriction of output."¹⁸ Violence, also, is not characteristic of any one type of labour organization. It is an incidental and natural result of the excitement of a strike. Labour organizations are to be distinguished, not by any particular type of behaviour, but by different degrees of impulsiveness and diverse associations of ideas that spring from different experiences.¹⁹

The resentment of employers, when their domination is thwarted, shows the same forms of impulsive action as the resentment of workmen. As in the latter case, it is the strike, the boycott, violence and sabotage, so, in the former, it is the lockout, the blacklist, violence and sabotage. As to sabotage, Veblen writes that the word "has quite unavoidably taken on a general meaning in common speech, and has been extended to cover all such peaceable or surreptitious maneuvers of delay, obstruction, friction and defeat whether employed by the workmen to enforce their claims, or by the employers to defeat their employés, or by competitive business concerns to get the better of their business rivals or to secure their own advantage."²⁰

As to the violence practiced by the employing classes, this varies

¹⁵ Brissenden, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, 273.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 237.

¹⁷ Fitch, *The I. W. W., An Outlaw Organization, Survey*, June 7, 1913, 361.

¹⁸ Brissenden, *op. cit.*, 277.

¹⁹ Hoxie, *Trade Unionism in the United States*, 163-171; Brissenden *op. cit.*, 238.

²⁰ Veblen, *On the Nature and Uses of Sabotage, The Dial*, Apr. 5, 1919, 341.

all the way from the petty taking advantage of labour in illegal ways to the gross violence practiced in the illegal suppression of strikes. One kind of petty taking advantage may be seen from the numerous labour complaints and claims, arising from a great variety of injuries,²¹ which are never settled. "The data on labour complaints and claims in the files of the various legal institutions, public and private, constitute only a fraction of the total, because not all labourers make formal complaints. They generally have no money with which to hire lawyers. . . .

"They feel the injustice done them; they tell their friends; they do what they can by their own personal efforts, which ordinarily consist of 'begging' for or 'demanding' justice, or of some sort of a 'threat' against injustice; and after such fruitless endeavors they stop, helpless and desperate. This desperation grows and grows like a smouldering fire in the heart."²² The number of these claims legally made reaches hundreds of thousands yearly. Most of them are for non-payment of wages, and they aggregate, in a year, millions of dollars. The labour commissioner of the state of Washington states that most of these claims are such as to make an attorney think it unprofitable to handle them, and that it "may be said, from the experience obtained in handling these claims, that the non-payment of wages causes untold distress among the working people of this state. . . . Here to a great extent we find the fountain head of the I. W. W. movement."²³ This denial of justice to the working masses is due not only to illegal exploitation practiced by employers but to the impossibility of getting redress through the courts. On account of the law's delays and the expense of court costs and fees and of services of counsel, a vast part of our population is debarred from legal advice and the services of a lawyer in court.²⁴ While many persons are assisted by lawyers as a matter of kindness or charity, the great bulk of deserving causes of the poor go unplead because they cannot pay the cost of legal services. This denial of justice to the working masses is one of the great causes of resentment and of distrust of government.

Another source of working class resentment has been the ruth-

²¹ Speek, *The Need of a Socialized Jurisprudence*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., Jan., 1917, 504-506.

²² *Ibid.* 503.

²³ Ninth Biennial Report of the labor commissioner of the state of Washington, 1913-1914, 194-195, quoted by Speek, *op. cit.*, 511.

²⁴ Smith, *Justice and the Poor*, 33.

less and illegal repression of strikes,²⁵ and the brutal treatment of prisoners whose essential motive was hostility to capitalism. These incidents provocative of resentment are not mentioned in the newspapers but are heralded in the labour press far and wide. They are most common in mining states, but are by no means confined to that industry. They are encouraged by the presence of foreigners but are by no means confined to industries with a large percentage of foreigners. Gross violence is practiced by employers of the reactionary type and the civil authorities are apt to acquiesce, and, in some cases, actively support them. The state police is notoriously active against strikers.²⁶ Furthermore, capitalistic interests sometimes enlist the toughs and gunmen of the region against striking workmen and protect them against punishment for their crimes.²⁷ As special deputies sworn in time of strike, they provoke strikers to violence in order to arrest them for violence and thus convey, through the press which heralds the violence of strikers far and wide, the impression that they are lawless.²⁸ Much of the ruthlessness of officials is due to the tendency of the police or constabulary, unless properly instructed²⁹ to feel their authority and to aggress strikers on the slightest provocation.³⁰ But they are conscious that by so doing they are not at all antagonizing the capitalistic interests that the strikers are opposing.

Resentment is especially keen when reactionary capitalistic interests use their resources to tamper with the courts; for instance, to

²⁵ U. S. Department of Labor, Report of President Wilson's Mediation Commission on the Bisbee, Arizona, Deportation, Nov. 6, 1917.

²⁶ Foster, *The Great Steel Strike and its Lessons*, Ch. VIII.

²⁷ West, Report on the Colorado Strike, U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, 26-27; "Garyism in West Virginia," *New Republic*, Sept. 21 1921, 86-88; Lane, *West Virginia and its Civil War*, Survey, Oct. 29, 1921, 180.

²⁸ Basil M. Manly, Joint Chairman with W. H. Taft of the War Labour Board, is quoted as having said: "In many cases of alleged disorderly conduct and sabotage reported to the Board, it was found that employers had themselves deliberately hired operatives and detectives and strike-breaking agencies to go among the men and preach sabotage and instigate violence so as to discredit organized labour." (Quoted in "The Social Conflict in the United States," bulletin for June, 1919, of the Methodist Federation for Social Service.) In one case strikers were restrained from committing violence, under brutal provocation by the influence of certain clergymen (Methodist Federation for Social Service, *Two Recent Strikes of Special Significance*, bulletin for May, 1919,) who, for this service to the strikers and to public order, were clubbed on the streets by the police. ("The Social Conflict in the United States.") See also West, *op. cit.*, 60-61.

²⁹ Woods, *The Policeman and the Public*, 74.

³⁰ Final Report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, 1915, 149-151.

make and influence judges,³¹ to fix and hang juries,³² to suborn witnesses,³³ in order to "get" the labour leaders who lead the resistance against them. In some cases the judges openly show their prejudice for capitalistic interests from the bench and thereby prejudice the case and stir resentment throughout a whole national labour organization.³⁴ Sometimes the labour leader who is "gotten" by the capitalists is a high official in a great labour organization;³⁵ and the effect of this on the working masses is the same as would be the effect on capitalists of having a president of a national city bank sentenced to death, by a government controlled by the working masses, for a crime of which he was plainly innocent.

There are two distinct effects of gross violence perpetrated by capitalistic interests. First, because those interests are the conspicuous centres of social suggestion in the community, violence on their part tends to incite workmen to violence, much as the violent talk of parents incites the same in children. Unions sometimes, like employers, employ sluggers to commit violence, particularly against non-union men. Second, workmen resent the illegal methods whereby employers take advantage of their superior influence over the government to

³¹ Lindsey and O'Higgins, *op. cit.*, Ch. XII.

³² *Ibid.* 23.

³³ In the world famous "Mooney Case," Mooney, a labor agitator, had incurred the ire of the capitalistic interests, and was accused of throwing a bomb that resulted in the murder of several persons. He was convicted on the testimony of one Oxman, whose testimony was later shown to have been perjured. Yet Mooney was refused a new trial, and, five years after his arrest, was still serving his sentence of life imprisonment, and this in spite of the fact that a commission appointed by President Wilson to investigate the case had recommended a new trial (President Wilson's Mediation Commission, *Report on the Mooney Dynamite Case in San Francisco*, U. S. Department of Labour, *Official Bulletin*, Jan. 28, 1918, 14).

³⁴ The United Mine Workers of America, in 1916, called the attention of Congress to the conduct of Judge Dayton of West Virginia. The judge was a stock-holder in the mines of his district. During the trial of miners he showed by his passion against them that he was for the corporation and so pre-judged the case. He "enjoins private citizens from furnishing food to strikers; . . . is unwilling to hear 'what the defendants had to say'; and . . . openly declares in his court that proof of membership in a union is sufficient evidence that the defendant is guilty." (*Survey*, March 25, 1916, 763.)

³⁵ See John R. Lawson's Reply to Judge Hilyer, *Survey*, Sept. 4, 1915. This judge who sentenced Lawson, an official of the Western Federation of Miners, to death for a crime of which he was not guilty was a former attorney of a coal company like that against which Lawson had led the strike that resulted in his being sentenced to death. The judge had been prosecuting attorney in similar cases against strike leaders. Another judge from Colorado remarked to the author that in his opinion Lawson "was no more guilty of the crime for which he is suffering life imprisonment than you or I."

use it in their own interest, and this resentment is till another incentive to violence, for respect for law weakens when government is seen to be simply a strong arm used by a hostile class in its own interest.³⁶ Because of the effect of capitalistic violence in provoking labour violence, reactionary capitalistic interests rely on their control of the press to prevent the public learning of their violence or to blunt the impression made by it. When a labour paper becomes a formidable means of publicity, efforts are apt to be made to suppress it.³⁷ Capitalistic interests have assumed that the mass of American workmen are too conventional ever to become extremely "radical," wherefore all that is necessary is to suppress the "radicals," and to suppress attempts to give publicity to this suppression. But the suppression cannot be complete, hence the resentment will spread. As it spreads, it ceases to be radical, in the sense of animating only men of an unusually strong resistful disposition. It comes to animate the more conventional until, to share it, all a man has to do is to follow the crowd, which the most conventional are very apt to do. The radical resentment may cease to be such as it spreads until workmen take violence as a matter of course—something commendable—as they formerly took submissiveness as a matter of course.

The behaviour described in the preceding paragraphs, that obtains under a domination-resistance industrial relation, involves an extreme of suppression and violence; but, even when the industrial relation has not reached this extreme of tension, there is an inevitable suppression in a system based on rivalry. For in rivalry the advantages are never equally distributed. If the material advantages were made equal, still personal inequality would continue and there would again result inequality in material advantages. Those who have the advantages in rivalry aim to maintain them, and, in this effort, employ every means of social control, including domination. In the industrial world this condition of domination submission is the traditional one, but labour organization is disputing the domination of capital. Those who have long submitted now become rivals. In this growing rivalry for the product of industry, the share of each rival is not determined by any scientific standard. Each rival seeks all it can get, or more than it can get and then compromises. Rarely is a compromise mutually satisfactory. One or the other party feels aggrieved. As long as both parties are animated

³⁶ Williams, *The Foundations of Social Science*, 26-28.

³⁷ Strong, *A Newspaper Confiscated—and Returned*, *The Nation*, Dec. 13, 1919, 738.

by rivalry, there will be a sense of bafflement on the part of the weaker. Wherefore, only a change in the psychological basis of industry will reduce suppression to its lowest terms. If the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions are fostered it will be possible for all parties, heretofore rivals, to agree on a rational purpose of industry and on division of income and other vexed questions. This co-operation will require suppression of impulses that are rampant under the existing system. Inasmuch as human nature includes contrary dispositions, no system can be devised which, in providing for the satisfaction of some dispositions, will not require more or less suppression of others. The development of personality requires that we emphasize the satisfaction of dispositions which may develop many satisfying connections,³⁸ and these are precisely those which also are required for co-operation in industry.

³⁸ Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, 306.

CHAPTER XXIX

SUPPRESSED IMPULSES AND THEIR REACTIONS IN POLITICAL RELATIONS

REACTIONARY capitalistic interests inevitably use their economic power for political as well as economic repression; so resisting workmen inevitably seek political power to make good their economic resistance. Political power is sought by public appeal either from the platform or through newspapers and magazines and other centers of the dispersion of ideas. Wherefore classes that are rivals for political control try to possess themselves of the social means of spreading their ideas and to exclude others from those opportunities. Freedom of speech and publication is thus a right that is vital in the struggle for social control.

It is vital also to the development of personality, which it is the function of the state as far as possible to subserve. For freedom of assemblage and of speech is the means whereby men naturally express their grievances. One of the essential causes of working class resentment is the refusal of employers to listen to, or provide for a free expression of, grievances, and the repression of assemblies of workmen in public places or rented halls by civil authorities that are under the influence of capitalistic interests. A refusal to hear grievances, in any social relation, causes resentment. Nothing angers children more than the refusal of parents to hear their grievances. The assistants and instructors in the departments of universities feel deeply the refusal of an administration to learn of conditions except through the heads of departments. Students are angered by the refusal of teachers to listen to their grievances in regard to marks. The citizens of a city or nation are angered by the refusal of officials to permit them to carry their grievances before the voters of the city freely in public addresses. Resentment because of repression usually causes more disturbance than would a free expression of grievances, and, for this reason, wise administrators give the fullest opportunity for such expression.

The dominating attitude that prompts those in authority to repress those who differ with them has been conspicuous throughout history, from the religious persecutions of the Middle Ages¹ to the political persecutions in the United States in 1919-1920.² The increase of freedom has been due to the rise of prosperous economic classes that sought greater freedom primarily for themselves but incidentally secured it for all. The movement for political freedom in England in the eighteenth century originated in the economic conditions that produced a prosperous middle class.³ All branches of the government united in the attempt to repress this movement. The judiciary assumed this attitude in its interpretation of the law of libel. Freedom of assembly, of speech, and of the press, as interpreted, consisted in laying no previous restraints upon meetings, speeches, or publications; not in freedom from civil or criminal prosecution for speeches or publications that were considered to be of evil tendency. Whether or not speeches and publications were of evil tendency lay in the determination of the judges of the King's Bench. The test applied by these judges was whether the tendency of speech or publication was to create among the people an ill opinion of existing public officers, government, or laws; or an ill opinion of the Christian religion, or of existing standards of morality.⁴ That is, if what was said or published had a tendency to stir resentment or "an ill opinion" of the powers in control, or to shake any of the beliefs which supported their control, such expression was libellous.⁵ It made no difference whether what was told or published was true or untrue.⁶ Under this law the judiciary in their decisions supported the autocratic king by an interpretation, favourable to his domination, of the evident tendency of utterances of the opposition. Men were fined and imprisoned because their speech, in the

¹ Lodge, *Pioneers of Science*, 108-133; Draper, *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*, Ch. VI.

² Panunzio, *The Deportation Cases of 1919-1920*, published by Federal Council of the Churches in America, Chs. II-V; Report by the People's Freedom Union entitled, *The Truth about the Lusk Committee*, published by The Nation Press; Hale, *The 'Force and Violence' Joker*, *New Republic*, Jan. 21, 1920, 321-322; Lane, *The Buford Widows*, *The Survey*, Jan. 10, 1920, 392; "A Federal Judge Speaks Up," *New Republic*, March 31, 1920, 135-136; "The Red Hysteria," *New Republic*, Jan. 28, 1920, 250-251; Chafee, *Freedom of Speech*, Chs. II-VII.

³ Jephson, *The Platform*, I: 7-II.

⁴ *Ibid.* I: 135; Schofield, *Freedom of Press in the United States*, Pub. Amer. Sociol. Soc., IX: 71.

⁵ Hart, *Power of Government over Speech and Press*, *Yale Law Journal*, Feb., 1920, 414-417.

⁶ Schofield, *op. cit.*, 72; Jephson, *op. cit.*, I: 139.

opinion of the judges, tended to stir resentment against the dominating powers.⁷ In 1792 the jury instead of the judge was made the body which decided as to the evident tendency of opinions. But the judge might advise and direct the jury.⁸

Where the impulse animating a government is not the domination exercised by an upper class but resistance to such domination by a middle class, all departments of the government tend to be animated by this attitude and to further the extension of freedom of communication. The attitude of resistance was essential in the Declaration of Independence of the United States, and it determined the meaning which was given to freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly in the United States. The state constitutions of the time abounded in praise of freedom of speech.⁹ As regards libel the state constitutions wiped out the English common law test of the evil tendency of opinions and substituted the test of truth. If a statement was truthful as to fact, or if the opinions given were those which a fair-minded man might gather from the facts, the statement was not libellous. Furthermore, unless a falsehood had a tendency to defame personal or professional reputation, to cast suspicion on title or quality of property, to mislead the people on matters of public opinion, or to shock the morals or religious sense of the community, it was not libellous.¹⁰ This was an advance on the English law in that truth was invoked as a criterion. But the criterion of truth was not the opinion of intellectual men, but, ultimately, of those who might happen to have the decision in particular cases.

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provided that Congress shall pass no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." In the interpretation of this amendment the courts have applied the common-law test of incitement to crime.¹¹ "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion. . . ."¹² But

⁷ Schofield, *op. cit.*, 73; Jephson, *op. cit.*, I: 163-178.

⁸ Jephson, *op. cit.*, I: 142.

⁹ Robinson, *The Threatened Eclipse of Free Speech*, *Atlan. Mon.*, Dec., 1917, 812.

¹⁰ Schofield, *op. cit.*, 77-85.

¹¹ K. N. T., *Free Speech in Time of Peace*, *Yale Law Journal*, Jan. 1920, 338; Hart, *Power of Government over Speech and Press*, *Yale Law Journal*, Feb., 1920, 422-428.

¹² Dissenting opinion of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in *Abrams v. United States*, *U. S. Supr. Ct. Reporter*, Vol. 250, p. 22.

here again, the interpretation is not necessarily in the hands of men of intellectual discrimination but of officials who may have no intelligent interest in freedom of speech, and may have a very strong interest in denying it.¹³ The action of officials is, in the last analysis, dependent on public sentiment, but the lack of publicity and general knowledge of repressions makes it possible for officials, in particular instances, to go very far in repression beyond that in which an intelligent public would acquiesce.¹⁴ This makes it possible for a class which controls officials to carry its repression very far, with public acquiescence. The state or local officers who, in most cases, decide these matters are usually divided between the desire to win popular favour and votes for the next campaign, and the desire to please the propertied interests of the community. Aside from the more vividly conscious desires, there is always the subconscious impulse not to displease the influential men of the community. These are the real motives that determine the limitations placed by officials upon freedom of speech and assembly. The legal reasons assigned—whether or not the assembling and speaking will tend to provoke rioting—are conscious excuses for the more essential impulsive action.

This impulsive action may *cause* instead of *preventing* violence and disorder. Professor Robinson puts the case as follows: "Speech is, after all, only one phase of our general behaviour. . . . Human speech is derived directly from the various noises that our humbler kinsmen in the animal world are wont to make. We can growl, snarl, bark, whine, cackle, and purr, articulately as well as inarticulately. Talk enables us to warn, frighten, conciliate, threaten, soothe, and startle our fellow beings. In the beginning language was made up of vocal gestures which gave relief to fundamental emotions. It still serves this purpose and will continue to do so, *in saecula saeculorum*."

"What passes for reasoning on most occasions is a series of vocal sounds which serve—to use a phrase at once popular and scientific—to 'relieve our minds.' Arguments employed in political addresses, sermons, and newspaper editorials are commonly little more than mere ejaculations, called forth by feeling of approval or disapproval, comfort or alarm.

"Language is also an ingenious substitute for other and more laborious forms of action. A purely verbal attack often produces the

¹³ Robinson, *op. cit.*, 812-813. See also Brooks, *Freedom of Assemblage and Public Safety*, *Pub. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, IX: 12-36.

¹⁴ Chafee, *Freedom of Speech*, 333-340.

same effective results that might be looked for from a bodily encounter, and with none of its hazards. It gives the weak and timid a weapon for vanquishing the strong. One can arraign and punish whole nations in this way without shedding a drop of blood. Those who are wont to be frightened by violent talk should realize that the more violent it is the less dangerous. The very utterance of one's feelings produces a sort of Aristotelian catharsis, relieves the tension, and reconciles the speaker to inaction. If we do not approve of the talk, we are tempted to declare that it is a menace to morals and public order; but it is the talk that disconcerts us, rather than any appreciable risk that it will take the form of actual physical violence. Why cannot we learn that most people are continually saying things that they have no intention of doing, and of urging others to do things which they well know will not be done? The very freedom of speech is commonly its own antidote, and so should logically be welcomed by all those who would have the existing order remain undisturbed."¹⁵

Repression of any public indignation tends to increase the resentment. A citizen of San Diego wrote Mr. J. G. Brooks of an I. W. W. agitation there as follows: "We have learned considerable from the affair and I might say that the lesson briefly is this: Street speaking should be allowed as far as possible, where it does not absolutely interfere with traffic, so as to give an agitator the right to give vent to his feelings if he desires. It is safer to let him talk than to shut him up."¹⁶ Former Police Commissioner Woods of New York maintained that, if people are allowed to assemble and listen to speakers they feel amiable toward the authorities,¹⁷ while repression stirs resentment and ill-will.

Autocratic government is domination by one class of other classes that have no voice in the government, wherefore autocratic government involves a denial of freedom of assemblage and speech. Democratic government is a government exercised by the whole body of voters, who are organized in political parties. These parties, in their rivalry for control of the government, appeal to the whole body of voters, wherefore the very nature of democratic government involves the utmost freedom of assemblage and of speech. No class may, through its influence over the government, limit this freedom, even

¹⁵ Robinson, *op. cit.*, 814-815. See also Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation*, 156-157.

¹⁶ Brooks, *op. cit.*, IX: 12.

¹⁷ Woods, *Reasonable Restrictions upon Freedom of Assemblage*, *Pub. Amer. Sociol. Soc.*, IX: 31.

though the measures proposed by a party happen to be contrary to the interests of the class. A constitutional government is a government of law, binding on all, as opposed to autocracy, which is government according to the will of one man or a class. The very idea of a constitutional government assumes law and a law-enforcing power. But it does not assume that the mass of subjects obey because they have to, without any exercise of reason, without meeting for discussion. This is the assumption of an autocracy. On the contrary, a democracy assumes it to be the duty of all citizens to meet and discuss changes in law and government with the utmost freedom.¹⁸ It assumes the right of any body of citizens to organize in a political party in order the more effectively to urge proposed measures before the people. The court of last resort is the people who decide the issues at the polls. But the majority cannot deny the minority their right to appeal to the people for their political support. The majority cannot exercise an uncontrolled power.¹⁹ The very nature of a constitutional state, as well as of political progress, requires perfect freedom for all citizens to meet and freely discuss changes in law and to seek the support of the voters on behalf of changes.

The democratic state must, therefore, provide for that free expression of opinion, and that quick adjustment by governmental action that insures a minimum of unrest due to politically suppressed impulses. To reduce suppression to a minimum and thus facilitate the development of personality is precisely the essential reason for political freedom. Freedom "alone enables the individuality of men to become manifest."²⁰ "The social order of the present time tends more and more to destroy the personal will of each member of the state by asking from him a passive acquiescence in its policy on the ground of generous purpose. . . such uniformity is the negation of freedom."²¹ As employers in recent years have more and more substituted benevolent for harsh domination, so has the theory of political authority changed from that of a harsh to a benevolent, but none the less arbitrary exercise of authority, and limitation of political freedom.

Political repression deprives citizens of the opportunity of discussing their problems and settling them in a practical way. That is, it suppresses practical, sanely progressive political effort. In thus re-

¹⁸ Laski, *Authority in the Modern State*, 56.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 291.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 90.

²¹ *Ibid.* 121.

straining the intellectual disposition it stirs others, and thinking takes the direction of justifying and reinforcing these impulses instead of analytical thought, of rationalizing instead of reasoning. Thus it is that wherever thinking men are forced out of political life and have no opportunity to apply themselves intellectually to political and economic problems, they are apt to take to literature or to philosophizing.²² This tendency to affective, instead of intellective association in thinking is seen in Russian sociology. The Russian sociologists were the thinking men of Russia,—the men who, in a democracy, would have been progressive political leaders and publicists. Deprived by the autocratic rule of the opportunity of applying themselves intellectually to the problems of the empire, their democratic impulses, balked by the restraint on free thinking and action, sought satisfaction in the affective associations of sociological theorizing. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, these theories took the direction of opposition to absolutism, and a philosophy justifying the opposition developed. Much of this was imitated from similar French, English, and German philosophy. These philosophers were crushed by the Russian autocracy and the philosophy of resistance fell into disrepute. Another type of theorizers arose, who adopted the nationalistic philosophy of western Europe, and set forth the superior part Russia would play in subsequent European history. These philosophers, called Slavophils, taught that the Hegelian "Weltgeist" or absolute reason would attain its supreme expression in the Russian nation,²³ not in the German nation as maintained by Hegel. They magnified the Greek church, the autocracy and the land-commune as supreme expressions of the Weltgeist. This philosophized national ambition opened the mind of the thinkers to western civilization, inasmuch as that civilization must be understood in order to be excelled. For this reason, these philosophers were opposed by the autocracy, which wished attention to be paid exclusively to its commands and influence. Hence arose another kind of philosophers, called Russophils, who saw a danger for the autocracy if the popular mind came into contact with the political and economic ideas of other nations. Their leader, Minister of Education in 1830-1849, declared: "'Our general task consists in establishing such an education for the nation as will unify in itself the spirit of Orthodoxy, of Autocracy and of Nationalism.'"²⁴ Against this formulation of the autocratic ideal, various

²² Hecker, *Russian Sociology*, 28-29.

²³ Ibid. 29-32, 46-52.

²⁴ Ibid. 33-34, 53-56.

classes of thinkers developed philosophies of resistance.²⁵ All this philosophizing was opposed by the anarchists²⁶ who stood for relentlessly intellectual analysis. Their ideal was the “‘critically-intellectual individual.’”²⁷ These anarchistic teachers went among the rural population teaching political resistance until they were imprisoned, banished and many executed. Later arose groups of Marxian socialists. “The Marxians held their first national congress secretly at Minsk in 1898, and organized the Social-Democratic Party. Its headquarters were in Switzerland, and, as is usually the case with refugees unable to act upon the life about them, they split on differences of opinion about non-essentials. Their 1903 congress in Switzerland broke into Bolsheviki (majoritaires) and Mensheviki (minoritaires) on questions of tactics to be pursued. Later, ‘Menshevik’ meant one who wants the labouring class to be a powerful element in a bourgeois state, while ‘Bolshevik’ was one who aspired to a state in which the *bourgeoisie* shall have no share.”²⁸ These groups were active in the movements that resulted in the Russian revolution of 1905-06 and in the recent revolution. In the latter the Menshevik leaders first gained control but were succeeded by the Bolshevik leaders.²⁹ Their rule illustrates the effect of the removal of political repression on thinking, for their accession to power, in which they were in a position to put their radical ideas into practice, caused a modification of these ideas in the direction of what was practicable.

The same deflection of thought by political repression from the intellectual to the affective form is seen in the thought of modern Turkey. There the thinkers, denied the opportunity to apply themselves intellectually to political and economic problems, and to discuss these problems freely in the press, established a literary organ through which they aimed indirectly to shake the conformity of the people to the political and ecclesiastical autocracy. “In spite of the imposed restrictions, this weekly created an intellectual revolution among the thinking classes, and influenced the present generation of Turkey more than any other single factor. Its poems, and short stories, and novels, . . . were published in book form.

“This movement was called a ‘decadence in literature and in social ideals,’ by the writers of the old school. The animosity between the

²⁵ Ibid. 34-36, 65-67.

²⁶ Ibid. 37-40, 73-77.

²⁷ Ibid. 39-43, 88-118, 120-153, 236-256.

²⁸ Ross, *The Upheaval in Russia*, 199-200.

²⁹ Ibid. 200-213.

old and the new was very bitter."³⁰ "Later, every novel and story was prohibited which might cause a strong sensation."³¹ As in Russia, so here, national disaster strengthened the hands of the progressives and made possible more practical thinking and plainer speaking. Defeat of Turkey in the Balkan war caused a burst of fearless and direct criticism of her backward institutions, and an assertion that "our defeat means the final victory of modernism in Turkey."³²

Another effect of political repression on the people is that, in those of an unusually strong resistful disposition, character is organized around that disposition. The one supreme end of life becomes the satisfaction of the impulse to do away with political oppression. Thus gradually develops a formidable resisting power in the nation. This occurred in the revolutionary epochs of English, French and United States history and recently in Russia. In the latter country oppression reached a misery-producing climax during the World War, when it was perpetrated with a cruelty and insolence that cannot be exaggerated, by an utterly corrupt and inefficient aristocracy and bureaucracy. This was the climax of a long exploitation and persecution of the Jews in Russia by an insolent agrarian class and a vulgar priesthood,³³ of the exploitation of the peasantry by the same agents,³⁴ and of factory labour by a reactionary capitalism.³⁵ This surviving reactionary attitude of mediaeval landlordism³⁶ produced, among other groups of resisters, the Bolshevik group, which "surpass their rivals in two respects, firstly in discipline and secondly in their miraculous courage, their heroic rashness, their fanatical unwavering faith, which seems alternately stupid and sublime."³⁷ This courage and self-discipline was the effect of the long resistance of the Russian despotism on the part of an organization of picked resisters. This "severe training . . . taught them to despise pleasure, to dread drink, to keep a secret, to obey orders, and to live with every sense and thought alert, which gives them their incontestable superiority over the idle,

³⁰ Emin, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*, 76.

³¹ *Ibid.* 80-81.

³² *Ibid.* 109.

³³ Commons, *Races and Immigrants In America*, 91-93; Bryant, *Six Red Months in Russia*, Ch. XXVII; Mavor, *Economic History of Russia*, II: Bk. IV: Ch. XII.

³⁴ Mavor, *op. cit.*, II: Bk. IV: Chs. IV-VI; Bk. V.

³⁵ *Ibid.* II: Bk. VI: Chs. IV-VI.

³⁶ Davenport, *Peace in Its Economic Aspects*, *The Dial*, Apr. 19, 1919, 388-390.

³⁷ Brailsford, *Russian Impressions*, *New Republic*, Dec. 22, 1920, 104.

pleasure-loving, undisciplined upper class, which forms the White armies.”³⁸

Another result of political repression is its effect on the government itself. When an heretofore free government becomes repressive, the otherwise sane officials become apprehensive and emotional and radical in their repression.³⁹ This, in turn, suggests emotional and radical resistance to the people. The radical groups, in turn, incite the government to be still more repressive, for officials are, like other men, subject to social suggestion, and thus the vicious circle continues. Officials and the press, though equally violent or countenancing violence, easily attach the odium for the illegal action to the radical labour groups against whom the action is taken.⁴⁰

Once an odium has been worked up against a particular labour movement, the aim of reactionary officials and employers is to associate therewith all other labour groups against which it is sought to direct odium. In many instances strikes that had no connection with the I. W. W. have been said to be due to the influence of that organization. If, on the other hand, owing to a labour group's pronounced and publicly expressed antipathy to the odious labour group, the former cannot be associated with the latter, then the latter, as compared with the odious group, may appear harmless and even commendable. For instance, the press made the Bolshevik party of Russia appear extremely odious to the American people; but it was unable effectively to call the American Federation of Labour Bolshevik because of the latter's repeated public condemnation of Bolshevism. The American Federation of Labour now appeared conservative and commendable as compared with the terrifying Bolshevism; whereupon employers' associations which had long fought the Federation became alarmed and began to warn the people that some movements not Bolshevik were nevertheless dangerous and were to be as much condemned as formerly.⁴¹

³⁸ *Ibid.* 104.

³⁹ Hale, *op. cit.*, 392; Chafee, *op. cit.*, 83, 147-148, 332-339.

⁴⁰ Brissenden, The I. W. W., *Preface*, 8-11; see also McMahon, *Centralia and the I. W. W.*, *Survey*, Nov. 29, 1919, 173-174; E. M., *Centralia before the Court*, *Survey*, Apr. 3, 1920, 13-15.

⁴¹ For instance, the Open Shop Review warned that “there is danger in confusing the work of trade unionist propagandists and that of bolshevists. It is a common practice to refer to all labour agitators as bolshevists. As a consequence the public has received the impression that only bolshevists are to blame for acts of injustice and violence, while the Federation of Labour and its allied branches are something wholly apart, holy and righteous.” (*Union Leaders, not Bolsheviks, at the root of Labour Unrest in Gary*, Open Shop Review, Aug., 1919, 324.)

The political and social power of propertied classes, increasing as it does with the power of the modern state and of the press, tends to strengthen the determination of reactionary propertied interests to practice whatever suppression is necessary in order to maintain control of the situation. Political repression in a popular form of government is particularly fatal to progress because the citizens assume that, because they have popular government, they have political freedom. It is very difficult to convince people in one section of a great commonwealth of suppression in another section. The result is that suppression in various parts may go on unnoticed by the whole people for a long time. Furthermore, a democratic people that is suffering suppression is apt to assume that it is due to an emergency and can be only temporary because it is contrary to their democratic and free traditions. But these traditions are merely habits of political action which may change imperceptibly with the practice of the opposite behaviour. Repression of free speech in certain parts of a nation causes the people everywhere to become fearfully discreet and thus to lose the habit of free speech.

Not only the dispositions that are active in the impulse for free speech but any disposition will weaken in an environment where its satisfaction is impossible. Take the acquisitive disposition. This is strong in a new country where men have easy access to the essential instrument of production—land; it weakens as the instruments of production pass into the possession of a comparatively small property-owning class on whom the non-propertied workmen are dependent for an opportunity to work. In a man's own shop or on his farm the work "piles up around him," and every bit of work to be done means an additional opportunity to "make something." In the factory or on the farm of an employer who is seeking primarily his own profit mere abundance of work exerts no such stimulus. Low wages and long hours of work weaken the acquisitive disposition. Unemployment and living on charity pauperizes until men are willing to be fed by others. This process of degeneration may be traced in the ancient,⁴² and in the modern world, in Europe and in the United States. It is found wherever a peasantry is oppressed by landlords. In Poland the peasants were exploited by landlords and reduced to a state of apathy⁴³ which was reflected in the apathetic resignation of their religion.⁴⁴ The result was an inefficiency of labour which diminished the

⁴² Breasted, *Ancient Times, A History of the Early World*, 569.

⁴³ Hupka, *Über Entwicklung der westgalizischen Dorfzustände*, 56-60.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 375-379.

productivity of the land and the income of the landlords; whereupon, to increase the efficiency of labour, the landlords set about improving the condition of the peasants. The same apathetic attitude in work and fatalism in religion was wrought in the Negro by slavery; and is wrought among large sections of the immigrant population of the United States, which live in poverty and in fear of employers. Though dispositions weaken with disuse, their persistence is remarkable.⁴⁵ The weakened impulses continue as subconscious disturbing factors and assert themselves with every satisfying change in condition. When immigrants find opportunities which were denied them in their native land, their habitual resignation changes to ambition. It is a function of the state as far as possible to alleviate the repression of personality and encourage socially desirable action of the dispositions.

⁴⁵ Tead, *Instincts in Industry*, 88-90.

CHAPTER XXX

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

OUR problem, as stated in the preface, was to analyse economic conflict and the conflict of dispositions throughout social organization. We have seen that economic conflict runs throughout social organization. The egoistic dispositions, particularly rivalry, impel men to struggle for more wealth than they need. The strong and lucky get more than they need, the weak and unlucky, less. Superior wealth gives not only control in industry but also a predominant influence in the community, the state, the church, and education. Professional men are influenced by the attitudes of the wealthy classes, and artists by the attitudes of a leisure class. This ramifying social control gives a greater assurance than would mere economic control, and this assurance fosters reactionary control. This reactionary social control is contested by the liberals in the wealthy classes as well as elsewhere. The liberals are moved by an impulse for the development of personality both for themselves and on behalf of others.

From the point of view of the development of personality no disposition can be called bad in itself, but only as it interferes with that development. The egoistic dispositions have predominantly determined the development of the social attitudes and institutions under which the development of personality takes place. Institutional changes have taken place with little or no reflection as to their effect on personality and with no idea, except in the mind of the solitary philosopher, that social movements should be guided with a view to its development. The liberals are divided by their differing reform ideas, while the egoistic forces represent traditions under which men have long been united without knowing why. Consequently a liberal movement never accomplishes as much as its leaders expect.

Liberal movements lack a clear and effective purpose because so little is known about personality. The little we do know cannot be given in a few paragraphs but certain points may be mentioned. A

development of personality takes place whenever the individual successfully controls impulses that have become annoying in the social conditions in which he must live. It is always a question as to whether one should try to alter conditions, or to adjust oneself to them. Whenever it seems that conditions have been made as favourable as possible then development involves making the most of life under conditions as they are. Often this results in a further improvement of conditions. The two lines of adjustment act and react on each other. The entire process involves primarily the use of common sense. Let us disabuse our minds of the notion that conscious development of personality is possible only for the "high falutin' philosopher," as Huxley called him. It is possible for the common man. Subconsciously and more or less blindly he adjusts conditions to himself and himself to conditions throughout his life, but conscious adjustment is more effective. It alone brings out the latent possibilities of personal development. This is the truth involved in the growing popular idea of "the power of mind over body."

Conscious control involves the deliberate control of stimuli on dispositions that are over-taxed, in order to enhance the readiness of each disposition. As we saw in the first chapter, on readiness for satisfaction depends satisfaction and that normal functioning of which satisfaction is the indication. The normal is the ideal. The training of a zest for strong readiness is, therefore, fundamental in the organization of the dispositions.

When a zest for the largest total readiness becomes a conscious end, the intelligence is enlisted to direct such adjustments of impulses as shall promote this largest total readiness. The elementary processes involved consist of the reaction upon behaviour of definite sense experiences, of the general depression or elation which follows behaviour, and of mental after-images. Of the latter Professor Hocking says: "Distinct from all peripheral consequences of a sequence is a central comment which may be subconscious or distinct, but is probably always present in the human being. It is most noticeable, naturally enough, when it is contrary in quality to either the sensible result or the general bodily condition; as when one succeeds in a competition and finds himself somehow dissatisfied with his success, or as when one fails, and finds himself at peace in his failure."¹ The rivalrous disposition of the boy who won the prize was satisfied, but his sympathetic disposition was annoyed when he later thought of the girl he had beaten, and

¹ Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 160.

he resolved never again to work for a prize. That is, the mental after-image determines whether the disposition shall be strengthened, or weakened that another may be strengthened.² This after-image is a result of the reaction of "the *whole will* upon the partial impulse, when the full meaning of that impulse is perceived in the light of its results. . . . In the unfinished condition of our instincts (and the slightness of our experience) every course of action is launched more or less hypothetically. It is my theory, as I make my decision, that this is what I want to do; yet I am aware that there is some doubt about it, and that I shall not be sure until the returns are all in. The mental after-image is the answer to the question involved in this tentative state of mind.

"If the after-image is negative, the natural result will be a *new hypothesis* for dealing with a similar situation. And the *transformation of instinct, under experience, consists essentially in the series of hypotheses* which a given mind adopts,—hypotheses about the ways in which impulses are to be followed in order to satisfy the complete will."³

While the problem of the individual life is that of so adjusting the different dispositions as to attain and maintain maximum readiness, this adjustment always is relative to social conditions. It takes place in the course of man's life as a worker, as a citizen, and as a member of cultural groups. That is the significance of our analysis, in the preceding chapters, of the conflict of interests in social relations. Whatever development the individual experiences is achieved in his social relations. These limit the possibilities of development. Furthermore, self-development is limited by the material means at the disposal of the individual. There is an economic scarcity which all alike must suffer, for the sake of the relative development of each; and the range of social contacts, which are important for self-development, is a good deal dependent on the material means at the disposal of the individual. Even if there were an equitable distribution of wealth, this would not insure for all an unlimited supply of the material means of satisfaction. There would still be an economic scarcity. This limitation cannot be entirely overcome by culture. In the ideal world—in religion and art—one may create the mental means of self-development; but the opportunities of so doing are limited for most people by reason of the

² *Ibid.* 162.

³ *Ibid.* 162-163.

drudgery of life. Furthermore, even for those who have abundant means, cultural development has its limits. Development through religion is limited because impulses to objectify the ideal are so often thwarted. The religious man is never satisfied with mere contemplation of the Kingdom of God but aims to bring it to pass and complete satisfaction can come only with that. The idealist in his thirst for exclusive contact with the Immortals as a means of uninterrupted self-development finds indispensable some social contact with other idealists. And he finds his self-development limited by cramped material circumstances and the drudgery of time-consuming work.

Social conditions, therefore, set an upper limit to the development of personality. The conception of personal development is always relative to the period in which we live. In periods of oppression in the world's history it has been difficult or impossible for the masses to conceive of self-development at all. And great sections of them to-day have no such conception.

Not only is self-development always relative to the period of time, but also the individual measures his satisfactions, his denials, his inner attainments comparatively as between himself and others. This is true of the egoistic dispositions, for their satisfaction is never absolute; the individual considers whether he has attained the social standard of satisfaction. A family in a lower class is satisfied with what would seem to a family in an upper class an unbearable existence. When an upper class family, owing to financial reverses, has to "come down a peg" in its scale of living, it suffers annoyances—unless it finds relief in religion—which a family that has always had the lower scale never feels. The standard of living of each class is a relative one. As soon as a considerable number pass beyond the standard then a new standard is thereby created for that class.

The satisfaction of the sympathetic disposition, also, is relative. Members of a family who are accustomed to an extreme solicitude for each other's material comfort and enjoyment often are repelled by the apparent lack of consideration of members of another family for each other. In each community there is a rough approximation to a vague standard of sympathetic behaviour. The standard depends not only on the kind of families that make up the community but also on prevailing conditions. In a war period people are less considerate of one another and expect of one another greater sacrifices than in time of peace. The satisfaction of the intellectual disposition, also, is

relative. What was conspicuous intellectual effort and attainment in the high school is no longer such in college, where leaders from many high schools congregate.

One great function of association is to bring people together in order to correct their relatively determined views of their spiritual condition by furnishing opportunities for a broader comparison. By membership in a church that has been built up or transformed by a genuine minister the individual finds, through contacts there enjoyed, that there is a sympathy beyond what he ever experienced. If he goes into a group of missionaries, or into a radical political group of a certain type, he finds a still greater sympathy. By membership in a college the youth finds an intellectual earnestness and integrity beyond what he ever before realized. But if he goes to an institute devoted exclusively to research he finds still greater earnestness. The development of personality requires this great range of associations, this constant correction of comparisons previously made.

To furnish opportunities for these larger comparisons in space and time should be the great purpose of education. One reason for the shortcomings of educational institutions is that they let their purpose be defined for them by their patrons, in their rivalry for students and funds. And patrons generally have no clear and adequate conception of the meaning of the development of personality. They are so obsessed by particular impulses and controlled by local attitudes as not to be conscious of the possibilities of their own personal development. Only through coming to understand his own personality will the individual come to respect that of others, and to wish for them adequate opportunities. This understanding can come only through the proper education. The pupil must be brought into vital contact with the conditions and personalities of the past and with conditions and peoples everywhere in the present, if, in his comparisons, he is to transcend as far as possible the limits on his development that are imposed by the relativity of his judgements.

Education in this sense is impossible, however, while people live in conditions that suppress impulses for self-development. Repressive political and industrial conditions must be improved. The repressive influence of reactionary political and economic interests over education must be challenged. This is difficult because of the control exercised by those interests over public opinion through the press. Those interests for the most part control the press so that a literate but credulous and untrained population may be more easily con-

trolled than an illiterate. This reactionary influence is seriously contested by only one force, that is, the men and women, who, because of unusual strength of the sympathetic and intellectual dispositions, have ideals that call for reforms in the existing order, and whose rivalrous and associated dispositions are satisfied by contesting with the leaders of reaction for social control as a means to the realization of a rational social order.

Two distinct tendencies may be observed in the reforms urged. One tendency is for thought to take a direction in which the sympathetic disposition will satisfy itself. It creates utopias, pacifist theories for the settlement of political conflicts, a "harmony of interests" for the settlement of industrial conflicts, that is, a system of ideas which satisfies sympathetic and esthetic impulses. Then it turns to the world with a mild insistence that the world acknowledge the truth of these ideas. Undoubtedly if all the world did so men would find in them a new life. Unfortunately, however, the masses are so fearful and submissive and the interests that control so rivalrous and dominating and all of them are so habitual in their acceptance of the conventional and institutional expressions of these dispositions that the ideas of those who live a protected life, in which they can indulge their unusual dispositional impulses, make little impression.

The second tendency of idealism is that in which the imagination, under the impulsion of the sympathetic disposition, creates a progressive social order—discerns the tendency in all men to realize a freer development of personality, to exercise the creative impulse in work, and to enjoy a wider range of social contacts and other satisfactions in recreation,—but in which this idealistic order is subjected to criticism as to its practicability. The idealism is not, therefore, merely a system of ideas which function primarily for the satisfaction of the idealist, but involves a critical analysis of the motives of others and of the economic and other conditions of social self-realization. The idealist is not satisfied by his idealism but seeks its social realization.⁴ And in the effort for this realization all the other dispositions are enlisted. Instead of opposing the use of force, therefore, use force when necessary.⁵ Social progress has been slow because those who have the sympathy and intelligence for this very reason usually lack power of action. Because the sympathetic is so opposed to the aggressive

⁴ Adams, *Idealism and the Modern Age*, 20-22.

⁵ Dewey, *The Discrediting of Idealism*, *New Republic*, Oct. 8, 1919, 287.

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dispositions, those who are especially gifted in sympathy and its intellectual manifestations shrink from action. They retreat within themselves and seek satisfaction through their own affective associations of ideas. Sharply distinguished from this contemplative idealist is the critical and fighting idealist. He does not shrink from the unpleasant revelations made by scientific investigation of social conditions. He does not lay down the book and seek to escape the unpleasantness of plain facts by not believing them. Mere intellect is weak unless supported by a vigorous resistful disposition. The intellect of the idealist is one capable of forming convictions. He is not afraid to face the facts, but he demands facts as the basis of his convictions. He would create a new social order not out of his head but out of the old. And in this use of the old in the creation of the new, he finds that his own personality experiences an all-round development that neither worldliness on the one hand, nor contemplative idealism on the other makes possible. Whatever the social influence and effect of his ideas and efforts, his own personal development shows the possibilities of human progress.

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